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káRoly Fazekas anD ágota sCHaRle
FoReWoRD
the aim of this volume is to offer an overview of the practices and achievements 
of employment policy over the past 20 years, with particular attention paid to 
the interactions of individual policy tools. by comparing these with international 
experience and theory, the volume also attempts to point out opportunities for 
policy making to contribute more successfully and effectively to an increase in 
employment, taking account of the specific features of the Hungarian labour 
market and economy.
the volume comprises six parts. the first part describes the changes in employ-
ment, briefly outlines the underlying economic and structural processes and makes 
recommendations for decision makers responsible for employment policy. the 
second and third parts explore the mission and functions of the major institu-
tions that influence employment policy. slightly unusually, the remaining parts 
are structured according to the main functions of employment policy rather than 
focusing on the institutions or the tools of employment policy. the fourth part 
deals with wage costs, the fifth with matching labour market demand and supply, 
and the sixth with reducing the transaction costs of hiring and employment. after 
the core parts comes a statistical annex with time series for the most relevant 
data, and an appendix, which summarizes the methods of a small-scale research 
project that supported the writing of some of the chapters.
employment policy is related to several other policy fields, some of which (e.g. 
public education or vocational education and training) may even have a stronger 
impact on labour market developments than employment policy tools themselves. 
it was impossible within the scope of this study to examine these policy fields, 
but, whenever necessary, we referred to studies that provide more detail on 
the relevant issues of education, social policy, housing and tax policy.
the publication of the volume was supported by the national employment Foun-
dation. the editors and authors are grateful to the Foundation, and especially 
to the staff in charge of the project and the members of the anonymous expert 
committee, whose comments on the first draft were of immense help. most 
chapters of the volume are based on existing research findings, mainly on earlier 
works of the authors, and primarily reflect on the period between 1990 and 
2010. in some cases, we had an opportunity to supplement this work with the 
collection of new data, generally through interviews: we contacted 31 experts 
and politicians who have played an active role in the development of employment 
policy over the past two decades. they have been very generous with their time 
in answering our questions; many thanks to them, too. 
21.1. Structural problemS of the hungarian labour market 
káRoly Fazekas anD ágota sCHaRle
1. Diagnosis anD lessons
as a result of the economic downturn that accompanied the political regime 
change, dramatic changes occurred on the labour market in the first half of the 
1990s: at the lowest point (in 1996), slightly more than half of the working-age 
population were in employment, 42 per cent were inactive, and the propor-
tion of the long-term unemployed exceeded 3 per cent of the working-age 
population, i.e. more than half of the unemployed had not had a job in over 
a year. Following that, there was a slow increase until 2003, after which 
employment stagnated at about 57 per cent up until the global financial crisis 
of 2008, which brought another decline. similarly, the proportion of the long-
term unemployed never dropped below 1.5 per cent, and has been increasing 
continuously since 2003.
the recession following the political changeover was accompanied by plum-
meting employment in nearly all post-communist countries. at the lowest point 
in the transitional recession, the employment level dropped to 70 per cent of 
its 1989 level in those countries that opted for a fast privatization strategy 
(e.g. estonia, latvia and Hungary), to 80–84 per cent in other countries, and, 
as the most cautious, to 87 per cent in the Czech Republic. after bottoming 
out, employment in Hungary started to rise again quite soon, but then became 
stagnant after a few years, while all the other post-communist countries that 
had joined the european union managed to improve their employment indica-
tors rapidly until the crisis of 2008 (Figure 1).
the external economic downturn hardly provides a full explanation for the 
recent decline in Hungarian employment indicators; a more probable reason 
is internal structural distortions. as will be shown in the next chapter, the 
explanation lies partly in the loosening of fiscal policy and a business environ-
ment that had become increasingly unstable due to the need for continuous 
correction, and partly (probably more significantly) in the earlier changes to 
the welfare system.
it is a conspicuous symptom of labour market distortions that during the 
economic recovery between the two recessions of 1997 and 2007, in spite of 
the continuous (although weakening) growth in output, the employment rate 
within the population aged 15–64 only increased by less than 5 percentage 
points,1 largely between 1997 and 2000. according to scharle (2008: 257), 
more than 70 per cent of the total increase reported in the ten inter-recession 
years was due to changes in the composition of the workforce, while there 
was hardly any change in employment within individual age groups or levels 
1 From 52.4 per cent in 1997 to 57.3 
per cent (Source: Labour Force Sur-
vey of the Central Statistical Office, 
annual data).
1. D iagnosis anD lessons 1.1. stRuCtuRal pRoblems oF tHe HungaRian labouR maRket
3
of education. that indicates that even this modest increase was mainly due 
to the rise in the level of educational attainment.
the large variation in employment opportunities also reveals structural prob-
lems: the employment rate is well above average among university graduates 
and people living in the western part of the country, and considerably below 
average among the oldest and the youngest age groups, women of childbearing 
age, the low-skilled and people in the northern regions.2 thus the employment 
rate of the unqualified, of young people aged 15–24, of the age group 55–64 
and of women aged 25–44 is especially low. according to the estimation of 
kertesi (2005), the employment prospects of the Roma population and of 
people living in small settlements in remote areas are even worse, irrespec-
tive of their age or level of education.
the majority of the long-term unemployed are unqualified or middle-aged/
elderly people, or live in settlements with poor access due to reduced public 
transport. between 1992 and 1996, the chances of an unemployed person 
of pre-retirement age finding another job were (controlling for educational 
attainment) less than 10 per cent of the chances of a jobseeker aged 21–25 
(galasi and nagy, 1999), and the gap in the employment rate of men with 
lower-secondary education (compared to those with higher education in the 
same age group) shot up from 1–2 per cent before the political changes to 20 
per cent in 1992 (köllő, 2009). variation in the employment chances across 
regions and levels of education have scarcely changed since the political 
transformation.
2 Controlling for composition effects 
does not modify the findings, i.e. the 
characteristics mentioned have their 
own impact on employment (Scharle, 
2008).
Figure 1: Changes in employment from 1989 to 2010 (1989 = 100)
Source: 1989–95: ILO (2011); 
1996–2010: Eurostat online database (LFS employment, population aged 15+).
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according to popular opinion, the situation is not as bad as the figures suggest, 
because the high level of black labour is not included in the statistics. unfortu-
nately, this explanation is not supported by research on the informal economy. 
according to calculations based on comparing the size of the workforce regis-
tered at the pension authority and the size of the workforce revealed by the 
labour Force survey (lFs) conducted by the Central statistical office, in 2005 
black labour amounted to 17 per cent of the employment level measured in the 
lFs (elek et al., 2009). the results do not differ significantly if we use other 
data from the Central statistical office (census, time-use survey, Household 
budget survey) or data collected by private organizations (táRki monitor) to 
measure the size of the total (formal and informal) labour force. this indicates 
that the majority of illegal workers are included in the labour force measured 
in the lFs, i.e. they are included in the above figures and are not additional 
to them. this is also supported by research based on the Household budget 
survey of the Central statistical office: according to responses given to the 
interviewers, unemployed working-age people (probably including some ille-
gally employed) are significantly less content with their lives than are their 
peers in employment, controlling for their (declared) income (molnár and 
kapitány, 2008). 
A generAl explAnAtion for the low employment level
there are several reasons for the permanently low employment level: the 
inherited economic structure, the political changeover, the external economic 
downturn, demographic trends – and perhaps also government policy. the 
global crisis that started in 2008 further exacerbated the situation tempo-
rarily; however, low employment is mainly due to internal (and much earlier) 
processes.
the political transformation necessarily resulted in a temporary increase in 
unemployment. prices and technology changed, as did international trade 
relations and their requirements, and this necessitated an improvement in 
productivity, which led to a dramatic fall in demand for labour. after 2000, 
unstable regulation and the volatile business environment may have contrib-
uted to the slowdown in growth, as well as to a decrease in investment, and 
therefore demand for labour. nevertheless, permanently low employment 
cannot be attributed to capitalism: it did not result from the slowdown in 
growth (and not even from the financial crisis of 2008), but rather from the 
unfavourable combination of policy responses to unemployment.
to put it simply, the main objective of employment policy was to reduce the 
number of jobseekers; to that end, older, low-skilled or low-productivity 
workers were enabled, through various welfare provisions, to leave the labour 
market for long spells or even permanently. this alleviated the political and 
social tensions temporarily, but at the same time it was the first step in the 
development of the current imbalances. a vicious circle emerged: the exten-
sive welfare provisions entailed high government expenditure, which required 
higher government revenue, which necessitated higher taxes and contribu-
tions. When high contributions are payable on the minimum wage, it is not 
worth employing low-skilled workers legally, and this keeps labour demand 
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and employment at a low level. in turn, long-term unemployment and inactivity 
leads to poverty, which generates a need for further social expenditure, and 
so the vicious circle is complete.
as a result of the generous welfare policy that was adopted at the beginning 
of the political transformation with the aim of easing tensions, nearly a third of 
the working-age population is still dependent on some type of welfare provi-
sion (unemployment, maternity or disability provisions, or early-retirement 
schemes). this proportion built up in the first years of the transformation and 
has only started to decrease in the past few years. the majority of beneficiaries 
are inactive, and most of them have left the labour market for a long period 
or permanently (see Chapter 4.2).
at the same time, regulations and services promoting re-entry to employment 
have remained weak. market economies, too, can enjoy almost full employ-
ment – if their labour market is flexible and there are market mechanisms in 
place to ensure the balance of demand and supply. one of the most important 
mechanisms is the response of wages to unemployment: when unemployment 
grows, average wages should fall in real terms so that employment levels can 
rise. this has two preconditions: wages are allowed to fall and unemployment 
is visible on the labour market (i.e. the unemployed actively look for jobs).
as will be seen, neither of the above conditions has been met in the past two 
decades. the minimum wage (which was raised at the start of the 2000s and 
has remained relatively high ever since) restrains adjustment to real wages. 
since it is not differentiated according to local wage levels, it has an espe-
cially strong impact on disadvantaged regions: in the majority of the 33 most 
disadvantaged micro-regions, the minimum wage was 55–70 per cent of the 
local average wage in 2008, while the national figure stood at 41 per cent 
(scharle and váradi, 2009). according to ex-post impact assessment, raising 
the minimum wage in 2001–02 did not significantly increase the supply of 
labour, while it substantially reduced employment in labour-intensive sectors 
(see Chapter 4.3).
until recently, the willingness of the non-employed population to take up 
employment (i.e. the visibility of the unemployed) remained low. the replace-
ment rate of the unemployment benefit gradually decreased, but early pensions, 
insured maternity leave and disability pensions remained relatively generous, 
even in the 2000s. this raises expected wages and reduces motivation to 
actively look for work, which is not counterbalanced by strict job search condi-
tions imposed on benefit recipients. as will be seen in Chapter 4.1, the reach of 
job centres is extremely small: they have regular contact with less than a fifth 
of the non-employed, because not all welfare services require the beneficiary 
to cooperate with a job centre, even if they are of working age. Due to lack of 
capacity and adequate regulation, job centres do not even work intensively 
with those claimants who are obliged to cooperate with them: they only meet 
jobseekers every 1–3 months, which (according to international experience) 
does not provide sufficient motivation for intensive job search.
nor is labour market adjustment very intensive in other respects. the mobility 
of the labour force across sectors and occupations is low (balogh and Róbert, 
2008; berde and scharle, 2004) and geographical mobility is also restricted by 
the structure of home ownership, by failing public transport and by the sparse 
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network of roads (see Chapter 5.1 and Chapter 6.4). in other areas it is the 
lack of state intervention that adds to the problems of employment, such as 
indecisive action against gender-based and ethnic discrimination (Chapter 4.4) 
or the postponement of public health measures to prevent ill health.
reAsons for the low employment level  
of unquAlified workers 
the above problems need not necessarily lead to the permanently low employ-
ment level of the unqualified workforce; there are other specific causes. it 
is hardly surprising that the rapidly transforming economy at the beginning 
of the political changeover did not offer employment for the unqualified 
masses. However, chronic unemployment is not a general characteristic of 
market economies; rather, it is a consequence of the specific features of 
eastern european economies. one of the reasons is the lack of small and 
family enterprises, as well as the bureaucracy that acts to inhibit their expan-
sion. in Western europe, the employment level of the unskilled workforce 
is nearly the same as for graduates, but employment for unskilled workers 
is typically provided by small enterprises. this sector could not be rebuilt 
overnight in the post-communist economies. not even the fast-growing 
polish sme sector, supported by investment from returning emigrants, can 
be compared in size to in south american countries that have a similar level 
of development (maloney, 2004). Rapidly changing regulations, markets that 
are strongly influenced by lobbies, and heavy administrative burdens after 
the change of regime have all discouraged the growth of the small and family 
enterprise sector (see next chapter).
another reason is weak public education, which restricts the productivity 
and flexibility of the workforce. the general competence (writing, reading 
comprehension, problem solving) of the unqualified workforce is rather poor, 
and thus they have difficulty in navigating the labour market, while their 
retraining is also expensive. the rapid technological change that occurred 
during the economic transition increased the disadvantage faced by unquali-
fied workers, since most new jobs were created in occupations requiring 
literacy (köllő, 2009).
the low employment level of the unqualified population is far from being just 
a marginal problem, and it cannot be expected to simply disappear in the 
near future. it accounts for more than half of the gap in the employment rate 
(compared to the eu average). a third of the non-employed population aged 
20–59 (nearly 2 million people) has only eight years of primary education, 
and more than half have not completed upper secondary education. Current 
statistics on school leavers show that, among 20-year-olds, the proportion of 
those with only primary education is still 15 per cent (ibid.).3
public education, vocational education and training, adult education and training 
– none of these have kept up with the requirements of the changing labour 
market: many school leavers lack the basic competencies and learning skills 
needed to fill technology-intensive jobs and to retrain several times over. the 
lack of early intervention and the uneven quality of basic education produce an 
unqualified workforce with low chances on the labour market, and these are 
3 This is not simply a Roma or a ‘dead-
end village’ issue: at most a fifth of the 
1 million unqualified non-employed 
(20–59 age group) are Roma, and 
only 200,000 unqualif ied unem-
ployed people live in the villages of 
disadvantaged micro-regions, while 
another 60,000 live in larger settle-
ments of the same micro-regions.
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also the main causes of the reproduction of poverty. not only does the average 
Hungarian school not reduce the disadvantages that children face as a result of 
their family background, but it even increases them, since most teachers lack 
the methodology required to develop disadvantaged children (Havas, 2009). 
the methodological reform of public education started too late, in 2003, and 
it will only come to have an impact on the skills of school leavers in the next 
decade. in the past 20 years, young people without upper secondary education 
(and especially those completing only basic schooling) have had poorer skills 
than their peers in Western europe: the unqualified Hungarian workforce is 
less productive and is less capable of retraining or moving into another occu-
pation (köllő, 2009). adult learning is also infrequent: the majority of workers 
do not upgrade the skills they acquire at school (varga, 2006).
Finally, according to the sparse data and empirical research available, active 
labour market programmes implemented with the aim of reducing unemploy-
ment have not proved very effective in increasing employment. often it is not 
the most vulnerable who benefit from labour market programmes that improve 
employability; job centres do not consistently enforce sanctions against those 
who refuse to accept a job or training (partly because these sanctions are 
too strict and would have adverse effects); the supply of placement and reha-
bilitation services is limited and patchy; and many of the jobs created under 
job-creation initiatives or wage subsidies would have been created anyway. 
the increasingly popular public works schemes do not support entry to the 
labour market, but instead create a  ‘revolving door’ between benefits and 
casual labour – the majority of the unqualified unemployed sooner or later 
find themselves in this dead-end street (see Chapter 5.2).
the municipalities that provide services for the long-term unemployed are 
even more limited in capacity: a third of them are settlements with fewer than 
1,000 inhabitants, where it is not only difficult but also inefficient to provide 
resources and competent staff to activate the long-term unemployed. even 
some larger settlements lack sufficient staff or expertise (Fazekas, 2001; Csák, 
2007; nagy, 2008).
81.2. the macroeconomic and buSineSS environment  
attila baRtHa
1. Diagnosis anD lessons
historicAl legAcies 
before the regime change, the main economic trends in Hungary reflected 
the typical economic history of Central-eastern europe (kornai, 2005). after 
the strong expansion of the 1950s and the 1960s, economic growth slowed 
down in the 1970s and was conspicuously weak in the 1980s: annual average 
gDp growth of around 1 per cent implied a contracting business potential and 
a gradual loss of the consumption opportunities previously achieved. However, 
the Hungarian scenario had two specific features. on the one hand, the polit-
ical leadership was obliged to make gradual ‘political concessions’ after the 
revolution of 1956, and especially from 1964 onwards, in the shadow of the 
country’s financial collapse (Csaba, 2002). as a result, the so-called ‘second 
economy’ had been gradually developing since the 1970s, and this became an 
important structural feature of the Hungarian economy in the 1980s (gábor 
and galasi, 1981). although the social support behind the market transforma-
tion and the expansion of certain quasi-market-type elements (e.g. limited 
skills of entrepreneurship) might have indicated a relative advantage for the 
Hungarian capitalist transformation, the developing ‘second economy’ also 
institutionalized several norm-breaking behavioural patterns,4 which (among 
others consequences) had a long-term negative impact on Hungarian tax morale 
(semjén and tóth, 2009). at the same time, the relatively high level of well-
being (set against only moderate economic performance) was only possible in 
the short term – and at the price of grave indebtedness: the Hungarian state 
debt doubled between 1984 and 1987. the high level of government debt 
became a serious additional burden in the period of transformation; this is 
another atypical feature of the Hungarian economy, as the vast majority of 
Central-eastern european (Cee) countries were not heavily indebted at the 
time of the system change.
the decAde of the 1990s: rApid stAbilizAtion  
And liberAlizAtion without profound institutionAl 
trAnsformAtion
During the 1990s, Hungary was a leader in the formal adoption of the so-called 
slip agenda (stabilization, liberalization, market-compatible institutional 
transformation and privatization) promoted by Western economic and business 
4 The long-term unfavourable 
effects of the second economy on 
both the state finances and the real 
market attitudes were revealed early 
on by Kornai (1992: 12) and Róbert 
(1994: 314).
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advisors (World bank, 1996; kolodko, 2000): Hungary’s economic policy leaders 
implemented the suggested measures rapidly and relatively coherently. by the 
end of 1996 (albeit to varying degrees) the painful macroeconomic stabilization 
was complete, the financial system had been consolidated, the privatization 
that encouraged the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDi) was practically 
finished, and the country had been turned into an export-oriented open economy. 
thanks to these developments, Hungary was catching up fast in the second 
half of the 1990s: the gDp growth rate was high and the convergence in terms 
of economic development was unquestionable. Whereas in 1997, Hungary’s 
gDp per capita in purchasing power standards (pps) was only 53 per cent of 
that of the eu-27 (the 27 present members of the european union), by 2003 
(i.e. the year before the country joined the eu) Hungary achieved 63 per cent 
of the eu-27 average gDp in pps.
the various international comparative surveys that analyse the quality of the 
business environment5 are practically unanimous in their findings: by the second 
half of the 1990s, the Hungarian business investment climate was significantly 
more favourable than that of the other countries of the visegrád region.6 
However, as we mention in Chapter 1.1, the desirable profound structural insti-
tutional changes were not completed – either in public education or in public 
administration. in order to mitigate the social tension of the transformation, 
Hungarian economic policy makers adopted rather less painful, short-term 
measures that proved to be ineffective and, in the long run, structurally futile. 
Regarding the impact of employment, the growth path of the 1990s can be 
split into two contrasting periods. after the years of post-transition decline, 
between 1994 and 1997 economic growth was mainly based on productivity 
and capital input growth. in this period, employment’s contribution to growth 
was markedly negative; however, the labour force reallocation did have a signifi-
cant positive impact (Harasztosi, 2011: 14). in the period between 1998 and 
2001, the strong inflow of foreign direct investment implied a predominantly 
capital-based growth; meanwhile, the growth contribution of labour was no 
longer negative, though it was statistically negligible. in fact, the structural 
components of growth did not support any expansion in employment in these 
years. moreover, by the end of the period, the minimum wage increase in 2001 
was having an obvious negative effect on employment: ‘the minimum wage 
hike eliminated about 12,000 small-firm jobs mostly in the depressed regions 
– a huge loss in the Hungarian context’ (kertesi and köllő, 2003: 22).
the decAde of the 2000s: the growth impActs  
of An unsustAinAble fiscAl policy
evaluation of the post-socialist period of the Hungarian economy reflects two 
different phases: while the era of the 1990s was fairly successful, the decade 
of the 2000s was an obvious failure. in Hungary, structural change in the 
manufacturing industries and the subsequent Western reorientation of exports 
began earlier than in the other Cee countries, thanks to the relatively rapid 
privatization and FDi inflow. as a result, in the first phase economic growth 
was stronger, and at the beginning of the twenty-first century Hungary was 
considered to be one of the most successful countries in the region. even one 
5 See the global competitiveness 
reports of the World Economic 
Forum and the IMD Lausanne or the 
comparison of the aggregated gov-
ernance indicators of the World Bank 
(WEF, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011; IMD, 
2009; WBG, 2009). (These reports 
combine traditional macroeconomic 
and institutional indicators with 
large-sample survey variables.)
6 The Visegrád region includes the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia.
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of the most critical of the state-socialist historical legacies – the government 
debt – improved: while gross state debt oscillated around 85–90 per cent of 
gDp in the mid-1990s, by 2001 it had decreased to 52 per cent – far below the 
critical level of 60 per cent (the prescribed criterion for euro adoption). aside 
from the pension reform of 1997, there was no major structural reform in the 
sphere of public services, and in the 1990s fiscal policy was fairly disciplined. 
However, the ‘fiscal alcoholism’ (kopits, 2008) of the Hungarian government 
returned at the beginning of the 2000s: old policy-making practices were resur-
rected with the intention of restoring the (financially unsustainable) welfare 
regime of the late-kádár era of Hungarian state socialism. Hence, Hungarian 
economic development reproduced all the old negative characteristics: high 
indebtedness, a low level of employment, grave regional inequality and a high 
level of inflation. Consequently, in this period, the Hungarian economy achieved 
much lower growth than the Cee regional average, and the process of real 
convergence with the more developed countries practically ceased. the 
generous welfare regime remained up to the end of the decade, even though 
domestic income sources could not finance it (kármán, 2008; Csillag, 2009). 
the resurgence of state debt and external indebtedness, and the conspicuous 
vulnerability of the Hungarian economy – these were the logical consequences. 
by 2008, gross government debt was back up to 73 per cent of gDp and the 
international financial market considered Hungary one of the most vulnerable 
countries of the region. From the second half of the decade, the government 
did try to apply various minor policy-correction measures, but these were 
neither consistent nor convincing; only the stabilization measures of 2009 
(again in light of the financial collapse of the Hungarian state) proved satisfac-
tory. nevertheless, the price of this drastic stabilization package was deep 
recession – much deeper than in the other countries of the visegrád region.
From the middle of the 2000s, macroeconomic stability wavered, the FDi inflow 
decelerated and the investment/gDp ratio gradually decreased. this was the 
bleak situation that faced Hungary, even though its strong and established 
manufacturing capacities should have ensured its competitiveness on world 
markets, as in most other countries of the Cee region. meanwhile, the private 
service sector remained weak; and on the demand side, a  lively growth in 
domestic consumption proved fragile and fleeting. moreover, the high domestic 
interest rates and the high risk appetite on international financial markets 
generated a peculiarly unfavourable phenomenon: an unprecedented expan-
sion of credits denominated in foreign currencies, which implied an extreme 
indebtedness in general (in the household, as well as in the corporate world 
and local government). this might undermine the growth performance of the 
Hungarian economy in the long run. 
business environment And institutionAl development  
in the 2000s
international comparative surveys that analyse business environment develop-
ment reflect Hungary’s negative macroeconomic trends in the 2000s, even 
compared to the other Cee countries. the weakness of small businesses – 
something that was identified back in the mid-1990s (gábor, 1997 and laky, 
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1998) – is a major factor that limits growth even today (bartha, 2011). in the 
meantime, those business environment indicators that influence the invest-
ment decisions of large corporations consistently reflect a deterioration in 
the relative position of Hungary over the last decade. this is true of both the 
aggregate competitiveness indicators and the government efficiency indicators 
(bartha, 2010). the overwhelming majority of international surveys indicate 
that, by 2009, the business environment in Hungary had become significantly 
less attractive than in the Czech Republic, slovakia or poland; the last two 
years have not brought about any change in Hungary’s relative position. the 
regulatory environment in place and the moderate administrative burden 
on enterprises have been the relative strengths of the Hungarian business 
environment since 2008; in this respect, Hungary is almost as attractive as 
slovakia, and the Hungarian business regulation environment is more attrac-
tive than in the Czech Republic or poland (see table 5.3 of the statistical 
annex). However, besides regulation, perception of the business environment 
depends on at least two other decisive aspects: the level and stability of the 
overall tax burden, and the quality of local services provided by the public 
administration sector – especially the quality of public education and the 
transport infrastructure (seibert, 2006). Hungarian competitiveness is clearly 
deteriorating, both in the field of education and when the overall tax burden 
is considered. this perception is also reflected in the business environment 
surveys of the german-Hungarian Chamber of trade and industry (DuiHk). 
since the middle of the decade, those german enterprises that play a dominant 
role in regional investment trends have considered the Czech Republic to be 
one of the most attractive countries for investment, and poland has achieved 
the same status in the last three years. in the meantime, the DuiHk business 
environment surveys indicate that during the crisis Hungary is only likely to 
be able to achieve a modest improvement in the way business perceives it: in 
2010–11 it was only able to secure fourth place in the Cee regional investment 
rankings of german enterprises (DuiHk, 2011: 34). it is not just international 
comparative surveys – the preferences of potential investors indicate the same 
trend: by the second half of the decade, the Hungarian business environment 
had deteriorated significantly compared to the other visegrád countries, and 
the crisis-management measures of 2009 were only able to halt a further 
decline in Hungary’s relative position.
Regarding the impact of employment, it seems clear that in the past decade 
improvements in productivity have had the major effect on economic growth. 
according to the calculations of Harasztosi (2011: 14–15), in the period after 2001, 
better productivity explained 74 per cent of Hungarian economic growth. the 
contribution of capital to growth decreased to 16 per cent, while the contribu-
tion of employment remained marginal: as in the 1990s, it explains only 2 per 
cent of growth. the positive employment effects were also moderate in the 
service sector (Harasztosi, 2011: 18), which reflects the gradual deterioration 
in the business environment.
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1.3. the StrengthS and weakneSSeS of policy reSponSeS 
ágota sCHaRle
slightly unusually, this volume examines the history of the past two decades in 
terms not of institutions, but of functions. as the previous two chapters have 
revealed, employment policy has not been a success story: the employment 
situation has not improved over the past two decades. this chapter provides 
an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of policy measures; these will 
be detailed in later chapters.
the opportunities open to employment policy have been limited by the low 
priority attached by the government strategy to the ministry responsible – and 
indeed to the aim of increasing employment. after the political transition, the 
ministry focused on the rising unemployment and on remedying social tensions 
that may have stemmed from this. the importance of raising employment and 
of eliminating the internal distortions of the labour market has only recently 
been recognized. although reducing regional inequalities in employment was 
regarded as one of the objectives from the outset, local and regional proj-
ects have not been supported by corresponding measures in related policy 
areas, horizontal cooperation between local agents has remained limited, 
and resources have tended to be distributed in a short-sighted or politically 
motivated way.
in terms of the quality of policy making, the most remarkable achievement of 
the past two decades has been the attention given to data collection – some-
thing that has largely been due to the commitment of policy makers and to 
their demand that policy implementation should be more evidence based. 
the employment service collects detailed and good-quality data about the 
unemployed, the wages of employees and, to a lesser extent, the implemen-
tation of the main labour market policies. However, the data collected have 
not been adequately utilized to improve policy measures – partly because of 
lack of interest at the political level. problem identification, the first stage 
in the policy cycle, is usually undertaken; but assessment of the impact of 
ensuing interventions is generally missing, as is any attempt to make adequate 
adjustments.
employment policy may support the functioning of the labour market in three 
areas: it may enhance the flexibility of wage adjustment, support the matching 
of supply and demand, and reduce the costs of hiring and employment.
Flexible wage adjustment may be supported by the state in two ways. on the 
one hand, measures encouraging the unemployed to search for jobs serve to 
improve the visibility of the unemployed labour force on the labour market, so 
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that employers are able to adjust wages in response. on the other hand, the 
state may reduce discrimination (which distorts wages) or may impose certain 
restrictions for welfare or political purposes, e.g. regulations on working hours 
or a minimum wage. at the beginning of the period, this consideration was 
rarely reflected in the objectives of the ministry. However, after the turn of 
the millennium, and especially after eu accession, efforts were increasingly 
made to involve the unemployed and inactive population – although recently 
mainly through less-efficient public works. as regards minimum wage regu-
lation, the ministry responsible did not manage to exert its influence so that 
potentially negative employment effects were usually overlooked in favour of 
fiscal or political considerations. similarly, although the disadvantages faced 
by the disabled, the elderly, the Roma and women are significant, the issue of 
discrimination did not receive sufficient attention over this period.
the matching of labour demand and supply is perhaps the only function where 
the ministry could draw on the experience of the planned economy, and this 
has been one of the main priorities since the very beginning of the political 
transition. this is also the area that is most often identified as the ministry’s 
main task, by both the government and the general public. it is to ministry’s 
credit that they have followed the international trend (supported by empirical 
evidence) of allocating more resources to active labour market policies. also 
in accordance with international best practice, the ministry has increased 
the proportion of personalized services within eu-funded programmes, and 
has intensified its efforts to target programmes at the most disadvantaged 
jobseekers. However, the effectiveness of these efforts has been restricted 
by the lack of thorough impact assessment mentioned above. issues that do 
not fall within the remit of the ministry (such as migration or internal mobility) 
have not received adequate attention in the past two decades. 
as opposed to mitigating structural discrepancies, reducing the transaction 
costs of employment has posed new challenges for the ministry. after the rela-
tively stable labour market of the planned economy, the new market economy 
(increasingly flexible due to globalization) generates large movements of labour. 
this creates a need for up-to-date and easily accessible information, and for 
subsidies that reduce the cost of moving between jobs, between locations – 
and indeed between stages of life (e.g. joining the workforce from college, or 
returning to work after parental leave). in this respect, the ministry has been 
good at tasks that could be achieved without the need for it to stray beyond 
its remit – for example, it has steadily developed the network of job centres 
and has improved the services provided to jobseekers and employers. However, 
when an issue requires the reconciliation of conflicting aims, the ministry has 
usually fallen short in developing and implementing the necessary detailed 
institutional and procedural solutions. When some accommodation has had to 
be found with other fields – e.g. the family support system, public transport 
or housing – so often the interests of employment have failed to be taken 
into account (or have been considered only to a limited extent). this has even 
been the case when the policy under consideration has fallen within the same 
ministry as the labour portfolio. 
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1.4. recommendationS 
ágota sCHaRle
Hungarian governments have made several attempts in the past 20 years to 
mitigate unemployment, but empirical research shows that most of these 
have been ineffective – or have reduced employment as well as unemploy-
ment (for a summary, see köllő, 2009). as was mentioned above, measures 
taken to reduce supply (early-retirement schemes, lax regulation of disability 
pensions) at the beginning of the political transition contributed to keeping 
the employment level permanently low. but subsequent measures that have 
focused exclusively on stimulating labour supply have not been successful 
either: reducing unemployment benefits, abolishing insured maternity leave 
(gyed) (without increasing the number of places at nurseries), increasing the 
minimum wage and allowing work while receiving flat-rate parental leave 
benefit (gyes) – none of these have boosted employment, and most have 
probably contributed to the aggravation of poverty.
the evidence on the impact of measures to boost demand is more mixed. 
Detailed impact analyses on public works suggest that increased expenditure 
on such programmes does not reduce – and may even slightly increase – long-
term unemployment (Fazekas, 2001; köllő and scharle, 2011). in the case of 
wage subsidies and repeated cuts in employer contributions, research evidence 
is scarce; but (based on estimates of the wage elasticity of labour demand) it 
is probable that these have contributed to an increase in employment (or at 
least to curbing its decrease) (kertesi and köllő, 2003; kőrösi, 2005; tarjáni, 
2004; oeCD, 2010).
the similar experience of other post-communist countries suggests that 
the poor performance of employment policy may be due to the scale of the 
problem: the shockwaves generated by the political transition were just too 
great for the responsible government institutions to deal with in the space of 
two decades (cf. part 3). the strengthening of government decision-making 
and implementation capacities requires (in addition to political will) a compre-
hensive economic growth strategy that assigns employment growth a high 
priority; a government unit with competent staff dedicated to implementing 
it; and a system of regular consultations that can ensure genuine coopera-
tion with related policy areas. it is also essential to measure the impact of 
interventions regularly, and to continue to develop policy tools on the basis 
of the findings. all of this requires staff that have expertise in econometrics, 
an expansion of data collection and easier access to microdata.
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However, the failures of the past two decades offer some important lessons 
as well. above all, it is clear that employment cannot be successfully increased 
without a harmonization of economic policy with measures to stimulate labour 
demand and supply.
the most important contribution economic policy can make is to ensure 
a predictable macro-economic environment (as well as a stable business 
environment) and to reduce the administrative burden (something that would 
improve the job-creation capacity of small enterprises in particular). in order 
to mitigate regional inequalities, it is crucial to develop the most disadvan-
taged micro-regions in an integrated way, based on local conditions and local 
expertise (see Chapter 2.3). 
an expansion in labour market demand requires a reduction in wage costs, 
including taxes and contributions (which disproportionately hit the wages of 
unskilled employees): the regulations that stipulate a contribution base higher 
than the actual wage should be abolished; a cautious minimum-wage policy 
should be pursued; and there needs to be differentiation of the minimum wage, 
according to region or age. black and grey employment may be reduced more 
effectively by well-targeted inspections than by increasing the minimum wage 
(see Chapter 4.3).
encouraging job search may mitigate the limitations of wage adjustment and 
may help increase labour supply: such a move would require job centres to be 
better staffed and would need a wider range of the welfare benefits granted 
to the working-age population to be conditional on job search (a stipulation 
that should be better enforced by the job centres). access to (but not the 
amount of) welfare provisions that support exit from the labour market (e.g. 
early pension, disability pensions, flat-rate parental leave benefit) should be 
limited, and there needs to be a further rise in the average retirement age 
(see Chapter 4.2). a more consistent enforcement of job search requirements 
would make it possible to raise the amount and the maximum duration of 
unemployment benefit. the recent drastic cut in the insured benefit is likely 
to have a detrimental effect on how well jobs are matched to jobseekers, and 
may also make the later reintegration of the unemployed more costly.
better government communications, an increase in internships in public service 
and public education, the introduction of employment quotas, an expansion of 
the obligation of employers to draw up an equal-opportunities policy and to 
monitor its implementation – all this would help curb employer discrimination 
against the Roma, the elderly, the disabled and women. support for work trial 
schemes, personalized active policies and a related mentoring service would 
serve the same purpose (see Chapter 4.4).
in order to support the matching of labour supply and demand, there is a need 
to improve the ability of disadvantaged regions to attract direct capital invest-
ment; to encourage mobility and commuting by harmonizing education and 
housing policy, as well as active labour market policies; to provide better-
targeted and higher-quality retraining programmes and personalized active 
labour market policies that involve the most needy; and to offer more, more 
diverse and better-quality rehabilitation services to improve employability 
(see Chapter 5.2). international experience shows that adequately targeted, 
personalized and integrated retraining programmes are the most effective. 
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these could be developed on the basis of a thorough impact assessment of 
current Hungarian programmes and pilot projects. the educational attainment 
of the workforce can only meet the changing demands of the labour market in 
the medium term if the methodological reform of public education continues, 
and if the role of skills development increases and the equal opportunities of 
disadvantaged pupils are better enforced.
Finally, the transaction costs of taking up employment and commuting may 
be reduced by the development of job centres, in order to ensure easy and 
cheap access to labour market information and to provide services to support 
recruitment and selection (cf. Chapters 6.1 and 6.2). Conflicts between the 
two roles of the public employment service (as an authority that evaluates 
benefit claims and as a service provider) may be resolved by better coopera-
tion between the institutions that fulfil these functions, whether they work 
in the same or in separate institutions. improving the information service of 
job centres requires a clear strategy and corresponding internal procedures, 
as well as a regular quantitative and qualitative assessment of daily work, 
supplemented by feedback from both staff and directors.
in order to enhance mobility and make it easier to reach nearby towns, the 
network of roads and public transport should be further developed, and the 
costs of commuting for unqualified workers should be subsidized permanently; 
it would be more expedient to subsidize the rental of a flat than the purchase 
of one, and wage costs should be reduced (see Chapter 6.4). Finally, in order 
to remove any obstacles related to family obligations, more places and better 
services should be provided at (state-run) nurseries and family-run day-care 
centres (see Chapter 6.3).
most of these measures can only be effective if they are launched simultaneously 
and aligned with one another. this would require considerable coordination 
and implementation efforts, but not necessarily significant resources. some 
of the measures do involve extra costs, but others would result in savings 
– offsetting one against the other would reduce the need for substantial 
extra budget expenditure even in the first few years. For example, imposing 
stricter rules on early retirement (e.g. by adjusting bonus–malus regulations), 
providing unemployment benefits to working-age people only if they meet 
activation criteria, and restricting home purchase subsidies will all generate 
savings. in other areas it is not possible to reduce spending, but funding may 
be channelled from less efficient programmes to more efficient ones. For 
example, the development of rehabilitation services could be financed from 
a 20 per cent reduction in the subsidies to sheltered employment schemes for 
disabled workers. some measures have an impact in a short time and will be 
self-sustaining in a few years – e.g. support provided to nurseries and family 
day-care centres is recovered from the tax and contributions paid by mothers 
taking up employment.
Rather than budgetary resource constraints, the obstacles standing in the 
way of implementation may be lack of expertise on the part of government 
staff or concerns over the political cost (cf. parts 2 and 3). the former may be 
resolved by involving external (Hungarian or international) experts, while the 
latter could be overcome by a thorough preliminary assessment of costs and 
returns, losers and winners – and by persistent negotiation, which will (sooner 
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or later) persuade (or reconcile) any major opponents. What is at stake is how 
to make the various stakeholders realize that the well-being of the country can 
only be secured through reform. the gains from reform will, in the medium 
term, more than offset the initial losses, whereas failure to reform may well 
mean that any present advantage is forfeited.
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2. labouR maRket goals in a WiDeR poliCy Context
2.1. the role and Significance of labour affairS in the SyStem of government 
inStitutionS* 
balázs váRaDi
* Special thanks to Lilla Garzó, György 
Hajnal and Ágota Scharle for their 
comments.
the room for manoeuvre in employment policy depends largely on the position 
and significance of the government ministry(s) responsible for employment 
objectives within the structure of government institutions. the (ever-changing) 
position of the labour portfolio in the government is not just a public admin-
istration issue, and it cannot be solely described by depicting institutional 
changes over time.1 although there are studies available on the relationship 
between policy making and political institutions, and between civil servants and 
politicians in general (see körösényi, 1997; ágh et al., 2005), we are not aware 
of any relevant research findings concerning this sector. this chapter seeks 
to supplement the scarce literature and – based on budget data, government 
strategies, media analysis and interviews – to describe the political condi-
tions that define the elbow room of employment policy.2 the chapter may be 
regarded as a first draft for a future study of the history of institutions. 
why is it importAnt?
as specialist literature (Hare, 1993) and a report prepared by the social affairs 
and labour ministry (szmm, 2006) both state, as well as labour affairs, successful 
employment policy covers financial (tax and contributions) policy (which influ-
ences labour supply and demand), social affairs, family policy, economic and 
business development and education policy. support in formulating decisions 
related to these policies is necessarily undertaken in different ministries and 
departments of central government.
However, the position of these ministries/functions within the institutional 
structure is not simply a matter of design. they serve different sub-targets 
and therefore vie with one another for public funds. according to one of the 
key principles of bureaucracy theory (niskanen, 2001), there is a correlation 
between the size (and the budget) of agencies (ministries) and their political 
significance. Furthermore, the politicians in charge of these ministries may 
have aims and priorities of their own. inevitably, therefore, the cooperation 
between various functions in the decision-support processes of employment 
policy is not without conflict, including political and institutional conflict 
within government (Howlett et al., 2009). thus, since successful employment 
policy depends heavily on the public administration staff and the politician in 
charge of policy making and monitoring the sector, the political weight and 
influence of the ministry or department responsible for labour affairs is of no 
1 For a  detailed review of institu-
tional changes, see Halmos (2010), 
Frey (2002; 2011).
2 The system of institutions for inter-
est conciliation is discussed in Chapter 
2 of Part 2.
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small import. obviously, the relationship between the bargaining power of 
the ministry and the performance of government in terms of employment is 
not unidirectional: a weak and downgraded ministry headed by a lightweight 
politician will be unable to contribute substantially to developing and adopting 
successful policies; in the same way, a prime minister who does not consider 
employment policy to be important will tend to appoint a weaker politician 
to head up labour affairs in a junior ministry. 
although we have found no international data on the linkage between the posi-
tion of labour affairs within a government and the attention devoted to them 
by that government, we are aware of some general, empirical research on the 
topic. Wehner (2010) summarizes and investigates empirical studies on the 
connection between the number of ‘spending’ ministries and the government 
budget, based on several decades of international data. according to this work, 
cabinet performance is strongly related to cabinet structure: controlling for 
other factors with a high impact on fiscal performance, the higher the number 
of ‘spending’ ministries, the higher the budget expenditure (and deficit). in 
his international quantitative and empirical study, Huber (1998) examines the 
statistical relationship between hard policy variables (such as changes in annual 
healthcare expenditure) and the frequency with which ministers are replaced. 
the impact is significant and, although temporary, lasts for several years.
increAsing expectAtions – shrinking room for mAnoeuvre 
to put it simply, two opposing processes have had an influence on the lati-
tude enjoyed by labour policy makers and their staff in the past twenty years 
in Hungary.3 on the one hand, there was a gradual recognition that labour 
policy is more than merely incomes policy: in addition to providing benefits 
to the unemployed, it may also contribute to economic growth by effectively 
regulating the internal operation of the labour market and by adequately 
supporting labour demand and supply. on the other hand, there has been 
increasing centralization of government decisions, entailing the declining 
significance of decision support, which has made it increasingly difficult to 
coordinate the various policy fields.
in terms of employment policy, we have witnessed a general external, political–
institutional tendency that has been of crucial importance: in the past twenty 
years we have seen the formation of a top-down government structure that 
is subordinate to political goals; this has led to the political wishes of the 
prime minister being implemented by civil servants swiftly and with the least 
possible modification of the objectives (goetz and Wollmann, 2001; brusis, 
2006). this trend – which involves a reduced number of ministries, a more 
political second line of ministry officials and an increased role for the immediate 
team surrounding the prime minister and for the prime minister’s office – has 
also had an influence on the labour ministry (see also Chapter 3.1). However, 
centralization has not necessarily improved efficiency, since it has not resulted 
in a better decision-making process. improvement has also been hampered 
by the traditionally weak intra-governmental cooperation between related 
policy fields, such as social affairs and labour, and the frequent lack of clear 
policy objectives, monitoring and adjustment (verheijen, 2006; oeCD, 2007).
3 Both processes will be described 
in detail in Chapter 3.1.
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the importance of employment as an interesting macro-economic indicator has 
gradually become clear to politicians. as early as the mid-1990s, international 
observers (e.g. oeCD, 1997) drew attention to the danger of low employment 
levels ‘getting stuck’, but the knowledge that a low level of employment is an 
obstacle to growth and that the causes reside in the labour market was built 
up gradually (see Chapters 1.1 and 1.2). it was only at the time of the favour-
able economic trend between 1995 and 2007 that decision makers started 
to see that economic growth will not in itself automatically raise the employ-
ment rate to the level it stood at before the political changes; it also requires 
restructuring within and beyond employment policy (see Chapter 3.1).
it took a long time for labour economists to persuade prime ministers and 
economic policy makers that the policy tools of the ministry might actually 
have significant positive effects on employment policy (cf. Chapter 3.1). Within 
the structure of bureaucracy retained from the communist era, labour policy 
was regarded as a ‘spending’ ministry, transferring public funds to job seekers. 
accession to the european union also contributed to the increasing importance 
of employment. eu directives and planning frameworks included employment 
as one of the most important objectives, and encouraged decision makers to 
develop systematic policies and to identify the causes of structural problems.
Figure 1: Expenditure of the Labour Market Fund* and increasing payment 
into national budget, 1991–2010 (in percentage)
*Between 1991 and 1995, the figure shows the aggregate amount of the Solidarity Fund, the 
Employment Fund, the Vocational Education and Training Fund, the Rehabilitation Fund and 
the Wage Guarantee Fund. Spending also includes expenditure related to the two EU schemes 
managed under the labour portfolio (SROP 1.1 and 1.2). Budget reduction (i.e. payments into 
the national budget) was calculated in proportion to the larger expenditure indicator. 
Source: 1991–2001: Frey (2002), 1998–2010 Ministry for the National Economy, 
balance sheets of the Hungarian Treasury, as well as Frey (2010).
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apart from during the crisis years, the labour ministry was unable to increase 
the funding it could devote to employment policy. one possible explanation for 
this is that its increasing significance was overshadowed by other, presumably 
short-term and political factors. the labour market Fund and the eu funding 
directly controlled by the ministry have ranged from 1 per cent to 1.2 per cent 
of gDp throughout most of the past twenty years, which is on a par with the 
regional average, but is lower than in the nordic countries and countries with 
marked corporative traditions. it is an indication of the weak lobbying capacity 
of the ministry that it has not managed to maintain control over its allocated 
revenues: from the mid-1990s (when unemployment started to decrease) it 
paid an increasing proportion (40 per cent in 2009) of revenue from contribu-
tions to the labour market Fund into the national budget (Figure 1).
the gradual reduction in the elbow room outlined above is further explained 
by specific features of the various government administrations. these will be 
detailed in the following, focusing on changes in government programmes and 
implementation agencies.
the AntAll And boross governments4 
Due to its major role in preserving social stability, the ministry of labour was 
fairly important in the first government following the political transition. 
However, the main goal of the change to a market economy and privatization 
was to establish efficient markets, and employment was subordinate to that 
(boda et al., 1999).
until 1990, the state office for Wages and labour was responsible for employ-
ment policy, and its chairman participated in government meetings as a non-
voting member (Halmos, 2010). When the antall government was formed, the 
first signs that the change of regime would present significant challenges for 
labour policy had already appeared: by 1989, the number of vacancies had 
decreased by 40 per cent in just a year, and the number of job seekers had 
doubled (ibid.). the strike law, which sought to provide legal solutions to the 
anticipated labour conflicts (which were foreshadowed by the first strikes of 
1988), was adopted by parliament as early as spring 1989, following significant 
social and political debate (ibid.). However, the challenges were still great. at 
a time when nobody was yet clear what the outcomes of the transformation 
of the whole social and economic system would be, the democratically elected 
government of the day was expected to develop an employment policy, to 
establish a system of employment-policy institutions (from retraining to public 
works), to provide a meaningful structure for the reconciliation of labour 
disputes, to strengthen the labour market organization, supporting commu-
nication between employers and employees, to organize the collection of 
information, and to prepare forecasts in the ‘new’ world of liberalized wages 
and labour migration. although in spring 1990 the media was still not devoting 
much attention to employment, the government programme, which aimed at 
a social market economy, was already anticipating ‘a temporarily significant 
increase in unemployment’ (programme of national Renewal; see kiss, 2004). 
after a blockade organized by taxi drivers on 26 october 1990 demonstrated 
that non-parliamentary political pressure was a real alternative in a democratic 
4 Coalition of the Hungarian Demo-
cratic Forum, the Independent Small-
holders’ Party and the Christian 
Democratic People’s Party, 1990–94.
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Hungary, the establishment of a trade union movement, representing several 
hundred thousand discontented people and playing a political role, probably 
seemed a serious risk.
although the first democratically elected government did not establish a parlia-
mentary committee for labour affairs,5 it did set up a ministry for labour 
affairs. However, it was headed by lightweight politicians. During its first eight 
months, it was headed by sándor győriványi (independent smallholders’ party), 
a retired technology historian and head of a secondary vocational school,6 
while from 1991 to the end of the government’s term in office it was headed 
by gyula kiss (independent smallholders’ party), a lawyer from the city of 
miskolc. the position of state secretary was first filled by györgy lőrincz, 
a lawyer specializing in labour law, and then by Ferenc Rolek, who had exten-
sive public administration experience in the previous system; from 1993 to 
the end of the next administration (!) the position was filled by gyula pulay, 
who worked in the state office for Wages and labour in the 1980s. all three 
men had a background in employment.
the significance of the portfolio was not related to the personalities of the two 
ministers. neither the weight of their party nor their own political strength 
or competence in the policy field earned them the respect and loyalty of their 
staff. nor did they make any great impact on their fellow politicians. (it should 
be noted that immediately after the political changeover there were very few 
people who met the twin requirements of aptitude and policy experience, and 
who had not been involved in the previous system.) it was also a source of 
conflict within the ministry that it was headed by a member of the independent 
smallholders’ party, while the state secretary was a member of the Hungarian 
Democratic Forum; therefore the relationship between the minister and his 
state secretary was not harmonious.
a network of job centres was established during this period, based on the 
previous system of county and city council labour departments. the national 
labour market office (later renamed the national employment office) was 
appointed to be the central agency of the employment service, with county 
(and metropolitan) job centres and their municipal branch offices affiliated to 
it (Frey, 2002).
after the employment law took effect in 1991, employment expenditure was 
funded from two separate sources: the solidarity Fund (financed from the 
contributions of employees) and the employment Fund (financed from the 
national budget). the former served to finance unemployment-related benefits, 
while the latter financed active labour market measures. after contributions 
were raised several times, the solidarity Fund showed a significant surplus 
from 1993, which could be transferred to the employment Fund (ibid.).
the government, which sought extensive tripartite dialogue in decision making 
in the field of labour, involved the representatives of employers and employees 
in controlling the funds (see Chapter 2.2). the fact that they had a say in the 
distribution of resources gave the participants greater prestige and impor-
tance in policy making, but later on this was to provide the grounds for regular 
attacks on the ministry.
the different interests represented by the sectors also emerged during this 
period: according to the interviews we conducted, the powerful finance 
5 In 1990–94 the policy field was 
covered by the Economic Commit-
tee of Parliament. (Source for data 
related to the competence of parlia-
mentary committees: here)
6 Source for members of the govern-
ment, CVs of ministers: here. 
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ministry, which was responsible for the budget, wished to impose stricter 
conditions on early pensions and long maternity leaves, while the ministry 
for social affairs and labour attempted to prevent this. at the same time, the 
two ministries of social affairs and of labour tried to foist any unpleasant 
tasks on each other. the survival of the hidden or administrative pluralism of 
state socialism (ágh, 2003), implying that each ministry strove to represent 
the interests of a sector or a social group, meant that the civil servants of 
the ministry for social affairs and labour had identified a (hidden) mission 
for themselves: to represent job seekers in the inter-ministerial competition 
for budget resources. nevertheless, the conflicting goals of the individual 
ministries did not hamper harmonious cooperation and information sharing 
between the various ministries or units. 
the horn government, 1994–987
the portfolio was probably strongest during the Horn government: the policy 
staff was retained, the remit of the portfolio was widened, it had an influence 
on policy, and it had two influential politicians as ministers.
by 1994, unemployment was being continuously covered by the press, although, 
among the general public, there was still a strong belief that the problem 
would automatically be alleviated by economic growth. in the parliamentary 
programme of the Horn government (kiss, 2004), the key word was ‘modern-
ization’; employment as a distinct term was not included.
However, the policy field itself was important. a separate parliamentary 
committee, the employment and labour Committee, was set up in 1994 and 
has been in place ever since. the labour portfolio had its own ministry, headed 
by two key politicians from the socialist party: magda kósáné kovács (onetime 
literary historian and trade union leader) until her resignation at the end of 
november 1995, and then péter kiss (former leader of the Hungarian young 
Communist league and the association of leftist youth). the position of 
political secretary of state was filled throughout the period by lajos Héthy, 
a journalist and sociologist.
During the coalition negotiations (this time and for later socialist–liberal 
governments) the liberals did not want the labour portfolio – partly because 
they accepted that the socialists ‘were more attached to it’ and partly because 
liberal politicians regarded employment more as an offshoot of economic 
policy than as a policy field interesting in itself.
the austerity measures of 1995–96 (the so-called bokros package) caused 
relatively few labour conflicts. Favouring both rationalization and the transpar-
ency of public administration, in january 1996 the finance ministry initiated 
a merger of the solidarity Fund and the employment Fund with three other 
funds (the vocational education and training Fund, the Rehabilitation Fund 
and the Wage guarantee Fund) to establish the labour market Fund, while the 
funding allocated from the national budget was reduced. the minister in charge 
of the labour portfolio shared control over the fund with the consensus-based 
steering committee of the fund (steering Committee of the labour market 
Fund).8 the bokros package mainly contained measures suggested by the policy 
staff, some of them planned well beforehand (such as the abolition of career 
7 Coalition of the Hungarian Socialist 
Party and the Alliance of Free Demo-
crats (Liberal Party).
8 If the steering committee (comprising 
representatives of employers, employ-
ees and the government) cannot agree 
on the allocation of the resources of 
the fund, the decision is made by the 
minister (ÁSZ, 1999; 2008).
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starters’ allowance), and the finance ministry was ready to make concessions 
as well; thus the period was not especially conflict ridden for policy staff.9
the first orbán government, 1998–200210
this administration marked the absolute low point in terms of the importance 
of labour affairs and labour policy in government. the portfolio lost influence: 
it was not included in the government manifesto, the ministry was split up, 
the state secretary suffered a defeat and the minimum wage was raised (see 
Chapter 4.3 for more detail).
as with the previous government manifesto, the programme of the first orbán 
government (government programme, 1998) did not contain a chapter on 
employment, but job creation (primarily through tax changes) was one of its 
key objectives. the government programme regarded job creation as the 
catalyst for economic growth and promised modification of the system of 
taxes and contributions, as well as improvement in the efficiency of labour 
market institutions. it is interesting to look back at a prophetic paragraph 
on labour policy ahead of eu accession: ‘if the country is unable to increase 
the workforce significantly above the current level of about 4 million people 
before eu accession, it is possible that – because of the inflexible employ-
ment policy of the eu – employment levels will not improve after accession 
either’ (ibid.). this is exactly what happened, even though there is no reason 
to think that it did due to eu regulations. nevertheless, in its programme the 
government drew the conclusion that labour market flexibility needed to be 
increased in coming years.
in line with its programme of subordinating labour to growth-enhancing 
economic policy, the government did not establish a separate labour ministry.11 
it divided the portfolio and its tasks into two (or into three, if we include the 
education ministry). employment promotion, wage policy and the coordina-
tion of interest representation were assigned to the economic affairs ministry, 
headed by attila Chikán (an independent economist and university professor). 
most labour affairs roles – such as the employment service, active and passive 
policies, strategy development, legislation and supervision of the labour 
market Fund – were assigned to the ministry of social and family affairs, headed 
by péter Harrach, a Christian Democrat politician (gyula pulay stayed on as 
state secretary), while vocational education and training was assigned to the 
education ministry. later, in july 2000, the elements of the labour ministry 
that belonged to the ministry of social and family affairs were returned to the 
ministry of economic affairs, headed by györgy matolcsy (another independent 
economist) from january 2000 (Frey, 2002).
the ministry of economic affairs wanted to focus on strategic tasks from 
2000 and to hand over the implementation of labour market policy to the 
employment service. as a result, employment institutions, job centres and 
the reorganized national employment office, which coordinated them, were 
again granted more autonomy and tasks in 2001 (ibid.).
During this government administration, significant sums were transferred from 
the labour market Fund to the ministry of economic affairs, the ministry of 
social and family affairs and the municipalities (ibid.).
9 However, Magda Kósáné Kovács 
resigned at the time. According to her 
official explanation, the new sick-pay 
regulations encouraged behaviour 
that was harmful to health; but the 
real reason was probably the per-
ception that policy considerations 
in general came to be dominated by 
political ones.
10 Coalition of Fidesz, Independent 
Smallholders’ Party and Hungarian 
Democratic Forum.
11 However, it set up a separate min-
istry for youth and sport.
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there was an important and emblematic conflict in 1999 between the prime 
minister and gyula pulay, the state secretary responsible for labour issues in 
the ministry of social and family affairs. the immediate cause of the conflict 
was a draft measure proposed by the government, alongside which the state 
secretary had prepared an alternative proposal (in line with his convictions), 
which also served the aims of the government but was considered better in 
terms of policy. However, the government rejected it without a policy debate 
and adopted its own proposal. to the civil servants, it was not clear what 
(social) policy objective the government’s proposal followed; the state secre-
tary became involved in an argument with prime minister viktor orbán and 
tendered his resignation.12 this conflict amounted to a prime ministerial slap-
down of the labour portfolio. in general, the disagreement also highlighted the 
contrast between an influential civil servant trying on his own to determine 
the policy tools best suited to the presumed goals of the government, and 
a prime minister who held a democratic mandate but was inexpert with the 
details, yet still insisted on control over decisions on policy tools. this conflict 
had a symbolic significance for the labour portfolio, conveying a message from 
the prime minister about the limits of its remit.
the medgyessy And the first gyurcsány government, 
2002–0613
this government term was hampered by changes in ministerial staff and by 
a change of prime minister. politically important measures were developed 
outside the labour ministry, in the prime minister’s office, which indicated that 
rather less importance was attached to it within government than in the first 
two terms after the political changes.
analysis of media coverage at the time reveals that, in 2002, the general public 
expected more intervention on the part of the government (even direct job 
creation) than before, and was more aware of the regional, social and qualifi-
cation patterns of the low employment level.
the government programme (2002), which contained both liberal and social 
democratic elements, identified as one of the symptoms of a slowing economy 
the fact that ‘the expansion of employment has stopped’ but included ‘a high 
level of employment through reliable and trustworthy economic policy’ as one 
of the tools of the ‘empowering state’. it promised to increase the wages of 
public servants and to reduce contributions. a separate chapter on employment 
contained several particular measures, including welfare/employee-friendly/
social democratic promises.14 similar populist measures (e.g. increasing the 
length of time for which unemployment benefit could be claimed) were included 
in the 2004 programme of Ferenc gyurcsány ‘one hundred steps’, but they 
did not constitute a unified government strategy, either.
prime minister péter medgyessy re-established a separate ministry of employ-
ment and labour (headed by péter kiss until march 2003, and then by sándor 
burány, a socialist party politician with a degree in economics, until october 
2004). in the first gyurcsány administration, from october 2004 the position 
was filled by gábor Csizmár, a socialist politician (previously state secretary 
to péter kiss). ágnes Csanádi (who worked for and later headed the regional 
12 The prime minister did not accept 
the resignation of the state secretary, 
and so finally Gyula Pulay was trans-
ferred to another ministry.
13 Coalition of the Hungarian Social-
ist Party and the Alliance of Free 
Democrats (Liberal Party).
14 E.g.: ‘we guarantee two rest days 
a week, one of which has to be Sun-
day … The most important task of 
the labour institutions is to provide 
employment for fresh graduates 
in the shortest time possible ... We 
are going to establish an integrated 
employment registry. We are going 
to make the system of labour inspec-
tions more effective’ (Government 
Programme, 2002).
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development body váti), who had public administration experience from the 
Horn and Chikán era, was appointed state secretary.
in 2002, then, péter kiss returned to head the ministry, bringing with him 
political weight and his earlier experience, and thus managing to improve its 
bargaining power. During the orbán administration, the economic and educa-
tion ministries had spent eighteen months arguing about the supervision of 
resources under the Human Resource Development operational programme; 
kiss swiftly made a decision on the matter and succeeded in having it approved. 
When gábor Csizmár was appointed minister, several civil servants regarded 
it as a continuation of the ‘péter kiss era’ (since Csizmár had been his state 
secretary). the position of state secretary was then filled by lajos Héthy, who 
returned from the un mission to kosovo and the academic world.
the tendency for resources to be channelled from the original functions of 
the labour market Fund (mainly active and passive labour market policies) to 
other functions continued: an increasing proportion of funding was spent on 
elements specified in the budget act (see Figure 1). However, in addition to the 
labour market Fund, eu funding also became accessible. the distribution of 
eu funds was undertaken by the ministries until 2006. the Human Resource 
Development operational programme, developed jointly with other ministries, 
was supervised by the ministry of employment and labour, with the managing 
authority set up within the ministry. 
the second gyurcsány And the bAjnAi governments 
(hungAriAn sociAlist pArty), 2006–1015 
the ministry was again merged with other ministries, and ministers were 
replaced on an annual basis; in other words, it again lost importance. the 
short employment chapter of the government programme (2006) contained 
general remarks (e.g. reform of the employment service and amendment 
of the labour Code), a commitment to job creation, wage cost-reduction 
programmes financed with eu support (start, start extra), and a public works 
programme with 50,000 participants.
in his new government, Ferenc gyurcsány cut the number of ministries by 
three and merged the labour and the social affairs ministries. the resulting 
ministry was again headed by péter kiss for a year (for the third time), until 
june 2007; it was then headed by mónika lamperth (a socialist politician) 
until may 2008, by erika szűcs (another socialist politician with a degree in 
economics) until april 2009, and by lászló Herczog (independent, onetime 
deputy state secretary and state secretary) until the end of the government 
term. erika szűcs had some importance as a minister who doled out tens of 
billions of forints to the municipalities during the crisis, but she was considered 
a creature of the prime minister without any other power base. Her successor, 
while undoubtedly competent professionally, was politically insignificant, and 
therefore only managed to have some influence in the crisis management of 
the bajnai government if it did not threaten major individual or party interests.
between 2006 and 2008, the state secretary responsible for labour adminis-
tration was gyula tarcsi, onetime leader of the Hungarian young Communist 
league and former Ceo of state-owned companies, who, as a government 
15 From 2006 to 2008 in a coalition 
with the Free Democrats; in 2009–10 
with external support from the Free 
Democrats. 
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commissioner in 2005–06, was also responsible for the modernization of the 
public employment service. From 2006 the position of deputy state secre-
tary was filled by judit székely, who had worked in the national employment 
office in the 1990s.
in addition, a new institution – the national Development agency, in charge of 
distributing eu funds independently of (and partly in parallel with) ministries – 
was established, headed by gordon bajnai (independent, businessman) to take 
over operational programmes previously supervised by the ministries.
unlike during the merger under the Fidesz government, the second gyurcsány 
administration merged the labour ministry with the social affairs ministry. one 
possible reason was that by this time the prime minister had realized that 
there was a potential conflict between projects that offered high added value 
but did not improve employment significantly, and projects that did not offer 
much added value but increased the employment of the unqualified workforce. 
He wanted to see compromises being reached within the government, rather 
than in a (merged) ministry responsible for labour and economic affairs.
the deepening conflict between the civil servants and the politicians was 
indicated by the withdrawal of the minister because of the implementation 
of a large-scale public works scheme. the scheme was mainly supported by 
mayors (who were often members of parliament at the same time), while the 
ministry of labour regarded public works as a dead end, from which it was 
impossible to escape. under pressure from socialist mayors, Ferenc gyurc-
sány also supported the public works scheme, but mónika lamperth (who, 
according to the civil servants and politicians interviewed, was the least 
successful labour minister) was unable to produce a draft of decent quality. 
therefore the prime minister appointed erika szűcs, who had no central public 
administration background but was loyal to both the prime minister and the 
public works scheme. 
conclusion
since the shock of transformation and the years of insecurity, the labour port-
folio has never been considered particularly important; it has fairly steadily 
and with only minor ‘blips’ grown less and less significant. this is partly due 
to the fact that (according to the politicians interviewed) the portfolio was 
partly a cluster of labour market policies that did not always fit with the 
main objectives of economic policy and partly a forum for bargaining and for 
consulting with social partners and their representatives, but by and large 
was an unimportant field. although by the end of the period the objective to 
be achieved by the portfolio (i.e. to enhance employment) had become clear 
to a larger part of government, it was unable to gain in strength enough to 
achieve this goal by itself.
apart from the years of the political changeover, the political weight of the 
labour portfolio was only (relatively) significant when there were socialist 
administrations, which paid attention to this policy field and had good rela-
tions with the largest trade union – and especially when the portfolio was 
headed by high-ranking socialist politicians interested in the policy (magda 
kósáné kovács, péter kiss).
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the position of the labour portfolio among the ministries did not improve, and 
by the end of the period under consideration it had been merged into other 
ministries (into the ministry for social affairs and, from 2010, into the ministry 
for the economy). this deprived the labour portfolio of having its interests 
represented in government, but at the same time made it possible to settle 
disputes and reach compromises on employment policy within a ministry. 
However, this did not help the inter-ministerial coordination required for 
a successful employment policy, since it was impossible to include in a single 
ministry all the functions that needed to be coordinated in order to increase 
employment.
in view of the above, it is difficult to make recommendations. the subject of our 
research – the political significance of the structure responsible for providing 
support to government in making decisions on labour issues – is (although 
probably interrelated) not directly linked to the effectiveness of a government’s 
employment policy. the independence of the portfolio is not an advantage in 
itself, because it may only serve the political ambitions of its minister.
What is important for future policy making in employment is to develop an evidence-
based economic policy strategy, possibly embedded in an objective-based financial 
framework,16 which prioritizes increased employment and in which the policies 
analysed above have logical functions. its development and implementation 
require inter-ministerial cooperation, and it is also certain that the government 
department responsible for developing and implementing the strategy will have 
a key role. this role can only be assumed by an adequately trained, organized 
and managed government unit, and the strategy can only be successful if this is 
within a ministry headed by a competent and influential politician. 
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2. labouR maRket goals in a WiDeR poliCy Context
2.2. wage and taxation policieS 
lászló neumann anD balázs váRaDi
this chapter deals with changes in wage policy, as well as with the aspects of 
tax and contributions policy related to employment; it focuses primarily on 
the institutions of political decision-making. it seems obvious to approach 
the issue from the perspective of the body handling national tripartite social 
dialogue, since for much of the past 20 years it has been the regular forum for 
public wage policy disputes. nevertheless, this is not without its limitations, 
since political decisions were clearly not taken at this basically consultative 
forum.1 We do not aim to analyse the complete wage and tax policy, but to 
examine when, where and in what context labour market objectives were 
considered, and whether expected impacts on employment were taken into 
account. We will look at two areas of the past two decades when economic 
policy developments were accompanied by significant tax and wage policy 
measures: the two periods of crisis (1994–95 and 2006–08) and the wage 
policy expansion of 2001–05.
theoreticAl bAckground 
Wage policy may be defined as the set of government tools that have a direct 
influence on wage setting. as opposed to state socialism, where the state is 
the main employer, in a market economy the range of wage policy tools avail-
able to the state is relatively restricted, since wages are negotiated between 
employers and employees, depending on market conditions and largely inde-
pendently of the decisions of government.
aside from setting the minimum wage and defining the salaries of public sector 
employees, the most important tool is determining the taxes and contributions 
imposed on employment. on the one hand, these yield considerable revenues 
for the government; on the other hand, they – just as other taxes –involve 
inevitable social costs. more specifically, if we leave out of consideration lump-
sum and corrective taxes, the various types of taxes curb income generation 
(by reducing the output of market activities) and thus cause deadweight loss 
(stiglitz, 2000). Compared to other types of taxes, the distorting effect of 
charges on labour (taxes, contributions) is especially high (oeCD, 2010). 
a simplified explanation for the distorting mechanism of charges on labour (which 
generate social costs) is the following: employment is subject to labour market 
demand and supply. if taxes and contributions are levied on wages, demand is 
determined by full labour costs (net wage + taxes and contributions), while supply 
1 This chapter is based on original 
research: structured interviews and 
document analysis. The latter pri-
marily covered the agreements con-
cluded by the National Council for the 
Reconciliation of Interests (Országos 
Érdekegyeztető Tanács, OÉT) and 
the positions of the negotiating par-
ties recorded in the minutes of the 
meetings. 
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is determined by the net wage. the proportion of the difference between the 
two relative to full labour costs constitutes the so-called ‘tax wedge’. the higher 
the charges are in relation to wages, the lower employment will become, relative 
to a hypothetical level without taxes. the exact extent of this is an empirical 
question: it depends on how flexibly labour demand reacts to labour costs and 
how flexibly labour supply reacts to changes in net wages.2 an important and 
empirically supported consequence is that, in the long run, it is only the extent 
of the tax wedge that counts – not whether its various elements are deducted 
from the employer or the employee (nickell, 2004).
it should be noted that the system of taxes and contributions on employment 
and income has a different impact on the various segments of the labour market 
with various wage levels, where the flexibility of both labour demand and supply 
may be different. For example, the same flat-rate healthcare contribution may 
constitute a quite different tax wedge in terms of extent and impact: it will 
have one impact on single, well-qualified men, but quite another on low-skilled 
(and therefore low-paid) women with a family, for whom a real alternative is 
to stay at home, and who are thus more sensitive to wage changes.
another important mechanism of wage policy is the supposed keynesian 
effect of wages on inflation (the so-called cost-push inflation). in this respect, 
governments are able to curb (double-digit) inflation if they can ensure that 
inflation expectations are not entirely built into wage increases.
although the prices of products are generally determined in the market in 
a market economy, some industrialized countries have special political mecha-
nisms (interest conciliation, minimum wage regulation) to influence wage 
changes, and these have direct social and political effects. in Western europe, 
wage-related interest conciliation is usually a bilateral process, involving free 
collective bargaining between employers and trade unions (i.e. without govern-
ment intervention); rarely is there direct government intervention or a wage 
freeze. the structure of collective bargaining is different in each country in 
terms of the level at which it takes place (corporate, sectoral or national collec-
tive agreement) and the wage features (tariff wages, percentage pay increase, 
minimum wage, etc.) negotiated. the bargaining structure also influences 
the impact wages have on inflation and employment (Calmfors and Driffill, 
1988). as regards macro-economic performance, those countries with a fully 
centralized or an extremely decentralized structure are more successful and 
more capable of adapting to external shocks than are countries with primarily 
sectoral bargaining, because their structures allow for stronger wage adjust-
ment (layard et al., 1991).
alongside free collective bargaining between employers and trade unions, 
governments have other important tools to influence wages, even in market 
economies. besides minimum wage regulation, discussed in Chapter 4.3, the 
role of the state as an employer is such a tool, if employment and wages in the 
public sector differ from those regulated by the market or collective bargaining.3
2 That is, the wage elasticity of labour 
demand and supply. For more detail 
see e.g. Scharle et al. (2010).
3 The state may also make employ-
ment more expensive through 
employment law and other adminis-
trative regulations, such as obligatory 
pay supplements, the need to have 
certain (regularly upgraded) qualifi-
cations for certain occupations, and 
various safety regulations (e.g. rest 
periods for lorry drivers or limits on 
overtime); however, these are not con-
sidered here. 
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estAblishment And operAtion of the system of collective 
bArgAining in the mArket economy 
the tripartite (government, employer and union) national Council for the Recon-
ciliation of interests (országos Érdekegyeztető tanács, oÉt)4 was established 
in 1998, but its origins go back to the ‘wage reform negotiations’ of 1987. the 
main purpose of the reform was to abolish administrative wage regulation in the 
corporate sector, with the hope of arresting the decline in average real wages 
that had been taking place since 1979, and then of reversing the trend.5 the trade 
unions and employers (still mainly state-owned and cooperative enterprises) 
fully accepted the goals of the wage reform. Central wage control was to be 
replaced by tripartite negotiations between employers, trade unions and the 
government, and by bilateral industry- or company-level collective bargaining, 
whose institutions (since genuine trade unions and employer organizations 
were lacking) were to be established. the wage reform was also expected to 
ensure that central wage regulation did not have employment policy functions.6 
as will be seen later, this approach was also present in the wage policy pursued 
by the ministry in the following decade.
Following the political changeover, the confederations created by the break-up 
of the national Council of trade unions (szakszervezetek országos tanácsa, 
szot) of the single-party era and the newly established independent trade 
unions joined the employee side of oÉt, while those organizations representing 
employers that were formed from the earlier corporate or cooperative artisan 
and shopkeeper organizations and the national association of entrepreneurs 
and employers joined the employer side of the oÉt. the lack of legitimacy of 
these organizations in 1990 was due to the fact that the internal, functional 
reform of the successors to communist organizations was not obvious, while 
the newly established organizations suffered from poor organization among 
their members. later on, the oÉt itself played an important role in the 
consolidation of the new interest groups: partly by settling the legitimacy and 
property rights disputes of trade unions, and partly by ensuring legitimacy 
through its membership, since only oÉt members were accepted as social 
partners.7 on the side of the government it was always the ministry respon-
sible for labour issues that participated in oÉt, but government delegations 
also included the ministers of other ministries involved in whatever issue was 
being discussed. although the political significance of oÉt varied consider-
ably across government administrations, prime ministers usually attended 
meetings when announcing significant economic or wage policy measures. 
it is indicative of the different political aims that socialist prime ministers 
attended meetings more frequently.
the routines and attitudes adopted at the beginning of the 1990s, when tripar-
tite negotiation developed fully – partly because of the conflict-resolution role 
it assumed during the october 1990blockade of budapest organized by taxi 
drivers8 – remained dominant. the wage policy pursued by the labour ministry 
of the antall government mainly followed the ‘wage reform’ principle. almost 
from the beginning, annual wage negotiations included setting the minimum 
wage and the recommended wage increase (as an upper limit in the first few 
years). During the negotiations, the priorities of the government (still based 
4 Wage negotiations took place in 
the OÉT between 1990 and 1999, 
and in the National Labour Council 
between 1999 and 2002. In addition 
to changes to its name, the mandate of 
the council was also modified several 
times. Reform of the OÉT began under 
the Horn government, with the aim 
of reinforcing its consultative char-
acter and reducing its co-decision 
rights. The reform was completed by 
the first Orbán government: the man-
date of the National Labour Council 
was restricted to discussion of labour 
issues. The Medgyessy government 
restored the OÉT’s earlier (pre-1998) 
mandate in 2002, and also – as a sym-
bolic gesture – its name. The last 
meeting of the OÉT took place on 2 
December 2010. 
5 While in the pure command econ-
omy there was no economic restric-
tion on the efforts of companies to 
increase headcount and wages (Kornai, 
1980), from 1968 central wage control 
obliged state enterprises to pay a sur-
tax should they increase the average 
wage or the wage bill. Some of the 
increase in wages could be exempt 
from the surtax, if a performance indi-
cator was met or in line with casual 
exceptions (Gábor and Kővári, 1990; 
Tóth, 2008).
6 In 1988, these efforts were inspired 
by the consequences of previous reg-
ulations governing average wages, 
which were designed to maintain full 
employment under state socialism by 
providing incentives for companies to 
keep on their low-wage employees. 
7 This approach was later also 
adopted by legislators and, in accor-
dance with a law passed in 1996, only 
organizations that were members of 
a confederation that participated in 
OÉT were eligible to delegate rep-
resentatives to lower-level tripartite 
bodies (e.g. county labour councils).
8 The ‘taxi drivers’ blockade’ was 
a protest against a steep rise in the 
price of petrol in 1990; thousands 
of taxi and lorry drivers stopped the 
traffic of Budapest and several other 
towns in Hungary for three days (see 
also Somorjai 2003).
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on practices adopted in the ‘shortage economy’) were to limit the outflow of 
earnings and wage inflation. this was a question of balance, and the politicians 
did not consider competitiveness or employment aspects. at the same time, 
the main considerations of the employers and the employees were the transi-
tion to a market economy (wage liberalization) and performance-related pay 
increase. the oÉt also had standing committees, including one (which bore 
different names at different times) that dealt with wages, collective agree-
ments and/or welfare issues, and that always had a significant role.
there were diverse items on the agendas of plenary meetings, and these were 
reflected in the outcome of negotiations – called wage policy agreements. For 
example the agenda of the December 1990 meeting included, in addition to 
changes to the wage and tax system, various transfers: the method of pension 
increase, increasing the flat-rate parental leave (gyes) and family allowance, as 
well as the budget of the social security Fund. this agenda heralded an ambi-
tion to develop a complex living standards policy. in this respect, there was 
a break during the first orbán government, since it had its own welfare policy 
vision, which it implemented without consulting social partners. Following that, 
the ‘restoration’ of the oÉt during the medgyessy administration, with the 
slogan ‘welfare transition’, entailed a return to the role oÉt had developed 
for itself in the 1990s. tripartite negotiations followed the pattern of meet-
ings held between the government and the national Council of trade unions 
(szot), predecessor of the oÉt, before 1988. these followed the tradition 
of acting upon presumed interests, typical of the communist kádár era, since 
they sought to speak for a wider social group than was directly represented 
by their delegates. although the restriction on wages was of high priority in 
the first few years, by the mid-1990s the reform of social transfers and their 
institutions received more focus, as did changes in real wages.
Wage negotiations, in fact, involved bargaining about distribution from the 
very beginning: according to the minutes of meetings, allocation ratios for 
the three ‘income owners’ (employers, employees and the state), as they 
were called, were negotiated, during which it was only possible to make minor 
amendments to the government proposal, e.g. small realignments of taxes and 
contributions. employment (or, more precisely, changes in unemployment) was 
a precondition of the collective bargaining only in the early 1990s, but then 
was soon forgotten.9 the suggestion that an increase in unemployment may 
be curbed by a reduction in wages was never discussed.
trade unions always demanded a minimum wage not lower than the living 
wage, a new system of national tariff-based wages, with using the ‘favourability 
principle’.10 employers never agreed with this trade union proposal, regarding 
it as a restriction on their autonomy. trade unions wished to compensate for 
their weak bargaining power at the industry and company level, as well as for 
the lack of local collective agreements, by securing legal regulations adopted 
through the national negotiations. their demand for a minimum wage set at 
the level of the living wage resulted from a realization that the transfers of 
the state socialist system were being cut back, and therefore they wanted to 
have the value of these built into wages.
in addition to the formal agenda of the oÉt meetings, an almost ritual 
procedure for negotiating wage policy developed back in the early 1990s 
9 According to the manifesto of the 
Antall government, ‘The aim is to 
adjust the minimum wage to sub-
sistence costs continuously, without 
generating inflation and reducing the 
competitiveness of some sectors. 
Potential negative impacts on employ-
ment are to be taken into account’ 
(quoted by Tóth, 2008). However, the 
minutes reveal no explicit example 
of the latter during the wage nego-
tiations in the first government term.
10 The national tariff system inher-
ited from state socialism was abol-
ished in 1992, when the new Labour 
Code was adopted. The ‘favourability 
principle’ refers to the German Gün-
stigkeitsprinzip, which is also acknowl-
edged by the Labour Code; it states 
that lower-level regulations can only 
deviate to the benefit of employees. 
A ministerial decree on the system 
of cross-sectoral classification was 
adopted in 1992. OÉT even developed 
recommended wage coefficients for 
the tariff categories in 1993; in spite of 
the efforts of the trade unions, these 
did not have a regulatory effect. 
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and was preserved until 2010. it always consisted of three rounds. First, the 
partners discussed the main macro-economic indicators (preconditions 
for wage negotiations) expected for the following year, especially inflation, 
gDp, productivity and unemployment. the ‘outcome’ of the first round was 
a consultation held on the budget. the second round dealt with changes in the 
tax and contributions system, and only after that was a (formally separate) 
meeting (or series of meetings) devoted to wage negotiations, i.e. to setting 
the national minimum wage and making recommendations for wage increases 
in the private sector. these ‘autumn negotiations’ were still a feature in autumn 
2010, during the second orbán government’s term in office. the negotiating 
parties regularly held their own meetings before the plenary and committee 
meeting of oÉt to agree a common position and strategy. informal deals 
were always important during the national tripartite negotiations. on the 
one hand, the government itself organized non-public meetings – usually to 
prepare the ground for major economic policy changes.11 on the other hand, 
informal meetings were also frequently held by the social partners; these 
were often attended only by the rotating chairs and chief negotiators of the 
parties. this kind of information exchange occurred regularly between the 
wage negotiation rounds.
the government was represented by the labour and finance ministries at the 
tax and wage negotiations. of the two, it was obviously the finance ministry 
that was dominant; the labour ministry’s role was to translate fiscal limitations 
in terms of wage policy and to organize the meetings.12
organizing the meetings also included making expert calculations. the wage 
policy recommendations of the government (the so-called position papers) 
were generally summarized by the labour ministry, usually supported by detailed 
impact calculations (tóth, 2008). neither the trade unions, nor the employer 
organizations had sufficient expertise on which they could rely, so the impact 
calculations were prepared in the ministries, taking into account the needs of 
the social partners. in some cases, the experts from the social partners worked 
together with the experts in the ministries in the ‘back rooms of the finance 
ministry’ to calculate the impact of various tax scales. those social partners 
interviewed had a high opinion of the quality of the calculations made by the 
ministries, which prevented any of the partners from bluffing or negotiating 
on the basis of unsubstantiated figures. However, the calculations only dealt 
with the number of people affected by measures, their proportions in terms 
of industry, and the impact on the budget and on inflation; they did not model 
impacts on labour supply and demand (cf. Chapter 3.2).
Hungarian wage policy has been influenced by the recommendations of various 
international organizations at various times. in the early 1990s, the recommen-
dations of the oeCD and (especially) of the imF had an impact, as did those 
of the international labour organization (ilo), which early on recommended 
setting up the tripartite interest conciliation system.
the fiscAl crisis And the bokros pAckAge (1994–95)
by 1994, the balance of payments and the general government deficit had 
become unsustainable: the government budget deficit stood at 8.4 per cent of 
11 Such a  meeting was convened 
by the first Orbán government after 
announcing the increase in the mini-
mum wage in spring 2001; however 
they only became more frequent after 
2006.
12 According to one of the senior 
staff responsible for wage policy in 
the labour ministry, ‘being in charge 
of organizing the negotiations, the 
“labour folks” usually managed to 
mediate successfully when the fiscal 
plans of the finance ministry and the 
wage demands of the trade unions 
clashed’. According to another minis-
try official, to some extent they were 
able to bargain with the finance minis-
try, e.g. about the extent of the budget 
reserves during the wage increase in 
the public sector. 
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gDp. this necessitated the so-called ‘bokros package’ of 1995, long postponed 
by the Horn government. one of its important elements was the restriction of 
wage levels in the public sector, which managed to restore the sustainability 
of public finances (antal, 1998). throughout the decade, the country had 
inflation running at over 14 per cent, i.e. significantly higher than the oeCD 
average. inflationary expectations built into wages may have contributed to 
the economy’s stagnation.
in the first half of the 1990s, the outcome of the annual negotiations was 
often called a ‘price-wage agreement’. and rightly so, since it was not just that 
the wage increases were based on projected inflation, but the prices fixed 
by the authorities were also negotiated (especially fuel and energy prices, 
partly because of the taxi drivers’ blockade). the outcome of the price nego-
tiations was usually exceeded by actual inflation, but this was mainly due to 
the tendency on the part of the finance ministry (a tendency known to the 
other negotiating parties) to provide understated inflation figures – partly as 
a negotiating strategy and partly to avoid exaggerated inflationary expecta-
tions. according to gábor tóth, one of the government officials responsible for 
wage negotiations, only the years of 1997–98 were exceptions, when reliable 
forecasts were prepared.
the possibility of concluding a price-wage agreement supplemented by an 
economic-welfare package (i.e. a social pact, in the Western european sense 
of the term) arose as far back as the early 1990s, but it was only the Horn 
government that finally attempted to conclude a social-economic agreement.13 
this was in 1994, in a macro-economic environment where political decision 
makers already knew that they would soon have to introduce measures that 
would significantly damage living standards. the aim of the agreement was 
to ensure public support. However, the government’s proposal on wage policy 
did not explicitly state the aim of reducing wage levels or halting their rise 
(tóth, 2008). the increasingly lengthy lists of demands from the trade unions 
and employers indicate that the social partners did not wish to endorse the 
inevitable austerity measures (kőhegyi, 1995; Héthy, 1998).
after the negotiations were declared unsuccessful, in February 1995, the 
bokros package was practically issued as a government ultimatum. its only 
wage component concerned the public sector: it restricted wage increases 
for employees of state-owned companies and government agencies. never-
theless, the programmed devaluation of the Forint and a newly introduced 
additional duty had a dramatic inflationary impact on nominal wages. in 1995 
and 1996 there was an overall 17 per cent decrease in real wages (in spite of 
a double-digit increase in nominal wages). the (renamed) Council for Recon-
ciliation of interests (Ét) only managed to agree a minimum wage for 1995 
and, as a result of the bokros package, the usual recommendation for a wage 
increase was not issued in 1995.
in autumn 1995 the government was afraid that inflation would remain high, 
and therefore issued a proposal to the employer and employee organizations 
of the Ét for a price-wage agreement for 1996. in the event, no agreement was 
reached, but it was an important milestone, in that one of the key demands of 
the employer organizations was that employer contributions (which amounted 
to 50 per cent of the gross wage) should be significantly reduced. although 
13 According to Héthy (1998), a price-
wage agreement was first proposed at 
the beginning of 1994 by László Urbán, 
who at that time was an MP for Fidesz.
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agreements were reached on changes to several taxes, the negotiations on 
contributions ground to a halt. in spite of this, the finance ministry decided to 
support the demands of the employers for a reduction in employer contribu-
tions and an increase in employee contributions – a move they only managed 
to implement in 1999. these measures on the part of the ministry were 
influenced by the oeCD recommendations to reduce the tax wedge (oeCD, 
2000). later on, there was a gradual shift in contributions from employers to 
employees (see table 5.7 of the statistical annex).
as for the realignment of contributions, it is worth looking at the positions 
of the negotiating parties. according to a senior official in the labour ministry 
at the time, a more significant realignment of employer and employee contri-
butions would have required a  ‘grossing-up’, i.e. employees would have to 
receive higher gross wages in order to be able to pay higher contributions. 
a fair solution to this would have been a (technically difficult) amendment 
to the progressive personal income tax. However, this was never seriously 
discussed, even though one argument for the realignment of contributions 
was the positive (educational) impact it would have on the tax awareness of 
employees (tóth, 2008).
We believe there were more telling arguments for (and interests related to) 
the realignment. a senior official from the labour unit of the finance ministry 
said in interview that, while it had been a strategic objective to reduce labour 
costs, there had not been sufficient budget appropriations. as it was not 
possible to reduce the aggregate level of contributions, it was left to the 
local level to negotiate trade-offs for the increase in employee contributions. 
it probably resulted in a fall in net wages in the short run, and the procedure 
held out the prospect of an additional political benefit: decentralization of 
conflicts. that is exactly why the trade unions opposed the measure. they 
were afraid that employees would not be compensated because of their weak 
bargaining power at the local level.14 this argument has been widely used by 
the trade unions ever since. later on, government efforts to reduce charges 
on labour always clashed with the position of the unions, which maintained 
that reducing the charges on labour would only increase profits, but would not 
create jobs – this is hardly surprising, considering the distributive function of 
the wage and tax negotiations.
wAge policy expAnsion (1999–2005)
the period following the bokros package was characterized by sustainable 
macro-economic balance and stable global economic conditions. the common 
goal of the political elite was the political and economic integration with 
Western europe, including eu accession. Hungary was successful in the 
regional competition among post-communist countries (primarily for foreign 
direct investment). inflation, although still high, had fallen below 10 per cent 
by the end of the period (oeCD, 2000). the change of government in 1998 
saw a sharp break with the roles the previous governments had assumed: 
the Fidesz government wished to (and was able to) impose its political and 
economic policy goals more firmly on the government administration, even if 
the civil service opposed them (see Chapter 3.1).
14 It was to some extent justif i-
able: according to economic the-
ory, although it may be important 
in the short run which contribution 
is reduced, in two or three years it 
depends on the bargaining power of 
employers and employees how much is 
received by employees (Nickell, 2004).
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the influence of the european union on government policy increased even 
as the country prepared for eu accession. in terms of wage policy, the eu’s 
broad economic policy guidelines were of importance: these explicitly recom-
mended concluding long-term wage agreements (tóth, 2008). after accession, 
the various eu framework documents (european social Charter, employment 
guidelines) had some impact on the activity of oÉt, but there were no direc-
tives on wage policy, and those on employment rarely concerned the issue of 
wage levels until 2004.15
inflation kept below 10 per cent in this period and was only a challenge in terms 
of meeting the convergence criteria. economic growth opened up opportu-
nities for a gradual wage rise. trade unions expressed their disappointment 
during the 1998 autumn negotiations that employees barely benefited from 
the economic growth, as the government envisaged a real wage increase 2–3 
per cent lower than gDp growth. signalling a change in government tactics, 
from now on the government insisted that the social partners should first 
agree on a minimum wage and wage increase recommendation, and only then 
would the government decide whether to join the agreement. this was obvi-
ously driven by the consideration that the employer organizations were much 
stronger at resisting the demands of trade unions than was the government. 
thus, by 2000, both the minimum wage level and the wage increase recom-
mendations were determined by a bilateral agreement between employers 
and employees.
although the trade union demand for wage increases proportionate to output 
has been a feature throughout the history of wage negotiations,16 it was only in 
1999 that an informal government proposal was made, offering to link the real 
wage increase to economic growth for three years. this was the brainchild of 
istván stumpf, and it proposed a real wage increase of 50 per cent of annual 
gDp growth – a figure that was not acceptable to the social partners. this 
was apparently a ‘spur of the moment’ figure and its possible ramifications 
were investigated by government experts only in 2000, when the govern-
ment entered into negotiations on a potential long-term wage agreement 
with the public sector trade unions (tóth, 2008). nevertheless, a decade and 
more later, this is still the only moment in the history of wage negotiations 
that there was a chance of applying a formula in the medium term which at 
least had a structure similar to those of the wage agreements of the Western 
european social pacts.17
the orbán government doubled the minimum wage between 1999 and 2001. the 
context within which this essentially unilateral decision was made is described in 
Chapter 4.3, but it should be noted here that the demand in society for a wage 
increase had already been voiced earlier. it was not only the general public that 
hoped the political transition would result in prosperity and that conditions would 
improve after two crises. the national labour Council (országos munkaügyi 
tanács, omt) (the new name for the old oÉt) also took a decision in 1998 to 
consult on the possibility of aligning wages with european levels. the consulta-
tions took place in summer 1999, when a study prepared by the analysts of the 
ministry of economic affairs was discussed. this study emphasized the fact 
that any rise in wages was subject to convergence of economic output (based 
on productivity and not jeopardizing balanced public finances) and thus was not 
15 For more details see Gács (2005): 
the lack of ‘wage awareness’ of the 
EU Employment Guidelines may have 
contributed to the weak cooperation 
of wage and employment units within 
the Hungarian ministry. 
16 Trade unions never succeeded in 
asserting this claim in the 1990s.
17 Social pacts are national macro-
economic agreements, typically con-
cluded in major crises, which may 
include taxation, monetary issues, 
wage restrain, inflation, labour mar-
ket and employment policies, flexibility 
and the Euro convergence criteria, etc. 
(Fayertag and Pochet, 1997; Hassel, 
2007). 
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a short-term process. it required faster economic growth than was achieved in 
the eu-15 countries in the long run (tóth, 2008).
another important development related to the significant increase in the 
minimum wage is that in 2000 the question of the direct impact of a rise in 
the minimum wage on employment arose for the first time in the history of 
the oÉt/Ét/omt negotiations. However, neither the government papers nor 
the proposals of the social partners contained any preliminary calculations; 
counter-arguments were only improvised by the negotiating parties. this is in 
sharp contrast to the repeated recommendation of the oeCD (oeCD, 2000, 
2002, 2004, 2007), which emphasized the importance of reducing charges 
on labour as a major tool in boosting employment.
one of the important wage policy measures of the orbán government was 
a generous salary increase for military and law-enforcement personnel and 
for civil servants in 2001. Following that, major wage policy measures of the 
medgyessy government’s ‘100-day programme’ included a 50 per cent salary 
increase for public service employees and a move to make the minimum wage 
tax-free. increasing the salaries of public service employees was inevitable, 
since (due to the earlier minimum wage increase) in 65 of the 140 mandatory 
wage brackets the guaranteed minimum salary was lower than the minimum 
wage. From autumn 2001, protests and petitions also called attention to the 
fact (see árok and mayer, 2002). experts still disagree whether it all had to be 
implemented at the same time and whether the wage adjustment should have 
been linked to structural changes (the concept of which was not developed at 
the time).18 the political motives for making the minimum wage exempt from 
tax are clear, but its implementation is criticized by the unions.19
one of the most significant of the wage agreements of the period was a three-
year agreement concluded in 2005 (during the second term in office of the 
gyurcsány government) on the gradual increase in the minimum wage; it also 
introduced two minimum wage levels for skilled workers, dependent on work 
experience. it established a three-tier system for a mandatory minimum wage, 
supplemented by a recommended wage minimum for professionals with a higher 
education degree. this system is unique in europe: in some other countries, 
the minimum wage is typically reduced for some groups of workers, in order 
to encourage their employment. the uniqueness of this system requires us 
to discuss the institutional background to its introduction below.
there had already been attempts to conclude a three-year agreement earlier, 
during the medgyessy administration, and a multi-tier, tariff-like system had 
long been demanded by the trade unions. the labour ministry also accepted 
the idea; on the assumption that a higher minimum wage discourages the 
shadow economy, it fitted in with a series of government measures to combat 
the shadow economy.20 over the three years of the agreement (and assuming 
the government projections were fulfilled) the minimum wage was to reach 
the level of the living wage for single people, which had also been a long-
cherished dream of the unions. as in previous years, the employers rejected 
the proposal at first, saying that ‘it would eliminate the labour market defini-
tion of the minimum wage … and guaranteed wage minimums would inter-
fere with the decisions of employers on wages’ (quoted by tóth, 2008). the 
consent of the employers was achieved by offering a five-year tax-reduction 
18 E.g. to the termination of doc-
tors receiving gratuities, or to layoffs 
in other fields. On the impact of the 
significant wage increase in the pub-
lic sector on the private sector, see 
Telegdy (2007).
19 Tax exemption was achieved by 
expanding the tax credit, which is effi-
cient (unlike a zero tax rate, it only 
applies to people with low income) 
but, according to the trade unions, it 
did not comply with the original aim of 
tax credits, i.e. to reimburse the costs 
of taking up employment. The Per-
sonal Income Tax Act of 1988 included 
a fixed credit rate for that purpose.
20 A similar attempt was made in 
2005 to conclude and extend an 
industry-level collective agreement 
in the construction industry, which 
would cover all enterprises, regardless 
of their membership of an employer 
organization (Tóth and Neumann, 
2005). According to the interviews 
conducted, the labour team at the eco-
nomics ministry also recommended 
the multi-tier system in order to pre-
vent another significant increase, and 
in this way to mitigate the (probably 
highly negative) impact on the employ-
ment of unskilled workers. According 
to interviews conducted with labour 
officials, there was not another sig-
nificant minimum wage increase on 
the agenda. 
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scheme at the informal meetings. although three employer organizations 
the national Federation of agricultural Cooperatives and producers, the 
Confederation of Hungarian employers and industrialists, and the national 
Federation of Craftsmen boards did not sign the agreement, they did not 
veto it either. employers only managed to have it included that the guaranteed 
minimum wage of skilled workers could be lowered to the minimum wage 
under a sector-level collective agreement – but such an agreement was only 
concluded in agriculture. as with previous minimum wage increases, only the 
usual preliminary calculations had been made, but no forecast of the impact 
on employment had been prepared at the ministry – though two studies on 
the impact of an increase in the minimum wage had recently been published.21 
the oÉt document announcing the three-year agreement at the end of 2005 
only makes general statements on employment, and does not include actual 
measures or recommendations.22 questioning the sense of the vat reduc-
tion that occurred at the same time, the social partners declared that they 
would have preferred a tax reduction in relation to charges on labour (tóth 
and neumann, 2006).
according to announcements issued after oÉt meetings, employment policy 
was included in the wage negotiations, or at least in the declarations, after 
2004.23 besides the rhetoric, from 2005 there were efforts to make real changes 
by simplifying the tax system. the ‘100 steps’ programme launched in 2005 
primarily aimed at curbing the shadow economy, while the social partners at 
the oÉt negotiations called the attention of the government to the fact that 
‘they deem it important that positive decisions are also made on employment 
in the formal economy in order to improve the revenue generation of the 
Hungarian economy’ (oÉt, 2005a). nevertheless the most significant battles of 
the period still concerned issues of distribution: the most important demands 
of the trade unions included adjusting the tax brackets to the distribution of 
nominal wages (so that average wages are not subject to the highest tax rate) 
and retaining tax-exempt allowances. in the same period, the demands of the 
employers focused on reducing taxes and contributions on labour: the most 
notable demand of the period is for the abolition of the flat-rate healthcare 
contribution, which was reduced in 2006 but abolished only in 2010. 
Austerity And crisis (2006–10)
the budget deficit, which had again increased to an unsustainable level by 
2006, was mainly due to several deficit-generating decisions made for political 
reasons (ohnsorge-szabó and Romhányi, 2007). in the meantime, the rela-
tively good regional competitiveness of Hungary had eroded considerably 
according to the ranking of both the institute for management Development 
(imD) and the World economic Forum (WeF), based on different methodology 
(see Chapter 1.2). Hungary was competing with the other eastern european 
post-communist countries for foreign direct investment through wages and 
taxes. by 1997, all three baltic states had introduced an apparently flat-rate 
tax system (though – as only the part of income above the minimum wage is 
taxable – in fact it is a two-bracket system), and after 2000 they were followed 
by nearby competitors Russia, slovakia and Romania (kiss et al., 2008).
21 Based on the already available 
impact assessment of the previous 
increase (Kertesi and Köllő 2004; 
Halpern et al., 2004), forecasts of the 
impact on employment were prepared 
in the Finance Ministry and the Cen-
tral Bank of Hungary, but there is no 
evidence that they were provided to 
the participants of the OÉT. However, 
it was well known that the analysts 
of the Finance Ministry opposed the 
further increase of the minimum wage, 
and the summary of the debate on it 
was published on the website of the 
ministry (Benedek et al., 2006).
22 ‘OÉT regards the expansion of 
employment to be as important as 
the increase in wages. Based on these 
principles, it is a common interest of 
the negotiating parties of OÉT to 
increase wages to an extent that will 
harmonize the increase in real wages, 
the expansion of employment and the 
output of the economy and in this way 
will determine a stable and reliable 
path for approaching the higher Euro-
pean (inserted by the authors) wages 
in the long run’ (OÉT, 2005b).
23 E.g.: ‘…considers job creation 
a high priority’ (OÉT, 2003). ‘…it sup-
ports all solutions for job retention 
and creation through tax relief’ (OÉT, 
2004).
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to tackle the obviously unsustainable government budget deficit, projected 
to be 11 per cent of gDp, after the elections of 2006 the government (the 
first since the change of regime to be re-elected) decided to increase reve-
nues. Following the prime minister’s leaked speech in balatonőszöd and the 
ensuing protests, the government embarked on an ambitious reform agenda 
with little social and political support; most of the reforms were thwarted by 
a referendum initiated by the parliamentary opposition. the socialist prime 
minister, leading a minority government after the breakup of the mszp–szDsz 
(socialist–liberal) coalition, could do nothing but resign in response to the 
global economic crisis of 2008.
the euphoria of the oÉt agreement concluded in December 2005 lasted only 
six months, as the austerity package was announced by Ferenc gyurcsány in 
june 2006, after the elections, at a plenary meeting of the oÉt. negotiations in 
the oÉt followed the same scenario as after the announcement of the bokros 
package. the prime minister declared that he was only prepared to play by 
the rules of a ‘zero-sum game’. in accordance with the traditions of the forum, 
after the prime minister’s opening speech and the following general remarks 
by the social partners’ subcommittee and expert team, meetings were held. 
the issues discussed at the plenary meetings were of less and less signifi-
cance. the issue of a potential social pact did not arise at the time the detailed 
package was announced because that would have conveyed the message: ‘We 
have already developed it, calculated everything and are only expecting your 
support.’ the announcement only outlined the austerity package and sought 
to reassure the state’s creditors; it confined itself to generalities about the 
reforms (since the government only had a rough idea of them). therefore it 
was not possible to discuss them and to reach a mutually advantageous, long-
term agreement. the negotiations resorted to discussion of minor details, and 
even partial agreements failed because of the resistance of the government 
(neumann and tóth, 2008).
in the following two years, the employers wanted to denounce the three-year 
agreement and the three-tier minimum wage, arguing that the circumstances 
had changed. these ‘achievements’ were retained by the trade unions, with 
strong support from the government.24 the usual scope of the bargaining 
was restricted to spreading the pain caused by the tax increase, and the wage 
recommendations issued in january 2007 served to preserve the prestige 
of the oÉt (which was under attack by the president of the country at the 
time),25 rather than pursue their original aim of providing guidance for lower-
level negotiations. once the global economic crisis broke at the end of 2008, 
it became even more difficult to reach national wage agreements (which 
primarily aimed at preserving real wages), and meanwhile the employers put 
up ever fiercer resistance to the idea of maintaining the minimum wage of 
skilled workers. nevertheless, during the crisis, local collective bargaining 
increasingly focused on retaining jobs.
after the resignation of the prime minister, the new government, led by gordon 
bajnai, was mainly responsible for managing the international and internal crisis. 
the oÉt was informed of the bajnai package of 2009 by the finance minister. the 
proposal stated that it was impossible to achieve growth without restrictions; 
therefore the length of insured maternity leave (gyed) and flat-rate maternity 
24 Before the announcement by 
Prime Minister Gyurcsány on the aus-
terity measures, Péter Kiss, head of 
the prime minister’s office, assured 
the trade unions that the government 
would respect earlier agreements con-
cluded in the OÉT. At the same time, 
the (unjustified) belief that a  high 
minimum wage effectively reduces 
the shadow economy and increases 
revenues was also widely held in the 
Finance Ministry (cf. Halpern et al., 
2004). 
25 The OÉT law, adopted unani-
mously by Parliament after lengthy 
preparation, was not signed by Pres-
ident László Sólyom. He referred it 
to the Constitutional Court, which 
deemed some sections of it (e.g. the 
consensual determination of the mini-
mum wage) unconstitutional.
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leave (gyes) was to be reduced, and there was to be a 10 percentage point cut 
in the replacement rate of sick pay, and modification of the subsidized housing 
promotion loans and the subsidized gas and district heating rates. Further-
more, significant measures were planned to reduce charges on labour (which 
would encourage employment)26 and to reduce the administrative burdens on 
employers and employees. these measures were to be paid for by introducing 
a real estate tax and by increasing vat by 5 percentage points.
the unions accepted the vat increase (with minor modifications) but ‘firmly 
rejected and considered unethical the 10 percentage point cut in sick pay’. 
they also opposed the unconditional general reduction in employer contribu-
tions, and demanded the same reduction in employee contributions. at the 
same time, they tried to protect the tax-exempt allowances of employees and 
took strong exception to the government’s proposed realignment of taxes to 
stimulate employment.27 nor were the employer organizations content with 
the offer.28 the employer and employee organizations joined forces to fight 
the taxation of benefits in kind. Finally, in spite of the intentions of the govern-
ment, it was not possible to overcome the usual framework of distributive 
bargaining among ‘income owners’.
the top personal income tax rates have fallen almost continuously in the past 
20 years; thus, if we ignore the ‘tax bracket creep’ due to inflation, the tax 
system has become less and less progressive. in effect, the bajnai govern-
ment introduced a flat-rate income tax when it announced plans to raise the 
threshold of the lower band to 15 million Forints by 2011. these performance 
incentives were probably well received by the employer organizations, though 
their support is barely evident in the minutes of oÉt meetings. the resis-
tance of the trade unions is more conspicuous; they have always supported 
progressive taxation.
the charges on labour were reduced after a decade-long campaign by the 
employer organizations; however, even employers were unsure that it would 
have a positive effect on employment. according to interviews conducted, to 
some extent they even agreed with the unions that the charges are required 
for the normal functioning of the various funds (pension, social security and 
labour market fund). because of the distributive nature of the bargaining, 
the trade unions regard the reduction in contributions and the shifting of 
contributions to employees (which has been a steady trend over the past 20 
years) as a profit-maximizing rearrangement, since it reduces the net income 
of employees, who are unable to ensure in the local bargaining that employers 
compensate them for this 1–2 per cent annual loss.
the deepening economic crisis further eroded the prestige and political signifi-
cance of oÉt (which was restored as such in 2002). on the one hand, this was 
due to the ever more obviously poor organization of its members (especially 
the trade unions), their lack of ability to mobilize their membership, and their 
political divisions; and on the other hand it was due to the rival forums set 
up by the government (economic and social Council, economic Reconcilia-
tion Forum). traditional forums for the trade unions were also increasingly 
overshadowed during the crisis, because Reformszövetség (Reform alliance), 
a new interest group for enterprises, took the lead (neumann, 2009). During 
the crisis management, trade unions gradually lost ground in the forums of 
26 The flat-rate healthcare contribu-
tion was abolished, employer contri-
butions decreased by 5 percentage 
points up to double the minimum 
wage, the lower personal income 
tax threshold was raised to 5 million 
Forints and sick pay was reduced.
27 According to the employee side 
of OÉT ‘Tax amendments in 2010 … 
serve the interests of employers … it 
opposes the modification of personal 
income tax brackets and rates in its 
proposed form … and … regards the 
proposal as a shift towards flat-rate 
personal income tax’ (OÉT, 2009).
28 ‘It considers “super grossing” 
unreasonable, … [and] it does not 
accept a fivefold rise in the rehabili-
tation contribution …’ (ibid.)
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influencing policy making. their labour law rights and their budget were pruned, 
and the formal abolition of the oÉt during the second orbán government 
marked the end of a long process.
summAry And recommendAtions
Wage negotiation in Hungary is primarily based on company-level collective 
agreements or individual agreements. Following the elimination of the central 
wage regulation of state socialism, the government had only the tax and contri-
butions system, the minimum wage and its power to set public sector wages at 
its disposal in order to influence wages and – through them – employment. in 
the past 20 years, the tripartite negotiations have had an impact on all of this, 
although to varying extents. However, such negotiations amounted to distribu-
tive bargaining, with the macro-economic conditions fixed by the government, 
and the issue of employment playing but a marginal role. the intentions of the 
government were paramount (it was always the government that submitted 
proposals; the other parties always relied on figures provided by the govern-
ment). the social partners sometimes managed to modify the proposals slightly, 
but in the long run, however, they were capable of achieving more significant 
change – especially if their efforts were supported by the government. partly 
as a result of this, taxes and contributions on labour, as well as the top tax rate, 
have all decreased considerably in the past two decades. nevertheless, even 
the social partners are sceptical about their positive impact on performance 
and employment. the most important role of oÉt/Ét/omt was not conflict 
resolution or preservation of social harmony (as was assumed in the early 
1990s). For the negotiating parties, distributive bargaining has always been 
more important; but the changes determining its trends (e.g. the taxation of 
capital and work incomes, reforming/expanding the welfare state, distributing 
contributions, etc.) were decided in the course of political games, over which 
the social partners had little influence. However, it was a major result for the 
institution that the social partners, representing the interests of employers 
and employees and with their wide-ranging corporate and workplace experi-
ence, did contribute to improving the quality of policy making.29
it may also be concluded that, if it is not generally accepted by either the 
government, or the employer or the employee organizations that the labour 
market is an actual market, where an increase in payroll taxes or in the minimum 
wage will reduce employment (something supported by both theory and 
empirical data), then the different sides are likely to adopt their different 
stances on wage policy based exclusively on other considerations, such as the 
wage-inflation fears of the Finance ministry, the constant demands for the 
budget revenues to be increased, and the considerations of employers and 
employees concerning distribution have all resulted in different measures in 
different situations. in spite of the declared political intentions, throughout 
the past 20 years, taxes and contributions on average and lower earnings have 
remained higher in Hungary than in other countries. if labour economists do 
not manage to make all the negotiating parties realize that decisions on wages 
may have a direct impact on employment, we cannot expect the situation to 
improve in the future.
29 This ‘input’ was less conspicuous 
during the functioning of the tripar-
tite negotiations but its absence is felt 
after the abolishment of OÉT. Accord-
ing to the interviewees, the govern-
ment intervention compensating for 
the negative impacts of the changes in 
the personal income tax in 2011 would 
not have been needed if the govern-
ment considers the remarks of social 
partners articulated at the OÉT meet-
ing, shared by several experts.
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2.3. micro-regional development* 
geRgely kabai, juDit kelleR anD nánDoR nÉmetH
* The authors would like to thank 
Gábor Balás, András Csite and Bálint 
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paring this chapter. 
this chapter will map out the goals of domestic development policy and the 
way it has influenced settlement cooperation at the micro-regional level. 
although generally clear demarcations are drawn between regional and rural 
development within Hungarian and eu development policy, this chapter does 
not differentiate one from the other, since the new complex rural development 
approach also focuses on competitiveness and on harnessing local capacities 
and resources. an in-depth discussion of local government initiatives that 
directly aim at increasing employment will follow in the next chapter.
theoreticAl bAckground to regionAl development
economic theories generally support state intervention in local economic 
development in two cases (barca, 2009). in the first case, agglomerations1 
always come about as a result of decisions by state and private actors (through 
investment, regulation, the foundation of institutions, public services). there 
is generally scant information to go on in deciding whether the agglomeration 
process will increase or decrease the efficiency of the economy as a whole 
(or whether there may be another agglomeration initiative that is worthy of 
development). as a result, private interests can easily influence public decisions 
– this risk can be mitigated by intervention, transparency, external evaluation 
and the involvement of the local public. 
in the second case, either the local elite has no vested interest in developing 
and managing economic institutions based on local capacities, or else effective 
institutions that could form the basis of the necessary institutional develop-
ment have been absent from the outset (path-dependence). state intervention 
could provide an adequate solution to this problem, integrating public services 
and goods that might induce institutional development and that might increase 
the productivity of local economic actors. 
in this case, intervention can be regarded as successful if it brings about 
changes in the institutional framework in such a way that increases the capaci-
ties of local actors to establish autonomous associations and developmental 
coalitions. associations established autonomously by local actors can enable 
them to mobilize resources and to represent their own development priori-
ties at higher decision-making levels of the state (bruszt and vedres, 2010). 
in Western europe, regional development had evolved since the 1950s as 
a crisis management policy; it attempted to improve the ability of regions to 
1 Agglomerations denote spatial 
units with a high density of consum-
ers, employees and enterprises; this 
permits economies of scale and the 
development of positive externalities 
as a result of multiple opportunities 
for specialization. The latter, how-
ever, also poses risks, as it makes local 
economies vulnerable to unpredict-
able processes of globalization and 
swift shifts in external demands. 
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attract capital by developing factors of productivity (szigeti, 2006). in a narrow 
sense, the goal of regional development is to reduce territorial inequalities 
and ensure the conditions for balanced territorial development. 
in the past two decades, both the academic literature and the economic 
development programmes of transnational organizations2 have encouraged 
the practical integration of public and development policies, as well as the 
implementation of subsidiarity and partnership. this approach recommends 
an overall strategic framework, within which local state and non-state actors 
can shape associations as they see fit. strategy-building and the establishment 
of an institutional framework are central state objectives, but local state and 
non-state actors should also be given ample room to participate in the process. 
institutional framework conditions can influence the qualitative features of 
local associations: top-down initiatives based on hierarchical (clientelistic) 
networks cannot guarantee social capital-building (paraskevopoulos, 2001). 
to ensure transparency and accountability, both external evaluation – whether 
actors actually play by the rules – and associations of local actors are neces-
sary (bruszt and vedres, 2010).
over the past few decades, instead of investments planned and implemented 
by the central state, Western europe and north america have witnessed the 
rise of local institutions and development projects that rely on local resources 
and that are accomplished through coalitions of local actors. in the eu’s 
multi-level governance model3 this vertical (decentralization, devolution) and 
horizontal (various state and non-state actors) distribution of power plays 
a significant role. 
the ‘place-based approach’ views the local level as the basic unit of the eu’s 
Cohesion policy. the local level is defined as a functional unit, i.e. its bound-
aries are drawn flexibly and not by public administration and politics (barca, 
2009; Czene and Ritz, 2010). this approach emphasizes that developmental 
interventions must be designed to be compatible with local endowments and 
preferences, building on local capacities and the autonomous cooperation of 
local actors. the barca report and the White book of the Committee of the 
Regions recommend the development of territorial performance indicators 
– not only to monitor local experiments with institution-building, but also to 
measure the efficiency of Cohesion policy interventions. 
in international practice, the actors of local economic development are local 
authorities, local non-state actors and local development agencies that focus 
on territorial development (mountford, 2009). local development agencies 
prepare regional development strategies, coordinate and promote the asso-
ciation of local actors and the planning and implementation of development 
projects. local development agencies can be coordinated by local government 
or by any other local organization (including partnerships); but in all cases they 
separate local development functions from local government tasks of public 
service provision (mountford, 2009). local economic development activities 
are ‘market-facing’ and involve long-term, wider area-based interventions that 
are planned and implemented through the cooperation of assorted local actors 
(mountford, 2009). the public service delivery function of local government, on 
the other hand, is organized at the public administration level and is based on the 
logic of ensuring service delivery to inhabitants of the local administrative area. 
2 Such as the Local Economic Devel-
opment (LED) and the Developing 
Enterprises Locally through Alliance 
and Action (DELTA) programmes of 
the World Bank, the Habitat pro-
gramme of the UN and the Local Eco-
nomic and Employment Development 
(LEED) programme of the OECD. 
3 It safeguards local state and non-
state actors’ participatory and deci-
sion-making rights in defining the 
goals and means of public and devel-
opment policy. 
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regionAl development dispArities in hungAry
two decades ago, the change in the political and economic system radically 
transformed the spatial development structure of Hungary. Whereas in the 
1970s and 1980s the main differential factors were the quality of public infra-
structure and access to services at the settlement and township level, nowa-
days it is the employment rate and income level. in the present-day economic 
spatial structure, depression means an employment crisis, accompanied by 
general impoverishment (enyedi, 1996; nemes nagy, 2001; meusburger, 2001; 
jakobi, 2002; németh, 2009).
economic development and rising living standards began to stagnate towards 
the end of the 1970s. Hungarian heavy industry fell into crisis, which led to the 
rapid decline of industrial areas. as a result of political détente and as a sign 
of economic transformation, new private enterprises were allowed to start 
up in 1982. the spatial distribution of these enterprises was characterized 
by high-level concentration: they sprang up in the capital, in big towns and in 
special areas (e.g. with tourist potential) (enyedi, 1996; nemes nagy, 1998). 
even though the economic processes of the 1980s were partly market led, 
the development of towns and suburbs depended on central state decisions. 
these decisions did not take local characteristics or potential into consid-
eration, and the functions assigned to settlements did not evolve as part of 
an organic settlement development. Consequently, the industries of whole 
areas and counties were built on weak, temporary foundations that drove the 
transformation of the spatial structure in the 1990s (váti, 2002).
the emergence of the market economy brought about a new spatial struc-
ture in the 1990s. three decisive regional and settlement transformations 
took place that induced regional disparities: the outstanding developmental 
dynamics of budapest; the greater ability of larger towns to attract capital; 
and the economic upgrading of the western part of the country vis-à-vis the 
southern transdanubian, eastern and north-eastern regions (nemes nagy, 
1998; Rechnitzer, 1996). major transformations in the spatial structure had 
taken place by the mid-1990s, and since then regional disparities have stabi-
lized at a high level. the crisis-ridden areas of the early 1990s are still the 
most underdeveloped territorial units today. 
the evolution of hungAriAn regionAl development policy  
in the lAst two decAdes
as a result of the emergence of crisis areas and mass unemployment, regional 
development has been defined in Hungary in a rather narrow sense: interven-
tions aimed at reducing unemployment, improving employment conditions 
in disadvantaged (micro)-regions and minimizing disparities in income levels 
and living standards. 
between the regime change and 1996, in the absence of an independent insti-
tutional system of regional development, sub-national development proceeded 
on the basis of central government decisions (váti, 2002). the five most disad-
vantaged eastern and northern counties were declared ‘crisis areas’; jobs in the 
service sector there were created by central state investment (váti, 2002). 
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the Regional Development act of 1996 established the institutional system 
of regional development – it introduced the concept of micro-regions – and 
regulated the financial means of regional development. the national Regional 
Development Concept (otk) envisaged significant spatial structural reforms 
that would influence resource distribution (as well as governance and policy 
expectations), alongside shifts in regional development policy, the effects of 
which are felt to this day. the otk regarded the country as having a spatial 
structure, where ‘as regional disparities narrow, so the number of disadvantaged 
and underdeveloped areas affected by high unemployment is reduced’ (otk, 
2008: 1). according to the document, the central goal of regional development 
is to provide employment. However, in the following years researchers and 
planners realized that the resources available to support regional development 
and employment goals were inadequate to induce palpable spatial structural 
effects. the volume of available resources remained significantly below market 
investment (nemes nagy et al., 2000; németh, 2009).
For as long as an independent regional development policy existed in Hungary, 
it was based on centralized decision-making mechanisms. then in 2004 it was 
merged into the institutional system of development policy that concentrated 
on the distribution of eu resources. thanks to some examples of Western 
european good practice, a degree of decentralization had taken place in the 
distribution of resources. moreover, the regional economic problems of the 
last 20 years have induced endogenous economic development practices. 
the first otk, for example, emphasized the importance of micro-regional 
associations and differences in local development paths of areas with diverse 
endowments and potential. the second, in 2005, underlined these principles 
and abandoned the idea of equal territorial development. in the new Concept, 
regional, county-level, micro-regional and settlement-level development poli-
cies are presented, along with plans for rural, urban and village development 
(otk, 2005). of late, development efforts based on endogenous resources have 
mostly taken place in rural development (or in programmes related to it, such 
as agricultural public employment projects) (cf. nemes, 2005; németh, 2011). 
Following Hungary’s 2004 accession to the european union, domestic develop-
ment policy was entirely reorganized, and the proportion of eu funds within 
developmental resources increased significantly. three eu-funded develop-
ment programmes have been launched in Hungary since 2004: the national 
Development plan (between 2004 and 2006), the new Hungary Development 
plan (since 2007) and the new széchenyi plan (since 2010). the principles of 
the ‘place-based approach’ prevail in all three documents, alongside goals of 
employment policy. 
regionAl development resources
this section focuses on regional development resources that either directly 
or indirectly pursue employment policy goals. these funds were available to 
micro-regions and settlements between 1991 and 2008. 
in the first half of the 1990s, regional development functions were financed 
by the Regional Development Fund4 (Területfejlesztési Alap) (see table 1). the 
financial resources defined by the Regional Development act 1996 comprised 
4 Between 1986 and 1991, funding 
was provided by the Regional Devel-
opment and Organization Fund, and 
between 1991 and 1992 regional 
development and job-creation funds 
were financed from the central state 
budget. 
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target-appropriations from the central budget and decentralized funds. it was 
the spatial development target-appropriation (területfejlesztési célelőirányzat 
or tfc) that provided the largest amount of direct funding for the employment 
market. the state of the local employment market played an important role 
in decisions on distribution: funding was available for settlements suffering 
socio-economic disadvantage, located in underdeveloped areas or where 
the level of unemployment was 50 per cent above the national average. 
in 2003, aside from the spatial development target-appropriation and the 
spatial and regional development target-appropriation,5 three other, smaller 
funds targeted job creation and job preservation: the area and settlement 
development target-appropriation (településfelzárkóztatási célelőirányzat; 
ttfc), the micro-regional support Fund (Kistérségi Támogatási Alap; kita) and 
the enterprise-zone target-appropriation (vállalkozási övezetek támogatási 
célelőirányzata; vöc) (nFgm, 2009).
the distribution of funding resources has displayed a rising trend until 2003, 
when resources became scarcer. in the first half of the 1990s, the Regional 
Development Fund had over 0.15 percent of gDp at its disposal, but in the next 
15 years, the tfc and the regional compensation fund (teki) together comprised 
5 The spatial development target-
appropriation (tfc) became the spatial 
and regional development target-
appropriation (trfc) in 2004, when 
decision making on the distribution 
of funds was transferred from the 
counties to regional development 
councils. Nevertheless, funds con-
tinued to support the development 
of beneficiary areas. 
Table 1: Regional development funds and target-appropriations 
at various decision-making levels, 1991–2010
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
N
at
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vöc
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ev
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céde
leki
teut
tehu
ttfc
C
ou
nt
y 
le
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l tefa tfc
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Note: Those target-appropriations that directly supported job creation are in italics.
Abbreviations: céde = local government development fund; kita = Micro-Regional Support Fund; 
leki = most disadvantaged micro-regional development fund; tefa = Regional Development Fund; 
tehu = waste management public services development for settlements fund; teki = regional compensation 
fund; tfc = spatial development target-appropriation; trfc = spatial and regional development target-
appropriation; ttfc = area and settlement development target-appropriation; teut = in-settlement 
public road renewal fund for local governments; vöc = enterprise-zone target-appropriation. 
Sources: VÁTI OTO (2000); NFGM (2009: 16). 
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only 1 thousandth of gDp. the 2007–08 total framework sum did not even 
approach the 1996 figure (at comparable price levels) (nFgm, 2009). Within 
this, infrastructure development funds exceeded support spent on job creation 
(váti oto, 2000; nFgm, 2009). some 77 per cent of the total support was 
received by local governments and local government partnerships, which indi-
cated that the most important local actors in regional development are local 
authorities and micro-regions. enterprises received 19 per cent of the funds, 
while the non-profit sector got 4 per cent. the bulk of the job-creation and 
job-preservation support went to enterprises (nFgm, 2009). it is important 
to note that the local and regional levels played an important role in the distri-
bution of funds. the goals and means of 95 per cent of these central funds 
were decided at the local level (county and, later, regional level) (nFgm, 2009). 
the effects of regional development support on the employment market 
have not been estimated. according to administrative estimates, support 
for economic development (almost entirely covered by tfc and trfc) meant 
that some 36,000 new jobs were created and 65,000 jobs were successfully 
retained between 1996 and 2008 (nFgm, 2009). However, according to Hahn 
(2004), in terms of the total amount of decentralized target-appropriations, 
the distribution of funding across the micro-regions did not correlate with 
the socio-economic indicators throughout the 1990s. this essentially implies 
random patterns of fund allocation, irrespective of local goals. in this context, 
the compensatory effect of funding remained weak. 
the development of public roads, on the other hand, indirectly affected local 
labour markets. according to studies in the mid-1990s, settlements with 
a high unemployment rate were often surrounded by urban labour markets 
that were in a relatively good state. improving accessibility to the towns 
could help reduce unemployment and, within the local labour market, could 
moderate differences in employment across villages (köllő, 1997). as a result, 
public road development became the most important target for decentralized 
target-appropriations (nFgm, 2009).
in addition to regional development funds, the labour market Fund (Munkaerő-
piaci Alap; mpa), which directly targeted employment, also included goals of 
reducing regional disparity. the employment section of the mpa had 80 per 
cent more funds than decentralized target-appropriations: in the 1990s, nearly 
0.5 per cent of gDp, dropping to 0.4 per cent in the 2000s. in the distribution 
of mpa funds among counties, decision makers took county labour market 
conditions into account. the employment section of the Fund was further 
divided into a centrally distributed and a decentralized segment. the central-
ized segment of the Fund financed programmes at the national level and across 
several counties. Decentralized funds, on the other hand, were allocated to 
counties in proportion to the state of their labour market. Funds available 
to the most disadvantaged counties (in terms of their labour market), were 
further raised to compensate for territorial disparities. Fazekas and németh 
(2009), however, found that the system of distribution was too complicated 
for decision makers to be able to enforce the priorities of reducing regional 
disparities. it was county employment councils that were mandated to make 
decisions on the application of active labour market measures and their 
funding, the decentralized segment of the employment fund. the territorial 
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distribution of mpa funds was not analysed and evaluated until the mid-2000s 
(Fazekas and németh, 2009). Hence, it can be stated that the use of mpa did 
not chime with micro-regional development programmes, and nor could it 
serve to smooth territorial disparities. 
Following Hungary’s accession, eu funding streams partly took over the role 
played by domestic funds. among these eu-funded programmes, leaDeR – 
which has been operating in various forms since as far back as 2001 – should be 
highlighted (Füzér et al., 2005; leaDeR, 2011). the programme provides funding 
for integrated rural development concepts, especially experimental integrated 
development strategies, the development of cooperation across rural areas 
and networks of local actors. although the goals of the Hungarian programmes 
were similar to Western european good practice, leaDeR in Hungary has not 
achieved significant results. the implementation of the programme took place 
in several waves, but its shortcomings remained the same throughout: tardi-
ness of central administration, over-regulation and foot-dragging in terms of 
contracting and payment (see Fazekas and nemes, 2005).
Finally, the programme that began in 2007 for the development of the most 
disadvantaged micro-regions must be mentioned: it aimed at reducing unemploy-
ment and implementing employment measures in underdeveloped areas, with 
the financial assistance of eu funds. the programme targeted the development 
of the 33 most deprived micro-regions, with the purpose of expanding local 
capacities to increase the number of employed inhabitants and thus improve 
local living conditions (nFÜ, 2007). these micro-regions – which were selected 
on the basis of the Central statistical office’s socio-economic indicators – are 
home to over 1 million people – 10 per cent of the total population. Within 
the framework of the new Hungary Development programme (ÚmFp), nearly 
HuF 135 billion were directly set aside in 2007 for the development of these 
disadvantaged areas (out of this, HuF 25 billion were earmarked to increase 
employment). in addition, the institutional system provided for easier access 
to other tender funds (nFÜ, 2011). according to Czike (2011), the first phase 
of the programme was rather a wash-out. While micro-regional actors had 
great expectations of the programme, it ultimately failed to bring solutions 
that met local needs. in practice, eu development policy could not be adapted 
to the micro-regional approach, which was further complicated by an over-
bureaucratized grant application system. another factor was the way in which 
party politics seized the local level of the programme in the first phase. From 
the perspective of getting eu funds into the most deprived micro-regions, the 
programme could be considered a success, since the rate of average funding 
increased from 71 per cent to 85 per cent between 2009 and 2010. However, 
the goals of the employment policy measures – raising the employment level 
and reaching disadvantaged social groups – were not met. 
the impAct of regionAl development  
on micro-regionAl cooperAtion
in Hungary, local authorities and local government associations are the most 
important actors in local development; the network of development agencies 
tends not to initiate development (Czene and Ritz, 2010). as is argued below, 
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this is not about the expansion of effective institutional forms; rather it is mainly 
due to the weakness of local civil society and the increasing centralization of 
regional development policy. 
Following decades of centralized governance, an elementary demand for 
local self-governance was articulated, even if this came at the price of effi-
ciency. the local government reform of 1990 established 3,070 independent 
settlement-level local governments that had, on average, 2,700 inhabitants 
(excluding budapest from the arithmetic) – compared to the norwegian or 
swedish models, where the strong local government level has 10,000–30,000 
inhabitants. although the functions and scope of authority of local govern-
ment are quite extensive, its tax-raising power has been gradually circum-
scribed over the past two decades. local governments receive money from 
the central budget through two main channels: a steadily decreasing propor-
tion of personal income tax (in 1990 it was 100 per cent, but by 2007 it had 
dropped to 8 per cent), and normative funding (some of which is ear-marked 
to finance some public service). 
even though economic rationality had, from the beginning, encouraged local 
actors and settlements to engage in various forms of association, local and 
micro-regional coalitions typically came about thanks to external incentives.6 
the establishment of micro-regional associations was driven by two goals: to 
ease local government service provision tasks and to implement local develop-
ment programmes. as a result, the institutional structure of micro-regional 
associations was partly shaped by changes both in the institutional system of 
development policy and in public administration. the eu played an active role 
in shaping the institutional structure by the way it influenced and defined – in 
its own developmental institutions such as pHaRe, sapaRD or the structural 
Funds – who can participate and what counts in planning (bruszt, 2007). 
in the first half of the 1990s, the institutional framework of development 
policy explicitly encouraged the creation of integrated development systems 
that relied on the mobilization of local resources. in this period, the central 
state considered micro-regional associations to be its new potential partners 
in sub-national development policy; since it lacked capacities and skills, it 
supported the establishment of endogenous development strategies through 
local associations. encouraged from above by the central state, the Regional 
Development Fund, the national employment Fund (Országos Foglalkoztatási 
Alap; oFa) and the decentralized spatial development target-appropriations 
provided financial resources for local economic development and crisis manage-
ment, based on the cooperation of various local actors. in addition, the austrian 
national Council of Disabled persons (Österreichische Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
für Rehabilitation; ÖaR) and the first (‘experimental’) pHaRe programmes 
targeted job creation and infrastructure development, and funded the prepa-
ration of micro-regional development plans by diverse local actors.7 the 
abundance of development programme funds in the early 1990s sparked an 
unprecedented ‘willingness’ on the part of local associations in those years. 
in 1995, 40 per cent of the 134 micro-regional associations were so-called 
‘settlement associations’, integrating diverse types of local actors; while 57 
per cent of the existing organizations comprised local government (develop-
mental) partnerships (Figure 1).
6 Although Ehrlich et al. (1994) pre-
dicted ‘the expansion of local govern-
ment associations and coalitions and 
the slow re-emergence of integra-
tion and merging tendencies’ until 
the mid-2000s – in parallel to part-
nerships – the secession and inde-
pendence of settlement districts also 
continued. 
7 The Soros Foundation, the British 
Know How Fund and USAID provided 
financial resources for similar projects 
based on the same criteria. 
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the creation of micro-regional development associations in the first half of the 
1990s owes a lot to pilot programmes financed by oFa. many oFa programmes 
aimed at improving employment by means of complex economic development 
and decentralized, integrated policy mechanisms. thus, oFa programmes often 
promoted cooperation among diverse local actors and community-building – 
e.g. the complex micro-regional development programme between 1992 and 
1997, and the framework programme for the employment of micro-regional 
managers to coordinate the implementation of development programmes 
(keller, 2010). oFa’s other programmes focused on similar goals, such as 
establishing employment managers at the micro-regional level (1993–96) and 
developing local enterprises and the economy (1998–2000). 
all in all, the 1990s can be described as a period of experimentation with 
local institution-building to solve social and employment problems gener-
ated by economic restructuring. institutional experimentation at this time 
was based on integrated policy mechanisms, with complex employment and 
regional development goals that made use of endogenous resources and were 
based on various institutional solutions for the association of diverse actors. 
although the general weakness of civil society meant that an ideal balance 
of power did not exist between non-governmental and governmental actors, 
asymmetries in power between them were less visible in the early 1990s, as 
regulations prevented concessions being given to one actor at the expense 
of others (keller, 2010).
in the second half of the decade, the central state initiated the introduction of 
a homogeneous institutional structure in place of – what seemed from above 
– haphazard micro-regional associations. the Regional Development act of 
1996 and the act on local government partnerships of 1997 generated stan-
dard forms of associations that paralleled the existing ad hoc micro-regional 
 Figure 1: The distribution of micro-regional associations in 1995 and 1999
Note: The organizations numbered 134 in 1995 and 184 in 1999. 
Source: Own calculations, based on Fekete and Bodolai (1995) and Fekete (2001).
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associations. With this, the central state introduced an institutional system that 
– at least for its own purposes – seemed more transparent and accountable. 
the acts, however, only gave local governments the right to participate in the 
definition of developmental goals through their representative on the county 
development councils. since decentralized financial resources were available 
only to local government partnerships, settlement association-type organi-
zations were overshadowed and civil actors marginalized. this institutional 
system provided privileges in financial assistance and interest representation 
for local government partnerships without offering non-government actors 
similar mandates. this ended the (more or less) equal relationship between local 
governments and civil actors that was built on a mutual desire for efficiency 
gains, and instead generated asymmetrical bargaining positions between the 
two sectors (keller, 2011).
Figure 1 illustrates the process by which the number of development associa-
tions – which integrated diverse types of local actors – had decreased signifi-
cantly vis-à-vis local government partnerships within just four years. by 1996, 
the proportion of civil organizations and public utility companies involved had 
fallen to 8 per cent (Fekete, 2001).
towards the end of the decade, a process of recentralization had begun in super-
vising the distribution of development resources, which meant the strengthening 
of the central state at the expense of local government and non-state actors. by 
the end of the decade, the european Commission had redefined the conditions 
governing accession by changing its priorities within regional policy. by switching 
its discourse to stress technical and financial accountability (safe money transfer 
of the structural Funds), the Commission left the issue of extended political 
accountability (territorial devolution, decentralization, integration of sub-national 
actors) largely to one side, which ultimately gave central states the prerogative 
to control regional policy making and implementation (bruszt, 2007; 2008). 
thus, by the turn of the century, many of the pHaRe programmes sought to 
strengthen administrative capacity at the central state level, rather than build 
up the capacity of heterarchic8 associations at the sub-national level (see also 
Hughes et al., 2003; bruszt, 2005). this further weakened central state ‘readi-
ness’ to adopt governance principles of the eu – partnership, devolution – in the 
use of development funds (keller, 2011). ultimately, it led to the strengthening 
of hierarchical modes of governance in Hungarian regional and development 
policies, rather than heterarchic forms of policy coordination. 
as part of the recentralization, the number of central state representatives 
of ministries increased in regional development councils, as well as in county 
development councils. another element of the recentralization process was 
the provision of privileges to particular local actors (local government) that 
weakened previous win-win associations between diverse local actors and 
fostered collusive coalitions. Representational mandates exclusively for local 
government partnerships in county development councils were one such privi-
lege, as was the per capita funding scheme for multi-purpose micro-regional 
associations in 2004, as opposed to ad hoc funding opportunities for non-
governmental organizations.9 
in the early years after the regime change, there was a hotchpotch of local 
government partnerships, settlement associations, micro-regional development 
8 Heterarchic modes of governance 
denote forms of associations or policy 
coordination where diverse types of 
actors cooperate, and where author-
ity is shared among them more or less 
equally. 
9 Although multi-purpose asso-
ciations often contracted out local 
governmental functions to non-gov-
ernmental organizations (most typi-
cally tasks of local development), this 
relationship was not based on hori-
zontal principles of partnership, but 
rather on hierarchical dependencies 
of non-governmental actors on gov-
ernment-supplied financial resources. 
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councils, etc. amidst this apparent chaotic abundance of micro-regional coali-
tions, at the time of eu accession (and in the name of eu governance norms), 
the central state saw the creation of multi-purpose associations as offering 
some kind of assurance of transparency and accountability in the utilization 
of eu and domestic development resources. the per capita funding for micro-
regional development that became available to the multi-purpose associations 
crowded out the earlier local government partnerships, making them redundant 
and standardizing the institutional structure and opportunities for resource 
mobilization. as a result of such funding schemes, in many micro-regions local 
actors terminated their broad-based development coalitions, leaving multi-
purpose associations as the only development organizations. in most cases 
that brought about the marginalization or exclusion of non-state actors from 
development planning and decision making. 
unlike Western european practices, the institutional model of the multi-purpose 
association combined local government service provision with local economic 
development functions. experience shows that, so far as improving public 
service provision is concerned, the multi-purpose associations have produced 
more or less positive results, even though only the first steps of the necessary 
transformations have been taken, and these have not involved the structural 
alteration of public administration (kovács, 2008). on the other hand, the 
institutional system of multi-purpose associations – also contrary to Western 
european practices – confines micro-regional associations to within the limits 
of statistical-administrative boundaries. in addition, per capita funding through 
a highly centralized domestic institutional system of development policy plugs 
micro-regional development functions into the central state (re)distribution 
system.10 Central state regulations on multi-purpose associations limit the 
scope for local actors to organize the mobilization of development resources 
as they see fit. this weakens local development capacities, but increases the 
vertical dependence of local governments and their associations on the central 
state. the institutional system of Hungarian regional development has elevated 
local government to the position of the single trustee of local development 
policy. but local governments are inherently afraid of losing their indepen-
dence and share power with larger regional centres or non-state actors. the 
general feeling of distrust generated by bad experiences of the centralized 
and hierarchical distribution of resources still hampers cooperation at the 
local levels (bekényi, 2004; kovács, 2008).
conclusions And recommendAtions
in the past 20 years, Hungarian development policy has not been able to fulfil 
the goals of employment policy related to the expansion of employment or the 
advancement of social groups that are lagging behind. even though significant 
funds have been mobilized to support territorial ‘narrowing’, these have been 
unable to counteract foreign and domestic economic processes. 
the effectiveness of development policy in Hungary has been hindered by 
institutional factors. in developed countries, local development policy is 
completely separate from local government public service provision, and 
local institutions play an increasing role in development activities. successful 
10 Receiving more per capita fund-
ing for local government service 
provision in an association provided 
incentives for local governments to 
establish multi-purpose associa-
tions. Nevertheless, multi-purpose 
associations had discretion over only 
a limited amount of these resources; 
most of them were pre-destined by 
central state appropriations. Finally, 
combining local government service 
provision with development func-
tions brought increasing administra-
tive burdens for associations; these 
crowded out and eclipsed principles 
of regional development. 
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development stems from an alignment with local endowments/potential and 
the mobilization of local resources through the association of diverse local 
actors. the institutional framework shaped by the central state can help the 
autonomous, bottom-up initiatives of local government, and also the top-down 
initiatives of non-state actors. 
bucking these trends, in Hungary local governments have played a decisive role 
in bringing about local and micro-regional associations, and in planning and 
implementing development initiatives. this is partly due to the weakness of 
civil society and to changes in the institutional environment that have favoured 
state actors in the mobilization of resources. local and micro-regional associa-
tions have evolved as a result of external incentives and – with a few excep-
tions – have failed to maintain the essentially local focus of the association. 
in Hungary, multi-purpose associations merge local government public service 
provision and regional development functions in one organization, which serves 
to weaken the developmental capacity of local government and other local 
actors. opportunities for micro-regional cooperation are restricted to within 
statistical-public administrative boundaries and can only be financed by per 
capita funding, which is embedded in the redistributive machinery of the central 
state. this further weakens local actors’ capacities to mobilize resources for 
the development of local economies and for the expansion of local employ-
ment markets. local authorities, overburdened by their public service tasks but 
with scant resources, find it difficult to harmonize their roles in public service 
provision and development policy. local government partnerships, which are 
dependent on the central state and live in fear of any strengthening of the 
local centre, have achieved modest but encouraging results. 
attempts to introduce heterogeneous institutional solutions in development 
and employment policies, based on the integration of diverse social groups, 
mostly took place in the 1990s. However, the holistic approach to integrated 
policy making has failed to be institutionalized, and encouraging initiatives have 
often remained local experiments. in the 2000s, due to the re-centralization of 
programming and access to financial resources, the room for local institutional 
experimentation based on the win-win coalitions of local state and non-state 
actors has become more confined. as a result, non-state actors – who otherwise 
would have the capacity to integrate goals for the expansion of employment 
and economic development – have been marginalized in development policy. 
besides harmonizing sub-national employment, development and economic 
development policies at the strategic level, an effective regional development 
policy needs the right institutional framework (e.g. comprehensive meth-
odological standards, a system of quality control) to provide room for local 
actors to organize development associations at their own discretion. the 
first step towards this system would be the termination of local government 
monopolies in the planning and implementation of sub-national employment 
and development programmes. in this context, it would also be necessary to 
detach (in institutional terms) the local government functions of providing 
public services from local development policy in the new district-based public 
administration system, due to be launched in 2013 by the current government. 
the next step would be to establish local development agencies on the initia-
tive of, and in partnership with, local government, profit-driven and non-profit 
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non-state actors. networks of local development agencies should not be 
organized on the basis of the new district boundaries: it is important to 
allow local actors to choose their partnerships (settlement, profit-driven and 
non-profit partners) for themselves. this would encourage organic cross-
settlement cooperation and would improve ‘willingness’ to cooperate at the 
local level. the function of local development agencies to build local markets 
and expand local labour markets could provide a bridge between the busi-
ness and the public sector; and these agencies could also play a central role 
in harmonizing state and non-state institutional mens and methods in policy 
making. it would be important to ensure the comparative independence of 
local development agencies from the state, which would provide the neces-
sary flexibility for the business sector and guarantee consistent market- 
and employment-building strategies across electoral cycles. as opposed 
to current practices within the multi-purpose associations of local govern-
ments, local deelopment agencies could afford to employ staff with special 
skills (in project management, planning, etc.) to implement programmes 
successfully. it is recommended that the practical experience of the handful 
of local development agencies – or functionally similar organizations – that 
already exist in some micro-regions should be emplyed across te coutry.
references
barca, F. (2009): an agenda for a reformed cohesion policy. a place-based 
approach to meeting european union challenges and expectations. indepen-
dent Report prepared at the request of Danuta Hübner, Commissioner for 
Regional policy.
bekényi, józsef (2004): a települési önkormányzatok többcélú kistérségi 
társulási rendszeréhez kapcsolódó főbb jogszabályok és irodalomjegyzék. 
in: Németh (ed.): kistérségi közigazgatási modellek és fejlődési minták. magyar 
közigazgatási intézet, budapest. 
bruszt, lászló (2007): evolving regional governance regimes: Challenges for 
institution building in the Cee countries. Research report, european university 
institute, Florence.
bruszt, lászló–vedres, balázs (2010): local developmental agency from without 
theory and society. manuscript.
Czene, zsolt–Ritz, judit (eds.) (2010): területfejlesztési füzetek, 2. Helyi 
gazdaságfejlesztés. Ötletadó megoldások, jó gyakorlatok. nFm–ngm–váti, 
budapest.
Czike, klára (ed.) (2011): Where the paved road ends. Regional disparities and 
Roma integration. Report on the interim results of the most Disadvantaged 
micro-regions program (Hungary), open society Foundations, budapest.
ehrlich, Éva–Révész, gábor–tamási, péter (eds.) (1994): kelet-közép-európa: 
honnan – hová? akadémiai kiadó, budapest. 
enyedi, györgy (1996): Regionális folyamatok magyarországon. Hilscher Rezső 
szociálpolitikai egyesület, budapest.
eu Committee of the Regions (2009): White paper on multilevel governence. 
building europe in partnership
2. labouR maRket goals in a WiDeR poliCy Context 2.3. miCRo -Regional Development
60
Fazekas, károly–németh, nándor (2009): a regionális különbségek csökken-
tése. in: könczei (ed.): a magyarországi foglalkoztatáspolitika az európai unió 
kontextusában. Fogyatékosságtudományi tanulmányok, xix. budapest, 2009
Fazekas, zsuzsanna–nemes, gusztáv (2005): kísérleti leader-jellegű program 
magyarországon. in: avop leader+ készségek elsajátítása. tananyag. promei 
kht.–Faluműhely alapítvány–szRva–zRva, pp. 360–381.
Füzér, katalin–gerő, márton–zongor, gábor (2005): a társadalmi tőke növelé-
sének lehetőségei fejlesztéspolitikai eszközökkel. Fejlesztéspolitika társadalmi 
hatásai, 4. tárki
g. Fekete, Éva (1994): a kistérségi szerveződések szerepe a területfejlesz-
tésben. in: Csefkó (ed.): tér és közigazgatás. mta Rkk–magyar közigazgatási 
intézet, pécs–budapest, pp. 67–89.
g. Fekete, Éva (2001): együtt! – de hogyan? innovációk a kistérségi fejlesz-
tésekben. mta Regionális kutatások központja, miskolc–pécs. 
g. Fekete, Éva–bodolai, Éva (1995): együtt! – de hogyan? kistérségi szerve ző-
dések megjelenése a területfejlesztésben. mta Regionális kutatások központja, 
miskolc 
Hahn, Csaba (2004): a térségi fejlődést befolyásoló tényezők. területi statisz-
tika. vol. 7. no. 6. 
jakobi, ákos (2002): traditional and new factors of regional inequalities in 
Hungary. emerging market economies and european economic integration, 
eksjö, 2002. june, conference presentation.
keller, judit (2010): patterns and dynamics of european sub-national gover-
nance: institutional transformations in Hungarian micro-regional associations 
1990–2006. phD thesis, european university institute, Florence.
keller, judit (2011): Heterarchia és fejlődési pályaváltás: Új elméleti megkö-
zelítés a kistérségkutatásban. tér és társadalom, 3.
kovács, katalin (2008): kistelepülések lépéskényszerben. in: váradi, monika 
mária (ed.): kistelepülések lépéskényszerben. Új mandátum könyvkiadó, 
budapest.
köllő, jános (1997): a napi ingázás költségei és a helyi munkanélküliség, esély, 
no. 3. 
leaDeR (2011): a leaDeR története. Új magyarország, vidékfejlesztési program.
meusburger, p. (2001): spatial and social disparities of employment and income 
in Hungary in the 1990s. in: Meusburger, P.–Jöns, H. (ed.): transformation in 
Hungary. physica-verlag, Heidelberg, pp. 173–206.
mountford, D. (2009): organising for local development: the role of local 
development agencies. summary report. oeCD.
nemes, gusztáv (2005): integrated rural development. Hungarian academy 
of sciences, institute of economics, Discussion papers, budapest.
nemes nagy, józsef (1998): vesztesek – nyertesek – stagnálók. a társadalmi-
gazdasági változások regionális dimenziói. társadalmi szemle, no. 8–9. pp. 5–18.
nemes nagy, józsef (2001): new regional patterns in Hungary. in: Meusburger, 
P.–Jöns, H. (eds.): transformation in Hungary. physica-verlag, Heidelberg, pp. 
39–64.
nemes nagy, józsef–kullmann, ádám–Fekete, attila–szabó, pál (2000): 
a területi fejlődés „állami” és „piaci” útjai az 1990-es években. területi statisz-
tika, vol. 3. no. 3.
2. labouR maRket goals in a WiDeR poliCy Context 2.3. miCRo -Regional Development
61
németh, nándor (2009): Fejlődési tengelyek az új térszerkezetben. Regionális 
tudományi tanulmányok, 15. elte Regionális tudományi tanszék, budapest. 
németh, nándor (ed.) (2011): a helyi kezdeményezésű gazdaságfejlesztési 
programok vizsgálata. esettanulmányok. kti könyvek, 14. mta közgazdaság-
tudományi intézet. budapest.
nFgm (2009): a hazai területfejlesztési támogatási rendszer átfogó értékelése 
1996–2008. nemzeti Fejlesztési és gazdasági minisztérium.
nFÜ (2007): nem mondunk le senkiről. Új magyarország felzárkóztatási program. 
nemzeti Fejlesztési Ügynökség honlapja. 2007. november 19.
nFÜ (2011): leghátrányosabb helyzetű kistérségek felzárkóztatási programja. 
nemzeti Fejlesztési Ügynökség.
otk (1998): az országgyűlés 35 /1998. (iii. 20) határozata az országos terül-
etfejlesztési koncepcióról.
otk (2005): 97/2005. (xii. 25.) ogy határozat az országos területfejlesztési 
koncepcióról.
paraskevopoulos, j. C. (2001): interpreting convergence in the european union: 
patterns of collective action, social learning and europeanization. palgrave, 
Houndsmills, basingstoke. 
Rechnitzer, jános (1996): a regionális folyamatok sajátosságai és jövőbeli 
fejlődési irányai. magyar tudomány, 11. pp. 1347–1360.
szigeti, ernő (ed.) (2006): terület- és településfejlesztési ismeretek. tankönyv 
a köztisztviselők továbbképzéséhez. magyar közigazgatási intézet, budapest.
váti (2002): területfejlesztés magyarországon. területi folyamatok alakulása 
az 1990-es évtizedben. a területfejlesztés feladatai a xxi. század első éveiben
váti (2005): 2005. évi jelentés a területi folyamatok alakulásáról és a terül-
etfejlesztési politika érvényesüléséről. 6. fejezet: a területfejlesztési politika 
érvényesülése az eszköz- és intézményrendszeren keresztül.
váti oto (2000): területfejlesztési országgyűlési jelentés 2. pénzügyi eszközök. 
Háttéranyag, magyar Regionális Fejlesztési és urbanisztikai kht.
62
2. labouR maRket goals in a WiDeR poliCy Context
2.4. local government* 
juDit kelleR anD lajos bóDis
* The authors of this chapter would 
like to thank Ágota Scharle for her 
invaluable contributions and com-
ments. 
this chapter examines the role that local government has played in expanding 
employment at the local level over the past 20 years. Drawing on international 
literature, the expansion of employment is viewed here as an element in the 
institutional environment that integrates various sectoral policies. the basic 
principles of this institutional environment are decentralization and partner-
ship. While Chapter 2.3 provides a general overview of the mechanisms of 
development policy, this chapter observes the opportunities that local govern-
ment has had to shape the local labour market. the questions addressed 
here include: What role has local government played in job creation? Has 
the expansion of employment been taken into consideration as a dimension 
of public service development (e.g. in developing public transport or crèche 
services)? to what extent has local government cooperated with other local 
actors in achieving these goals? the chapter has scant empirical data to go 
on, due to the low level of involvement of local governments and to the lack 
of empirical research in the field. 
public works progrAmmes 
as institutions of public administration at the settlement level, local authori-
ties have a mandate to participate in public job creation or in employment 
rehabilitation. although public works have been the dominant policy solution 
in Hungary over the past 20 years, there have been some initiatives to intro-
duce social-economic programmes and employment rehabilitation1 to prepare 
participants for employment on the regular labour market.
Hungarian public works programmes generally aim to arrest the deteriora-
tion of labour skills among the unemployed and to test their willingness to 
undertake employment, rather than to stimulate the local labour market as 
such. job centres have been able to organize public works for these purposes 
since 1987, and local authorities have been allowed to launch public works 
programmes since 1997 (Csoba, 2010).
public works schemes assumed greater importance in 2001, when the function 
of testing the willingness to work of the long-term unemployed – a function that 
used to be handled exclusively by the public employment service – was devolved 
to local government, alongside the provision of unemployment assistance. 
the new regulations stipulated that regular social assistance could be granted 
only if the claimant had worked as a public employee for more than 30 days. 
1 In particular, the so called “tran-
sit-employment” projects which 
help unskilled, disadvantaged and 
unemployed groups into permanent 
employment.
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the number of duties that could be carried out as public work increased, and 
central government provided large sums to finance public works. 
the ‘Road to Work’ (‘Út a munkához’) programme, launched in 2009, further 
increased the role of public works schemes. the programme aimed to alle-
viate local social tensions and to cut social expenditure2 (or so the political 
rhetoric had it), as well as to stimulate the local economy in stagnating local 
areas with capital shortages.3 as a result, the programme was inclined to 
increase the number of participants, rather than to extend employment. 
local governments had to prepare local employment plans, which got them 
actively involved in these programmes. in order to encourage micro-regional 
cooperation, a separate budget stream was created to finance public works 
at the micro-regional level. 
local governments increasingly relied on these expanding opportunities: in 
2003 less than half of all settlements organized public works, whereas by 2005 
almost every larger settlement did so. by 2009, virtually every settlement 
in the country – even the smallest village – had public works schemes (köllő 
and scharle, 2012). the increase in the number of participants in the ‘Road to 
Work’ programme was fuelled by the open top-down budgetary framework 
and the absence of content evaluation. 
municipalities could use the resources offered by the programme with few limi-
tations (and under highly advantageous conditions) to expand public services 
or to save on regular payroll expenses. there was no automatic mechanism 
in the programme that would curb the absorption of central budget funds in 
order to save resources for other labour policy goals or to protect the balance 
of the central budget. according to the national employment office, various 
factors hindered the effectiveness of the programme. modifications to public 
work plans did not need to be submitted for scrutiny at local job centres and, 
although the Hungarian state treasury collected these plans, it did not evaluate 
them either from a financial or from a professional perspective, and nor did 
it establish a monitoring system based on the information gathered (péter, 
2009; cited by Frey, 2009: 213). in addition, regional employment centres 
limited the focus of their examination to the number of participants. neither 
the implementation nor the output of public works plans was inspected either 
by the employment centre or by the sectoral ministry (scharle, 2011). 
local authorities can focus on various – at times contradictory – local social 
policy goals: the provision of social assistance for the unemployed, the detec-
tion of ‘black’ labour or supplementing resources for public service delivery. 
these social policy goals may inherently contradict the goals of a local authority 
as a local employer and maintainer of institutions. in addition, labour costs 
appear merely as extra workload for local government officers.
according to reports by the state audit office, the organization of public 
works was defined by the short-term interests and labour force needs of local 
government (ász, 2002; 2007).4 analysing the annual public works plans of 
51 settlements in the seven most deprived micro-regions in 2009, udvardi 
and varga (2010) found that, with few exceptions, they contained neither 
a situation analysis nor any long-term strategy to improve the situation of 
unemployed participants. according to Fekete (2011),5 local authorities justi-
fied this by citing their low management and service provision capacities. 
2 Two mayors in Hajdú-Bihar county 
initiated the tightening of regulations 
on social assistance at the central 
government level, on the basis of the 
following argument ‘local commu-
nities need to perceive that people 
receiving the assistance of the state 
also strive to make a  living by their 
own work’ (Csige and Éles, 2008). 
3 According to plans, the first few 
years would focus on rehabilitating 
the labour skills of the long-term 
unemployed and identifying viable 
activities for the local economy, fol-
lowed by the inclusion of the private 
sector in local economic development 
(Szűcs, 2009).
4 The State Audit Office examined 
the efficiency of public spending on 
public works schemes in 2002 and 
2007, based on local visits and on 
the unemployment register. In 2002, 
18 per cent of the support given out 
was audited in this way. 
5 The survey was conducted in 
a  hundred (medium-sized) settle-
ments in Northern Hungary and the 
Northern Great Plains, where 10 case 
studies in pairs of settlements with 
similar features in each of the regions 
were also prepared. 
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they would rather have employed craftsmen and professionals, which is 
indicative of their lack of motivation for dealing with low skilled long term 
unemployed. 
a degree of change can be observed with regard to micro-regional coopera-
tion. Fazekas’s (2001) survey shows that, at the turn of the century, only 1 per 
cent of local governments planned to implement public works programmes in 
micro-regional associations. in spite of the fact that management problems 
could have been more easily tackled through micro-regional cooperation, 
the dissemination of this institutional model was not supported by employ-
ment centres or by local job centres at that time (bódis and nagy, 2008). in 
Fekete’s (2011) sample, however, 45 per cent of local authorities organized 
local employment in partnership, and, within this group, 28 per cent in a local 
government partnership. 
according to Fazekas (2001), following the expansion of public works schemes, 
considerable differences arose between local governments with regard to 
the provision of access to social assistance, public works and programmes 
for health, mental rehabilitation and family problems.6 Due to organizational 
difficulties, local authorities could offer public works to only half of the popu-
lation that received permanent social assistance. according to nagy (2008), 
recipients of social assistance could expect to have to participate in public 
works in less than half of the settlements studied.7 more than a quarter of the 
local authorities stated that they differentiated between applicants for public 
works jobs on the basis of social and equity dimensions; special attention was 
paid to applicants with large families. 
the joint work undertaken by local authorities and local job centres with regard 
to the provision of social assistance to the long-term unemployed should also be 
mentioned here. in the mid-2000s, reorganization of the institutional framework 
of labour policy made local government responsible for the individual atten-
dance of the long-term unemployed. in principle, this is tailored to individual 
need and is based on a mutual agreement of responsibilities (a reintegration 
programme) to support integration back into the labour market. local govern-
ments required the clients to cooperate with the local job centres and with 
the local authority family support centre, especially since the cooperation of 
the long-term unemployed with local job centres was made mandatory under 
regulations introduced at the beginning of the decade.8
this system provides for synergies between two providers who are working 
with the same clientele. on the other hand, it can also lead to a rigorous 
demarcation of responsibilities, or duplicate inefficiencies in the enforcement 
of benefit eligibility criteria (see Chapter 4.1). Research conducted 18 months 
prior to the ‘Road to Work’ programme indicated the latter: due to technical 
shortcomings and lack of interest on both sides, cooperation between local 
government and local job centres stalled (bódis and nagy, 2008).
sociAl economy
over the last decades, social economy has gained increasing attention as 
a model for local employment expansion. in the eu jargon, this diffuse concept 
refers to the organization of local services for households and individuals into 
6 Fazekas (2001) studied the results 
of expanding public works schemes 
on the basis of local government 
data, interviews and administrative 
information. 
7 The sample included 5 small towns, 
14 settlements with a population of 
1,000–5,000, and 25 villages with 
a population of less than 1,000. 
8 Local job centres had an ambigu-
ous relationship with the long-term 
unemployed. Centres located in 
underdeveloped regions had a vested 
interest in maintaining a minimal level 
of cooperation. Others argued that 
cooperation with clients whose physi-
cal or health conditions prevented 
them from working should be main-
tained by organizations specializing 
in social assistance (Bálint, 2006). 
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market-based activities (eC, 1994; cited by Frey, 2007: 24), while in common 
parlance it is defined rather as a protected and self-sufficient local market 
(Czene and Ritz, 2010). 
in the past decade – partly as a result of spontaneous processes and assistance 
programmes – some local governments have taken a leading role in initiating 
the expansion of local employment opportunities.9 in most cases, this has been 
related to some central state assistance, such as the social land programme 
or the establishment of social cooperatives. 
the social land programme, financed from the central budget, supports deprived 
families in the labour market in 150–170 settlements on average per year; 
between 1992 and 2007 some 471 settlements got involved. the goal of the 
social land programme is self-sufficiency and the development of a culture 
of work (together with its related value system). Without external aid, even 
programmes that expressely aim for market sale rather than own consumption 
would not be able to guarantee these families a living. production and marketing 
communities that cover the whole production process and that function as 
supported enterprises came about in only a few settlements (Fekete, 2011). the 
way this land programme has been implemented in most places does not allow 
acquisition of the means necessary for the production of goods for permanent 
market presence, and of land for cultivation or active capital.10 
although (ethnic) minority self-government bodies, non-governmental organi-
zations and local government associations were all eligible for funding, as well 
as local authorities, the majority of applicants (and in 2007 more than 80 per 
cent of those successful) were local authorities. even the most independent 
family enterprises needed the coordination that local governments could 
offer; families most in need of support do not even apply for grants under 
the programme (Rácz, 2009). in-depth case studies in the second half of the 
2000s concluded that the launch of programmes, the network of participants, 
the intensity of coordination and the quality of services provided for producers 
depended greatly on the individual qualities, knowledge and ambitions of local 
government leaders (kovács, 2008; németh, 2011).
social cooperatives – along the lines of european models – have been possible 
in Hungary since 2006. the goal of these organizations is to create jobs for 
their unemployed and socially disadvantaged members, and also to supple-
ment their members’ economic, educational, social and health-related needs. 
the first cooperatives were created and encouraged by the labour ministry 
through programmes of the national employment Fund (oFa): between 2007 
and 2010, some 50 cooperatives were established. the role of ambitious 
local government leaders is key to the organization and functioning of social 
cooperatives (Fekete, 2011).
németh (2011) studied the empirical features of Hungarian social economy. 
His findings suggest that most of these programmes involve undifferenti-
ated, mass production; that products never reach their markets; and that 
production cannot be sustained beyond the end of the project. in cases where 
products do manage to reach the markets, actors who are aiming for greater 
efficiency squeeze out those who are most in need of employment. if the 
principles of efficiency and solidarity do manage to coexist in harmony, it is 
likely that the programme is organized by a charismatic local leader. therefore, 
9 According to Csoba (2007) Hun-
garian social economy-type pro-
grammes were first generated by 
non-governmental organizations; 
local governments took over the role 
of programme initiators only later. 
The weakness of non-governmental 
organizations resulted in their inabil-
ity to establish methodological cen-
tres on their own, and therefore these 
centres were eventually created using 
OFA funds. 
10 The most highly developed local 
employment programmes can be 
found in North-east Hungary and in 
Southern Transdanubia (Kabai and 
Németh, 2011).
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the sustainability and spread of such programmes is rather unstable: successful 
programmes are exceptions to the rule, rather than pilot projects that provide 
the foundations of sectoral policy. 
employment rehAbilitAtion (trAnsit) progrAmmes
transit-employment programmes have followed a negative developmental 
path: from heterogeneous and innovative institutional solutions to over-stan-
dardized and over-regulated local initiatives constrained from top to bottom 
(see also Chapter 2.3). the institutional transformation of transit-employment 
programmes was due to the lack of integration between employment and 
development policies, and to the recentralization of this fragmented institu-
tional structure towards the end of the 1990s.
oFa has supported endogenous development initiatives, based on the association 
of local actors, since the 1990s (molnár, 2011). in the first half of the 1990s, oFa 
programmes represented the second-largest pool of development resources 
in Hungary. besides local governments, the beneficiaries of oFa’s complex 
economic and employment development programmes could be non-governmental 
organizations that focused on micro-regional development – unlike in the case 
of decentralized funds in 1996. in this sense, oFa programmes – although they 
were central state funded – aimed to strengthen the local perspective by encour-
aging the mobilization of endogenous resources and by supporting innovative 
institutional solutions. oFa employment programmes covered practically all 
sectoral and labour groups. 
the first transit programme was launched by oFa as a pilot project in 1996, 
with the goal of helping unskilled, disadvantaged and unemployed groups into 
permanent employment. the programme was built on three pillars: training 
(semi-skilled or vocational, or that otherwise supports permanent employ-
ment), employment (generally funded either throughout the programme or 
just for part of it) and assistance (career guidance and aftercare) (györgyi 
and mártonfi, 2001).11
oFa transit-employment programmes were run by non-governmental orga-
nizations with various backgrounds and orientations, but that nevertheless 
shared the goal of helping individuals who were marginalized in the labour 
market (györgyi and mártonfi, 2001). the functional and organizational hetero-
geneity of non-governmental organizations made ‘transits’ highly innovative: 
their differentiated approach enabled them to reach various groups with 
diverse employment and social problems in micro-regions with different 
socio-economic contexts. 
oFa managed the heterogeneity and the (frequent) infrastructural and insti-
tutional instability of these non-governmental organizations by excluding 
extremely unstable organizations from the programme and by supporting the 
institutional capacity-building of organizations.
overall, 65–70 per cent of jobseekers who participated in oFa transit 
programmes ended up finding employment in the labour market (molnár, 
2011), while drop-out rates remained low, at around 5–6 per cent (györgyi and 
mártonfi, 2001). the long-term effects of the programmes were not evalu-
ated, though a single impact analysis was carried out before the programme 
11 Similar programmes – also referred 
to as ‘transit’ – of employment cen-
tres did not provide assistance.
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closed in 2001. this revealed that 72.4 per cent of programme participants 
had found a job within a month of completing the programme (györgyi and 
mártonfi, 2001: 51).12
oFa programmes were also adopted by other institutions, but with less flexible 
financial frameworks. the programme of the education ministry and pHaRe 
in 2000 financed several transit organizations that had been funded by oFa 
as well. Within the institutional framework of pHaRe, the flexible institutional 
logic of oFa programmes could be maintained, and thus project owners could 
organize the content and budget at their own discretion (without standard 
costs). the employment measures of pHaRe intended to provide a bridge 
between the programme standards of oFa and of the structural Funds. 
the measures of the Human Resource operational programme (HeFop) 
2.3.1 and 2.3.2 (between 2004 and 2006) continued earlier oFa and pHaRe 
programmes.13 the goal of these measures was to adapt previous non-govern-
mental oFa programmes to the institutional framework of the labour policy 
of the central state. this integration was, however, stalled by discrepancies 
in the institutional mechanisms of HeFop and of oFa transit programmes 
in terms of financial and institutional conditions.14 as a result, the projects of 
non-governmental organizations funded by measures HeFop 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 
remained isolated initiatives (HeFop, 2008). 
nevertheless, the responses of participants during evaluation of the programme 
indicated its relative success: 79 per cent of participants did not have a job 
before the training, but 64 per cent of them found employment after taking 
part in the programme; 67 per cent ended up working at or close to the level 
of their qualifications; 85 per cent of respondents found consultations very 
useful tools to help them in completing the programme successfully; and 64 
per cent of them graded the programme ‘excellent’ (HeFop, 2008).
in spite of these positive results, eu-funded transit programmes have been 
strongly criticized on professional grounds. late payment on HeFop and social 
Renewal operational programme (támop) programmes caused enormous 
problems for professionals in non-governmental organizations. besides the 
funding problems, the professional background of HeFop and támop transit 
programmes was also questioned by several professionals who had partici-
pated in the original oFa transit programme.15
anomalies in the adoption of oFa transit programmes by HeFop highlight 
a problem also mentioned by lászló (2010): the inability of the institutional 
system of Hungarian labour policy to integrate place-based principles, to define 
policy means and goals in a way that can manage regional variety and differ-
ences in employment and in the labour market. this can be explained by the 
lack of integration of development and labour policy, and by the absence of 
decentralization in institutional structures and in decision-making about the 
use of resources and their allocation. in the gradually recentralized institu-
tional system of development policy since the turn of the century, HeFop and 
támop funds have abandoned the principles of subsidiarity and partnership, 
and their centrally defined, over-regulated institutional system has narrowed 
the scope for action of local state and non-state actors. their standardized 
requirements have blocked heterogeneity and experimentation with innovative 
solutions. overlaps between HeFop/támop, oFa and employment service 
12 Beyond these concrete results, the 
authors of the impact analysis saw the 
success of OFA transit programmes 
in institution-building and the devel-
opment of professional standards. In 
this vein, these programmes contrib-
uted to the development of a holistic 
and interdisciplinary methodology 
that could provide the foundations 
for the planning and functioning 
of other transit-type programmes 
(Györgyi and Mártonfi, 2001). Insti-
tution-building that evolved as a by-
product of the programme generated 
associations of diverse organizations 
that would have been unimaginable 
earlier. This induced the long-term 
self-sufficiency and institutional sta-
bility of these organizations.
13 The authors of the mid-term 
evaluation of the programme in 2007 
found that the long-term effects of 
the 2.3.1 programme could hardly be 
measured. First, several parallel and 
overlapping programmes were run 
at the same time; secondly, the mea-
surement of target groups took place 
according to different standards in the 
programmes of HEFOP and the Public 
Employment Service (HEFOP, 2008). 
14 Project owners of OFA transit pro-
grammes could shape the content 
and finances of their projects more or 
less as they wished, without standard 
costs (HEFOP, 2008). 
15 Standard programme requirements 
‘sometimes oblige organizations to 
work in partnership even if they would 
manage the programme better alone, 
or in other cases force them to provide 
tasks (e.g. employment) that they can 
only implement with an external part-
ner’ (Vargabetű Association). HEFOP 
and TÁMOP standardized functional 
requirements of non-governmen-
tal organizations, which destroyed 
the organizational and institutional 
hetero geneity that had been seen as 
the source of earlier success. 
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transit programmes, discrepancies in their methodologies, and the fragmen-
tation of programme management organizations underline the decade-long 
absence of integrated development and sectoral strategies. 
employment pActs
employment pacts first appeared in Hungary at the beginning of the 2000s. 
since 2004, grants have been available for the local coordination of projects 
that promote employment within the framework of pHaRe, the Regional 
operational programme (Rop) and támop (lászló 2010).16 as part of these 
programmes, employment pacts were reached, setting out the willingness of 
enterprises, local governments, training institutions and employment organi-
zations to engage in cooperation in many micro-regions. 
employment pacts provide a framework for the development and manage-
ment of visions generated by the participants. such visions might include the 
synergistic development of micro-regional competitiveness and human capital, 
the coordination of institutions promoting employment, or the refinement and 
dissemination of methods used in social economy. 
lászló’s research (2010) identified 47 pacts across the country, two-thirds 
of them at the micro-regional level (the level also preferred by publishers of 
tenders). more than a third of pacts were initiated by local authorities, occa-
sionally by local government associations or employment centres, and only 
rarely by a non-governmental organization. the regional distribution of pacts 
is uneven, but this is due to varying degrees of engagement by county job 
centres and the spread of good practice in their vicinity, rather than a result 
of the level of regional development. in most cases, to begin with, a maximum 
of 25 organizations joined the pacts, though later (also due to tender require-
ments) the number of member organizations increased. vocational and adult 
training establishments are generally absent from employment pacts, as are 
innovation and development agencies and organizations, larger enterprises 
and regional representations of trade unions. 
Four-fifths of the pacts investigated were funded by grants. sometimes local 
actors had planned similar associations before, but it was more common for 
the associations to be formed in reaction to the invitation for tenders: to solve 
local labour market problems or, in many cases, to win grants. the majority 
of participants viewed a pact as just one project of many, and they remained 
involved for only as long as the project required; the project approach in these 
tenders also supported short-term and formal indicators. although most pacts 
include situation analyses, strategies and work plans, little is known of their 
content or functioning.
in general, the organization and impact of pacts – as of micro-regional asso-
ciations – is at an early stage. according to lászló’s (2010) evaluation, the 
conditions necessary for the effective functioning of pacts would be provided 
by a labour policy that differentiates between them and that acknowledges 
well-defined local plans as official programmes (and provides the means for 
their implementation). in the current climate, even viable local employment 
strategies and genuine partnerships come up against local actors who only 
see pacts as a way of acquiring grants and formally satisfying requirements. 
16 Two years before the launch 
of these EU-funded central state 
programmes, the first bottom-up 
employment pact was sealed in the 
micro-region of Kemenesalja, in 
May 2002 (Kovács, 2003). This pro-
gramme was initiated by the Employ-
ment Centre of Vas County. 
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since the cost of network building, dissemination and continuously improving 
coordination is not worth the effort for any actor in terms of the money 
received, at the moment the majority of the pacts rely on the state and central 
state resources, rather than on local initiative. 
the provision of dAy cAre
one way for local governments to contribute indirectly to the expansion of 
employment is to develop services that help people take on jobs. this might 
include the maintenance of institutions, improvement in the management of 
local government institutions, or the coordination of various actors in the 
provision of public services. 
From the perspective of employment, the most important local government 
institutions are crèches and kindergartens that help working mothers.17 since 
the start of the 1990s, the capacity of crèches has dropped from 15 per cent 
to 8 per cent of crèche-aged children. over a quarter of all crèches are located 
in budapest, and they are few and far between in small settlements. gener-
ally, crèches are open only during the day shift: children must be picked up 
by five o’clock or, in some places, by four o’clock (pataki and somorjai, 2007). 
the high cost to local authorities of setting up and maintaining crèches – 
higher than kindergartens – affects their establishment (Herczog, 2008).18 
in the absence of empirical data, it cannot be stated why it is that some local 
authorities have undertaken the development of crèches in the past 20 years. 
but according to some experts,19 the decision by local authorities to develop 
crèches is based not on making it easier for working parents, but rather on 
gaining access to eu funding, which appears in their communication strategies 
as providing care for children. Crèches that are located near to successfully 
privatized or new large enterprises, or that have been set up by them, are 
exceptions to this. there are also only a few agglomerations where the various 
factors required for a crèche to be set up and maintained are present at the 
same time. in these limited cases, migration into the settlement induces a rise 
in the number of children, and local governments have enough resources to 
cover the costs. in such cases, the new inhabitants can effectively lobby for 
public services , which is also important because neither local authorities 
nor job centres survey the unemployed about the expected impact of crèche 
development, and thus their needs are not taken into account in decisions 
about the provision of daycare. 
kindergartens can offer day care from the age of 3, but it is only mandatory 
from the age of 5.20 the institutional system of kindergarten care has led to 
considerable regional differences in the density of kindergarten service provi-
sion: in economically more developed regions, the number of kindergarten 
places has increased (or at least has not decreased), while in less developed 
regions their number has dropped (kotán, 2005). among the local authorities 
that provide kindergarten services, the proportion of those that have more 
jobs and more resources to keep up the kindergartens has increased.21
Facilitating employment plays an explicit role in the application of informal 
rules governing kindergarten enrolment: if kindergarten places are in short 
supply, children aged under 5 from families where both parents are employed 
17 See Chapter 6.3 for an in-depth 
discussion of the functioning of insti-
tutions that help to reconcile work 
and family commitments, and of the 
impact of childcare benefits. 
18 On the other hand, a survey in 
2010 demonstrated that the basic 
functioning of a  crèche can be 
ensured by central state per capita 
funding, without support from local 
government (Scharle, 2011).
19 Some previous (and current) 
officials from the Democratic Trade 
Union of Crèche Workers, who, along-
side their classic role of representing 
workers’ rights, also participate in 
policy discourse. 
20 Since 2005, different rules have 
applied to children aged 3 whose 
parents have at most eight years of 
primary-school education: kindergar-
tens are obliged to take such children 
at the age of 3. Since 2004, kinder-
gartens must also accept those chil-
dren whose parents cannot provide 
parental day care for them due to 
their work or to some labour market 
programme. In these cases, kinder-
garten day care must be aligned to 
the working schedule of the parents. 
21 Regional disparities in kindergar-
ten service provision also represent 
a serious problem for public educa-
tion. Studies have demonstrated that 
a scarcity (or complete lack) of kin-
dergarten services can be observed in 
settlements with high rates of unem-
ployment, and with high proportions 
of the persistently poor and of Roma. 
This causes considerable disadvan-
tages in children’s development and 
affects their future success in school 
or in the labour market (Havas and 
Liskó, 2006).
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have priority (vágó, 2005; Havas, 2009). kindergartens have a fair degree 
of autonomy in considering the situation of families,22 which is no guarantee 
that they give priority to supporting families in reconciling work and family 
obligations. in the case of unemployed parents, neither the local job centres 
nor the local authorities intervene to assist the placement of children in 
kindergartens. it is more common for them to ease the conditions governing 
job search (bódis and nagy, 2008). 
the opening hours of kindergartens seem to have adapted better to the needs 
of parents and the labour market. after 1990, the number of kindergartens 
at (formerly) socialist enterprises that aligned their opening hours with work 
schedules dropped by 90 per cent (tóth, 2000). in 2001, roughly half of the 
parents in a representative sample for a national survey were fully satisfied 
with the opening hours of their kindergarten (török, 2005). the number of 
completely dissatisfied parents was infinitesimal, but really only local surveys 
can show how local needs can be better met. kindergartens and those who 
fund them seemed more prepared to satisfy such needs in the 2000s than 
they were in the 1990s, which can be explained by changes in the labour 
market and by measures that strengthened client-centred approaches in 
public education institutions. For instance, our own research, conducted in 
the late 1990s among dressmakers in a county town in the great plains region, 
revealed that the opening hours of kindergartens were adjusted to the needs 
of kindergarten employees rather than to those of parents. as a consequence, 
despite the good labour-market and public transport conditions, parents 
commuting from a village to a nearby town were unable to arrive in time for 
a regular shift without the help of family members (bódis, 2002). part of the 
problem was the insensitive attitude of local authorities, which tried to duck 
their responsibilities, and part was the inflexible employment regulations 
governing kindergartens (such as the requirement for the permanent pres-
ence of a trained kindergarten teacher) (török, 2005; kotán, 2005). interviews 
repeated in the second half of the decade showed that the kindergarten had 
extended its opening and closing hours and was cooperating with parents 
who were coming from farther away (bódis, 2008). 
the coordinAtion of public trAnsport
local government can assist people to reach their workplaces. according to 
research data, the alignment of public transport timetables with the times 
at which people start work began to improve towards the end of the 1990s 
and the start of the 2000s (see Chapter 6.4). the engines of harmonization 
and information gathering were the public transport companies (largely the 
volán bus and coach companies, which early on became cost-conscious). the 
inclusion of the local authorities in finding out what people need is essential, 
since people who cannot travel and are unemployed because of a lack of proper 
transport schedules can still be reached by them. 
since the 1990s, one characteristic coordination problem has been how to 
arrive at work on time if the starting hour is later than usual. in the early days, 
the transformation of socialist enterprises was all about downsizing and the 
best utilization of resources (köllő, 2003), and many companies moved over to 
22 According to a national survey in 
2001, less than half of local govern-
ments stated that they had a say in 
the definition of preferences applied 
to enrolment (Vágó, 2005). Local 
governments became more active 
in this respect in the 2000s, and the 
forms of local government influence 
extends to local decrees and the adju-
dication of appeals. 
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a single day-shift regime. some of the new production lines in labour-intensive 
sectors in the latter half of the 1990s were also organized around a single day 
shift, which was very appealing to unskilled workers, who had been used to 
plants that worked using two or three shifts or on continuous shifts (bódis, 
2008). the public transport companies, despite little coordination, sought to 
guarantee that most commuters could reach the towns – even from quite far 
away and with a change of bus – by the beginning of the morning shift and 
the start of school. 
Company-sponsored transportation of workers requires coordination – not 
only by employers, but also by workers who live near one another. the costs 
involved in running a bus for workers make economic sense only if the buses 
transport a sufficient number of productive workers, on a fixed route and 
without major detours. aside from local job centres, companies involved in 
wide-scale recruitment also contacted the local authorities, which may have 
played a decisive role in the dissemination of information and the mobilization 
of jobseekers’ social capital (bódis, 2008).23 
the coordination of public transport is a success story: in more developed 
regions, it is on the daily agenda of micro-regional discussions. local job centres, 
local government and public transport companies all participate proactively in 
the process, and the latter – especially the volán coach companies – respond 
swiftly to new needs. 
conclusions And recommendAtions
the patchy research data discussed above indicate that local government has 
not played a significant role over the past two decades in expanding the oppor-
tunities for local employment. apart from a few successful attempts in recent 
years, we have not seen the kind of local partnerships between employers, 
training and other stakeholder institutions that could generate endogenous 
development based on long-term strategies. nevertheless, there have been 
promising initiatives that could spark progress – or at least provide lessons 
for policy makers in the future. 
the organization of public works is a critical aspect of programme manage-
ment and of inter-agency cooperation; it can trigger diverse responses even 
from different local authorities that have certain characteristics in common. 
the very modest results of public works programmes – something that runs 
counter to expectations – indicate that the majority of settlements do not have 
the capacity or the skills to manage tasks related to long-term unemployment. 
Research suggests that local authorities find inter-settlement cooperation 
burdensome; nevertheless they increasingly organize public works within some 
form of partnership – mainly within local government associations. 
local government also plays a decisive role in organizing social economy, which 
reconciles market production and human services. this can be explained by 
a decline in the non-governmental sector that used to be more active in this 
field. experience shows that these programmes could only be sustained in 
a few places, and only at the price of social goals.
the project owners of the transit-employment programmes that were 
launched in the 1990s were non-governmental organizations, which focused 
23 This is due to the fact that a cera-
tin number of workers need to be 
enrolled from the same settlement 
at the same time for the bus to make 
a worthwhile detour. Therefore, indi-
vidual jobseekers may sometimes 
need to get involved in recruiting 
peers from their village. 
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on micro-regional development. transit adaptations funded by eu develop-
ment schemes have been over-regulated, over-standardized and display insti-
tutional uniformity. the institutional system of these transit programmes is 
fragmented and lacks coordination. this can be explained by the lack of policy 
integration (between labour, education and economic development policies) 
and lack of harmonization at the regional level.
the patchy empirical data suggest that the organization of public transport 
timetables improved greatly in the 2000s, and that local government played 
an important role in this by providing essential information to the service 
providers. the data also suggest that the opening hours of childcare institu-
tions have adjusted to parents’ working hours. access to local government 
childcare is still inflexible and haphazard. the considerable autonomy of 
kindergartens means that, if capacity is low, enrolment decisions are based 
on parents’ chances of employment and willingness to work. 
in local government institutions and local job centres, the coordination of 
moves to facilitate employment is poor, and is undertaken by several indepen-
dent organizations, and hence is not clearly observable. For this reason, the 
collection and dissemination of good practice should take place at the right 
level – by and large above that of individual institutions. 
Due to limits in local capacity, local government functions that support the 
expansion of employment should be organized at the level of micro-regions – 
e.g. by job centres or the new district public administration institutions. in this 
way the incentives for cooperation among local actors would be strengthened. 
in this set-up, programme and institutional management would have higher 
transaction costs than before. but this is the price of developing individual 
mentoring, improving targeting, harmonizing the quality of work in different 
units and influencing the impact of organizational features on programme 
outcomes.24 this would also be in keeping with the schemes to moderate and 
transform local government dominance in local coordination. it would likewise 
support the strengthening of local partnerships between businesses, state 
and non-state actors and the evolution of local development agency-type 
institutions. 
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3. tHe quality oF poliCy making
3.1. deciSion-making procedureS in the national policy* 
balázs váRaDi
* Thanks are due to Lilla Garzó, György 
Hajnal, Péter Galasi and Ágota Scharle 
for their remarks, and to András G. 
Szabó for compiling the media analysis. 
I have integrated the ideas of Zsombor 
Cseres-Gergely and Petra Reszkető 
on EU policy with their approval, and 
assume responsibility for any mistakes 
or inaccuracies.
the aim of this chapter is to examine the decision-support and decision-making 
mechanisms behind employment policy over the past 20 years in Hungary. the 
institutions of interest conciliation were discussed in Chapter 2.2.
twenty years is a long time in policy making, and the literature available on the 
decisions and decision support in Hungarian employment policy (e.g. Frey, 2002; 
Halmos, 2010; tóth, 2008) is rather limited. this chapter does not attempt 
to fill this gap. nor does it aim at providing a descriptive catalogue of policy, 
regulations and institutions of labour affairs by summarizing the extensive 
work of mária Frey (2002; 2011).
instead, it will discuss the history of decision support and decision making 
through some arbitrarily selected topics that have been characteristic of most 
of the past two decades, and whose social and economic policy impacts are 
still relevant today. the chapter relies on the scarce literature, some structured 
interviews (supplemented by a questionnaire) and media analysis. owing to 
these limitations, this chapter (unlike other chapters that summarize empirical 
findings) presents hypotheses, rather than empirically sound evidence. 
the theoreticAl bAckground to policy decision mAking
using the methods of several disciplines (political science, economics, orga-
nizational sociology, game and information theory and psychology), various 
descriptive models have been developed for analysing policy decision making. 
the extensive literature on these is summarized by parsons (1995) and, in 
Hungarian, briefly by Hajnal and gajduschek (2010).
We are going to examine those models that are relevant to decision making 
in Hungarian employment policy.
the first is the classical cyclical model of policy making, the major steps of 
which are summarized in table 1 below. 
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Table 1: Actions and roles in the cyclical model of policy making
Action Decision maker Expert
a) Agenda-setting: identifying 
and defining issues* 
politicians in charge  
and policy makers
b) Developing policy 
alternatives
civil servants and/or 
external experts
c) Ex ante assessment of 
alternatives
civil servants in 
accordance with criteria 
defined by decision 
makers
d) Decision-making upon 
thorough consideration of 
the above
politicians in charge: 
minister, government or 
parliament
e) Implementation civil servants
f) Ex post evaluation of policy experts not involved in 
the decision making and 
implementation
* may be based on the development of the country, politics (e.g. party manifestos), institutional 
agendas, lobbies, external crises, the media, international trends or ideologies.
the professional approach of new public management (Hajnal, 2004) (which 
focuses on governance and rational elements) and evidence-based policy making 
(Head, 2009) (which is one of the most important policy-making approaches 
of recent years) fit very well into this model (especially on actions (b), (c) and 
(f)). this model is highlighted here because – not coincidentally – it forms the 
focus of introductory textbooks (e.g. Howlett et al., 2009): many experts who 
are not involved in decision making itself but who participate in other steps 
of the process consider it the only ideal form of decision support.
several other models, which analyse policy making with more sociological and 
descriptive methods, may be contrasted with it. these will not be described, 
but some important elements of the wide range of models (see parsons, 1995) 
that do not fit into the scheme of table 1 are discussed below:
 – stakeholder interest already influences preparations for decision making. 
according to lindblom (1959), policy decision making is incremental, i.e. it 
involves the art of taking small steps. only small changes can be made, one 
at a time and after broad consultation. lindblom warns that, if policy actions 
are adopted in this way, it may lead to ‘local optimums’, i.e. situations that 
seem ideal if one considers a small number of alternatives, but that are not 
optimal if one considers the full range of policies available.
 – the production and processing of information also has several (e.g. temporal 
or psychological-cognitive) limitations. 
 – institutions involved in the decision-making process are not always able 
to aggregate personal – albeit possibly rational – goals of individuals to 
obtain the public good. political decisions are usually made by groups with 
members in conflict with one another. 
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the relationship between the policy makers, civil servants and political leaders 
who possess a mandate based on democratic elections is an important compo-
nent in all models.
the significAnce of policy decisions
the details of policy decision support and decision making would hardly be 
interesting and relevant for the output of employment policy if different coun-
tries arrived at a similar employment situation by adopting different policy/
institutional decision-support and decision-making mechanisms. However, if 
we compare Hungary to other eastern european post-communist countries 
– which started from the same baseline and were exposed to roughly similar 
external economic shocks – we see that this is not the case. Whether we 
consider labour market participation or the proportion of long-term unemploy-
ment within unemployment generally, there are significant differences to be 
observed (bajnai et al., 2009). these differences, in a group of countries with 
similar pre-1989 history and status in the world economy, reveal (or at least 
do not exclude) the fact that their different decision-making procedures may 
have had an impact on the indicators of employment policy.1
in the following, we will discuss to what extent and how the decision-support 
and decision-making procedures of Hungarian employment policy differ (if 
they differ at all) from the classical, cyclical model of policy making in four 
fields. First, the recruitment of senior civil servants will be examined, along 
with their own perception of their role. secondly, we will investigate the 
perception of problems by decision makers and their support staff, as well as 
the main ideas on how to improve the labour market situation. the third topic 
will canvass opinions on public works; while the fourth will look at the impact 
of eu guidelines on policy making.
the role of civil servAnts And their perception thereof
the personnel who initially handled the labour portfolio during the political 
transition were primarily recruited from the national planning bureau, the 
national office of Wages and labour and the (communist) party trade union. 
those of our interviewees with this last career background looked back on 
the pre-transition era with some nostalgia. 
to start with, it is worth noting that, according to linder (2010), the employment 
of civil servants under communism was usually characterized by the following: 
 – the politicization of public administration,
 – low mobility, 
 – the decentralization and fragmentation of human resource (HR) policy,
 – the allocation of certain HR functions to ministers, and
 – a negative image of the civil service (due to its politicization) and a low 
salary level.
the dichotomy that is so characteristic of democracies – between the (frequently 
changing) elected government politicians, with their divergent political goals, 
and the career civil servants who are devoted to them and simultaneously to 
the public good – was absent from this structure. those who participated in 
1 For changes in the civil service of 
post-communist EU Member States 
after EU accession, see Meyer-Sahling 
(2009).
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this system were expected both to recognize and to serve a public good that 
was inseparable from the politics. 
the first government after the political transition also relied on this self-
confident attitude. in this period, within the budget and objectives specified, 
the civil servants handling the labour portfolio had considerable scope for 
initiative in selecting instruments, and often also in defining sub-targets (see 
Chapter 2.1).
in 1992, parliament adopted a law on the status of civil servants, which included 
mixed provisions that were, to a large extent, based on the traditional, closed 
german–austrian governance of the civil service (salary dependent on seniority, 
job security) (linder, 2010).
this highly autonomous role, which included scope for political deliberations, 
was retained after the change of government in 1994. For example, the abolition 
of support for new graduates was initiated by the civil service: Finance minister 
lajos bokros only specified that welfare benefits should be pruned. During the 
development of the ‘bokros package’, civil servants were expected to review 
political decisions, and it was entirely acceptable for them to argue against 
a planned measure by saying ‘it will be too painful’ (i.e. it will cause significant 
losses and therefore generate discontent) or ‘it will have poor returns’ (i.e. it 
will entail only minor savings in the budget and so is not worth implementing).
Following the bokros package, under the leadership of minister péter kiss, it 
was mainly programmes that targeted distinct groups (and potential voters) 
– the Roma or fresh graduates – that got the green light. some civil servants 
resented this, but others appeared to go along with the political orders.
looking back, staff working at the ministry between 1990 and 1998 say that 
a relatively cooperative and well-performing civil service emerged during the 
period (compared to other ministries).
the first orbán government tended to be more specific in its political instruc-
tions, but the details of employment-related plans were still worked out by 
the ministry’s civil servants (pesti, 2000). nevertheless, the government 
considered implementation (rather than the development of alternatives) to 
be the main task of the civil service between 1998 and 2002.
an important change in the role of civil servants and politicians was marked 
by the massive increase in the minimum wage in 2001 and 2002. the exact 
source of the idea has proved impossible to identify, but it definitely emanated 
from leading government politicians and came as a complete surprise to senior 
civil servants. although they accepted some of its elements (the potential to 
curb the shadow economy, an increase in the difference between the amount 
of social assistance and labour income), it was a shock to them that a decision 
had been taken on a labour issue without prior calculations of the possible 
employment effects being undertaken by the experts at the ministry (cf. 
Chapter 2.2).
the orbán administration’s concept of civil servants differed from that of its 
predecessors, as is indicated by the fact that, in 2001, it established a 300-strong 
team of highly skilled (and highly paid) lead civil servants who were suited to 
several fields of government. the aim was to improve the quality of policy 
making, but the political loyalty of this elite team was felt to be suspect after 
the change of government, and its special status was abolished in 2007.2
2 The government also planned 
a  unif ied public service law, and 
a  government commissioner was 
appointed to draft it; but then the 
plan was abandoned – probably in 
part because of the resistance of the 
civil service (Linder, 2010).
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those who had an inside view of the labour ministry during the Horn and 
medgyessy government – a ministry that was split up and then re-merged – 
unanimously said that the quality of the personnel had deteriorated by 2006. 
in that period, policy packages considered important for the elections (e.g. 
the programme entitled ‘one Hundred steps’) generally consisted of only 
minor steps and were drawn up using a top-down approach, without the usual 
horizontal consultation. Civil servants were only expected to work out minor 
regulatory details.
the scrapping in 2006 of the position of deputy state secretary is judged 
differently by the various actors.3 according to ambitious civil servants, the 
professional independence of the civil service was impaired, its initiative was 
needed less, and the career path available to civil servants without open party 
allegiance became shorter. they think the change, forwarded to legislators 
as an explicit political wish, aimed at suppressing opposition to the unprofes-
sional instructions of politicians. However, according to politicians who were 
directly involved, the deputy state secretary position had, in fact, previously 
also been filled by political appointees (politicians cum public servants), upon 
whose dismissal large sums in severance pay would have to be paid. according 
to them, the reform brought the written law closer in line with the reality of 
the situation.
our interviewees stated unanimously that, once the Western european study 
tours that were conducted during the political transition and consultation 
with visiting international experts were over, no statistical, methodological or 
economic in-house training was held either for labour affairs politicians (who 
often had a completely different background, cf. Chapter 2.1) or for decision-
support civil servants,. this did not necessarily prevent those civil servants 
willing to engage in self-education from understanding aggregated time series 
or comparison tables, but it probably did hamper the preparation of analyses 
based on micro-level data, which required labour economics and econometric 
studies (for more detail, see Chapters 3.2 and 3.3).
the problem of providing decision-support calculations may have had something 
to do with the above deficiency. although the ministry’s civil servants tried to 
obtain accurate, up-to-date and detailed data, and occasionally commissioned 
surveys on relevant, long-term issues (e.g. an ex-post impact assessment of 
the minimum wage increase), usually they themselves – by their own admis-
sion – ‘cobbled together’ the figures included in proposals submitted to the 
government. it is important to note, especially in the case of active policies, 
that in the course of decision support no behavioural effects modifying the 
supply of and demand for labour were taken into account (except for in the 
field of pensions).
over the past 20 years, the boundary between the civil service and politi-
cians in the decision-support procedures has gradually shifted towards the 
politicians: the civil service has increasingly become a mere implementer. 
a confident late-kádárian civil service4 (which considered itself to be profes-
sional) participated in employment-policy decision support, with considerable 
autonomy and influence, during the antall, boross and Horn administrations 
after the transition.5 During the first orbán government, however, this role 
was restricted to codifying and implementing (increasingly impatient) political 
3 While deputy state secretaries 
used to be departmental appointees, 
the new ‘special secretary of state’ 
position was expressly political. Previ-
ously there had been a political and an 
administrative state secretary report-
ing to a minister, as well as deputy 
state secretaries in charge of sub-
sectors, who reported to the admin-
istrative state secretary. In the new 
system, each portfolio had one state 
secretary and several ‘special sec-
retaries of state’ reporting to them, 
all appointed by the prime minister.
4 For a background to this, see for 
example Szalai (2005).
5 The first two governments after 
the political transition were fairly 
dependent on this civil service.
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orders. nor was this tendency reversed after the change of government in 
2002; indeed it was pushed even further by the 2006 conversion of the deputy 
state secretary position into a political post. this resulted in a more successful 
realization of the political will of the government, on the one hand, but also in 
the demoralization of the civil service and its gradual exclusion from decision 
support, which damaged the quality of the decisions taken.6
opinions on the low Activity rAte
one of the most important questions – if not the most important question – of 
employment policy in the past two decades has been why it took so long for 
politicians to realize that the permanently low employment level (see Chapters 
1.1 and 2.1) is one of the key strategic challenges for Hungarian economic policy. 
it is a problem that will not sort itself out and that can only be solved by the 
coordinated modification of labour supply and labour demand incentives, as 
well as of the whole system of employment policy. it should have been the 
task of civil servants providing employment-policy decision support to make 
government politicians aware of this.
media analysis clearly reveals a slow process of journalists coming to realize 
the significance of the problem. in the turbulent spring of 1990, employment 
hardly figured in the media, and even the language that allowed it to be spoken 
about it in the context of the market economy had yet to evolve. the strike law 
was adopted by parliament after large-scale social and political consultation 
in 1989. in the same year, the labour Code was amended to fit the system of 
private property (Halmos, 2010). However, journalists were left in the dark 
about emerging employment relations. according to the daily newspaper 
Népszabadság, only “self-financing” jobs were worth supporting, other people 
losing their jobs should be retrained and the unemployed deserved decent 
benefits. according to the weekly magazine HVG, people should be helped to 
take up employment through relocation assistance. by the autumn of 1990, 
changes in the labour market had made progress: the press was explaining 
that the level of employment was dependent on investment, and increasing 
unemployment was tackled by early retirement.
in 1994, on the eve of the elections, the press was already discussing the fact 
that high unemployment was perceived as a structural problem. incoming 
foreign investment to stimulate job creation was considered a positive notion 
by the conservative press, too. the specialist press was also interested in the 
more detailed structure of the employment situation: highly qualified workers 
were less likely to become unemployed, parental leave benefits encouraged 
absence from the labour market, and neither early retirement nor (forced) 
self-employment were real solutions.
by 1998 the media still believed that economic growth would increase employ-
ment (albeit not automatically). this was the first time that the idea had 
appeared in the press that increasing taxes on labour (this time the healthcare 
contribution) may depress employment.
in the spring of 2002, Népszabadság presented the following employment-
related issues: 1. incoming foreign investment improves employment; 2. a high 
minimum wage may reduce employment; 3 . unemployment is higher among 
6 According to Meyer-Sahling (2009), 
Hungary was one of the new Mem-
ber States that joined in 2004 where, 
in some respects, the post-2004 
shift (in compliance with EU norms) 
towards a Western European, autono-
mous civil service has been reversed.
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the Roma (who are also less qualified), but allowing them to obtain a secondary 
school leaving qualification may be a solution; 4. the active population may at 
the same time reduce the number of those employed and those unemployed, 
e.g. disability pension may provide an alternative to unemployment; 5. it is more 
expedient for municipalities to employ people in public works schemes than 
to provide benefits. according to the daily Magyar Nemzet, taxes on labour 
hindered any increase in employment, while the aim of employment projects 
was partly to improve the chances of the Roma minority.
by the autumn of 2006, Népszabadság was less convinced about part-time 
employment than it had been before (it did not support the employment of 
older workers), and it also discussed the way in which the expansion of the road 
network might contribute to increased employment. the story resurfaced that 
tax relief may boost employment. the press was already aware that improving 
productivity does not necessarily entail an increase in employment, and that 
lack of qualifications hampers an improvement of the employment situation. 
nevertheless, a specialist politician belonging to the governing party announced 
that it was impossible for the government to counteract unemployment (i.e. 
not low employment) directly.
Magyar Nemzet was still hopeful about part-time jobs and teleworking: it 
hoped that Hungarian enterprises would expand and was aware of the impact 
of the quality of education and healthcare on the employment situation. it also 
stated that economic growth stemming from an increase in productivity does 
not necessarily boost employment.
it was around 2006 that HVG covered employment most frequently. in addition 
to earlier opinions, it had the following new ones: the reasons for low employ-
ment included the expanded welfare systems, high taxes and contributions 
levied on labour, an insufficiently liberalized labour market, and a high minimum 
wage. it also revealed that unemployment was lower along motorways and 
that the number of the unemployed may be related to the size of benefits. 
multi-generational unemployment was presented as a serious problem.
in the autumn of 2006, the topic of employment lost ground to other issues 
in HVG and Népszabadság; however, Magyar Nemzet mentioned again that 
reducing taxes on labour may lead to an increase in employment, and for the 
first time it considered that the relationship between growth and employment 
may work in the opposite direction: increasing employment may be the basis 
for long-term economic growth.
obviously, the issue of employment gradually moved higher up the political 
agenda: in 1990 the focus was on fear of the future; then, for a long time, it 
was expected that economic growth would alleviate employment problems; 
only by 2006 had it become clear that employment was stuck at a low level 
for structural reasons (an opinion present in the literature since 1994).
it seems the media had woken up slowly; but was the government ministry in 
charge of the issue any faster? alas no. this may have been due to the (other-
wise understandable) strategy, by which the main task for the portfolio at 
the start of the transition was to tackle steeply rising unemployment, largely 
by removing people from the labour market (see Chapter 1.1). politicians and 
civil servants thought that the approximately 1 million (generally older or less 
well qualified) people leaving the labour market would never have a job again, 
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and therefore the state had to provide for their subsistence through social 
means. to achieve this, sometimes even inertia was enough: for example, 
for allowing many out-of-work people to be declared disabled it was enough 
not to tighten regulations – since the increase of the number of people on 
disability benefit would only have been prevented by more stringent regula-
tions. at the time, job retention or labour demand stimulation through wage 
support (measures perceived as excessive intervention in the functioning of 
the market) would not have been well received by the typically (economically) 
liberal public opinion.
For quite a long time, even as late as in 2002–05, the unemployment rate was 
the most important indicator for the ministry; only after 2005 did civil servants 
realize that the employment rate is also of importance.7 the number of unem-
ployed was not only important because it was used by the press to gauge the 
efficiency of the minister, but also because unemployment is, in general, more 
closely related to the unpopularity of a government than is inactivity: those who 
are not looking for a job accept their lot and thus do not blame the government 
as much as those who are looking for a job unsuccessfully.
the employment section of the bokros package (except for the ensuing large 
decrease in real wages) contained more stringent measures, already planned 
by the ministry in charge – corrections also deemed necessary by the civil 
servants, based on the experience of the first years.8 However, they princi-
pally aimed at making economies rather than boosting employment. even the 
government manifesto of 1998 expected economic growth to improve the 
employment situation.
until 2002, there was no sign that the ministry regarded the employment 
situation as a reason, rather than as a symptom and a key challenge requiring 
a complex, coordinated policy response. some of our interviewees believe it 
was between 2002 and 2006 that the civil servants handling the portfolio 
started to ponder increasing employment in addition to reducing unemployment. 
a lead politician recalls having taken account of both indicators from 2004.
nevertheless, employment policy between 2002 and 2006 remained a mosaic 
of several separately introduced measures (rather than integrated in a compre-
hensive strategy), some of them only aimed at improving election prospects.
interviewees expressed their disappointment several times about the ad hoc 
approach to employment policy: while it focused on developing, fine-tuning, 
cutting back or abolishing a measure, it did not pay enough attention to the 
whole of the system.
policy decision support was nothing more than deliberating (albeit often 
important) details, and the civil servants could not get politicians to put the 
main strategic issue – the low employment level – on the agenda. 
it would be unjust to blame the civil servants exclusively for the above, since the 
Hungarian parliament of the day never had a proper debate on the proposals 
of the government, least of all during the discussion of the budget. as the 
Hungarian system is institution-centred, baseline budgeting (marczell and 
Romhányi, 2010), the goal of senior officials is to protect their own institu-
tions and ensure their own finances. by a curious paradox, the government 
prepares programmes for government that contain more or less specific 
objectives, and then parliament discusses the budget, in which there are 
7 According to one of our interview-
ees, it was partly because senior min-
istry officials did not have up-to-date 
employment data. However, this is 
not supported by the findings of 
 Chapter 3.2.
8 Two overgenerous benefits were 
abolished: the benefit for jobless 
fresh graduates and early retirement.
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unclear relationships between the objectives and the several thousand billion 
Forints set aside for the largest items. similarly, progress in implementing the 
government’s explicit (and hidden) programme is not debated, and nor are 
the further measures necessary.
public works As A solution
one of the paradoxes of Hungarian employment policy is that, while the relevant 
literature (see Chapter 5.2) considers public works (and especially large-scale 
public works) to be one of the least efficient active labour market policies, in 
Hungary its volume had increased dramatically by 2009–10.
according to media analysis, acceptance of this solution by the general public 
has increased gradually over the past two decades. Readers of Magyar Nemzet 
were already informed in 1994 that, for municipalities, it may be more worth-
while to organize public works than to pay benefits. the opinion that non-
market employment programmes (public works, social welfare employment) 
may encourage the unemployed to become self-sustaining was also expressed 
here. in 1998, the left-wing media (Népszabadság) also shared the view that, 
in disadvantaged micro-regions, public works schemes were the only employ-
ment opportunity. in the autumn of 1998, after the elections, Magyar Nemzet 
thought that public works could help marginalized groups to reintegrate back 
into society. in the autumn of 2002, Népszabadság articulated even stronger 
views: the government was responsible for increasing employment and reducing 
unemployment; the disabled should be offered social welfare employment; and 
state-supported employment was able to reintegrate the unemployed into 
the labour market. the press still hoped in 2006 that public works schemes 
would be capable of remedying unemployment.
in the meantime, public works schemes were obviously attractive to govern-
ments: they provided popular solutions, as opposed to unpopular benefits, 
and mayors also liked them. back in 2000 this may have been the reason for 
introducing public works organized by municipalities (which at the time was 
opposed by the socialist party).
prime minister Ferenc gyurcsány realized the political necessity of such 
a programme from 2007, but he failed to get a feasible policy proposal from 
his minister, mónika lamperth. Considering the opposition to large public works 
schemes on the part of civil servants in the ministry, it is possible that the launch 
of a programme was delayed by resistance in the ministry. then erika szűcs 
was appointed by the prime minister, and she did implement the plan.
this case reveals a lot about employment-policy decision making. the policy-
based opposition of the portfolio’s experts was enough for some obstruction, 
but it was not enough (especially not in the late 1990s and late 2000s) to 
persuade politicians to inform the public or to ensure that the government 
did not select an inefficient policy instrument to achieve its political goals. 
the impAct of eu guidelines on hungAriAn employment policy 
policy making was influenced by the eu accession – right from the start of the 
negotiations leading to accession,9 and then, after 2004, by eu membership 
9 EU accession already had an effect 
on policy making before it took place, 
e.g. the Public Employment Service 
was modernized in a PHARE twin-
ning programme. The EU wanted to 
ensure that this priority institution 
was adequately reformed, or was at 
least approaching that state, by the 
time of the accession. Therefore it 
not only aimed at modernizing it, 
but also commissioned experienced 
experts to elaborate the objectives to 
be achieved. The issue is discussed in 
detail in Chapters 6.1 and 6.2.
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itself. there were influences from two sources: on the one hand from adjust-
ment to the policy-making cycle of the eu (and consequent tasks), and on the 
other hand from changes that came with use being made of the structural 
Funds.
policy making in the european union relies clearly on the classic cyclical model 
of policy making. When Hungary became a candidate country, it became 
subject to the european employment strategy, the lisbon strategy, and 
the related employment guidelines, and then to the integrated guidelines 
from 2005. based on this, the country had to prepare national action plans 
(meeting eu-level objectives and then, later on, including national targets) 
between 1989 and 2004, and national Reform programmes for the periods 
of 2005–08 and 2008–10, with convergence programmes that contained 
employment policy chapters. experts from the european Commission consult 
governments before they submit these documents, and then the experts of 
the Directorates evaluate the final documents.
a similar document, prepared and evaluated in a similar context, was the 
annual implementation Report, which described the fulfilment of the objec-
tives undertaken in the national Reform programmes. on the basis of this, 
country-specific recommendations are drafted. it is a requirement for member 
states to follow the country-specific recommendations, but non-fulfilment 
does not entail sanctions – only reprimand.
in the course of the coordination, several question and answer cycles take 
place. these review the objectives of economic and employment policies 
annually. the logic is different from the institution-centred, baseline budgeting 
of Hungary: the eu coordination documents focus on objectives, and their 
arguments are generally evidence based.
this policy cycle could have a direct impact on the domestic, governmental 
decision-support and decision-making process, as it requires the preparation 
of several policy documents that the government would not otherwise prepare 
(or would prepare significantly later or in a different way). the frequent delays 
between, and the different content of, documents addressed to the eu and 
to the Hungarian public suggest that the two processes are not in harmony. 
the documents prepared for the Commission often reveal their fragmented 
preparation and implementation.
eu accession necessitated adjustment of the system of employment policy 
measures to eu regulations. that would have been a good opportunity for 
comprehensive reform. if there had been political will, as well as civil service 
capacity and intention, it would have been possible to introduce a simplified, 
more purposeful and efficient system of employment policies. the chance 
was missed.
the administration of the structural Funds requires extremely stringent and 
detailed financial and content planning. the programmes financed from the 
structural Funds have more visibility than those implemented from national 
funding. the use of structural Funds is governed by pre-defined, formal 
framework regulations. therefore strategic and operational documents 
are needed to align the content, implementation and funding of the proj-
ects and to divide implementation into technical stages. Hungarian govern-
ment measures are usually not that well prepared or well implemented. 
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the macro-level convergence and reform programmes translate into opera-
tional programmes and action plans for distributing hundreds of billions of 
Forints from the Cohesion Funds.
the transparency of employment policy measures funded from the structural 
Funds is also important because in the case of interventions financed from 
national sources (the labour market Fund) there is little documentation 
published and their evaluation is also insufficient (cf. Chapter 5.2). since 
significant programmes were entirely funded from the Human Resources 
Development operational programme (HRDop) and the social Renewal 
operational programme, these have become much more transparent. as 
opposed to nationally funded projects, those financed from eu grants have 
obligatory indicators – ideally output, outcome and impact indicators. non-
fulfilment places the beneficiary in an exceedingly difficult financial situa-
tion; therefore such indicators are defined carefully. their mere existence 
represents great progress in an environment where neither the preparation 
nor the implementation of policy measures is as detailed as is required under 
structural Fund regulation. in addition to monitoring the achievement of 
indicators, the government agency in charge (typically the national Devel-
opment agency) may also decide – and has often decided – to commission 
a professional programme evaluation (e.g. of the HRDop 2.1 programme for 
the modernization of the public employment service). such evaluations are 
rarely organized for interventions financed exclusively from national resources 
(cf. Chapter 3.2).
after 2004, because of eu requirements, policy makers were under pressure 
to systematize and provide information. anyone who wishes to implement 
policy measures with the assistance of funding from such sources cannot 
avoid thinking structurally (or at least giving that impression). this also has 
a disciplinary effect on politicians: they have to be aware that (at least some 
of) their measures are known to the public early on. this is very different from 
nationally funded and pre-accession measures.10 
conclusions
if we try to apply the cyclical policy model of table 1 to the processes presented 
above, the Hungarian practice of identifying and defining issues (influenced by 
the media and external factors) more or less fits the first step of the model. 
However, the second step – of developing policy alternatives (by civil servants 
or experts) – is not characteristic of Hungarian reality.
at the beginning of the reference period, the self-confident civil servants 
(who had gained experience in public administration in the 1980s) provided 
full-fledged solutions rather than alternatives; by the end of the period under 
consideration, civil servants had hardly any influence on developing solutions 
and measures.
Ex ante evaluations are even less frequent, perhaps because politicians define 
policy instruments (e.g. public works schemes) without defining social, economic 
and political objectives first; or perhaps because everything is done in haste 
and there is never any time; or perhaps civil servants do not have the experi-
ence and autonomy to undertake ex ante assessments.
10 As an unfortunate side effect, due 
to the special governance structure, 
technical supervision during imple-
mentation may conflict with main-
taining the absorption capacity (i.e. 
spending the funds), which is not 
always resolved.
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Decisions about the public works schemes were not taken after consideration 
of evidence-based alternatives: they were based on political considerations 
outside the scope of employment policy. even though the eu would obvi-
ously like Hungary to adopt the model described above, employment policy 
is not based on it. among the policy factors described at the beginning of the 
chapter, the influence of vested interests is not characteristic of the aspects 
of employment policy examined.
However, incrementalism is a strong feature of the sector: policy makers 
focus on individual measures, changes, side effects or political instructions, 
while the whole sector is stuck in a sub-optimal state (low employment level), 
which, as we can see from other post-communist countries, could have been 
avoided. in addition, we cannot rule out (although it is not verified either) that 
information and other cognitive biases (e.g. their work history in the 1980s or 
their lack of training in evaluation methodology and labour economics) may 
have had an impact on policy making.
and finally, apparently the expertise of civil servants and the institutions 
that contribute to political decisions are not integrated in an evidence-based 
strategic structure of the policy cycle, but operate within a public administra-
tion and political framework that is not quite suited to strategy development, 
implementation and organizational learning.
this chapter offers no recommendations, as the addressees of policy recom-
mendations, i.e. the proposers of decisions and decision makers are the very 
subject of this chapter.
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3. tHe quality oF poliCy making 
3.2. the information baSe of policy making, impact aSSeSSment 
zsomboR CseRes-geRgely anD pÉteR galasi
this chapter examines the information that has been available over the past 
two decades to those decision makers who plan and implement employment 
policy measures. it also covers, albeit with severe limitations, how decision 
makers have or have not used the information available.
in general, the impact of information bases and impact evaluations on labour 
market policies and on the labour market itself is difficult to ascertain. Due 
to the lack of an adequate control group, the usual causality analysis is of no 
use for the large-scale programmes of national labour markets. there is no 
international experience in this field, because the effects of improvement in 
an information base are usually unmeasured. international good practice, by 
making use of various (output, result, etc.) labour market success indicators, 
might justify the given policy, ex-post ; however, there have been no efforts to 
distinguish between the impacts of various factors. more simple institutional 
questions – such as the impact of the method of evaluation on the evaluation 
results – have only recently come to be researched, for example by Card et 
al. (2010).
on the assumption that, when it comes to information, more is better than 
less, the type, amount, accessibility and cost of the information available are 
examined in what follows; the significant difficulties detailed in Chapter 3.1 are 
not covered in this chapter. the policy process has been analysed from two 
perspectives: only those organizations that have participated in the process of 
policy making through well-defined institutions (e.g. unemployment benefits) 
have been taken into account; and only issues pertaining to policy making 
have been considered – other elements of the process have been disregarded.
 We collected data from the appropriate ministry and from the public employ-
ment service on direct and indirect information sources; these we sorted into 
two categories. the first category included collections of data used by the 
organizations: these data provide inputs for analysis and supply information on 
simple processes. the data cover statistical services and other, state-owned 
institutions such as the public employment service and the national Devel-
opment agency (as well as their predecessors and successors). the second 
category includes analyses and studies prepared using external and internal 
resources that are sometimes used to support decisions; it also includes the 
intellectual resources suited to producing such studies. 
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use of dAtA And policy mAking in hungAry
the conditions leading to a more efficient, evidence-based policy making have 
improved in the past two decades. information sources have expanded, access to 
information has improved, and opportunities for analysis have increased thanks 
to developments in information technology. in addition, human resources have 
developed to enable the exploitation of these advantages. Whereas in the early 
1990s it was not feasible to analyse individual data (e.g. follow the individual 
history of unemployed people) using a computer, by the late 1990s this had 
become possible, and by the start of the 2000s it had become established 
routine. similarly, professionals with a degree or phD obtained abroad who 
were able to use modern, internationally accepted tools (and to interpret the 
information produced with those tools) started to enter the Hungarian labour 
market in the 2000s.1 the fact that, in the more advanced Western european 
countries and the united states (regarded as role models by Hungarian policy 
makers), research into the effects of labour market programmes and analysis 
of the effectiveness of employment services gradually gained ground from 
the 1980s also opened up opportunities for evidence-based policy making 
(see Chapter 5.2).
the development of information sources and economics/econometrics usually 
generated policy changes in more advanced countries. For example, in ireland, 
great britain and sweden, institutions with significant human resources and 
budgets were established to produce policy impact evaluations.2 these bodies 
regularly evaluate the effectiveness of the latest labour market programmes 
and income maintenance and training programmes generally, making maximum 
use of available data sources and methodological tools. a good example of the 
support provided to policy making by information is the british ‘“pathways to 
Work” programme, based on the principle of „better regulation” – elaborated 
at the end of the ’90s – stressing the importance of a thorough analysis of 
problems, applying tools that emerged from the theory and practice of situ-
ation analysis and adjusting them as required (scharle, 2007). analysis was 
considered important right from the launch of the programme. Conscious 
of the need for control groups to ensure comparison, the developers of the 
programme rolled it out gradually, first in just a few job centres: five years 
after its launch, the programme was available in 40 per cent of job centres. 
the reason for the apparent delay was the evaluation itself: by 2007, some 
11 assessments had been produced. the findings of these were used for the 
continuous fine-tuning and adjustment of the programme.
there are significant differences in the information support for policy within 
europe, and the european union tries to tackle this by disseminating what-
ever knowledge is available. the collection of manuals of evalsed, which 
supports the evaluation of socio-economic processes contains information 
on both methodology and best practice. the former includes methods and 
techniques to measure the impact of programmes (from ‘soft’ indicators to 
econometric methods). the latter includes, among other things, efforts to 
build capacity to analyse the effectiveness of programmes, and cites Dutch, 
irish and italian examples. the manuals also cover best practice from post-
communist countries.3
1 It is important because Hungarian 
higher education does not produce 
sufficient numbers of professionals 
who are well versed in the theory, 
methodology and political-economic 
background relevant for policy making.
2 Such institutions include ESRI 
(Economic and Social Research Insti-
tute) in Ireland, the IFS (Institute for 
Fiscal Studies) and the Warwick IER 
(Institute for Employment Research) 
in the United Kingdom, as well as 
the IFAU (Institute for Evaluation of 
Labour Market and Education Policy) 
in Sweden.
3 E.g. a Polish study analyses the 
impacts of cohesion policy on the 
level of employment and quality, rely-
ing on a wide range of econometric 
tools (Dębowski et al., 2010).
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international good practice would have provided examples for Hungary to follow 
(and did so in a few isolated cases) in basing its policy decisions on reliable 
evidence. However, the opportunity was inadequately utilized. Whereas the 
Hungarian employment service improved considerably, policy making and the 
use of information bases to measure the impact of programmes did not perform 
well. this was partly because the expertise of the civil service did not improve 
sufficiently. neither the employment service nor the relevant ministry built up 
advanced analysis capacity: assessments were made by a handful of staff in 
the ministry. leaving aside the limited number of the analysts involved, their 
methods also left something to be desired: the assessments were restricted 
to determining the size of various population groups affected by the given 
policy and calculating simple averages to describe their characteristics. they 
did not attempt to include more refined indicators to describe the behaviour 
of employees and employers. However, the lack of interest evinced by top 
politicians (and the fact that other stakeholders – e.g. trade unions – were 
either ignorant of the situation or found their attention deflected onto other 
issues) meant there was no pressure to improve. Consequently, the available 
information sources could only be used (and sometimes were used) profession-
ally by involving external contractors. although researchers in various fields 
were now and then commissioned to undertake small tasks, policy makers 
did not regularly rely on external analysis in their decisions. as a result, they 
did not even use individual-level data to assess the impact of their (often far-
reaching) decisions.
We are not aware of any permanent staff at the Research institute for labour 
(and its forerunners), at the national employment office,4 or in the relevant 
government departments who are skilled in up-to-date econometric analysis 
methods and who can use these to undertake studies prepared for policy 
making or for academic publication.
in order to highlight the losses that accrue from the non-exploitation of the 
available data, we must briefly outline the key importance of these data. in 
general, the process in which this information is so vital involves measuring 
the impact of policy programmes, the details of which are described by kézdi 
(2004) and in Chapter 5.2 of this study.
such impact evaluation seeks to provide answers to three types of question: 
1. Was the programme adequately targeted, i.e. did it reach the people who really 
needed it?; 2. Did it have the right impact, i.e. did the lives of the participants 
change for the better (and if so, to what extent) because they participated 
in the programme?; 3. Did it have any unintended by-product; if so, to what 
extent? these questions can only be answered by analysing individual-level 
data and by using statistical-econometric tools. expertise is required to use 
these tools and to handle all the potential methodological problems. obvi-
ously not all problems fit into this framework perfectly, because the analysis of 
complex past behaviour, micro-simulation and forecasting are not the same as 
impact evaluation, and they do not meet the criteria of impact evaluation. but 
the methods applied are similar to those of impact evaluation of programmes, 
since they seek to discover functional and causality mechanisms, and require 
similar types of data and methodology.
4 The name of the authority super-
vising the activities of the Public 
Employment Service changed fre-
quently in the reference period; 
therefore it is always mentioned as 
the National Employment Office (its 
current name) for the sake of clarity.
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the process may be presented through the following example. Wage subsidy 
and labour cost subsidy are important elements of active labour market 
policies and have long been used. in order to assess their effectiveness, the 
individual data of the beneficiaries are needed. the relevant raw data indicate 
that a significant proportion of participants were still in employment three 
months after the end of the support period. this proportion is higher than is 
typical for other active policies. For example, in the first half of 2010, the raw 
share of participants (successfully completing the wage subsidy and labour 
cost subsidy programme) who were in employment was 93 per cent and 86 
per cent respectively (tajti, 2010: 8), which seems very effective. However, if 
we also have data on the individuals involved, it is possible to examine their 
individual characteristics and work histories, as well as their ensuing career. in 
this case, it turns out that far from being positive, the impact of the programme 
is negative, i.e. the seemingly positive effect is due not to the efficiency of the 
programme, but to the special composition of the participants (see o’leary, 
1998 using earlier data for the same programme). the policy conclusion is that 
the programme should be terminated (or significantly amended) and, above 
all, better targeted.
one might question why this situation arose. Why did policy makers not rely 
more on the processed and raw data available to stop evidently ineffective 
interventions and to launch others? lack of information was not the cause, 
since our interviews clearly revealed that – at least in some of the organiza-
tions – expertise on information sources and methods was available.
Was it because of financial reasons? a simple calculation may be in order. 
Having a small analysis unit involves annual salary costs of, say, HuF 60 million 
(at 2012 prices), plus negligible other costs.5 this is insignificant when set 
against the HuF 341 billion budget of the national employment Fund for 2012; 
to recover the costs, the analyses carried out would be required to save just 
five-thousandths of the budget of the Fund. the lack of interest cannot be 
explained by financial reasons.
the most probable explanation, suggested by Chapter 2.1, is that the problem 
is political in nature. the employment agency was never strong enough to 
make long-term plans and strategies; however, there were always political 
considerations that defined the directions that were deemed ‘correct’ in the 
absence of thorough analysis of a problem. as a result, mid-level officials 
could not convince their superiors of the importance of such analyses, and 
thus could not allocate sufficient resources to establish or involve analysis and 
research capacities. Furthermore, even if there is the occasional achievement, 
if it is not utilized then those middle-ranking officials lose their motivation 
to undertake or commission regular impact evaluations. the interviews we 
conducted revealed that, even though the ministry departments relied on 
outdated techniques, they still produced more diverse (and more) data than 
were required by top-level officials.
individuAl And corporAte surveys 
micro-level data on individuals and businesses have a double benefit. on the one 
hand, aggregate data on the complete population can only be computed on the 
5 Assuming that five experienced and 
five fresh graduate analysts with an 
appropriate background (at a monthly 
gross salary of HUF 500,000 and HUF 
250,000, respectively) are able to 
carry out thorough research in the 
total scope of employment policy. 
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basis of individual data. on the other hand, the results of economic processes and 
the impacts of policy interventions can (with rare exceptions) only be examined 
by relying on micro-level information. this is primarily because the observed 
impacts are due to several factors – spatial and temporal information that can 
only be interpreted and handled at the level of individuals (persons, households, 
businesses). equally important is the fact that it is only possible to account for 
the impact of human adaptation if such detailed information is available. if it is 
not undertaken, no analysis can differentiate between the impact of the inter-
vention, independent processes and human adaptation.
the regular and careful implementation of large-scale surveys of individual 
data is costly, and it is not easy to use the information produced. partly 
because of this, most of the micro-level, labour market- related information is 
collected by two organizations – the Central statistical office and the national 
employment office. Rare exceptions to this are the individual-level household 
surveys undertaken by the social research institute táRki in the 1990s and 
2000s, which were funded by government agencies. in general, the findings 
of individual-level surveys may be used in themselves; but if the permission 
of the individuals involved is gained during the survey, they may also be linked 
to other data sources.
Wage Survey. before the establishment of the public employment service, 
there was only one important internal information base (which is still in use). 
this is the Wage survey (conducted in 1986, 1989, and then annually since 
1992), from which the most important data on wages can be obtained; it is also 
used at the tripartite negotiations and in the course of collective bargaining. 
one of the important characteristics of this survey is that it provides indi-
vidual-level data on the wages of employees in the businesses included in the 
sample, along with information specific to the individuals and the businesses 
involved. the sample covers all company types except the smallest (those with 
less than 20, more recently, less than 10 employees), and altogether annually 
150–200 thousand people. this survey – either on its own or in conjunction 
with other (anonymous) data – is suitable for impact evaluations, such as the 
assessment undertaken after the increase in the minimum wage in 2001–02, 
or a potential assessment of the impact of changes in wages or contributions 
on the demand for labour.
Labour Force Survey. the other notable external information base is the labour 
Force survey conducted by the Central statistical office (Cso lFs, quarterly 
since the first quarter of 1992), which is the source of the major officially 
published employment and unemployment figures. the unit of observation 
is the individual, but the data of persons living in the same household may be 
analysed together. Within limits, it is also suitable for panel analysis, as the 
same households are included in the sample for six consecutive quarters (Cso, 
2006). it is suitable for impact analysis in itself.
Household Budget Survey. the Central statistical office has been organizing 
household budget surveys for over 50 years (Cso Hbs). these have some-
times been carried out annually, and sometimes every two years, and include 
the data of about 10,000 households (thus 25,000 persons). the structure 
was finalized after 1993. since then, as with the labour Force survey, it has 
been a rotating panel: one third of the sample is replaced every three years. 
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the unit of observation of the survey is the individual, but it contains data 
on both individuals and households. the aim of the survey is to assess the 
pecuniary and in-kind income and expenditure of the population. there is 
less labour market-related information, but it does give a detailed picture of 
various incomes (Cso, 1997). it is also suitable for the preparation of impact 
evaluations, e.g. on the impact of changes to the tax system on consumption 
and the labour market position.
Household Panel Survey. the household panel survey of táRki social Research 
institute, carried out annually in the 1990s, contains the most important 
socio-demographic, labour market and income characteristics of individuals 
and households for the period 1992–97. this was later replaced by Household 
monitor, with a set of variables that were very similar to those of the panel, 
and with cross-section samples. these surveys were organized first annually 
(1999, 2000, 2001) and then every two years (2003, 2005). after 2005 it was 
discontinued (táRki, 2010), which is unfortunate, because this survey was 
more reliable in terms of income data than the Household budget survey of 
the Central statistical office (cf. kézdi, 1998).
the labour government made attempts to assess labour market processes – 
especially the reintegration of the unemployed into the labour market – quite 
early on, at the beginning of the 1990s. the regular data collection and data 
provision for this purpose started with the establishment of procedures to 
monitor active measures and the introduction of short-term labour market 
forecasts.
Active Measures Monitoring. assessment of the effectiveness of active measures 
is an important policy tool that helps to develop adequate labour market 
programmes and to identify target groups. the monitoring of active measures 
was established in 1994 by the national employment service, following consid-
erable organizational development and with support from the World bank. 
essentially, the labour market status of people involved in active measures 
is recorded on the basis of a questionnaire, three months after they exit 
the programme. the questionnaire is received by the participant or, in the 
case of wage-subsidy programmes, by the employer. the chief output indi-
cator is to find normal market employment (or, in the case of wage-subsidy 
programmes, continued employment by the employer). Results are regularly 
published by the employment service. However, information obtained from 
the monitoring of active measures is problematic for several reasons. First, 
there is no control group (participating, dropping out or exiting the programme 
while still unemployed), and therefore the impact of the measures cannot 
be measured properly. secondly, the bias from self-selection and refusal to 
answer is not handled. and thirdly, only the raw employment rate after the 
programme is published, which does not even provide an accurate estimate of 
the short-term impact of programmes. there were efforts to modernize the 
system of monitoring active measures, in a project undertaken by the Human 
Resource Development programme, entitled HRDop 1.2, between 2004 and 
2008. a recommendation was drafted to rectify the estimation and impact 
evaluation problems mentioned above (nagy, 2006a,b), and similar proposals 
were drafted by a study that evaluated the HRDop 1.2 programme (bCe eet, 
2008). adjustment of the monitoring system started after 2009, and today 
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it is solely based on administrative data on the progress of individuals; this 
will be described in detail below. Further development of the programme is 
envisaged within the framework of sRop 1.3.1 of the social Renewal opera-
tional programme.
Short-term labour market forecasts. this information base, which covers 
the actual demand for various occupations, may be an important instrument 
to facilitate the flexible and rapid adjustment of employment policy. such 
surveys, based on company interviews, began in the mid-1990s and have 
continued since. Currently the forecasts are prepared annually by the institute 
for economic and enterprise Research, using a one-year horizon. the data 
for the forecasts for the period 2004–11 are available on the website of the 
employment service.
Mid- and long-term labour market forecasts. initiated by the ministry of labour, 
the 15-year forecast of labour market demand and supply was prepared in the 
mid-1990s with the support of the World bank (1995–2010); it was based on 
aggregate data (ministry of labour, 1996). the objective of the forecast was to 
predict the volume and structure of the demand and supply in terms of gender, 
age, qualifications, fields of study and occupations, and in this way to support 
the development of education and employment strategies. at the end of the 
project, the working group was dissolved. the project was not repeated and 
the findings do not seem to have been utilized. the next forecasting project 
started about ten years later, under the HRDop 1.2 programme, and partly 
relied on aggregate data. the findings were presented at a conference, were 
published, and some of them are available on the internet (labour market 
research, 2008). after the closure of the HRDop 1.2 programme, the working 
group was dissolved, the project was not repeated, and we have no informa-
tion on whether the findings were utilized. a similar project was launched in 
2009 under sRop 2.3.2; its findings are expected at the beginning of 2013. 
the aim is again to forecast the structure of the labour market for a period of 
five and ten years. this time the project relies on economic models and the 
individual data mentioned above. 
individuAl dAtAbAses supporting government AdministrAtion 
besides the Wage survey, the internal information base of the employment 
sector, including the employment service at the beginning of the period 
under consideration, consisted of information obtained from registration 
activities related to unemployed people and the administration of unemploy-
ment benefits; the data were totalized in the regional/county job centres and 
the national employment office, and revealed all the characteristics of the 
unemployed that could be revealed by statistical methods at these various 
stages of aggregation.
Ad hoc data collection and supplementary surveys. the aggregate data used by 
the national employment office were derived from individual data collected 
daily to aid in the administration and disbursement of unemployment benefits. 
the routine nationwide collation of these primary data was rather difficult, not 
least because of the heterogeneous it context within which the recording 
took place. However, the difficulties were overcome on several occasions, as 
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is evidenced by the findings of academic research (e.g. galasi and nagy, 1999) 
and some impact evaluations.
Integrated IT system. the individual data of registered jobseekers held by 
job centres have been compiled in an integrated it system (iis) since the late 
2000s. Work on the iis began under the pHaRe programme, and the unified, 
integrated it system (which supports both administration and analysis) was 
implemented under the HRDop 1.2 programme. the system records the data 
of clients required for administration and allows the registered unemployed 
to be tracked within the institution. thus it creates the conditions necessary 
for programme impact evaluation with a control group of registered unem-
ployed. Research projects analysing the employment effects of the HRDop 
1.2 modernization programme (Cseres-gergely and scharle, 2010) and the 
placement activities and labour market services of the employment service 
(berde, 2010) relied on the iis.
The Hungarian Unified Labour Database (Egységes Magyar Munkaügyi Adat-
bázis, EMMA). this unified it system holding the central registration data of 
employees was launched in 2003. originally the plan was to link it to other 
administrative databases, but nothing came of that. in principle, the database 
is suitable for the evaluation of labour market measures – a move that would 
revolutionize the information system of employment policy. However, in 
january 2007 emma was overtaken by the tax authority’s system, and since 
then the national employment office has been able to obtain labour market 
information from that database (within certain limits).
Other administrative databases. just as the Household budget survey of the 
Central statistical office provides important supplementary information, in 
addition to the information from the labour Force survey and the Wage survey, 
so other administrative databases within the public administration system 
may provide important information for the formulation of employment policy. 
although emma is not operating as was originally envisaged and does not 
serve its original purpose, act Ci of 2007 on the accessibility of information 
required for decision support allows the government to request the anony-
mization of any administrative database for government decision-support 
purposes and to use up to 50 per cent of the data held for the purposes of 
analysis. in this respect, since 2007 employment policy has been able to make 
use of large databases covering the entire population, such as the database 
of the national tax and Customs administration on income tax and corporate 
income tax, the database of the Central administration of national pension 
insurance on determining and disbursing pensions, and the database of the 
national Health Care Fund (oep) on use of healthcare services. these provide 
valuable information – even when anonymized – on the relationships between 
employment, wages, health, pension claims and employment history. not only 
do they provide information on a large number of individuals, but they do so 
continuously, and in this way the dynamics of behaviour may also be examined. 
However, unlike the population surveys which use much smaller samples, they 
only provide information on registered employment.
Ad hoc linked databases. as well as anonymization, act Ci of 2007 allows 
for various databases to be linked up, applying a technique used for encryp-
tion. Databases like these that contain complex information have the same 
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advantages as those described above, but they also contain more information. 
this partly remedies the halt in the development of emma: in terms of the 
volume of information for a given period, the resulting database is not infe-
rior to emma (as it was originally envisaged). However, in order to meet data 
protection requirements, the sampling, linking and anonymization of the data 
must be repeated each year, and the resulting database is difficult to clean. 
this in turn may reduce the accuracy of calculations based on these data.
an important example of analysis undertaken by anonymized linking is the 
reform of the monitoring of active measures in 2009 (see tajti, n.d.). this quiet 
but significant reform was based on application of the technique described 
above, during which the national employment office annually links the data of 
the national tax and Customs administration on payment of contributions with 
the data from the unemployment register. this database enables analysts to 
examine the work history, benefits and post-benefit labour market success of 
the unemployed. the national employment office only uses the data for moni-
toring purposes, in order to track the participants in all programmes (including 
those who have participated in one of the wage-support programmes) and 
to collect information about them six months after the end of the support 
period. although not all the features of the database are utilized (e.g. there 
is no control group defined), this still marks considerable progress over the 
earlier method. this method has the same weakness as other administrative 
databases: it can only take account of registered employment. since, in terms 
of employment policy, entry to informal employment is also desirable (albeit 
not the optimal outcome), those not listed on the registers continue to be 
approached with questionnaires.
AggregAte dAtA
using micro-level data – and interpreting whatever analysis is carried out using 
such data – requires considerable expertise, and not everyone manages to 
acquire such skills. partly because analysis that is carried out without applying 
a strict methodology is, within limits, also useful (e.g. to determine whether 
there is need for more detailed analysis), such analysis is often performed – in 
Hungary, too. this is usually based on aggregate data.
although aggregate data, by definition, are obtained from micro-level data, it 
is important to consider them separately, for two reasons. First, both for tech-
nical reasons and for lack of expertise, most of the civil servants responsible 
for policy decision support have used aggregate data in the reference period, 
but since a significant proportion of the middle and senior management do 
not have any research-related qualifications, they are not familiar with the 
strengths (and weaknesses) of these tools. secondly, they embarked on their 
careers at a time when it was not possible to analyse micro-level data routinely, 
because of the lack of capacity of it devices. For these two reasons, it was 
mainly aggregate data that supported everyday work in the reference period.
aggregate data are usually obtained from individual-level, unanonymized data 
that are aggregated by data providers (they are the ones authorized by law to 
manage data). although it was possible to transmit unanonymized data within 
the statistical service, this did not happen regularly. therefore the content of 
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the regularly produced data series was primarily determined by the staff of 
the data providers, and the content of the data requested on a case-by-case 
basis was determined by the body requesting it. the two most important 
data providers in employment policy, the Central statistical office and the 
national employment office regularly produce data series for internal use 
and to meet external orders; however, these are not published together by 
the labour ministry as its own product.
the website of the national employment office offers a lot of statistical data 
for analysts and policy makers. there are monthly flash reports on the status 
of the labour market; detailed monthly figures on the number and composition 
of the registered unemployed; annual figures, as well as the time series data 
obtained from the registers of the national employment office, which break 
down the data of the registered unemployed, beneficiaries of cash benefits 
and registered vacancies by county/region.
a special group of aggregate data is based on micro-level data and is related 
to behavioural models, but may still be calculated routinely. such indicators 
include parameters describing the behaviour of economic actors, such as the 
flexibility of labour demand, the rate of return on educational attainment, or 
indicators of labour market flows. the institute of economics of the Hungarian 
academy of sciences has made an effort to develop and publish such indica-
tors in its indicators database. other data aggregated according to region or 
some other relevant aspect also fall within this category, e.g. the so-called 
Resource map, developed by the institute of economics. although, in terms of 
their purpose and structure, both examples could be suitable for supporting 
the government’s work, we do not have information on their utilization.
AnAlysis And impAct Assessment 
the labour portfolio generally carried out analyses either using its own limited 
capacities or relying on the greater capacity of its subordinated agencies.
in addition to calculations prepared in the ministry, analyses were made 
by professional teams, at universities, independent research institutes and 
private companies – sometimes under contract from the ministry, and some-
times without funding. However, the national public employment Foundation 
(országos Foglalkoztatási közalapítvány – oFa) regularly finances research on 
labour issues. as a result of this fragmentation, relevant analyses and research 
had no central repository for most of the reference period (e.g. a suitable 
website in the 2000s).6
the labour Research information system (mukutiR), which operated between 
2007 and 2012, followed the example of more advanced countries and was also 
the repository of labour-related research funded by oFa or the national employ-
ment office. the website offered hundreds of studies for download and, after 
some modernization and marketing, it could have been central to the provision 
of information to decision makers – however, it was discontinued in 2012.7 there 
is a similar website, but with broader objectives – the integrated knowledge 
base of social partners, which was developed under the sRop 2.5.2 project. 
although this website is still available, its information content is inferior to that 
of mukutiR, and at the time of writing, it was last updated in 2010.
6 Such a website in the United King-
dom is that of the Department for 
Work and Pensions, which contains 
research findings, analyses and sta-
tistical data. Readers can find side 
by side the policy programme and 
research findings. This arrangement 
ensures that readers can clearly see 
the objectives of policy and the data-
base on which decisions are based.
7 The summaries of research funded 
by OFA are currently available at the 
OFA website and the works funded 
from SROP programmes are pub-
lished on the research portal of the 
National Employment Office.
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just as civil servants in their daily work mainly relied on aggregate data, which 
are of limited value as a source of analysis, so research studies and analyses 
also often examine simple data (typically time series or one-dimensional 
spatial or social distribution) using simple tools (mainly analysing graphs and 
tables). a typical example of this is the annual publication on the functioning 
of active measures, which is available to both internal and external users on 
the website of the public employment service. as was mentioned above, 
these surveys are not suitable for measuring the real impact of interventions 
or for analysing causality. nevertheless, they do have one advantage: they can 
be rapidly implemented and can pinpoint areas that require more thorough 
research into underlying mechanisms.
However, it would seem there is a peculiar division of labour between govern-
ment units/agencies and professional teams at universities or research institutes: 
government units and agencies perform simple analyses almost exclusively, 
whereas the university/institute teams undertake all manner of research and 
analysis. unless there is direct, daily contact between researchers and their 
clients, this situation is not optimal. in the course of decision support, there 
may often be times when the expected success of an intervention has to be 
assessed by micro-simulation or advanced estimations based on micro-data, to 
take account of behavioural effects and to examine counter-factual situations.
We are not aware of the regular use of advanced methods in the labour ministry. 
nevertheless, calculations concerning the registered unemployed and the 
wages of workers – which examine government interventions – are sometimes 
made, generally at the statistical unit of the public employment service. some 
were undertaken during the period of the minimum wage increase, before the 
introduction of public works schemes, and during changes to unemployment 
benefits. However, in the absence of supplementary data (e.g. the labour Force 
survey) and professionals who are able to use advanced methods, no analysis 
or research using up-to-date methods was undertaken (nor could have been 
undertaken, even if commissioned), and thus the reliability of simple analyses 
depends largely on the nature of the problem examined.
a good example of the use of micro-simulation is a computer programme devel-
oped jointly by the economic research unit of the finance ministry and táRki 
social Research institute from 2005. later on it was regularly used by the unit 
to examine employment policy issues. an informal inter-ministerial team was 
set up to focus on the use of the micro-simulation software, and formal training 
courses were also organized. the unit made attempts to involve the staff of the 
ministry of social affairs and labour in the use of the software, but with only 
moderate success. the development continued at the secretariat of the Fiscal 
Council (established at the end of 2008 but later dissolved) and in the national 
bank of Hungary, where it was first used to calculate the labour supply impact 
of the tax and transfer system reforms (benczúr et al. 2011).
there can be no evidence-based policy without impact evaluation and assess-
ment. in legislation it has been obligatory to undertake impact assessment 
since 2006: for example, only after such an assessment may a bill be intro-
duced to parliament. there are clear and comprehensible documents available 
concerning the nature of impact assessment, methodology guidelines on its 
implementation (see e.g. kovácsy and orbán 2004; ministry of justice, 2006) 
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and textbooks, such as o’leary (1998). there is a considerable difference 
between impact evaluation and impact assessment. We define impact evalu-
ation as an examination that fulfils the evaluation principle of comparing the 
outcome to a counter-factual. impact assessment, on the other hand, includes 
examinations that do not necessarily undertake such a comparison, but still 
give detailed and thorough information on the impact of an intervention. the 
former is essential to identify the impact of programmes, while the latter is 
useful in interpreting an impact or in altering a programme in order to improve 
its effectiveness.
Despite the opportunity and the regulatory pressure, as far as we can gauge, 
impact evaluation has not gained ground in decision support and, given the 
circumstances surrounding policy implementation, this is not surprising – 
Chapter 3.1 discusses the issue in detail. the case of active measures is also 
edifying in this respect. if the ministry had considered the information provided 
by the impact evaluation and impact assessment to be useful and reliable, then, 
on the basis of the findings, it would immediately have ordered a review of 
the allocation of resources to active measures (since the actual situation was 
wasteful and inefficient and there was an appropriate alternative). if an impact 
is shown to be negative, no review is even needed for a decision to be made. 
if policy makers accept that the method is good but they do not believe the 
findings, they ask for further, detailed research or additional data collection. 
However, none of the above happened in the case of active measures. the 
available evidence is based on research conducted out of an academic interest, 
under restricted conditions, as a side element of low priority projects.
later on, impact assessments were undertaken, and these shed light on several 
interesting details (e.g. that in wage-support programmes many employers 
used the support to employ workers with whom they had already had contact; 
Frey, 2011); but no impact evaluations suitable to inform decisions on the 
reorganization and adjustment of measures were performed. the interviews 
revealed that this was no accident. the ministry admitted that it did not wish 
to provide feedback on the functioning of measures. on the contrary, it was 
proud of only ‘holding up a mirror’ for decision makers.
though central government did not do so, government agencies and non-
governmental institutes undertook impact evaluations that met the quality 
level of the age. the impacts of active labour market measures were first anal-
ysed in 1992–93, when the labour market status of the participants in three 
programmes (labour market training, support for start-ups, public works) was 
compared to a control group that did not participate in any active labour market 
programme (godfrey et al., 1993). a similar follow-up study was undertaken by 
the national employment office in 1997 involving the participants in four active 
programmes and a control group: the main findings are described in Chapter 5.2. 
then there were attempts to carry out impact assessment within the HRDop 1.2 
project, but ultimately the only research was accomplished by Cseres-gergely 
and scharle (2010). it examined the impact of HRDop 1.2 on job centres that 
participated in the project and on those that did not, by comparing average 
chances of entering employment, using the difference in differences method.8 
and lastly, an important exception is a multivariate evaluation of active measures, 
including a control group, carried out by Csoba and nagy (2011).
8 Currently implemented SROP 
programmes also contain stud-
ies defining themselves as evalua-
tive research, but these cannot be 
regarded as impact estimations in 
accordance with the potential out-
come model. For example, accord-
ing to its title, the work of Bíró et 
al. (2010), prepared for the project 
SROP 2.3 .2, analyses the impact 
of active and passive employment 
policy measures on labour market 
indicators. However, the authors are 
lawyers and their research is largely 
based on analysis of legal regulations 
(although they also relied on descrip-
tive sociological works and quoted 
from the published works of Hungar-
ian labour economists).
3. tHe qualit y oF poliCy making 3.2. tHe inFoRmation base oF poliCy making , impaCt assessment
101
the above impact assessments were almost exclusively commissioned by 
government actors, and thus their aim was to answer the questions of the 
client. this type of work often inspires independent academic works, which 
are also prepared independently in great numbers. although they do not often 
examine the impact of policy interventions, they do provide information on 
the behaviour of labour market players, which may also be useful for policy 
makers. independent research has usually been conducted by academic insti-
tutions or in international cooperation, but some have been commissioned by 
the national employment Fund, the national employment office or ministries.
conclusions And recommendAtions 
to sum up, the information base of policy making did improve significantly in 
the reference period; however, the information produced was not used effec-
tively. this may be largely due to the lack of well-defined strategic activities 
on the part of the sectoral ministry and to the paucity of research and analysis 
capacity, which is difficult to explain. 
as for the national employment office, most policy making is outside its remit, 
as – according to the division of tasks between public institutions – it is in 
charge of implementing employment policy. of course, this does not preclude 
the further development of information systems nor the improvement of the 
conditions required for impact evaluation activities. at present, the employ-
ment service does not possess sufficient research and analysis capacity – its 
department for statistics and research has no economists trained in labour 
economics and advanced econometric tools. Consequently, it does not have the 
analytical capacity to adapt international best practice, monitor the effective-
ness of adaptation and work out the correction of any deficiencies revealed 
by the monitoring (Cseres-gergely and scharle, 2010).
the limited use that is made of information bases for policy purposes is surprising, 
because the labour ministry generally tries to follow international (principally 
european) best practice. Recently both in the european union and in indi-
vidual member states there has been a shift towards measuring the impact 
of programmes and analysing the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of policy 
programmes. therefore we recommend that, assuming the government wishes 
to have an evidence-based policy, it should establish and maintain the capaci-
ties that are currently lacking. We are aware of plans at the public employ-
ment service to develop its analytical capacity, as part of its modernization 
process. the first steps towards this have already been taken within the national 
labour office, but with strict financial constraints. major progress was made 
in january 2011, when ecostat (the erstwhile research institute of the Central 
statistical office) was reformed and re-established as the ecostat govern-
ment Centre for impact evaluation. the function of ecostat is to use the data 
described above in preparing methodologically sound impact evaluations, and 
to support other public administration bodies in such work. in spite of the exis-
tence and functioning of these institutions, further development is required, 
primarily in order to ensure that national and eu-funded projects are based 
on the evaluation of earlier measures, and that the projects and interventions 
themselves actively support the production of data required for such work. 
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3. tHe quality oF poliCy making  
3.3. organizational capacity, organizational learning 
bóDis lajos
the aim of this chapter is to briefly present the factors determining the perfor-
mance of organizations that implement employment policy programmes and 
work with clients. these factors include the headcount, the workload and the 
procedures for accumulating and sharing knowledge (within the organization) 
required for successful intervention. the scope of examination has been 
narrowed down to the activities of the public employment service. Changes 
in the size of the organization over the past 20 years will be presented, as 
will changes in a crude workload indicator. a fairly detailed overview of the 
main conclusions of research conducted on workload in the late 2000s will 
be provided, in order to shed light on the causes of persisting problems. then 
follows a brief analysis of the main procedures for organizational learning, 
along with recommendations on their more efficient coordination. 
internAtionAl overview
the optimal headcount of job centres depends to a large extent on the precise 
tasks they undertake: whether they disburse unemployment benefits, organize 
placements and implement active measures alone or in cooperation with other 
institutions. as well as the tasks involved, the number of clients also deter-
mines how many staff are needed. since the tasks are different in each country, 
international comparison must be handled with caution, even in assessing the 
number of clients per staff member. according to kuddo (2009), the workload 
of staff working with clients is quite high in Hungary: data from 2006 show that 
a front-office clerk in sweden works with 24 jobseekers; in germany with 70; 
in the Czech Republic with 114; and in Hungary with 178.
the capacity of job centres and the expertise of the staff may increase the 
chances of the unemployed finding employment. Having examined the effec-
tiveness of job centres with differing activities in the united states, bloom et 
al. (2003) concluded that (controlling for all other factors) job centres with 
a lower number of clients per staff member perform better.1
chAnges in the cApAcity of the public employment service
the staff of the public employment service was recruited over two or three 
years, during the rapid growth in unemployment. the number of registered 
unemployed rose by two and a half times within a year in 1992, and peaked in 
1 Effectiveness was measured by 
the wages that jobseekers received 
after finding a job (over a period of 
two years).
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1993. the headcount of the county labour centres and the network of local 
job centres more than doubled in 1992, topping 4,200 by the end of the year.2 
We do not have headcount data from the mid-1990s; we only know that, in 
1994, the headcount increased by only 159. it would seem the headcount did 
not increase significantly after the mid-1990s – if we disregard the increase 
due to the shift between 1997 and 1999 to place the work safety and labour 
inspectorates (which had completely different tasks) under the control of the 
county labour centres. if we include these inspectorates, the headcount was 
highest in 1998 (4,916); if not, it was highest in 2010 (4,558, including civil 
servants with fixed-term contracts working on eu projects).
During the mass layoffs in public administration, the public employment service 
received no special treatment. therefore, layoffs of 5–10 per cent occurred at 
the time of the bokros package in 1995, and then in 2003 and 2006. the last 
wave of redundancies was implemented during the regional reorganization of 
the public employment service, when parallel units were merged. However, 
the headcount decreased only temporarily; it started to rise again because 
of the increasing scope of tasks and because of participation in eu projects. 
but in this way, some of the staff were replaced: those dismissed during the 
layoffs were usually replaced by better qualified and better paid staff. in addi-
tion, in the second half of the 1990s there was significant fluctuation: newly 
established companies lured away some of the staff, whose replacement was 
not always either quick or easy.3 since the mid-2000s, it has been even more 
difficult to retain highly qualified staff, as a significant proportion of new civil 
2 Because of the large-scale expan-
sion of the network, the average 
headcount in a  job centre is much 
smaller.
3 In 1997, 152 of the staff members 
who quit had not been replaced by 
year end. In one of the counties with 
favourable labour market conditions 
some 7–11 per cent of employees 
of the labour centre left annually 
between 1994 and 1997 (Taschner, 
1998). Average headcount was often 
lower than the annual approved head-
count; in the 1990s this was due to 
fluctuation, and in the 2000s to addi-
tional staff approved for extra tasks 
within a year.
Figure 1: The number of registered unemployed per Public Employment 
Service staff member, 1991–2010 (persons)
Note: Based on annual average headcounts. For more details, see Table 7.2. of the Statistical Annex.
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servant positions have been created for fixed terms, and the organization is 
unable to offer career prospects for keen, young employees.
Casework and various background activities together define the impact of 
most employment policy measures. the number and intensity of tasks related 
to the registered unemployed (as well as any differences in the number or 
intensity) can only be revealed by detailed workload surveys. Changes in the 
relationship between the headcount and tasks are now described by the 
number of registered unemployed per staff member – a less than perfect 
indicator (Figure 1).4 the workload of staff in this sense was highest in 1992. 
From the mid-1990s, the headcount did not change significantly, whereas 
the number of registered unemployed started to decline, and continued 
downward until 2002. the number of clients per staff member decreased 
by nearly 25 per cent between 1998 and 2002; there was a fall of over 10 per 
cent even compared to 2000. in terms of workload, this was the best time 
for reviewing organizational objectives, for developing activities deemed 
useful but hitherto (inevitably) neglected, and for redistributing capacities. 
by a fortunate coincidence, both the pHaRe programme of preparation for 
eu accession and preparations for the modernization of the public employ-
ment service started in 2002.
However, at the time of eu accession and the start of the development 
programmes, the number of registered unemployed (and thus the workload) 
began to grow again. this was not automatically followed by a rise the head-
count, but additional staffing was approved each year for the extra tasks given 
to the pes.5 the reorganization of labour centres according to regions – the 
most important organizational change of the period – took place in 2007. it 
involved almost a 9 per cent reduction in staffing (15 per cent in the national 
centre): the organization was slimmed down to the size it had last been in 
the second half of 1992. the downsizing, which was originally planned to be 
20 per cent, was moderated because of the new tasks of the public employ-
ment service, especially the new system of employment rehabilitation (see 
Chapter 4.2).
From 2004, eu-funded Human Resource Development operational programme 
(HRDop) and the social Renewal operational programme (sRop)6 allowed 
in-house staff to be employed to supervise the implementation until the end 
of the funding period, and services to be procured from third-party businesses. 
Headcount was increased mainly at the national centre: the number of staff 
there grew by 130 per cent in 2004/05 and by 50 per cent in 2009/10. at the 
end of the period, the number of staff at the national employment and social 
office was more than three times the number before eu accession, a signifi-
cant (and growing) share of them employed as fixed-term civil servants on 
eu-funded projects.
the staff paid from sRop programmes in the network of job centres7 worked 
with those groups of unemployed people that the pHaRe programme also 
recommended should be the focus of organizational attention (Hansen, 2003; 
see also Chapters 6.1 and 6.2). However, this occurred when the workload had 
increased to levels not seen since the 1990s. the success of the new, personal-
ized services may also have been diminished because analysis of the redistribu-
tion of capacities had only just started, and the various levels of management 
4 The closer a department is to the 
regional network, the more front-
office work it undertakes; but even 
in job centres not everyone does it. 
According to an optimistic estimate 
by Berde (2010: 60–61), the propor-
tion of staff (also) undertaking front-
office work in the network of labour 
centres before the reorganization 
into regions was less than 50 per cent, 
and was 60 per cent in subsequent 
years. Considering this, the propor-
tion of front-office staff on average 
at the PES was 44 per cent before 
the reorganization and 54 per cent 
after the reorganization. Based on 
this, there were 207 registered unem-
ployed per front-office staff mem-
ber in 2006, which is higher than the 
workload calculated by Kuddo (2009) 
(which took 65 per cent of the staff 
as front-office staff).
5 Such tasks included operating the 
Integrated Hungarian Labour Data-
base in the period 2003–06 (accord-
ing to data from the annexes of the 
final report, 266 staff in 2004, 130 
staff in 2005), employment support 
for disabled workers and related 
social policy activities from 2006 (60 
staff in 2006 and 424 staff in 2007) 
and organizing public works from 
2009 (200 staff in 2009 and 2010).
6 In the labour centres, 200 staff 
were employed on rolling annual con-
tracts between 2004 and 2007 under 
the HRDOP 1.1 programme. Between 
2008 and 2013, 113 staff are employed 
on similar contracts under the SROP 
1.1.1 programme. Some 226 staff were 
employed from 2008, and 316 staff 
from 2009 to 2011 under the SROP 
1.1.2 programme; and 54 staff annually 
from 2009 to 2011 under the SROP 
1.1.3 programme. In the national cen-
tre in 2010, employees were hired 
for 40 programmes financed from 
EU sources.
7 In all 339 staff in 2008 and 483 staff 
in 2009 and 2010.
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did not yet feel that they should systematically influence the division of labour 
in job centres. Following the regional reorganization, the number of clients 
per staff member increased by 20 per cent in a year. at the end of the decade, 
as a result of the global financial crisis, the number of registered unemployed 
had risen to levels not seen since the early 1990s, while the staff workload 
had increased to 150 per cent of the pre-accession level. not including staff 
in charge of eu projects, the headcount and workload of the network of job 
centres had both deteriorated: the headcount was 14 per cent down on 2003, 
while the workload was 82 per cent up on 2003.
as regards the human resource management of the public employment service, 
eu-funded projects expanded the room for manoeuvre somewhat, but at the 
same time reduced predictability. on the one hand, if they had any time left 
after completing their own tasks (i.e. providing information, involving clients in 
the programmes, keeping contact, monitoring and coordinating participants), 
staff involved in development programmes also undertook general adminis-
trative tasks . on the other hand, the success of the programmes depended 
not just on them, but also on the other job centre employees, who offered 
services, training or suitable jobs for clients. thus the activities of the staff 
at job centres often could not be clearly delineated, and the considerable 
increase in workload made it inevitable that adjustments needed to be made 
to cover actual shortfalls in capacity.
the development programmes may have served as a means of increasing the 
headcount and replacing staff, but, regardless of performance, fixed-term 
contracts do not offer career prospects (or only very tentative ones). the 
programmes may also have served as a means of avoiding layoffs – but usually 
they only offered a postponement; the staff involved knew this, and that may 
have had a negative impact on their motivation.
under the development programmes, job centres had the opportunity to 
purchase certain services for their target groups. according to the findings 
of a workload survey conducted in 2008, the number of external service 
providers working in job centres was about 10 per cent of the headcount of 
the job centres’ own staff (ergoFit, 2008). if that figure is correct, the total 
headcount of public employment service staff and contractors working in 
job centres would mean that the number of registered unemployed per staff 
member in 2008 was approaching the 2006 level.8 Capacity was boosted 
by purchasing services to approximately the same extent as the in-house 
staff was reduced due to regional reorganization and layoffs. the intention 
of the job centres to make up the shortfall in capacity for routine work was 
explicit in the justification for the purchase of services. in at least half of the 
cases, job centres did not hire external contractors to provide personalized 
services, but to provide information, so that their spare capacity could be 
used for diverse tasks. only 16 per cent of external service providers were 
hired to provide counselling, and only a few job centres hired contractors to 
maintain contact with employers (an area that is often described as neces-
sarily neglected).9
Workload also varied enormously between individual departments. this is 
illustrated by data from 2004, when the average workload of the public employ-
ment service was relatively low and therefore departments had considerable 
8 The estimated headcount of 
external contractors working in job 
centres was 269, so that PES staff 
and contractors altogether totalled 
4,286. The number of registered 
unemployed per staff was 103. We 
have relied on Berde’s (2010: 60) esti-
mate that 73 per cent of the staff of 
labour centres worked in job centres 
that year.
9 Job centres insist on keeping con-
tact with employers, even if they are 
unable to do it properly or with suf-
ficient intensity. For more details see 
Chapter 6.2. 
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freedom in deciding which activity to focus on. Figure 2 summarizes the find-
ings, by region, in order to reveal, later on, one of the greatest difficulties of 
the reorganization. 
the number of registered unemployed per staff in county labour centres varied 
by up to 2.7 times, and those of the subsequent regional organizations by up 
to 1.8 times. there was also a considerable heterogeneity within regions: in 
one case it was even greater than the variance across regions. in counties with 
high registered unemployment, the workload indicator was usually worse and 
differences within the region were higher. this may indicate that the depart-
ments of the public employment service working in the different regional/
local labour markets focused on different activities, in order to adjust to their 
tasks and the available capacity. However, we may also assume that the lack 
of balancing mechanisms meant that considerable differences emerged and 
persisted between the average workload of the staff of individual departments.
based on an analysis conducted in 2002, bódis and nagy (2005) also concluded 
that there was significant difference in the frequency with which benefit 
recipients were summoned to a job centre. in over half of the 28 job centres 
in the six counties involved in the analysis, benefit recipients were summoned 
every three months; the second most common frequency was every month 
Figure 2: The number of registered unemployed per staff  
in county labour centres in 2004 (persons)
Sources: Own calculations. The average headcount of county labour centres later 
belonging to regions is calculated from Annex 11 of the 2008 report of the State Audit 
Office, not including the headcount of the national centre. The number of registered 
unemployed is based on the data of the National Employment and Social Office.
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– a frequency used in a fifth of job centres. practice differed significantly 
between counties – and often within counties, too; and in a few job centres, 
there was even significant difference in staff practices. Data from the 2002 
labour Force survey of the Central statistical office on the proportion of 
benefit recipients visiting a job centre in a month led to a similar conclusion: 
there was a difference of over 200 per cent between the minimum and the 
maximum monthly ‘footfall’ in counties (made up of the average of 5–15 job 
centres). 
utilizing cApAcity At job centres 
the aggravation of problems pertaining to the reduction in headcount and 
the increase in tasks in the second half of the 2000s directed the attention 
of top-level officials and analysts to utilizing capacity in the network of job 
centres (kaucsek et al., 2006; ergoFit, 2008; berde, 2010; németh et al., 2011). 
as far as we know, after the diagnostic research by kaucsek et al. (2006), the 
first systematic workload survey, based on client statistics and time estima-
tion, was undertaken by ergoFit (2008). although this survey was carried out 
towards the end of the reference period, it analysed problems originating 
from earlier years, which had remained unaddressed and were only indicated 
by anecdotal information.10
in the course of the time estimation, it turned out that lots of job centre 
managers were unaware of how long certain activities took. at the various 
decision-making levels of the public employment service (and in the Hungarian 
public administration in general) there was no tradition of estimating the time 
required by specific activities and rationalizing work procedures accordingly. 
When establishing office procedures, the legal aspects take priority, while 
developmental and regulatory changes usually make tasks longer and more 
complicated. the heads of job centres estimated the time required for adequate 
service to be 25–35 per cent longer than it actually was, and the time required 
for contact with clients and individualized tasks11 to be 50–70 per cent longer 
than it took in reality. When time pressure was high, job centres reduced 
the length of time to 1–2 minutes, which of course was inadequate. all this 
is related to the lack of protocols influencing the content of services, as well 
as to system-level conceptual and capacity-planning problems. some 30–40 
per cent of the workload of job centres consists of only 4–5 activities, and 
thus workload may be significantly reduced by rationalizing these activities.12
there was no difference between the workload of the 75 modernized and the 
81 unmodernized job centres. However, there were rather large differences 
within these categories: the maximum values were 2.5–3 times higher than 
the minimum values. job centres react to an increase in workload – especially 
during peak times, when the peaks cannot (or are not) smoothed out – by 
focusing on mandatory tasks and speeding up other tasks wherever possible: 
interviews and placement interviews. Consequently, as a result of the crisis, 
the key activities of the ‘new service model’ lost out to bureaucratic activities, 
and administrative procedures became more formal.
job centres also adjusted to fluctuating workload by prioritizing tasks, reor-
ganizing the daily work flow and, if necessary, introducing voluntary overtime. 
10 The survey examined workload 
at 156 job centres in the first eight 
months of 2008, on the basis of data 
from the databases of the office, 
questionnaires used at the job cen-
tres and interviews.
11 Such tasks include the modifica-
tion of job-placement data (+50 per 
cent), conducting the first and an 
interim interview (+60 per cent and 
+65 per cent, respectively), place-
ment interview (+72 per cent) and 
recording the job search agreement 
(+55 per cent). The length of the first 
interview was estimated at 18 min-
utes on average, and the length of the 
interim interview and the placement 
interview at 10 minutes on average.
12 The most important are ‘recording 
continuous accountancy items’, ‘mod-
ifying the date of visit’ and ‘recording 
casual labour’. The most significant 
item, accounting for a  quarter of 
cases, includes the tasks related to 
casual employment logbooks. The 
abolition of these in 2010 was there-
fore an effective capacity-manage-
ment decision.
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official matters were top priority, since the consequences were worst if those 
were neglected. these were followed by job placements and active measures; 
contact with enterprises lagged some way behind; and the provision of labour 
market services brought up the rear (see also Chapters 6.1 and 6.2). most of 
the job centres complained (whatever the workload) that their activity was 
being hampered by excessive workload, the increase in administration and 
lack of time.
given the significant differences between job centres, it may be assumed that 
there were also considerable differences between micro-level work organiza-
tions, professional content, the quality of services, expertise of staff members 
and performance (ergoFit, 2008). this situation can only be changed by plan-
ning and monitoring capacity usage. High workload is not only caused by an 
increased volume of tasks, but also by poor workflow organization. according 
to analysts, that is where the potential is for improvement. according to 
németh et al. (2011), all job centres have, in recent years, adapted to deterio-
rating conditions by making use of specific work-organization solutions. this 
confirms the need to unify the elements and the optional models adopted, so 
that the centre of the network can support the decisions of job centres and 
mitigate the unjustifiably large variations. this partly confirms and partly colours 
our rough estimates of the long-term prospects and regional differences in 
workload. it also sheds light on the importance of analysing differences and 
of evidence-based differentiation at all levels of the organization.
the processes of orgAnizAtionAl leArning
the collection and sharing of knowledge necessary to accomplish the tasks of 
the public employment service are described in terms of labour economics 
and human resource management models. on the one hand, a significant 
proportion of these tasks require special knowledge that can only be acquired 
as a member of staff or in cooperation with the staff, and can only be used if 
working for the pes. this creates interdependence between the organization 
and its employees: it is worth offering career prospects to a significant share of 
the employees in order to motivate them to obtain the necessary skills, to stay 
in the organization and to do good work (ehrenberg and smith, 2012; milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992). on the other hand, a large proportion of the necessary 
knowledge is generated by staff members through horizontal cooperation. 
the technology needed for bureaucratic tasks and service provision can only 
be developed successfully if the staff support and monitor one another, since 
noone else can do that efficiently (lazear, 2006; storey et al., 2009).
in the following, some procedures related to organizational learning will be 
summarized: procedures supporting recruitment and selection, in-service 
training, career management and knowledge sharing within the organization. 
then we will look at the extent to which the pes fulfils these criteria. 
Recruitment and selection. When the organization was set up, the staff of 
county labour centres and job centres were recruited from the labour depart-
ments of discontinued local councils and from the personnel departments of 
companies that were closing or downsizing. a few years later, during the rapid 
expansion of the organization, job centres were in charge of recruitment, which 
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they carried out simply among their clients and selected staff by interviewing 
potential staff members. Recruitment and selection were carried out informally 
throughout the 20 years under consideration. the survey of human resource 
management tools applied by the public employment service, conducted at 
the end of the reference period, only slightly modifies the picture (Fodor et al., 
2010).13 it was mainly new recruits to the regional labour centres who received 
information on the grapevine; most of the new recruits to the national centre 
and the local job centres learned of vacancies on the public administration job 
site. selection was based on Cvs and (non-systematic, undocumented) job 
interviews, which are not suitable for checking the necessary skills and compe-
tences. the exception to this was the national centre, where one new recruit 
in five was selected on the basis of how well he/she accomplished a routine 
task, and where competence tests and assessment centres were also used.
Induction. When the service was established, many of the staff had only an 
upper secondary qualification. in the following years, it was typically higher-
education graduates who were hired – a sizeable proportion of them from the 
unemployed pes clients.14 most of those with an upper secondary qualification 
either obtained a degree later on or were passed over; a number of them were 
replaced by better-qualified workers during the mass layoffs.
Due to the special tasks, induction training undertaken by the organization 
is required for all employees. During the mass recruitment of the early years, 
the centre organized an internal basic training course, which culminated with 
a so-called ‘threshold’ examination (Rózsa, 1991). after a while the course and 
the examination became less rigorous – probably under pressure from job 
centres, which needed the new recruits at once. the course came to involve 
only simple, repetitive tasks, but many job centre managers were comfortable 
with that, and were confident that the new staff would be able to undertake 
more complicated tasks later on. this approach, which saved on management 
expenses and was similar to the way organizations functioned under commu-
nism, is probably largely responsible for the fact that the staff does not have 
a shared knowledge and concept of several theoretical and technical issues. 
according to the experts interviewed, the fate of the threshold examination 
was sealed by the introduction of the compulsory civil service examinations, 
which do not include specific knowledge.15
labour centres mainly organize lectures for newly recruited employees about 
regulations, organizational structure, finance and it issues. although one of 
the most important elements of the eu-funded development programmes of 
the public employment service was in-service training, the centrally organized 
obligatory induction training on several topics was not re-launched. However, 
modules of intranet-based e-learning started to be developed; in future these 
may be appropriate for uniform training in fields that do not require personal 
tuition. there were some regions where new recruits also attended practical 
training on client-centred approaches and stress management, but this has 
been discontinued due to lack of funding (Fodor et al., 2010).
In-service training. in order to carry out its specific tasks, the service has to 
undertake significant in-service training. in addition to basic training, steps 
were taken from the start to provide specific medium-level and higher-level 
training for staff members (Rózsa, 1991). However, the specific training was 
13 The data collection of the survey 
was based on an online questionnaire 
for the staff of the PES (n = 916) as 
well as interviews with top-level and 
HR managers.
14 For example, the proportion of 
staff with upper secondary qualifica-
tions in a county labour centre at the 
end of the 1990s was 39 per cent; 
the proportion of staff with a col-
lege degree was 40 per cent; and the 
proportion of those with a university 
degree was 16 per cent. Most degree 
holders had a degree in teaching and 
economics (28 per cent and 23 per 
cent), followed by those with a degree 
in HR and agriculture (11 per cent and 
12 per cent) and then by lawyers and 
engineers (9 per cent and 7 per cent) 
(Taschner, 1998).
15 According to the estimate by 
Felső- Farkas (2010), 40 per cent of 
own funding for training was spent on 
obligatory civil service examinations.
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gradually replaced by participation in formal education. this was encouraged 
by the changes in qualification requirements, the salary scale for civil servants 
and support from the organization to obtain a degree through part-time 
higher education courses.16 in addition, from 1997, after the leading role of 
the national centre was scrapped, the counties became the project providers 
for methodology development, and they did not have sufficient capacity to 
operate extensive in-house training.
in-service training was reinterpreted and received new funding as part of the 
modernization programme in the 2000s. most development programmes had 
a major training component: 1,250 employees attended in-service training in 
2005–06 and 5,000 in 2007 (barta, 2006; Felső-Farkas, 2010). the consider-
able opportunities for in-service training could not replace the missing unified 
conceptual and methodological foundations. similarly, the well-planned and 
monitored programmes could not make up for a missing human resource 
strategy, organizational and individual development plans, and a central register 
of staff qualifications and work experience. as a result, there was nothing to 
stop job centre managers from acting in their own (short-term) interests and 
preventing their most productive staff from attending training, simply in order 
to maintain the necessary capacity. they did not take on board the conclusions 
of methodology projects run in certain counties in earlier years, and did not 
respond to criticism from experts and workshops that failed to be included 
in the restarted central training courses.17 and finally, the sustainability of 
training courses depended on whether efficient solutions were developed and 
whether they were run using home-grown resources (e.g. relying on in-house 
trainers, increasing the role of the intranet significantly) (Felső-Farkas, 2010; 
Fodor et al., 2010; németh et al., 2011).
Procedures supporting knowledge sharing. between the late 1990s and the 
early 2000s, the methodology development of the public employment service 
was powered by county leaders and experts with ample ambition and skills. 
While the impact assessment of programmes is best implemented through 
independent survey, professional practices (e.g. the procedures for individu-
alized casework) are most successfully developed through the cooperation 
of staff in hierarchical and horizontal relationships. both the former and the 
latter should be reinforced in the organizational culture. this may be most 
efficiently organized not by traditional training courses, but by new forms of 
knowledge sharing (case studies, problem-solving groups, use of the intranet, 
etc.). such activities are undertaken in certain programmes or certain depart-
ments,18 but there are no routines or developments to indicate a shift in this 
direction for the service as a whole.
knowledge sharing may, for example, take place in the framework of quality 
management. this management tool was adapted to the public employment 
service according to the principles and methods of the public administration 
self-evaluation system of the eu (Common assessment Framework, CaF) at 
the time the new service model was introduced (see Chapters 6.1 and 6.2). 
the objective was to support the development of the professional activities of 
job centres participating in the programme by enriching the tools applied by 
their management – or, more specifically, to reinforce a culture in which the 
operation of the organization served the interests of clients and encouraged 
16 Around the mil lennium, sig-
nificant tension built up at the job 
centres between older workers 
(mostly with upper secondary quali-
fications) recruited in the first wave, 
and younger, graduate workers who 
arrived in subsequent waves.
17 Respondents to the questionnaire 
in the study on HR tools complained 
that there were few advanced interac-
tive methods in the training courses, 
that previous experience of partici-
pants was insufficiently utilized, and 
that the training was not very useful 
for supporting everyday work (Fodor 
et al., 2010).
18 For example, establishing the 
advanced system of career guidance 
(SROP 2.2.2 programme), whose ele-
ments supported one another excel-
lently; and the group problem solving 
(which was successful in one county 
labour centre and was then adopted 
by two other counties when the net-
work was reorganized into regions).
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reflection and responsiveness by mastering the cycles of planning, measure-
ment, analysis and feedback. the participating job centres developed detailed 
procedures, which, according to madarász (2006) and Fekete (2009), func-
tioned successfully. this picture is slightly modified by the fact that many job 
centres focused on satisfaction surveys, while international findings indicate 
that these are not an effective indicator (galasi and lázár, 2003). the impact 
of such surveys on the responsiveness of the organisation is not obvious either 
– this is reflected in the lack of response to the capacity distribution criterion 
pertaining to the new job centre model. although several departments prob-
ably use quality management for solving complicated professional problems, 
unfortunately the service did not uphold it as best practice.
the ‘management by objectives’ (mbo)19 approach may be partly suited to 
this, although the prevalent opinion has it that it is more of a management 
information or organization-level performance evaluation tool (pes forums, 
2009; Hörömpöli, 2008; madácsyné, 2004; orcsik, 2007). However, the expert 
who initiated the programme believes that the original aim (and initial prac-
tice) was to promote evidence-based analysis and discussion in labour centres 
about tasks and achievements (lengyel, 1998). obviously, this management 
approach includes negotiation (karolinyné et al., 2003) and seeks to structure 
it in cases with significant information asymmetry. if there is sufficient analysis 
capacity and a supportive management culture, it may be an adequate tool for 
achieving the original objectives.
Career management. Rapid changes in tasks due to labour market and institu-
tional factors, the significant deterioration in predictability and management 
deficiencies contributed to an absence of systematic career management in 
the public employment service (Fodor et al., 2010). the problem here dated 
back beyond the time when fixed-term contracts and bought-in services 
became the only way of boosting capacity; the rot had already set in by then, 
as permission for talented and interested staff members to attend training 
depended on their line managers (nagy, 2010). the problem was compounded 
by the lack of a unified labour issues database on staff members, to be used for 
analysis and practical decision-making. in recent years, there has been some 
opportunity to progress thanks to participation in development programmes; 
however, this has not been properly regulated either, and has not been based 
on any widespread performance principle (Fodor et al., 2010). according to 
our model, it results in the loss of the knowledge of some staff members. 
However, this may be reversed even after the development funds dry up by 
having an increased role for top management in human resource management, 
by balancing the autonomy and control of job centres and by increasing the 
headcount of internal experts.
conclusion And recommendAtions 
it is a common challenge for analysts and top-level officials to contribute 
to the establishment of efficient institutional mechanisms (milgrom and 
Roberts, 1992). effective management of the staff of the public employment 
service would encourage the members of the organization to cooperate in 
implementing effective policy solutions and would increase the knowledge 
19 The so-called Management by 
Objectives (MBO), used in several 
Member States of the European Union, 
based on performance indicators, has 
been in place in the Public Employ-
ment Service since 2005. See also 
Chapter 6.2.
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they jointly possess. this chapter has revealed several weaknesses of the 
public employment service over the past two decades. However, it has also 
pinpointed several promising development alternatives.
two of the governance mechanisms of the organization have been discussed: 
the division of tasks among organizational levels in human resource manage-
ment; and balancing the importance ascribed in regulation to inputs, procedures 
and outputs. by accepting higher transaction costs, the management would 
probably be significantly more effective in both fields.
our analysis shows that the competences of the three management levels 
in managing the staff were most harmonious in the initial years. in the late 
1990s, the national centre, which had lost ground, could not organize the 
unified training system of the service or offer internal career pathways – which 
were much needed and should have been possible because of the complex 
and very specific tasks in hand. the interests and capacity of the county 
labour centres were adequate to cope with their methodology development 
concepts. However, they were not powerful enough to select developments 
based on stringent criteria, to disseminate best practice and to launch their 
own training programmes based on experience gained. the national centre, 
reinforced before eu accession, ran the large-scale development programmes, 
but had neither the strength nor the will to influence the procedures of job 
centres and staff members. it is even doubtful to what extent the development 
programmes were able to mobilize the whole of the knowledge possessed by 
the staff and encourage them to systematically compare new knowledge with 
experience gained at job centres.
it is crucial to manage the distribution of capacity among job centres and 
the practices of staff members, and to create diverse roles for experts in 
the network for the purposes of career management. effective management 
methods are capable of providing autonomy for subordinates and information 
for management.
the approach in developed countries, which aims to modernize public service 
governance and to reinforce performance in general, recommends measuring 
the output of services rather than the inputs and processes (pollitt and 
bouckaert, 2000). in the case of the Hungarian public employment service it 
is worth developing all three elements, even at the same time. the problem of 
inputs involves the distribution of capacities and the lack of in-service training; 
the problem of processes involves the paucity of professional protocols; the 
problem of outputs involves the one-sided use of quality management and 
mbo and the neglect of dialogue within the profession.
Recommendations have already been made in the analysis: they are all related 
to the improvement of coordination between departments and tools and the 
fostering of dialogue and cooperation.
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4. aCtivation anD Wage aDjustment
4.1. uSing eligibility criteria to Stimulate job Search 
gyula nagy
theoreticAl considerAtions And internAtionAl experience
the literature on unemployment benefits primarily discusses the conditions 
of entitlement, the length of the support period and the amount of assis-
tance granted, as well as their effect on the labour market. However, it is also 
important to consider how support is administered; whether, in addition to 
basic entitlement, unemployed people are expected to fulfil any behavioural 
criteria; and, if so, how fulfilment of those criteria is monitored. analysing 
the long-term unemployment prospects of the oeCD countries, nickell et al. 
(2005) propose that making strict behavioural criteria a condition of unem-
ployment benefits, as well as sanctioning their violation, may curb the growth 
in permanent unemployment.
the entitlement conditions for unemployment benefits define the prerequi-
sites for being granted support. For example, claimants are only entitled to 
insurance-type support (benefit) if they worked for a certain length of time prior 
to becoming unemployed and if they paid employee contributions. similarly, 
only those living in a low-income household are generally entitled to unemploy-
ment support (assistance). apart from these entitlement conditions, access 
to support is also restricted by so-called eligibility criteria. according to the 
eligibility criteria, those unemployed people conforming to the international 
labour organization (ilo) definition1 may be given assistance if they are able 
and willing to take work at short notice and undertake active steps to find work 
themselves. this is monitored according to the various requirements of the 
administering organization: recipients of support have to visit the employment 
office by appointment, contact employers suggested by the office, accept suit-
able job offers and participate in prescribed training, etc.2
according to the predictions of economic models, unemployment support, 
as a financial support system administered to the unemployed, diminishes 
the likelihood of finding employment by inflating the reservation wage rate,3 
thus increasing the expected duration of unemployment. at the same time, 
because they have more resources at their disposal, benefit recipients are 
likely to have a better chance of finding employment.
making sure unemployed people fulfil the eligibility criteria may have a greater 
impact on their financial situation (and, consequently, behaviour) than changing 
the benefit amount (benefit/wage ratio), because a violation of the rules may 
result in them losing the entire amount of support. the two key requirements 
1 Out of work, able to enter work at 
short notice and undertaking active 
steps to find work.
2 Scharle (2002) and OECD (2007) 
offer an international overview of eli-
gibility requirements. According to 
the latter, the majority of developed 
countries apply an increasingly exten-
sive system of requirements in order 
to prompt the registered unemployed 
to actively seek work.
3 The lowest wage rate at which an 
employee is willing to accept a  job.
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of eligibility criteria (active job search and availability) directly stimulate the 
process of finding employment. in addition, the ‘disutility’ of monitoring may 
also contribute indirectly to the intensity of job search, thus increasing the 
chances of someone finding a suitable position. if this influence is strong 
enough, it may even discourage unemployed people from claiming benefits 
(grubb, 2001).
the insistance on the importance of eligibility criteria may appear to promote 
negative incentives: tighter monitoring of recipients may screen out dubious 
claims and stimulate the job-search efforts of those who wish to find employ-
ment. nevertheless, the same tools can also fulfil a role of positive motivation: 
tighter and more frequent contact with the public employment office may 
provide jobseekers with more information and help them apply relevant job-
search strategies. this latter may work most effectively if the administrative 
appointments are combined with counselling and a review of job opportuni-
ties. in sum, monitoring the recipients’ job-search activity and willingness to 
work may increase the likelihood of employment through both positive and 
negative stimulation.4
regulAtion And reseArch in hungAry
in Hungary, the eligibility criteria are officially termed the ‘cooperation require-
ments’ of benefit recipients and such criteria have been in use since the intro-
duction of unemployment benefit. unemployment benefit and social assistance 
recipients both have to fulfil eligibility criteria. unemployment support recipients 
have to report regularly to the public employment office or the organization 
appointed by the local authorities to administer the benefits. they have to 
accept suitable job offers, participate in any training offered, take active steps 
to find a job, and inform the public employment office or the local authorities 
of any changes in their situation. according to the benefit regulations, milder 
infringements of the requirements are sanctioned by the suspension of benefit. 
Repeated and graver offences (such as refusing a job offer) may result in the 
benefit being terminated. in the case of social assistance, the local authority 
sanctions the violation of eligibility requirements.5
among the criteria listed above, the obligatory acceptance of a  job offer 
provides an opportunity to monitor willingness to work. However, the scarcity 
of registered vacancies restricts the application of this monitoring strategy. 
in Hungary, unemployed people also have to accept jobs offered within public 
works schemes. jobseekers assigned by public employment offices have been 
employed in supported public utility works since the end of the 1980s. public 
work schemes were broadened by centrally regulated programmes in the 
second half of the 1990s and by local government-regulated programmes for 
social assistance recipients in 2000. in that same year, a significant change 
occurred in entitlement conditions: claimants of local government-administered 
social assistance were now required to participate for a minimum of 30 days 
in public works, if any were offered, before they could receive the benefit. this 
requirement is an ideal platform for monitoring willingness to work.
three separate pieces of research were conducted in conjunction with the 
fulfilment of eligibility criteria in Hungary. in 2003 and 2004 the monitoring 
4 Studies on the stimulating effects 
of benefit systems have primarily 
focused on the generosity of ben-
efits (amount of support, length of 
entitlement), while relatively few 
have addressed the issue of moni-
toring. Among these are: Abbring et al. 
(2005); Boone et al. (2007); McVicar 
(2008); Van den Berg and van der 
Klauuw (2006).
5 For a more detailed overview of the 
eligibility requirements in Hungary, 
see Koltayné (2002) and Frey (2007).
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of benefit recipients was analysed (bódis et al., 2005; micklewright and nagy, 
2010; and bódis and nagy, 2008). in 2007, case studies formed the basis for an 
examination of the social assistance administration practices of local govern-
ments (nagy, 2008: Chapter 3). Finally, in 2008 the data of a labour Force 
survey (lFs) performed by the Central statistical office were processed to 
determine the prospects of registered unemployed people in job seeking and 
finding employment (galasi and nagy, 2008).
monitoring willingness to work
Figure 1 shows the ratio of jobseekers among unemployed people receiving 
unemployment support (benefit or income support and social assistance) 
between 1992 and 2009. in the first part of the period, between 1992 and 
2003, the ratio of jobseekers decreased steadily in both categories: while 69 
per cent of benefit recipients and 60 per cent of social assistance recipients 
were actively looking for a job in 1993, by the period between 1999 and 2003 
the figures had plunged to 54–56 per cent and 39–48 per cent, respectively. 
this tendency seems to suggest that the targeting of benefits deteriorated, in 
the sense that the benefits were increasingly being given out to people who 
were not actively looking for a job.
significant changes came into effect regarding the rules of administering 
unemployment support in 2000, 2003 and 2005. the 2000 amendment 
primarily affected those permanently unemployed: the income support that 
Figure 1: The ratio of ILO unemployed among unemployment 
benefit recipients,%
Notes: UI: unemployment insurance (munkanélküli járadék, álláskeresési járadék); UA: means 
tested unemployment assistance ( jövedelempótló támogatás, rendszeres szociális segély) 
Source: Central Statistical Office.
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was available after benefit ran out was merged with the regular social assis-
tance that anyone could claim up to that point, regardless of employment 
status. With the amendment in effect, claims could only be lodged after 30 
days of public work had been undertaken; this prompted local governments 
to organize public work schemes (nagy, 2002). the so-called jobseeker’s 
support that was introduced in 2003 secured another six months of financial 
support after unemployment benefit was exhausted, offering a lower, flat-rate 
extension for those people with a minimum of 180 days’ entitlement. to be 
eligible, benefit recipients had to sign an individual action plan (the so called 
cooperation agreement) with the public employment office. according to the 
agreement, recipients had to visit the office at least once a month and give 
an account of their job-search activities. it was up to the benefit recipients to 
decide whether they would enter into this agreement, even though the obli-
gation to cooperate is included as one of the general conditions for receiving 
benefit, in accordance with international practice. this clause entails active job 
search and it applies to all recipients of unemployment support. the data in 
Figure 1 do not suggest that the jobseeker’s support introduced in mid-2003 
did anything to improve the job-search activities of benefit recipients. in fact, 
the same number of benefit recipients were active jobseekers in 2003 as the 
year before (55 per cent), and the figure rose by barely 1 per cent in 2004 (up 
to 56 per cent), which does not represent a significant change. the idea that 
an agreement was necessary for an extension (of the jobseeker’s support) 
suggested that those who refused to sign the agreement would be exempted 
from having to comply with the eligibility criteria in exchange for renouncing 
the extension. thus, the obligation to provide proof of job search would only 
apply to those claiming the extension. this construction is more likely to 
have undermined the enforcement of eligibility criteria in the support system 
than to have improved it. it would have been far more sensible to extend the 
support period universally, regardless of personal choice, and to ensure that 
the eligibility criteria were monitored more consistently than before. this 
could have been combined with a definition of individual job-search criteria.
the rules for administering unemployment support were modified to this 
effect in 2005: recipients of the redesigned forms of support now had to 
enter into a job-search agreement that detailed the ways of actively seeking 
a job. Depending on the form of support they received, different groups of 
claimants had to visit the public employment office at different intervals (often 
with increased frequency); they had to report that they were keeping up their 
end of the agreement; while the public employment office documented the 
activities reported by the recipient, re-evaluating and (if need be) modifying 
the agreement. the name of the support was also changed to jobseeker’s 
benefit from unemployment benefit (while the name of jobseeker’s support 
was changed to jobseeker’s assistance).
From Figure 1 it becomes obvious that after the introduction of the new eligi-
bility criteria far more recipients were actively looking for jobs. the proportion 
of the ilo-defined unemployed among the benefit recipients reached two-
thirds in the period between 2005 and 2008 – 10 per cent higher than in the 
previous years; and by 2009 the proportion was close to three-quarters (74 
per cent). the job-search activity of those receiving unemployment support 
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(social assistance) also increased: while 40 per cent of them took active steps 
to find work in the period between 2001 and 2004, this figure had risen to 
55–56 per cent by the end of the decade.
Willingness to work can only be monitored if the recipients regularly visit 
the public employment office that administers the support. these obligatory 
appointments may in themselves be regarded as monitoring willingness to 
cooperate and enter work: by reporting at the office, the unemployed demon-
strate their willingness to cooperate, as they have to devote this time to looking 
for a job. additionally, the visit is likely to hinder them in other activities, such 
as household chores and maintenance, unregistered ways of earning money 
or leisure pursuits. apart from this, the visits present an opportunity for the 
public employment office to monitor the willingness to enter work from other 
angles, for instance by asking questions about the independent job-search 
efforts or informing the client of likely vacancies, etc. For this reason the 
frequency and scheduling of visits is anything but unimportant with respect 
to the fulfilment of eligibility criteria.
Figure 2 shows the ratio of the unemployed who visited the public employment 
office in the previous month in the period between 1999 and 2005, according 
to the labour Force survey of the Central statistical office. significant varia-
tions manifest themselves in the different support groups in each year: people 
receiving benefits visited the employment office far more frequently than 
those on income support or social assistance. in 1999, more than two-thirds 
Figure 2: The ratio of unemployed who visited the public employment office 
in the previous month (by benefit type), 1999–2005, %
Notes: UI: unemployment insurance (munkanélküli járadék, álláskeresési járadék); UA: means 
tested unemployment assistance ( jövedelempótló támogatás, rendszeres szociális segély) 
Source: Central Statistical Office
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of benefit recipients visited the public employment office within a month of 
their last appointment, whereas with the other group the figure was less 
than half that. From 2000 onwards, 50–60 per cent of benefit recipients and 
26–34 per cent of social assistance recipients reported to the office within 
a month of their previous visit. in other words, the nationwide results seem 
to suggest that benefit recipients were summoned to the public employment 
office more often than those on assistance. in international comparison, this 
intensity of contact is relatively (though not remarkably) low. based on data 
from 24 european countries, the ratio of those who visit the public employ-
ment office within a month of their last appointment is lower than average in 
Hungary: in 14 countries the figure is higher, and in only 8 countries is it lower; 
one country is at the same level as Hungary (bajnai et al., 2009). 
the data in Figure 2 demonstrate the substantial decline in the frequency of 
appointments after 1999. the phenomenon is hard to explain. the reason 
cannot have been an increase in workload at the public employment offices 
because, from 1999/2000, the total number of registered unemployed and 
the number of benefit recipients both declined somewhat. the staff at the 
employment offices cited changes in legislation to explain the phenomenon: in 
the 1990s, the labour law had only one clause regarding the frequency of visits 
(to the effect that an unemployed person had to show up at the appointments 
specified by the office). the amendment that came into effect in 2000 left the 
practice of scheduling up to the individual office, but included an additional 
clause which obliged the unemployed person to report at least once every 
quarter. that is to say, the new legislation did not introduce a lower frequency of 
appointments: it merely broadened the requirements by inserting an additional 
clause of minimum frequency. in spite of this, it seems that a great number of 
offices aligned their appointment frequency with the minimum requirement 
specified by law, and even relaxed their previous practice.
From Figure 2 it also becomes evident that the frequency of visits by benefit 
recipients increased slightly in the period between 2003 and 2004, after the 
introduction of jobseeker’s support. the question regarding the time of the 
visit was not asked in the lFs from 2006 onwards; therefore, based on these 
data, the effect of the changes that came into effect in 2005, which affected 
all benefit recipients, cannot be measured. at any rate, the frequency of 
visits to the public employment office did not increase in the first year (2005) 
compared to earlier years.
in the 2000s there was no uniformity in how frequently the public employ-
ment offices saw their clients. according to nationwide data from 2004, in 
several counties less than half of benefit recipients reported to the office in 
the preceding month; in other counties the figure was closer to two-thirds. 
the highest rate was more than double the lowest (bódis et al., 2005: 84). 
the same issue was investigated in greater detail in research that processed 
2002 data from 28 employment offices in six counties (ibid, pp. 78–91). aside 
from differences between individual counties, the results also showed that 
the frequency of appointments was not uniform even at the county level. in 
the majority of the offices examined, benefit recipients were only summoned 
once every three months, while in others the obligatory visits were sched-
uled monthly. the data reveal that the employment offices did not consider 
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monitoring willingness to work to be an important duty, and aligned the 
frequency of visits with the minimum prescribed by law.
the data from the case studies revealed, furthermore, that most of the employ-
ment office staff only considered regular visits to be important insofar as 
they concerned the accurate recording of benefits and other administrative 
procedures. on the whole, the results of the 2002 research demonstrate 
that public employment offices in Hungary neglected to monitor the eligibility 
criteria and willingness to work. benefit recipients were rarely summoned 
to the employment offices; when they were, active job-search efforts were 
not monitored and negligent recipients were treated indulgently. employ-
ment offices attributed no significance to fulfilling the eligibility criteria and 
were likely to fend off related tasks due to the extra work involved and the 
risk of conflict they presented. it is also not unusual to find that employment 
office staff were not familiar with the exact eligibility criteria (‘the benefit is 
administered on the basis of intrinsic eligibility’) or they cited ideological or 
pedagogical reservations about them (‘the act of monitoring is not compatible 
with our character as a service provider’).
monitoring sociAl AssistAnce recipients’ willingness  
to work
We are in possession of case-study data that concern the application of eligi-
bility criteria by local authorities. a 2007 study concerned with the provision 
of regular social assistance to the unemployed (nagy, 2008) examined the 
assistance administration practices of local authorities in 44 settlements.6
Within the framework of (behavioural) eligibility monitoring, social assistance 
recipients had to arrange to be entered into the records and had to keep in 
contact with the designated agency. in four-fifths of the sample settlements, 
the agency coincided with the local public employment office; in the remaining 
cases, it was the family support centre run by the local authority or (in the 
case of one settlement) an employment non-profit organization. arrangements 
had to be made for an integration programme, and recipients had to accept 
suitable job offers, participate in training offered, as well as in developmental, 
life coaching and counselling programmes. Where the agency was not the 
public employment office, assistance recipients were still required by the local 
government to cooperate with the agency. in practice, this was carried out 
in the form of a job-search agreement with conditions similar to those cited 
earlier in this paper, as specified by the labour law.
in this time period, participation in public works was already established as 
a prerequisite for assistance. a number of local governments successfully 
applied the practice of offering jobs to monitor recipients’ willingness to 
work. some municipalities asked people who were claiming social assistance 
for a formal undertaking to accept a public works position if one was offered, 
and this occasionally led to the claim being withdrawn.
if there was no job opening in a settlement that corresponded to a well-educated 
recipient’s level of qualifications, their willingness to accept a job offer – and, 
ultimately, to cooperate – could not be monitored. local governments also 
secured an exemption for some recipients: if they had any kind of medical 
6 Within the framework of the 
survey, interviews were conducted 
with the local government officers 
in charge of benefit administration. 
They also collected data about the 
benefit administration practices 
and the public work involvement of 
recipients.
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certificate they did not have to accept an offer of a position. employment 
offices acted similarly with regard to social assistance recipients: they accepted 
virtually all requests for exemption filed by women (not child-raisers gener-
ally) citing childcare difficulties. there was no rule that provided for different 
treatment on the grounds of the child’s age, the family structure, the labour 
market activities of the family members or the work shifts at a company where 
the client was previously able to work. in the experience of the authors, local 
authorities were more familiar with the circumstances of the applicants than 
were the employment offices; consequently, they were in a better position to 
reliably weigh the obstacles that child-raisers faced on the job market.
in theory, eligibility criteria can be applied successfully to screen out assis-
tance abuse. in some villages cited in the above-mentioned study (nagy, 2008) 
untrained men receiving regular social assistance either in their own right or via 
their spouse regularly worked on construction sites as unskilled labourers, but 
according to local government officials any action to prevent this would have been 
futile. it also happened that regular social assistance (or unemployment benefit) 
recipients would turn up for their appointment at the agency even though they 
had a registered job, according to employment centre officials. 
social assistance for the unemployed was transformed into family assistance 
in july 2006.7 this enabled either spouse to be the claimant, so they could 
delegate the one more willing to visit the authorities. by way of example, in 
the experience of employment officers, women raising small children have 
been almost always granted exemption from having to accept suitable but 
non-desirable work. Families could be use this to releive male family members 
of the obligation of active job search so that men would only be affected by 
the income test part of the benefit claim.
the cooperation agreements signed at the public employment offices are 
relatively detailed and require an it system to administer them. in spite of this, 
certain critical factors affecting ability to work (such as temporary or perma-
nent medical conditions and childcare problems) are not treated uniformly, 
but are rather based on the judgement of the administrative officer.
in the day-to-day routine of local government offices, the log detailing the 
implementation steps of the integration programme, as well as its regular 
evaluation and (if needed) modification, is not unlike the procedure in prac-
tice at employment offices. With the former, however, the lack of it support 
is more prevalent; documentation is even less uniform; labour market criteria 
are ignored; and elements considered to be mere formalities (such as evalu-
ation) are generally not applied.
sAnctions Applied upon breAch of the cooperAtion 
Agreement
another crucial element of how well the eligibility criteria are administered is how 
often and how gravely violations are sanctioned. lamentably, the sole source 
of information in our possession on this matter is case studies. offenders are 
punished by the suspension or termination of the benefit payment. in the early 
2000s, based on data collected from 27 public employment offices (bódis et 
al., 2005), the suspension of benefit was applied as a sanction against repeated 
7 This is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 4.2.
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failure to keep an employment office appointment. even though the failure to 
actively seek work could be similarly sanctioned, only one employment office 
applied this punishment for that infringement. most benefit recipients were 
disqualified for refusing appropriate job offers, for engaging in income-generating 
activities or for repeated breach of the cooperation agreement. 
Disqualification was more frequent than the milder punishment of suspension 
of the benefit: in the employment offices examined, 0.37 per cent of benefit 
recipients were disqualified in an average month, as opposed to 0.17 per cent 
who were punished with suspension of benefits. a review of the sanction 
routines confirmed that there was no uniform practice of monitoring willingness 
to work either in the counties or in the individual employment offices within 
them. the differences between the sanctions applied in the various counties 
and their employment offices were manifold and cannot be accounted for by 
varying labour market conditions.
similar conclusions were reached when the authors reviewed the social assis-
tance administration practices of local authorities (nagy, 2008): assistance 
recipients rarely had to worry about disqualification due to insufficient coop-
eration. in the settlements examined, on a monthly average, in 2006 and in 
the first four months of 2007 less than 0.5 per cent of assistance recipients 
were reported by the monitoring agency (whether it was the employment 
office or the family support centre) to the notary for insufficient cooperation. 
in the same period, an average of 0.6 per cent of assistance recipients were 
punished with disqualification by the notary.
job seArch monitoring And reemployment 
We know relatively little about how stimulating job search and monitoring 
willingness to work affect jobseekers’ chances of employment. in 2003, an 
experimental research study was conducted in six counties on the effects of 
monitoring eligibility criteria (bódis et al., 2005; micklewright and nagy, 2010; 
bódis and nagy, 2008). benefit recipients of 75 to 179 days of entitlement were 
involved in the research. the sample was randomly sorted into two groups: 
a so-called ‘treatment’ group and a control group. the research continued for 
three months: members of the treatment group were summoned to the employ-
ment office every three weeks for a ‘regular appointment’, while members of 
the control group only had to report after three months had elapsed. When 
the three-month period was up, the offices continued to schedule appoint-
ments for those unemployed still receiving benefits according to their usual 
practice. With the majority of participating employment offices, this meant 
every three months; but in several places the period was of a considerably 
shorter duration – one or two months. Consequently, in this category of offices, 
the appointments for the control group were less frequent than usual. the 
employment officer interviewed members of the treatment group on the basis 
of a questionnaire. each unemployed person had to give an account of his/her 
job-search activities since the last interview at the employment office, and 
had to list the employers they had contacted. those who did not actively seek 
a job were asked each time why they had failed to do so. those who missed 
an appointment also had to explain themselves, and the answer they gave was 
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then entered on the questionnaire (in the same way as the answers given to 
the questions on job search). However, failure to actively seek a job was not 
sanctioned in any way.
the effect of tighter monitoring was measured by the outflow rate of both 
groups. even though members of the treatment group (who had to report more 
frequently) left the unemployment register somewhat sooner, the difference 
was slight – in fact, statistically negligible. in other words, it cannot be stated 
of the entire sample that the outflow rate of the treatment group would have 
exceeded that of the control group. examining the outflow and the chances of 
employment demonstrated that the treatment had a significant effect in the 
group of women aged 30 and above, resulting in quicker outflow and a higher 
likelihood of finding employment. the same phenomenon was not present in 
the case of men and younger women.
the authors used multivariate modelling to determine whether certain personal 
traits or the local unemployment rate modified the effect of the treatment. the 
results pertaining to women aged 30 and over vary according to marital status: 
married women in the treatment group were 60 per cent more likely to find 
employment than in the control group. However, in the case of single women 
there was no significant difference between the two groups. Furthermore, it 
is also demonstrable that, in the group of women aged 30 or above, the effect 
of the treatment varied by county, and its degree decreased quite significantly 
with the growth of the unemployment rate: according to the estimates, at an 
unemployment rate of 4 per cent, the treatment group’s likelihood of finding 
employment was 80 per cent better than that of the control group. With the 
average unemployment rate of 5.5 per cent, the difference was only 40 per 
cent; and at an unemployment rate of 8 per cent the difference was virtually 
non-existent.
the authors have not been able to account for the fact that increased monitoring 
affected (only) older (especially married) women in terms of their chances 
of finding a job. the explanation may have to do with the fact that older and 
married women tend to be less likely to be looking for a job than men or younger 
single women. another possible explanation may be that, although monitoring 
prompted all groups of people (younger and older, male and female) to more 
intensive job search, it was only among those older women with a lower job-
search intensity that the increased effort yielded tangible results. With men 
and younger women, who tend to be more active in seeking jobs anyway, the 
prompting did not result in a greater likelihood of employment. according 
to a further hypothetical explanation, monitoring did not increase the job-
search intensity of men and young women, who constitute a high number of 
jobseekers in the first place: the increased frequency of appointments at the 
employment office posed no inconvenience to them, and nor did having to 
answer questions about job search. However, it did increase the job-search 
intensity of older women (constituting a smaller group of jobseekers), and the 
extra effort resulted in a greater likelihood of employment. since job-search 
data were only collected from the treatment group and not the control group, 
we cannot provide a well-founded explanation for the phenomenon.
When interpreting the data, it is worth noting that, in spite of the obvious 
differences in the requirements incumbent on the two groups, we cannot be 
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sure that the monitoring of the treatment group was rigorous enough to affect 
behaviour in any measurable way. Reporting to the employment office every 
three weeks placed a small enough burden on any benefit recipient who was 
passive, had no wish to find employment or who worked unregistered; and 
neglecting job search was not sanctioned.
another similar analysis examined the job-seeking efforts and the likelihood of 
employment among registered unemployed people between 1999 and 2007 
using the lsF data of the Central statistical office (galasi and nagy, 2008). 
it confirms the trend depicted in Figure 1 regarding job-search activity: the 
ratio of jobseekers among the total of registered unemployed people declined 
somewhat in the early 2000s; then, from the middle of the decade (following 
a stricter prompting of job search), there was substantial growth. the study 
presents variations in job seeking by gender, region, age group and level of 
education, and although it claims to have found considerable differences in 
job-search activity, the same trend is observable among all groups: following 
the regulations introduced in 2005, the proportion of jobseekers increased 
significantly.
the multivariate modelling of the job-search likelihood also points to the 
conclusion that there was no significant difference in the increase in job 
search between the various groups of registrants. in other words, it cannot 
be shown that the public employment office would have prompted job search 
in a focused way, favouring certain groups on the labour market. at the same 
time, the modelling confirmed that the increase in the job-search likelihood 
of the entire cohort was significant (screening out the effects caused by 
changes in the composition of registrants): compared to 1999, the average 
job-search likelihood was 0.06 higher in 2005 and 0.11 higher in 2006. in other 
words, activation effected a significant change on the job-search activity of 
the unemployed in the last two years.
the study (also using the lFs data from the Central statistical office) exam-
ined employment rates in the period 1999–2007. according to the data, the 
likelihood of employment in the entire cohort of registrants and in various 
subgroups was no higher after the introduction of the new regulations. in fact, 
in certain groups employment rates declined slightly after 2005.
the authors used multivariate modelling (including the personal traits of 
registered unemployed people and, within that, the group of jobseekers; the 
current situation of the local employment market; and omitting the potential 
seasonal quarterly effects) that examined employment chances prior to the 
introduction of the jobseeker’s agreement and in the entire period following 
its introduction. these results also suggested that the increase in job search 
brought about by the new regulations did not figure in the growth of employ-
ment chances. examining the period prior to (2001–02) and after (2006–07) 
its introduction, the authors found that the measure’s positive effect on the 
chances of employment weakened in the second period.
in sum, the results showed that the 2005 austerity measures designed to 
monitor job search significantly elevated the ratio of jobseekers among the 
registered unemployed. However, the rates of finding employment did not 
increase because job search had little effect on the likelihood of finding 
employment.
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summAry And recommendAtions
in this chapter we have presented the Hungarian literature on stimulating 
job search, as well as domestic research findings. according to international 
literature, stimulating job search (fulfilling the so-called eligibility criteria for 
support) can have a significant effect on the likelihood of finding employment, 
decreasing the duration of unemployment. the Hungarian results found 
that, in the early 2000s, the public employment offices and local authorities 
administering social assistance did not focus on monitoring clients’ willingness 
to work or their job-search activities. the new eligibility rules of unemploy-
ment support (introduced in 2005) significantly increased the proportion of 
jobseekers among unemployment registrants; however, the proportion of 
those who were successful at finding employment did not increase. nonethe-
less, we do not accept this as evidence that stimulating job search is pointless 
or completely ineffective. the studies cited did not concern themselves with 
the qualitative aspects of the monitoring practices in the period following the 
change in regulations (such as what intensity of job search was required by 
the employment offices; how successful they were at identifying the deficien-
cies of cooperation; and how rigorous they were at sanctioning offenders). it 
is possible that an increased level of consistency in fulfilling the activation 
criteria would affect employment chances beneficially.
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4.2. penSionS and unemployment benefitS 
ágota sCHaRle
welfAre And lAbour mArket effects of trAnsfers  
to working-Age individuAls
this chapter will mainly address benefits to the unemployed, but it will also 
briefly touch upon pensions and similar provisions that allow an early exit 
from the labour market.1 in most developed countries, the state provides 
jobseekers and disabled workers with some sort of income. beside solidarity, 
state intervention can be justified by rational arguments as well (galasi, 1996; 
köllő, 2002).
on the one hand, unemployment insurance would not work on the basis of 
market principles, or its scope would be narrower than is optimal. on the 
other hand, unemployment benefits allow people to devote enough time to job 
search, even if they do not have substantial savings, and be able to financially 
support themselves and their families. benefit payments also make sense even 
if the problem could be tackled by taking out a loan, because many people 
cannot realistically assess their future opportunities or are unable to secure 
an adequate loan due to a dysfunction in the capital markets. in lower-income 
countries, state intervention is justified even if unemployment has little effect 
on consumption, but risk-averse households with no access to insurance cut 
back on both their consumption and their investments – particularly in the 
education of their children. Considering aggregate welfare, this would result 
in a less than optimal investment.2 Finally, unemployment provisions (if they 
smooth consumption) act as automatic stabilizers: during times of economic 
recession, they automatically increase government spending and thus miti-
gate fluctuations in the economy (see, for example, auerbach and Feenberg, 
2000). state intervention is justified for similar reasons in the case of people 
who have limited work capacity due to illness, accident or disability, and for 
parents with young children.
at the same time, financial assistance for working-age people does reduce 
willingness to work: Chapter 4.1 shows how this works in the case of unem-
ployment provisions. even if the provision does not (or does not completely) 
exclude the possibility of work, there is still a certain disincentive, because the 
individual – although he or she might not lose entitlement to the provision – has 
some income that might be enough to cover their basic needs.3
1 Parental leave benefits are dis-
cussed in Chapter 6.3. 
2 Chetty and Looney (2006) esti-
mated that in both the United States 
and Indonesia, food consumption is 
reduced by 10 per cent if the main 
earner becomes unemployed. Based 
on this, the introduction of a formal 
unemployment insurance system 
would provide a modest welfare gain. 
However, in the case of Indonesia, 
it should also be taken into account 
that people used inefficient methods 
to avoid their consumption declining 
with their income (in technical terms: 
they smooth their consumption). Gen-
erally, if consumption does not closely 
follow the changes in income because 
people are highly risk averse, then 
public insurance would provide sig-
nificant welfare gains by eliminat-
ing inefficient adaptation strategies 
(Chetty and Looney 2005).
3 The disincentive effects of differ-
ent provisions (flat-rate and means-
tested assistance, wage subsidy, tax 
credits, assistance linked to strict eli-
gibility) are somewhat different – for 
an overview see, for example, Cseres-
Gergely and Scharle (2008: 40–43).
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extensive provisions in hungAry Are coupled  
with low employment
since the regime change, nearly a third of the working-age population (15–64 
years) in Hungary has been receiving some form of welfare benefit; the majority 
of recipients are out of work. Half to two-thirds of the claimants receive 
disability or old age pension. Compared to this, the combined share of unem-
ployment and welfare assistance is relatively small.
there are few studies that have investigated the positive effect of unem-
ployment insurance in Hungary. galasi (1996) examined the effect of the 
amount of unemployment benefit (insurance based) on job search intensity, 
using the Household panel survey of táRki from between 1992 and 1995. 
He estimated that a higher amount resulted in higher job search intensity. 
therefore a higher benefit increases the probability of re-employment, 
because more intensive job search results in a higher number of job offers 
within a given period.
various empirical studies have confirmed the disincentives of unemployment 
provisions (for a summary, see bódis et al., 2005; Firle and szabó, 2007). 
Hungarian studies have found similarly modest effects to those in other 
countries. For example, micklewright and nagy (1998), in a follow-up of unem-
ployed people who had exhausted their benefit entitlement, found that the 
re-employment rate suddenly increased in the week following the end of the 
benefit. this suggested that some of the benefit claimants (2–3 per cent of 
the cohort) had found a job earlier, but had postponed starting the new job 
because of the benefit. köllő (2001) estimated the effect of the insurance-based 
unemployment benefit using the records of the employment service and data 
from a survey in the spring of 2001.4 He found no relationship between the 
replacement rate and re-employment, but there was an increased probability 
of exit at the end of the entitlement period. However, this was only signifi-
cant for jobseekers with upper secondary (with a school leaving certificate) 
or higher education, and such people make up a very small proportion of the 
total unemployed population.
Firle and szabó (2007) found that people receiving regular social assistance 
had a 30–35 per cent lower likelihood of re-employment, compared to people 
not receiving assistance – although this might not be attributable exclusively 
to the amount of the assistance, but also to the different characteristics of 
claimants.5
there is very limited research on disability and old age pensions; nevertheless 
the studies that do exist unanimously show a significant and negative effect on 
labour supply (for an overview, see scharle, 2008b). Cseres-gergely (2008) 
estimated how current wages and expected pension influenced retirement, 
using a panel created from individual-level data between 1993 and 2000 in 
the Hungarian Household budget survey. the results showed that a 1 per 
cent increase in earnings reduces the probability of retirement by 0.11–0.13 
percentage points, while the same increase in pension increases the prob-
ability of retirement by 0.16–0.18 percentage points. 
4 Adjusted for the different prob-
ability of recalled workers. 
5 Based on interview studies, it is 
likely that people receiving means-
tested assistance differ from benefit 
recipients and unemployed people 
who do not receive any assistance, 
not only in terms of education or age 
(these can be adequately measured 
and controlled for in most surveys) 
but also in terms of other charac-
teristics – such as inner motivation, 
self-confidence, social networks and 
health status – that are rarely mea-
sured in large-scale surveys. This 
might bias results and the disincen-
tive of assistance might appear larger 
than it is in reality. 
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economic trends hAve increAsed the tAke-up of provisions
the regime change, as is discussed in Chapter 1.1, was accompanied by dramatic 
changes, particularly a sharp fall in demand for labour. as a response to this, 
the demand for working-age provisions (unemployment benefit and assistance, 
different forms of early retirement, disability provisions and parental leave 
benefits) increased considerably, as table 1 shows. the ministry in charge did 
little to prevent this in the early 1990s (see Chapter 3.1). 
Table 1: Percentages of people receiving different welfare provisions 
within the total population aged 15–64, 1990–2010
Year
Unemployment 
benefit
Unemployment 
assistance
Pension
(under 65)
Disability 
provisions
Parental 
leave 
benefits
Total
Receiving 
assistance and 
working* 
1990 0.4 0.7 15.9 1.8 3.6 22.5 n. a.
1995 2.3 3.7 17.5 3.2 4.4 31.3 6.6
2000 1.8 2.4 19.7 3.5 4.4 31.8 8.3
2005 1.5 2.3 18.1 3.6 4.3 30.0 9.6
2010 2.8 2.5 15.9 2.8 4.0 28.0 10.2
*As a percentage of people aged 15–64 receiving provision.
Note: Unemployment benefit includes insurance-based provisions, while unemployment assistance 
covers means-tested out-of-work allowances (young entrant’s assistance, regular social assistance, 
income maintenance and income replacement assistance, depending on the year in question). 
Pensions include disability pensions, and disability provisions include non-pension provisions; 
parental leave benefits cover insurance-based childcare leave and universal childcare allowances. 
Source: Calculations by Duman and Scharle (2011), based on data from the Central Statistical 
Office, the Employment Office and the National Directorate of Pension Insurance. Last column: 
calculated by Árpád Földessy using data from the Hungarian Labour Force Survey.
subsequent periods when economic growth has stalled, and then the crisis 
from the end of 2008, have mainly increased the take-up of unemployment 
provisions; they have had no substantial effect on other provisions – probably 
partly due to earlier restrictions on the conditions governing entitlement. 
demogrAphic trends hAve decreAsed tAke-up of welfAre 
provisions
the health status of the population has been gradually improving since the 
early to mid-1990s. although mortality indicators only started to improve in 
1993, the deterioration in health had been arrested earlier, according to pauka 
and tóth (2003).6 this is also reflected in life-expectancy trends: since its 
lowest level in the early 1990s, life expectancy at birth has increased by 4–6 
years, and life expectancy at the age of 60 has increased by 2–3 years.7 this 
improving trend might have contributed to the decline in disability pension 
claims (scharle, 2008b).
6 Pauka and Tóth (2003) compared 
the results of the Complex National 
Morbidity Study carried out in 1980 
(and based on a  medical assess-
ment) with the self-assessment-
based health status survey in 1994 
and the 2001 demographic survey 
of the Population Research Institute 
of the Central Statistical Office. The 
latter two surveys indicated improv-
ing trends in the 40–49 and 50–59 
cohorts, for both genders. 
7 Source: CSO. See Table 4.3 of the 
Statistical Annex. The improvement 
in life expectancy does not neces-
sarily go together with an increase 
in healthy life expectancy; however, 
data from recent years suggest that 
this has also improved in Hungary (see 
Eurostat online database, the values 
of the indicator hlth_hlye show an 
increase of 1.5 years for men and 1 year 
for women between 2006 and 2009. 
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the education level of the working-age population – particularly women – has 
also improved in the last 20 years. this is a result of the expansion of education 
in the 1960s that reached pre-retirement cohorts in the past few years: the 
number of people with a school leaving certificate has increased substantially 
among the over 50-year-olds. the improvement in education has reduced the 
volume of pension claims and has thus helped to increase activity. analysis of 
the decline in disability pension claims between 2000 and 2004 has shown that 
95 per cent of the observed decline was due to changes in the composition of 
affected cohorts, while neither the reasons for claiming disability pension nor 
the rigour of the assessment process changed substantially. between 1997 and 
2007, when the economy was growing steadily, the employment rate in the 
15–64 population increased by 5 percentage points in total. scharle (2008a) 
found that over 70 per cent of the total increase observed during this ten-year 
period was related to changes in the composition of the labour force, while 
the employment rate remained virtually unchanged within particular cohorts 
or education levels. Further improvement of a similar magnitude in the educa-
tion level of women cannot be expected for another 20–25 years (in the case 
of men – 10–12 years): only then will new cohorts that are significantly better 
educated than their predecessors will reach pre-retirement (scharle 2008b).
unemployment provision hAs become much stricter, eArly 
retirement less so 
the unemployment insurance introduced in 1986 and the system of welfare 
benefits that dates from before then have been amended on several occasions 
during the past 20 years. the insurance-based unemployment benefit has oper-
ated in more or less its present form since 1989, although its name has changed 
from time to time and it has become increasingly less generous.8 most of the 
changes have reduced the (initially) fairly generous replacement rate (the ratio 
of the benefit to the previous wage) or the entitlement period, largely with the 
aim of cutting government spending. First, the entitlement limit was reduced 
in stages from two years to nine months between 1991 and 2000; secondly, the 
replacement rate dropped from 70 per cent to 65 per cent of pre-tax earnings 
(between 1993 and 1997 it had even reached 75 per cent). the highest amount 
of benefit was reduced from three to two times the minimum wage in 1992, and 
was then fixed at that rate until 1996 – which meant there were no increases, 
despite an annual inflation rate of around 20 per cent (nagy, 2002).
in addition to the benefit available to all eligible unemployed people, there 
were also various provisions targeted at older people during the early years 
of transition: the pre-retirement pension was replaced in 1997 by the much 
lower pre-retirement unemployment assistance (scharle, 2001). young entrants 
(who are not entitled to unemployment benefit) could claim young entrant’s 
unemployment benefit between 1991 and 1996.9
there were no significant changes to benefit entitlement conditions until 
the reform of november 2005, which sought to encourage the activation of 
jobseekers. this reform replaced unemployment benefit with a jobseeker’s 
allowance and incorporated the pre-retirement unemployment benefit into 
this assistance. the benefit in the first phase (up to 91 days) was linked to 
8 Insurance contr ibutions , the 
Labour Market Fund, employee and 
employer contributions were only 
introduced in 1991. 
9 This was a non-means-tested flat-
rate provision set at 75 per cent of 
the minimum wage. 
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previous earnings; in the second phase it was a flat-rate payment. those with 
low previous earnings received a much higher amount than under the previous 
system, because the lower rate of the benefit was set at 60 per cent of the 
minimum wage, rather than 90 per cent of the minimum old age pension, as 
before (this meant an increase from HuF 23,200 to HuF 37,500 in the lowest 
amount of benefit in 2006). there were also rises in the amount of benefit paid 
to higher earners, because the upper rate increased from twice the minimum 
old age pension to 1.2 times the minimum wage, which represented a 60 per 
cent increase in 2006. For those earning around or slightly above the minimum 
wage (between the new lower rate and the old upper rate) the amount of the 
benefit decreased by 5 per cent, because its rate was reduced to 60 per cent of 
previous earnings (from 65 per cent). in the second phase, everybody was paid 
60 per cent of the minimum wage, and thus the average unemployed person 
received more money at the beginning and less at the end. as a further incen-
tive, those who took up a new job before the end of their entitlement could 
claim half of their remaining benefit paid as a lump sum.
the latest restriction of the benefit (in september 2011) is hitherto unprec-
edented: the rate remains at 60 per cent of the previous wage; however, the 
upper rate has been reduced from 120 per cent to 100 per cent of the minimum 
wage, and the maximum benefit period has been shortened to 90 days (from 
the previous 270 days). jobseeker’s assistance – which had been paid for up 
to six months to those who had exhausted their benefit entitlement but could 
still not find a job, or who had not paid contributions for long enough to be 
entitled to jobseeker’s allowance – was abolished.
the eligibility conditions for social welfare assistance changed very little until 
2000, when the two means-tested benefits were merged into a single provision. 
technically this meant that the income replacement of unemployed people was 
abolished, and the regular social assistance paid to those of working age could 
only be claimed by unemployed people.10 the aim of this reform was to activate 
the long-term unemployed, and this is when the ‘jobseeker’s agreement’ was 
also introduced (see Chapter 4.1). the amount of the benefit also decreased 
(from 80 per cent to 70 per cent of the minimum pension), but people who 
had never worked could also claim this benefit, provided they had cooperated 
with the local job centre for at least 12 months (Frey, 2001).
entitlement was unaffected, but the amount of assistance increased signifi-
cantly for many people, following changes introduced in july 2006 that did 
away with the previous flat-rate assistance and linked its amount to the size 
of the family, supplementing the income per consumption unit in the family up 
to 90 per cent of the minimum pension (Firle and szabó, 2007). this change 
might have reduced child poverty, but it was criticized by professionals and 
local government officers because it created a disincentive to work and led 
to tensions between low-paid workers and those receiving social welfare 
assistance.11 in response, as of january 2007 the maximum amount of the 
assistance was capped at the net minimum wage.
the next major change was brought about by the ‘Road to Work’ programme 
(‘Út a munkához’) launched in 2009. people receiving regular social assistance 
were assigned on the basis of their capacity to work to one of two groups: 
those able to work and those not able to work. the first group was enrolled 
10 The regular social assistance also 
existed before transition as a means-
tested benefit administered by local 
councils. A reform in 1997 made it 
mandatory for recipients to cooper-
ate with the local job centre or the 
family service of the local council; 
however, being unemployed was 
not an eligibility criterion (the rules 
allowed a  limited amount of paid 
work). 
11 Changes only affected the amount 
of the assistance, there were no 
attempts to reduce the unemploy-
ment trap, for example by disre-
garding some of the work income 
of family members taking up work 
or continuing the payment of the 
assistance for some time (see also 
TÁRKI, 1998).
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in public works programmes or received income maintenance assistance.12 
increased funding from the state budget was made available for local councils 
to organize public works projects, and various co-financing deals aimed to 
encourage them to make use of this: central government contributed 80 per 
cent to the cost of income maintenance assistance (reduced from the earlier 90 
per cent) and 95 per cent to the cost of public works. the income maintenance 
assistance is flat rate and is somewhat lower than the average amount of the 
previous regular social assistance. However, this rule only came into force in 
january 2010, and therefore the previous regular social assistance was paid to 
all those eligible in 2009 (Csoba, 2010; Frey, 2011). another amendment in 2011 
renamed the income maintenance assistance ‘income replacement assistance’ 
and set its amount at the rate of the minimum state pension.
trends in the benefit and assistance claimant counts have been similar during 
this period. With the increase in long-term unemployment, the number of 
people claiming social assistance reached 45 per cent of the combined claimant 
count, before levelling off at around 50–60 per cent (bálint, 2010) until the 
onset of the global financial crisis, when the influx of the newly unemployed 
increased the share of benefit claimants.
the first major reform of disability and old age pensions took place in 1998, 
when the pension age of men was increased from 60 to 61 years, and then 
to 62 years, as of 2000. meanwhile the pension age of women rose gradually 
from 55 years – roughly by one year every other year – to reach 62 years in 
2009. the reform also aimed to encourage people to delay their retirement, 
by introducing changes to the amount of the pension: those retiring early saw 
their pension reduced proportionately, while those delaying their retirement 
past pension age received a proportionally higher pension. Full old age pension 
could be paid to those who reached the appropriate pension age, who had at 
least 20 qualifying years and who were not employed or self-employed. the 
pension age increased again in 2010, and it is gradually approaching 65 years.
also in 1998, there was an attempt – which enjoyed rather limited success – 
to restrict access to disability pensions; this was followed by a more serious 
measure in 2008 – the introduction of rehabilitation allowance. under the new 
scheme, people claiming disability pension are only eligible for rehabilitation 
allowance initially (except for those who cannot be rehabilitated). this is paid for 
up to three years and recipients must cooperate with the employment service. 
an amendment that extended the requirement of cooperation to recipients of 
other disability-related provisions came into force at the same time.13
the subsidies supporting the rehabilitation of people with reduced work 
capacity were amended at various stages in the years after 2005, in order 
to bring them into line with eu regulations, as well as to improve their effi-
ciency and promote more effectively the mainstream employment of people 
with reduced work capacity. as a result of the reforms, the subsidies paid to 
employers were reduced without there being any parallel increase either in the 
incentives to take employment on the open labour market or in the funding of 
employability services – typically provided by non-governmental, non-profit 
organizations (scharle, 2011). since 2008, job centres have offered a range of 
services for jobseekers with reduced work capacity within the framework of 
fixed-term, eu co-funded programmes.
12 Furthermore, while only one 
person in a household could receive 
regular social assistance, the income 
maintenance assistance could be 
claimed by more than one person 
up until January 2010. 
13 This rule applies to those who have 
been classified by a medical assess-
ment as suitable for rehabilitation; 
people within ten years of the pension 
age are temporarily exempt. In the 
same way as those receiving reha-
bilitation allowance, recipients must 
cooperate with the local job centre. 
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policy meAsures hAve so fAr hAd mixed results 
the restriction of unemployment provisions has been examined by various 
studies, none of which has detected a significant increase in the supply of 
labour. the most thorough of the three studies that addressed the 1993 reform 
(Wolff, 2001) concluded that the simultaneous decrease in the replacement 
rate and entitlement period had no effect on men, and only a moderate posi-
tive effect on women aged under 30 years.14 
the rise in the pension age could increase employment significantly. according 
to kátay (2009), by 2007 the proportion of pensioners within the 15–64 
population had declined significantly, and, as a result, the activity rate had 
increased by approximately 1.5 percentage points among men and by nearly 
3 percentage points among women.
there was a twofold increase in economic activity and employment among 
people with reduced work capacity between 2002 and 2008, while their 
unemployment rate increased by 60 per cent.15 the expansion of activity 
can be partly attributed to an increase in job search activity (and, to a lesser 
extent, in willingness to work); put differently, somewhat more people would 
like to work, and among those people significantly more are actively looking 
for work. increase in activity can be related to changes in legislation, but also 
to higher education levels – so far as we know, there has been no research 
that has addressed this question to date. 
recommendAtions
the entitlement conditions for unemployment benefit since the last reform 
have been exceptionally strict, compared to most of the developed world. the 
maximum claim period of three months is half that in the united states and 
the Czech Republic (which is the second-strictest eu country, after Hungary). 
the extensive literature on the optimum duration of unemployment provision 
suggests that both the entitlement period and the replacement rate should 
be increased substantially (see, for example, landais et al., 2011).
to reduce the disincentives of unemployment provisions, a number of countries 
use measures other than reducing their amount or duration, and that still do 
not increase poverty (World bank, 1996). such measures can include stricter 
eligibility criteria or the gradual withdrawal of benefit, in order to increase 
the financial incentives to return to work; the introduction of a negative tax; 
and schemes to disregard some of the earnings of benefit recipients (or to 
introduce a higher income threshold) (táRki, 1998). another incentive is if the 
payment of the benefit can be suspended and then easily and quickly claimed 
again after a spell of temporary employment – therefore people who are willing 
to take up uncertain jobs do not need to worry about being left without an 
income for weeks on end if they become unemployed again. in the area of 
pensions, other incentives are necessary to accompany the rise in the pension 
age if a real increase in the average retirement age is to be achieved. However, 
rather than a complete ban on early retirement, this should be implemented 
in a more flexible manner, by increasing the malus for early retirement and 
rewarding delayed retirement (bonus).
14 This result slightly clarified Mick-
lewright and Nagy’s earlier estimate 
(1995) that did not control for the 
effect of recalled workers. They mea-
sured the effect of tighter entitle-
ment conditions by comparing the 
re-employment rates of existing ben-
efit recipients and new entrants under 
the revised scheme. The results were 
biased by the fact that the number of 
recalled workers was higher among 
the new entrants, who are more 
likely to return to work. For a sum-
mary of studies looking at the effect 
of restrictions, see Bódis et al. (2005) 
or Cseres-Gergely and Scharle (2012).
15 The CSO’s Labour Market Sur-
vey had three supplementary surveys 
within the past 20 years – in 2002, 
2008 and 2011 – that were based on 
international methodology and pro-
vided representative and comparable 
data on the labour market situation 
of the population.
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For disability provisions, it might be justified to reduce the amount of assistance 
in order to bring it closer to unemployment benefit and future pension. more 
importantly, however, job centres should provide more and better services, 
because without these disabled people’s work capacity and employment 
prospects will not improve substantially. 
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4.3. minimum wage regulation 
jános kÖllő
the minimum wAge – its role And possible effects
the arguments for and against the minimum wage can be grouped around 
three questions: does the minimum wage promote fairness, what effect does 
it have on social inequalities, and how does it affect employment?
the second question can be answered more readily than the other two. the 
introduction of the minimum wage and any substantial increase in it does, in 
most cases, narrow wage inequality; however, in developed economies this has 
a very small effect on the dispersion of incomes, as is illustrated by Hungary, 
to which we turn later. the first and the last questions are rather more open 
to debate; these are closely related questions, however distant they may seem.
the justification for a minimum wage as a means to promoting fairness (elements 
of which can be found in the Rerum Novarum encyclical of leo xiii, issued 
120 years ago, as well as in contemporary documents of the international 
labour organization that describe decent work) assumes that the bargaining 
position of the employer and the employee is unequal and hence the power 
of the employer must be curtailed. the validity of this assumption – or more 
generally, of the model of perfect competition – determines the direction and 
strength of the employment effect as well.
in the classic model of the market economy, the introduction of a minimum 
wage generates unemployment. Firms that are under pressure from compe-
tition, that have no market dominance and are price takers will go bankrupt, 
downsize or hire better-qualified labour and introduce more capital-intensive 
technology. in such cases, fairness also suffers: the working class – which was 
supposed to be better off under the new rules – may end up worse off than 
before the minimum wage was introduced.
the situation is different if the firm is a monopsonist, either because it is the 
only buyer of labour in a geographical and/or market segment (which is often 
the case) or because it is a member of a collaborating group, which acts as 
a monopsony. in such cases, as we know from basic labour economics text-
books (e.g. ehrenberg and smith, 2012), the firm can set the wage below the 
zero profit wage level. in this case a modest increase in the minimum wage 
might boost employment, and the distribution of income will become fairer, as 
less monopsony rent is taken. (However an overambitious rise in the minimum 
wage will lead to layoffs even in the case of the monopsonist.)1
1 This is valid in the case of non-dis-
criminating monopsony, where every 
employee receives the reservation 
wage of the newest employee. In the 
case of discriminating monopsony 
(where the firm pays everyone his/her 
own reservation wage), the introduc-
tion of a minimum wage decreases 
employment or leaves it unchanged 
(Card and Krueger, 1995). 
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the effects of introducing or raising the minimum wage also differ from the 
anticipated effects of the perfect market-economy model when its assump-
tions regarding employees prove to be invalid: that is, if the employer is not 
dealing with employees who have no bargaining power, who can be hired and 
fired without any costs and who can easily be replaced with capital resources 
or better-qualified labour. if downsizing is costly and involves conflict, and if 
replacing one resource with another is time consuming and expensive, then 
the introduction of a lower wage threshold can prompt the firm to increase 
labour productivity through training. in this case – if the firm is forced to take 
action that it would not otherwise have taken – the equilibrium of employment 
is set at a higher wage level, with no decrease in the number of employees, 
which serves both economic development and the general good. predictions of 
other models also differ from the orthodox theories, taking into consideration 
market frictions, the inevitable imperfection of employment contracts and 
collective bargaining. the partial equilibrium model of mincer (1976), which 
takes into account the effects of the supply side and labour turnover when 
explaining the effects of a minimum-wage hike, shows that – depending on 
how the elasticities of demand and supply and the turnover rate relate to each 
other – employment and unemployment can rise, fall or stay the same. in the 
search model of mortensen (1988), burdett and mortensen (1989) and ahn and 
arcidiacono (2004), a rise in the minimum wage leads to increased employment 
through a reduction in market frictions. pettengill (1981) and Rebitzer and 
taylor (1991) point out that the level of employment can be raised by a hike in 
the minimum wage if the loss of income in case of dismissal becomes higher, 
as this allows for more stringent performance requirements. in the model of 
Cahun et al. (2001), the employment effect depends on the substitutability 
of the employees affected by the minimum-wage regulation and those not 
affected (i.e. those in a position to negotiate their wages).
it has to be decided, by empirical means, which of these contradictory (yet 
formally flawless) abstract arguments better describes the reality; but the 
empirical results are not uniform. there are very few instances in the literature 
of an increase in employment resulting from a minimum-wage hike, and the 
arguments for a ‘new economics of the minimum wage’ are mostly theoretical 
or experimental.2 the most frequently cited empirical study is that of Card 
and krueger (1994), which detected a positive employment effect in the fast 
food restaurants on the border of new jersey and pennsylvania; however, 
their analysis was criticized for the unreliability of data and for the methods 
of measurement applied (neumark and Wascher, 1992; michl, 1999).
a number of empirical studies have shown an effect close to zero, or a very 
slight negative effect: Card (1992a, b) and katz and krueger (1992) in the 
united states; machin and manning (1994) and Dolado et al. (1996) in europe. 
the longitudinal models of the 1990s usually detected a weaker effect than 
earlier ones (brown, 1999). among the abundant studies concerning the 
introduction of the british national minimum wage, stewart (2004) found no 
effect on employment, and metcalf (2004) detected a weak negative effect 
in the field of home care. lemos (2008) came to a similar conclusion in brazil. 
Doucouliagos and stanley (2009) analysed the publication bias (which means 
that researchers are less willing to publish results that contradict expectations 
2 An example of the latter is Falk et al. 
(2003).
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and editors are less willing to accept them) and came to the conclusion that the 
employment effect of the minimum wage was negligible. However, even after 
the birth of the ‘new economics of the minimum wage’, countless studies have 
indicated negative employment effects – in some cases very strong effects.3
according to the model of acemoglu and pischke (1999), the likelihood of 
receiving training is no lower for minimum-wage employees than for other 
employees; however, the overview by neumark and Wascher (2008) states 
that empirical studies show a decline in investment in human capital: a rise in 
the minimum wage definitely reduced the amount of training – and according 
to some studies, even on-going vocational training.
neither theoretical models nor international empirical literature lead to an 
a priori conclusion as to the extent to which Hungarian minimum-wage policy 
serves fairness, affects equality and influences employment. to resolve this 
issue we can only rely on Hungarian research – and on the fact that, over the 
past 20 years, Hungarian governments have boldly experimented with the 
minimum wage, which provides a good basis for study.
regulAtion of the minimum wAge in hungAry
the mandatory minimum wage was introduced in Hungary shortly before the 
regime change in 1989.4 it governed gross monthly earnings, net of overtime pay, 
shift pay and bonuses, and was legally binding on all employers and full-time 
employees. these principles did not change until 2007. in that year, minimum 
weekly, daily and hourly rates were introduced; furthermore, differentiated 
minimum wages were set, depending on the level of education required by 
the job and previous work experience. the separate wage minimum of young 
skilled workers was dropped in 2009. before 1998 and after 2002, the national 
Council for the Reconciliation of interests decided the level of the minimum 
wage, and the agreed figure was introduced into the budget by a government 
motion. between 1998 and 2002, the minimum wage was set unilaterally by 
the government, and it would seem that the current Fidesz-kDnp government 
is returning to this practice.
in the first year of its introduction, the minimum wage amounted to 34.6 per 
cent of the national average wage. this level was far below the average for 
the eu member states in the mid-1990s, but was still within the range of eu 
countries, being a little higher than the level in spain (Dolado et al., 1996). in 
the years of the transition, the relative level of the minimum wage declined 
almost constantly, and by 2000 it stood at only 29.1 per cent of the national 
average wage (Figure 1).
in discussing the Hungarian minimum-wage regulations, it is primarily the 
motivation for and the effects of the extraordinary rise in 2001–02 that require 
some analysis – on the one hand, because there is no parallel in the developed 
world for doubling the minimum wage (so far as the author is aware, a rise of 
similar proportions has only been undertaken in indonesia and puerto Rico); 
on the other hand, because the effects of this hike have been examined in 
several studies, using different methods.
it is unlikely that the ‘new economics of the minimum wage’ encouraged 
the Hungarian government to embark upon such an unprecedented move; 
3 For example, Deere et al. (1996), 
Neumand and Wascher (2002), Sin-
gell and Terborg (2007), Aaronson 
and French (2007) in the USA; Yuen 
(2003) in Canada for employees 
who have a low wage over the long 
term; Abowd et al. (1999) comparing 
France and the USA; Bell (1997) and 
Maloney and Nuńez-Mendez (2004) 
in Colombia; Castillo-Freeman and 
Freeman (1991) in Puerto Rico; El 
Hamidi and Terrell (1997) and Gin-
dling and Terrell (2007) in Costa 
Rica in the range of high minimum 
wages; Pereira (2003) in Portugal 
among teenagers; Rama (2000) and 
Alatas and Cameron (2003) in Indo-
nesia among small enterprises. In the 
above-mentioned British example, 
Dickens and Draca (2005) examined 
the decreasing chance of retaining 
a  job, while Stewart and Swaffield 
(2008) found a  strongly negative 
effect on working hours.
4 There was a concealed minimum 
permitted wage even earlier in the 
framework of the wage tariff regu-
lation. On the evolution of the mini-
mum wage between 1990 and 2011, 
see Table 5.6 in the Statistical Annex.
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nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the arguments used by the govern-
ment were, in their economic essence, close to the spirit of the new school of 
thought. as the then prime minister and his key administrators explained, the 
higher minimum wage would enhance work performance, raise productivity 
and make it easier to find labour, while the lower benefit/wage ratio was an 
incentive for jobseekers. most of the arguments did not use the terminology of 
economics (e.g. it was said instead that the minimum-wage hike would ‘restore 
the dignity of work’, ‘combat the culture of living off benefits’, etc.), but it is 
easy to discern their closeness to the core statements of the new economics 
of the minimum wage. Further arguments were that a change in economic 
philosophy had taken place; that this was an effort to create a new middle 
class; that it would maintain competitiveness at a new wage level (a level that 
generally increased with the new minimum wage); that it would reduce wage 
inequality; and that it would help curb the grey economy (see Cserpes and 
papp, 2008). the fact that the idea of raising the minimum wage was conceived 
directly after reform of the unemployment benefit system (january 2000 saw 
more stringent measures for claiming social security benefits; and in may the 
regular welfare benefit combined with public work was introduced, which to 
this day remains the main form of support for the long-term unemployed) 
means that the government’s main motivation was ‘to increase the distance 
between benefits and wages’.
at this point the trade unions reacted cautiously: they voiced their concerns 
about a possible decline in the employment rate and the erosion of wage 
differentials. they suggested mitigating the first by compensating those firms 
affected, and tackling the second by differentiating the minimum wage by level 
of education (see Cserpes and papp, 2008).
Figure 1: The minimum wage in 1991–2009, percentage of the average wage
Source: CSO Institutional Wage and Employment Statistics
Gross wage
Net wage
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Following the big hikes of 2001–02, the minimum wage/average wage ratio 
rose from 29 per cent to 39 per cent and later 41 per cent. yet even the 2002 
rate was below the oeCD average, though it surpassed the british, american, 
portuguese and spanish levels. at the same time, even in 2001 the proportion 
of people employed at close to the minimum wage exceeded the oeCD rate: 
the figure increased from 5 per cent in 2000 to 10 per cent in 2001 and 17 per 
cent in 2002 – a level that is unheard of in the oeCD (Figure 2).
the spillover effect was not strong in the short term. an precise description of 
the effect follows: in the percentiles 1–10 the new minimum wage was paid; in 
percentiles 11–40 there were successively lower rates of spillover; above this, 
wages increased in line with nominal gDp growth (kertesi and köllő, 2003). as 
a result, the distribution of incomes became unprecedentedly distorted (before 
the regime change, this was close to log normal distribution, and even in 2002 
was only a bit more dense in the vicinity of the minimum wage) (Figure 3).
Wage inequality decreased in 2001–02: according to the data of the Wage survey, 
the ratio of the top decile of gross income to the bottom decile (the decile ratio) 
fell from 4.9 in 2000 to 4.2 and then to 4.1. However, this effect was transitory, 
and by 2005 the decile ratio had increased to 4.8, near the level before the rise 
in the minimum wage. similarly the gini coefficient of gross incomes decreased 
from 0.39 before the rise to 0.36; however, it had begun to move back up as 
early as 2004, and in 2005 had climbed back to the 0.38 level. the effect on 
income inequality was even weaker; this can be explained by the fact that those 
receiving a minimum wage are typically not the primary earners in the household 
and during the period of the great hikes, less than 20 per cent of them belonged 
to the bottom income quartile (benedek et al., 2006; szabó, 2007).
Figure 2: The proportion of employees on a wage not more than 5 per cent 
higher than the minimum wage, 1992–2009
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Wage Surveys of the Employment Office.
working in firms with:
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the effect of the rises on employment was regarded as insignificant by some 
politicians and experts interviewed by the press; they argued that the level 
of employment did not decrease in 2001–02. this is clearly a flawed argu-
ment, since the task is not to determine whether employment decreased or 
increased compared to the period before the rise (this needs no research at 
all), but to determine the direction of change compared to the level that might 
have been expected if there had been no rise.
using the data from a survey of small firms in 2000–01, kertesi and köllő 
(2003) estimated that, in firms with 5–20 employees, some 12,000 jobs were 
lost due to the first hike. the immediate aggregate loss was estimated to be 
1.1 per cent. elek et al. (2011) examined a longer period, up until 2003, looking 
at the effect of rise in the average wage induced by the minimum wage hikes 
in firms that employed genuine minimum-wage employees (i.e. those that did 
not start to pay ‘cash in hand’ even after the rise). their study shows that, in 
firms that were strongly affected by either the first or both hikes, average 
wages rose significantly more rapidly, employment grew significantly more 
slowly (or decreased more quickly), and the employment of those with only 
0–8 years of general schooling suffered an especially large drop.
Figure 3: Distribution of the monthly average wage, 1986–2009
Source: Author’s calculations based on the Wage Surveys of the Employment Office.
4. aCtivation anD Wage aDjustment 4.3. minimum Wage Regulation
145
the study by kertesi and köllő (2003) examined the effect of the rises using 
both individual data and data from employment offices. using the Cso labour 
Force survey they estimate the probability of job loss for a 25-year-old man 
with five years of tenure to be an annual 0.972 per cent some 4–6 months 
after the first hike, if he was on the minimum wage (taking average values 
for other variables), and only 0.476 per cent if he was on a slightly higher 
wage.5 using the unemployment register of the public employment office, the 
study also examined the chances of a low-wage unemployed person getting 
a job. the data came from 172 job centres and covered a period of 54 months 
(january 1998–june 2002). it showed the number of registered unemployed 
at the beginning of the month, and those leaving the register because they 
found a job, sorted by level of education and wages. the study compared the 
exit probability of low-wage unemployed to the exit chances of uneducated 
unemployed (with lower secondary education or less). Whereas in 1999–2000, 
the relative chances of a low-wage unemployed person getting a job were the 
same as in the reference year (1998), in 2001 there was a 7–8 per cent drop, 
and in the first half of 2003 another 2–3 per cent drop. the relative chances 
of a low-wage unemployed person landing a job deteriorated even further in 
regions with a high unemployment rate.
nor have the government hopes of whitening the grey economy materialized. 
according to the estimation of elek et al. (2011), which has been verified in 
several ways, in 2003 some 5–8 per cent of employees in firms with 5–20 
staff were officially paid a minimum wage, whereas in reality they earned 
rather more. in 2000, barely 5 per cent of all employees earned the minimum 
wage; thus any decrease in the practice of ‘cash-in-hand’ wages is completely 
ruled out, even if we take the lower limit of this 2003 estimate as valid and 
assume that in 2000 everybody who officially received a minimum wage actu-
ally earned more.
Finally, the expectation that an increase in the difference between benefits 
and wages would motivate the uneducated to work also remained unfulfilled. 
the chances of this segment getting a job could not be improved because of 
the decrease in demand for labour. However, if potential wages increase when 
the number in employment drops, then we might expect more intensive job 
search – at least if jobseekers do not (or only belatedly) recognize the decrease 
in vacancies. nothing of the sort occurred either at the time of the big jumps 
in the minimum wage, or after 2003, when income tax on the minimum wage 
was abolished and the net minimum wage/net average wage rate increased 
further, as Figure 1 shows.6
the (so far) latest in the series of experiments involving the minimum wage was 
the 2007 introduction of a minimum contribution payable by the employer on 
the basis of twice the minimum wage.7 the aim of this measure (which some 
years ago was also introduced in Croatia and bulgaria on an experimental basis) 
was to reduce under-the-table (so-called ‘false minimum wage’) payments. 
Firms that paid less than double the minimum wage were not obliged to pay 
the increased contributions, but they did have an obligation to prove that 
they were paying their low-income employees the going rate for their specific 
market segment.8 Firms paying ‘under the table’ wages to their highly qualified 
workers had an incentive to raise their wages to double the minimum wage 
5 These seem to be small numbers, 
but they mean a big difference: the 
chances of the two men in our exam-
ple avoiding unemployment until they 
retire can then be estimated at 67.5 
per cent and 87.6 per cent, assum-
ing a constant probability of job loss.
6 On the trends in the intensity of 
job search, see Köllő (2009: Ch. 8).
7 More precisely, the rule required 
employers to pay social security 
contributions on the basis of at 
least twice the minimum wage, ie. 
for workers earning more than that, 
the contribution was left unchanged, 
and for workers earning less than that, 
the contribution was replaced by a flat 
rate. This rule was abolished in in 2011 
and later reintroduced at a rate of 
150% of the minimum wage.
8 Masses of those affected by the 
regulation used this opportunity: 
‘Altogether 307,958 firms have given 
notice that they have a  contribu-
tion basis of less than HUF 125,000, 
affecting 1,572,334 private individu-
als and 1,610,608 contracts… More 
than a third of private entrepreneurs 
have used this opportunity, partly as 
an employer or payer, but mostly for 
their own sake, through entrepre-
neurial withdrawals. The ratio is even 
bigger in the case of Ltds’ (response 
by the Ministry of Finance to a ques-
tion put by Kristóf Szatmáry, MP, 19 
November 2010.)
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and thus reduce the risk of a tax audit. this reasoning is supported by the 
estimates of elek et al. (2011): in firms that were – based on the double-hurdle 
estimation of elek et al. (2009) – suspected of paying a false minimum wage, 
observed wages grew faster in 2007 than the average, and it happened more 
often than average that the wages were raised from the level of the minimum 
wage to double the minimum. Due to the increased cost of labour, the revenues 
of these firms plummeted and the number of employees was cut.
fActors Affecting the minimum-wAge lAw
the notion that a high minimum wage can encourage work and ensure the 
expansion of employment soon proved illusory: nowadays there are no signifi-
cant mainstream political or professional groupings that would argue this. 
However, the consequences of decisions that were taken in the past in this 
context are still being felt (uneven wage distribution, income tax exemption of 
the minimum wage, the double-the-minimum-wage contribution). apart from 
that, a desire to maintain the current level of the minimum wage (or even to 
raise it) is still present and presumably will be in the future, too.
the motives are, above all, political. Despite the fact that the median voter 
is not affected by measures involving the minimum wage (in recent years 
the median employee has earned more than double the minimum wage), the 
majority of the populace supports it (gábos, 2000). this is supposedly due 
to demands for fairness and ‘decent work’, and is not seriously compromised 
by the failure of the minimum-wage regulations – partly because the findings 
of academic research are hard to communicate and remain little known, and 
partly because it is hard to identify the group that is adversely affected. in 
fact, disadvantage appears in the form of an absence of advantage – plans 
for workforce expansion cancelled, persistent inequality (scharle and váradi, 
2010). Furthermore, as Falk et al. (2006) revealed in a laboratory experiment, 
the minimum wage itself affects our ideas of fair pay. the reservation wage 
of the members of an experimental group increased after the ‘introduction’ 
of a minimum wage, but did not decrease after its ‘abolition’. this encourages 
decision makers to keep increasing the amount of the minimum wage in order 
to demonstrate their commitment to ‘decent work’.
these assumptions naturally influence the conduct of trade unions, although 
there are several other, more practical factors governing this. it is well known 
that, as early as in the years of the minimum-wage hikes of 2001 and 2002, 
trade unions pledged themselves to fight for the introduction of a differenti-
ated minimum wage based on qualifications. this is perfectly understandable: 
in the lower income decile around 20 per cent belong to a trade union; in the 
middle the figure is 30 per cent; whereas in the higher percentiles 40 per cent 
are trade union members.9 the efforts to switch to a tariff-based system came 
to fruition in 2006, and from that time on minimum-wage demands became 
a means of shifting the whole wage scale higher. enhanced trade union activity 
was particularly spectacular during the minimum-wage negotiations of 2008, 
when, in september, the side representing workers’ interests suggested a hike 
of 11.2 per cent in the basic minimum wage, a 10 per cent rise in the minimum 
wage of young people entering the labour market, and a 6.3 per cent rise in 
9 Data from the National Labour 
Centre’s Wage Survey from 2009. 
Organization levels are measured by 
the number of collective contracts. 
Data are for full-time employees.
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the minimum wage for skilled workers in real terms (assuming a 4.2 per cent 
inflation rate); and even in november, in the second month of the economic 
crisis, they were insisting on this initial proposal for the minimum wage of 
young people and skilled workers, while demanding a 10.9 per cent hike in 
the basic minimum wage.10
in the last decade, Hungarian minimum-wage regulations have been heavily 
influenced by budgetary considerations as well. undoubtedly, hidden wage 
practices did become widespread, manifesting themselves in the practice of 
formally registering workers as being on the minimum wage – in a way similar 
to turkey (erdogdu, 2008), the baltic countries (kriz et al., 2007; masso and 
krillo, 2009; meriküll and staehr, 2008) and bulgaria (madzharova, 2010). indi-
rect evidence of false minimum wages was presented in studies conducted 
by benedek et al. (2006) and tonin (2007); furthermore, elek et al. (2009), 
Reizer (2011) and elek et al. (2011) also estimated the scale of the phenomenon. 
the idea that ‘whitening’ of the economy could be achieved by increasing the 
minimum wage was presented during the rises of 2001 and 2002, following the 
simple train of thought that a raised wage threshold would guarantee higher 
budgetary income. Halpern et al. (2004) demonstrated with their general 
balance model that this expectation is unfounded if we take into consideration 
labour demand and other indirect effects. the aim of introducing contribu-
tions payable on twice the minimum wage was to make a greater part of the 
wages (fraudulently) paid by firms more transparent and eligible for taxation.
However, applying the minimum wage as a fiscal means has a cost; and even 
if we do not take this into consideration, the profit deriving from the move 
remains insignificant. as was shown by previously quoted studies, rises in the 
minimum wage generally, but especially in the case of ‘decent’ enterprises, 
reduced the demand for labour; and a similar effect was observed after the 
introduction of the ‘double-the-minimum-wage’ contribution among firms 
involved in hidden wage practices. according to estimates by köllő (2008), 
the expected profit from ‘whitening’ the economy would not exceed 1.3 per 
cent of gDp – even if we assume that every single minimum-wage recipient 
is fraudulent and that their real wages are similar to those of above-board 
employees, that the data on their real wages could be obtained without extra 
expense, and that the increase in the labour expenses has no effect on labour 
demand. Real fiscal profit is clearly much lower than that.
abolishing the twice-the-minimum-wage contributions threshold, not focusing 
on the minimum- wage issue and ignoring the fair-pay argument (which seeks 
the introduction of a minimum wage for public works) are signals that the 
current administration – unlike previous governments – is not making the 
minimum wage a cornerstone of its policies either by way of an incentive, or 
as an instrument of social or fiscal policy. there is scarcely any opportunity 
for the latter anyway, since, after the introduction of differentiated minimum 
wages based on qualifications, any increase in the minimum wage will inflate 
expenditure far more than previously.
minimum-wage regulation does not have to take account of external restric-
tions. there are no eu recommendations or directives in this field (although 
the idea of introducing a single european minimum wage did surface in brus-
sels in 2008). trade unions frequently refer to Hungary’s commitment to 
10 Source: Népszabadság newspaper. 
See also Chapter 2.2.
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achieving a 60 per cent (some say 68 per cent) minimum wage/average wage 
ratio, but this is not a binding commitment. Hungary did sign the european 
social Charter of 1961, renewed in 1996, which means that the government 
acknowledges the right of a worker and his family to a fair wage, but the 
Charter contains no reference to a desirable minimum wage/average wage 
ratio. the recommendation of 68 per cent was made in 1977 by a Committee 
of independent experts, which was set up to supervise the application of the 
Charter and consisted of nine members. it later altered its recommendation 
to 60 per cent. However, non-compliance with this recommendation is wide-
spread throughout the european union: minimum wage/average wage ratios 
are around 30–50 per cent.
conclusion And recommendAtions
twenty years after the transition, radical views on minimum-wage law seem 
to be fading; opportunities to use the minimum wage as a budgetary tool have 
decreased; promoters of ‘decent work’ have turned to other policy tools (for 
instance, to a flat rate income tax or the rejection of forced integration in 
education policy that would appeal to overburdened teachers); and the issue in 
general plays a less significant role in public opinion than previously. However, 
it is not yet possible to speak of an open policy change.
obviously, in a country like Hungary, where the employment levels of unskilled 
workers are conspicuously low, the minimum wage needs to be regulated 
with the utmost care. the most obvious means of achieving this would be 
to differentiate the basic minimum wage on a territorial and/or age basis. 
according to scharle and váradi (2009), the minimum wage/average wage 
ratio in the most developed areas of the country does not reach 30 per cent, 
whereas the ratio exceeds 70 per cent in the most disadvantaged regions. this 
invites a regional differentiation in the minimum wage – something that was 
proposed for consideration by an oeCD (2005) country report and that was 
documented in detail in scharle and váradi (2009). it would also be desirable 
to establish an independent committee with a similar status to the low pay 
Commission (lpC) in the uk. this committee could evaluate minimum-wage 
regulation (among other issues) from the viewpoint of the effect it has on the 
employment levels of unskilled workers. For the time being, there are no signs 
of reform or of new institutions of this type. also needed is a serious debate 
on the advantages and disadvantages of introducing wage regulation that is 
tending toward a tariff-based system.11
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4.4. labour market diScrimination  
anna lovász
definition of lAbour mArket discriminAtion And its effects 
in an economics sense, there is labour market discrimination if two – equally 
productive but distinct – individuals are treated differently on the basis of 
certain demographic characteristics.1 in this case, the market values the 
personal characteristics of an individual independently of his/her individual 
productivity.2
according to one of the common criteria used, there is no discrimination 
when the average wages of two people from equally productive groups (on 
average) are equal. in addition to innate ability, current productivity may also 
depend on an employee’s previous human-capital investment decisions, which 
may have been affected by discrimination. if would-be employees know that 
employers pay different wages to two different groups, then members of the 
group that is discriminated against are less interested in investing in education. 
in light of this, we can also talk of discrimination when the average wages of 
two groups that have equal innate skills are different, since productivity may 
also be influenced by discrimination (lundberg and startz, 1983). this is what 
lies behind measures that are aimed at equal opportunities: for example, the 
provision of good-quality public education to reduce the disadvantages of the 
home environment. such measures are intended to prevent the formation of 
future unequal labour market chances.
the literature distinguishes between two main types of labour market discrimi-
nation. Preference-based discrimination reduces certain prejudiced employers’ 
(co-workers, customers) sense of well-being when they come into contact with 
members of a certain group.3 prejudiced employers who maximize their utility 
rather than profit () are prepared to pay higher wages to members of an advan-
taged group with the same abilities. For this reason, they hire fewer employees, 
at a higher cost, and achieve lower profit than non-prejudiced employers 
(becker, 1971). if the proportion of prejudiced employers or customers in the 
labour market is high enough, this could lead to the segregation of employee 
groups at the company level and to wage differentials.4
labour market discrimination generates serious economic and social losses. 
it reduces production efficiency, since employers decisions in hiring, promo-
tion, and the payment of employees are not optimal. because of the lower 
demand for their manpower, the employment rates and wages of the group 
that is discriminated against will be lower than those ofother workers with 
1 The difference in treatment can be 
manifested in various stages of hiring, 
type of contract, profession, promo-
tion, notice to quit or pay. 
2 It is possible to discriminate by 
observable characteristics. The most 
frequently studied are discrimina-
tion against women, ethnic minorities, 
race, the handicapped, the elderly or 
immigrants. Occasionally, discrimina-
tion is studied based on sexual ori-
entation, height, appearance, voice 
tone, and religion or political views. 
3 This can also occur if the group’s 
productivity does not in fact differ 
from others. For the reasons and 
models for the formulation of preju-
dices, see Erős and Fábián (1999).
4 If customers are prejudiced against 
a particular group (e.g. do not trust 
female car mechanics), for jobs that 
require direct contact with clients, 
employers hire members of the other 
group – even if they are not prejudiced. 
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the same skills. the consequent lower expectations and the poorer financial 
circumstances of those who suffer discrimination can have an impact on their 
(and their children’s) human-capital investment decisions and on their poten-
tial, which can then lead to the perpetuation of disadvantage. the long-term 
social impact is visible in the disadvantaged group’s desperation, its inactivity 
on the labour market, and the development of social (inter-group) tensions. 
Discrimination also damages the optimal operation of the labour market, since 
undervalued labour remains underutilized.5
the other main type of discrimination is statistical discrimination, when 
employers discriminate not on the basis of personal preference, but because 
of a lack of information. employers do not know what the real productivity 
of a potential employee is: they only know that person’s basic human capital 
characteristics (e.g. education and work experience), gleaned from a Cv and 
an interview. However, the employer also observes which group the individual 
belongs to, and, if the average productivities of the two groups are different 
based on the employer’sexperience, i.e. statistics, then this is also taken into 
account in their decisions. . if two groups really differ on average, then the 
employer’s decision is rational and designed to maximize profit: he/she will 
hire workers from the more productive group on the basis of his/her expec-
tations. in an economic sense, statistical discrimination is efficient, and it is 
not a consequence of prejudice. However, for a number of reasons, it is still 
important to take steps to reduce such differentiation: it runs counter to the 
principles of fairness and equality, since employees are distinguished on the 
basis of characteristics over which they have no influence. in addition, aver-
ages can be misleading: members of a disadvantaged or discriminated group 
can clearly be above the average, and may well be more productive than 
members of the advantaged group. a decision based on averages is unfair at 
the individual level, and may be economically inefficient. in real life, employers’ 
decisions are based not on exact statistics, but on their own (not necessarily 
representative) experience, and this bias can limit the effective operation 
of the labour market. as with preference-based discrimination, statistical 
discrimination also affects human capital investment decisions, therefore, the 
banning of unequal pay reduces the extent to which the disadvantaged group 
lags behind (cf. eRRC, 2007; oeCD, 2008).
difficulties in meAsuring lAbour mArket discriminAtion 
although the economic definition of labour market discrimination is simple 
in theory, the empirical measurement of the extent and impact – i.e. proof – 
is extremely difficult. the main obstacleof accurate measurement is that an 
employee’s real skills and productivity are difficult to quantify, and appropriate 
data are seldom available.6
Differences in the easily calculated average statistics can be explained by 
numerous other factors, aside from discrimination. We obtain a more precise 
estimate if, using employee data, we filter out the impact of differences in observ-
able human-capital characteristics (in general: education and work experience).7 
the remaining unexplained wage gap is closer to the extent of discrimination; 
but it can be interpreted only as an upper estimate, since there may be further, 
5 Recent studies also emphasize that 
labour diversity increases productiv-
ity, and with the increase in teamwork, 
the role of alternative skills is also 
growing. 
6 In certain occupations, individual 
productivity is measurable – e.g. in 
the case of production that is measur-
able by the number of units produced. 
However, the results of research 
based on these is not representative 
of the economy as a whole. 
7 To do this, we estimated an individ-
ual-level wage equation by multivari-
ate analysis, in which the explanatory 
variables are the employee’s observa-
ble characteristics. If we also take into 
account the impact of segregation 
– so we are interested only in wage 
discrimination – occupation, com-
pany, sector and geographic param-
eters are also included as explanatory 
variables. In the equation, the esti-
mated coefficient of the indicator 
(dummy) variable for the demographic 
group is the unexplained wage gap. 
Lovász (2010), for example, using the 
Employment Office wage tariff sur-
vey, estimated the wage gap at 15 
percent between the sexes. Decom-
position methods can also examine 
what share of the overall wage gap is 
explained by group-level differences 
in the observed characteristics.
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unobserved differences between the productivity of groups, which could not 
be filtered out.8 moreover, this method requires detailed and representative 
employee data, and in many cases these are not available. 
‘Discrimination tests’ measure discrimination using a different approach: job 
applications are submitted using properly prepared Cvs for fictitious appli-
cants. they include identical skills and capabilities, but the ‘applicants’ belong 
to different demographic groups (as revealed by their name, age or photo). 
the tests measure the chances of success. this testing does not pertain to 
wage differentials, but provides information on hiring, based on the different 
chances that the different groups have of getting a job. However, this analysis 
is relatively expensive, and therefore discrimination is tested on a fairly small 
sample; nevertheless, it allows for experimental control of employees’ skills, 
and the results usually show significant discrimination.9
some surveys examine population and employee perceptions and experi-
ences of discrimination. these do not give an accurate benchmark as to the 
extent of discrimination, because the results are also influenced by the preva-
lence of discrimination and by social sensitivity. the problem with tests that 
examine the chances of victimization (own experience of discrimination) is 
also that respondents may hide/exaggerate their experiences, leading us to 
underestimate or overstate the extent of discrimination. nevertheless, these 
do contribute to the overall picture created by the various methods, and do 
provide important information on changes over time.10
Finally, examination of population and employer prejudices – according to the 
preference-based discrimination method – measures prevalence by the root 
causes of the phenomenon.
extent of And chAnges in discriminAtion since the trAnsition 
according to previous research and surveys of the Hungarian labour market, 
the Roma, women, elderly, and disabled workers are discriminated against 
most often. and yet nearly two-thirds of the working-age population belong 
to these groups.
1. Roma. the employment rate of the Roma population had started to decrease 
some years before the transition, and it has decreased further in the past 20 
years.11 Whereas before 1985 there was no significant difference between the 
employment rate of Roma and non-Roma men, the difference had increased 
to about 40 per cent by 1994.12 this was caused, in part, by the low education 
of the Roma, and by a fall in the demand for unskilled labour; but there are 
several indications that the role of employer prejudice cannot be ignored. in 
order to estimate the extent of discrimination, kertesi and kézdi (2011a) sepa-
rated out the total difference in employment explained by education, region, 
household size and number of children – and an additional (unexplained) 
element. according to the results, observable characteristics explain between 
a third and a half of the total difference. the most important explanatory 
factor for men is difference in education; for women, the number of children 
is also significant.
low education is also partly a consequence of discrimination.13 on the one hand, 
lower anticipated wages may be a demotivation to study further; on the other 
8 A  well-known example is that 
same-aged men and women generally 
(because of maternity leave) have dif-
ferent levels of work experience,and 
(because of familial obligations) have 
lower average number of hours 
worked per month. Differences in 
efforts made at work, opinions on 
the importance of their career, or 
attitudes towards competition could 
alsolead to real differences in produc-
tivity. The groups may also differ from 
preferences regarding working condi-
tions, which lead to wage differentials. 
9 Before the TÁRKI research series 
(Otlakán et al., 2006; TÁRKI, 2006), 
this method was only used in Hungary 
to prove individual cases of discrimi-
nation in the field of justice – mainly 
the Legal Defence Bureau forNational 
and Ethnic Minorities (NEKI for short) 
and the Equal Treatment Authority. 
NEKI considers it worth testing about 
10–15 notices per year; in 70–80 per 
cent of such cases, the test justifies 
the suspicions of the person who 
submitted the complaint (Simono-
vits, 2009).
10 See, for example, the international 
study of the European Union Minority 
and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS, 
2009a,b), the survey of the CSO in 
2008 and of TÁRKI in 2009 (Sik and 
Simonovits, 2010), and the Equal 
Treatment Authority’s research with 
reference to employers (Simonovits 
and Koltai, 2011a).
11 Kertesi and Kézdi (2011a) exam-
ined the development of the Roma 
population’s labour market situation, 
based on representative surveys in 
1993, 1994, 2003 and 2007.
12 Based on the Hungarian Career 
Survey of the Educatio Kht in 2007, 
35 per cent of working-age Roma 
men and 82 per cent of non-Roma 
men in the sample were employed; 
for women, the proportions were 24 
per cent and 71 per cent, respectively 
(Kertesi and Kézdi, 2011a). 
13 Kertesi and Kézdi (2011b) showed 
that the current significant differ-
ence in Roma/non-Roma test results 
almost disappears, if the variables 
describing the pupils’ family circum-
stances are taken into account.
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hand, it is well documented that anti-Roma discrimination has contributed to 
school segregation, which, in most cases, has led to poor-quality education 
for Roma children.14
in the case of the Roma, it is difficult to estimate wage differences accurately, 
since ethnicity is not included in most surveys. according to kertesi and kézdi’s 
(2011a) estimation, the wages of Roma are about 30 per cent less than those 
of non-Roma; but the role of selection bias is important here, since their 
sample covered Roma who were better educated than average Roma. there 
is no estimate for the difference in wages between Roma and non-Roma that 
is comparable to the estimate for the difference between the sexes, but the 
difference is reckoned to be nearly double that between men and women. Wage 
differences in the case of Roma and non-Roma men have not changed over 
time: in both 1993 and 2007 the difference was approximately 30 per cent; 
in the case of women, it increased from 30 per cent to 40 per cent over the 
same period. observable characteristics explained two-thirds of the differ-
ence in 1993; in 2007 the figure was rather higher, indicating a reduction in 
discrimination.
14 Kertesi and Kézdi (2010a) map the 
situation countrywide. According to 
their results, segregation in schools 
is significant; more segregation takes 
place based on ethnicity thanon being 
disadvantaged. On segregation by 
residence, see Havas and Zolnay 
(2010). There is also an estimate of 
the long-term benefits of investing 
in ‘catch-up’ policies: based on Ker-
tesi and Kézdi (2006), the discounted 
present value of future state budget 
gains of investing in early education 
is HUF 19 million; even the most cau-
tious estimate is at least HUF 7–9 
million forints. The basis for this esti-
mate is that better-educated people 
contribute higher amounts to the 
state budget and/or receive less in 
benefits from it.
Figure 1: Attitudes towards the Roma expressed in public opinion surveys, 
1994–2011 (per cent)
Medián: Average of opinions given on a 100-point scale, where 100 = not 
likeable sympathetic at all; 1 = very likeable sympathetic. 
TÁRKI-1: Proportion of those in the adult population (percentage) who agreed with the statement 
‘It can only be acclaimed be said that there are still such places that the Roma are not allowed to enter.’
TÁRKI-2: Proportion of those who answered the following question in the negative: 
‘Would you accept a member of the Roma as a neighbour/your child’s spouse?’
Sources: Medián (2009); TÁRKI-1: Enyedi et al. (2004); 
TÁRKI-2: Csepeli et al. (1998); Enyedi et al. (2004); Sik and Simonovits (2012).
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surveys examining perceptions and attitudes suggest that the degree of 
discrimination is extensive.15 this is also confirmed by research conducted in 
2006 to test discrimination in the first stage of the hiring process.16 the attitude 
surveys show that discrimination against the Roma declined in the 1990s, but 
has increased again in the past few years (enyedi et al. 2004; medián, 2009). 
Figure 1 shows how the prejudices of the population have changed over time 
since 1994.17
2. Women. in contrast to trends observed in developed countries, women’s 
labour market activity has decreased since the transition. the labour market 
activity of women with small children is particularly low, due to the traditional 
division of labour within families, the incentive system that rewards women for 
staying at home, and the low capacity of the childcare system (see Chapter 6.3). 
the proportion of women in managerial positions, among entrepreneurs and in 
government is low. at the same time, the average wage gap between men and 
women – as well as the inexplicable wage differential (by observable human-
capital variables) – has decreased in the past 20 years (Figure 2). 
the unexplained wage gap – which can be interpreted as an upper estimate for 
discrimination – has narrowed by about 20 percent (from about 35 percent) 
since the transition. the decline could be explained, in part, by improving 
female education and by the relative revaluation of typical female occupations; 
but also in part by the fact that the decline in employment greatly affected 
low-skilled women, in particular (galasi, 2000; Frey, 1998). a significant part 
of the change in the wage gap is inexplicable, possibly indicating the exis-
tence of discrimination; but it also decreases in parallel with growing market 
15 Based on the Equal Treatment 
Authority representative survey, four-
fifths of the Roma population con-
sider discrimination against Roma to 
be prevalent, and every second per-
son believes the extent of the prob-
lem has grown in the past five years. 
Nearly one-fifth of the population 
indicated that they had witnessed 
discrimination against Roma in the 
past 12 months (Neményi et al., 2011). 
According to the results of the EU-
MIDIS survey in 2009, 65 per cent of 
the whole population believed that 
a darker skin colour is a disadvan-
tage in getting a job (EU average: 42 
per cent). One third of the Hungar-
ian Roma perceived discrimination in 
job search, which is (together with 
the Czech Roma) the top value in the 
examined countries. Based on the 
TÁRKI survey for 2009, 14 per cent of 
the Roma perceived discrimination in 
hiring or dismissal in the previous 12 
months (Sik and Simonovits, 2009).
16 In testing by telephone, the posi-
tive feedback ratio was about 12 per 
cent higher for non-Roma people 
( judging by their names). Employers 
openly told 18 per cent of the Roma 
that the reason for rejection was their 
Roma origin. In testing by CVs with 
photos, a Roma appearance reduced 
the chances of feedback by about 8 
per cent (compared to non-Roma) 
(Simonovits, 2009).
17 In addition to the economic crisis, 
the media may have a role, too, often 
exaggerating the negative impact of 
real conflicts in order to increase 
viewer ratings, and being less than 
conscientious in giving a balanced view 
of the life of the Roma (Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs, 2007).
Figure 2: Wage differences between men and women in Hungary
Note: The total wage difference is the average wage difference between men and women (the log difference 
in average wages). The unexplained wage difference is the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable 
indicating gender in the equation including education (5 levels) and potential work experience (based on 
age and number of years spent at school). The dependent variable is the log of net salary per month.
Source: Author’s own calculation, based on weighted representative 
sample of the National Employment Office Wage Survey. 
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competition (Campos and jolliffe, 2005; lovász, 2010). the remaining wage 
gap is greatest among the best-educated and in the upper reaches of the wage 
distribution (koncz, 2008), indicating the ‘glass-ceiling’ phenomenon that is 
often referred to in the literature.
Discrimination against women is, in part, statistics-based: for employers, 
maternity leave really does mean extra costs, and this reduces the average 
productivity of women.18 However, it is difficult to separate this from prejudice, 
and empirical results suggest that both types of discrimination are present 
on the labour market. public and employer surveys show that the extent of 
discrimination against women is much lower than against the Roma. However, 
research based on wages confirms that prejudice-based discrimination against 
women is also present in the labour market.19 Finally, it is worth noting that, 
in Hungary, occupational segregation by gender is still significant (sik et al., 
2011; koncz, 2011). Women are often grouped into occupations where wages 
are lower, both in horizontal terms (these are typical ‘women’s jobs’) and in 
vertical terms (there are fewer managers). both surveys and the monitoring of 
job advertisements clearly demonstrate occupational stereotypes in society 
and among employers (simonovits and koltai, 2011a).20 according to a 2009 
survey that included the monitoring of nearly 2,000 job advertisements, 63 
per cent of those advertisements had discriminatory content, included gender 
restrictions (ibid.). a survey of employers by the equal treatment authority 
(egyenlő bánásmód Hatóság) also found that the so-called ‘forbidden questions’ 
(number of children, family planning and assistance with childcare) are asked at 
a third to a half of all job interviews (neményi et al., 2011).
3. the elderly. the employment of older workers (55–64 years) decreased 
dramatically in the early years of the transition, and then, from the beginning 
of the 1990s, slowly began to increase again (see table 1.1 in the statistical 
annex). these trends can be explained by reasons of both demand and supply. 
on the supply side, the trends are mainly due to changes in retirement regu-
lations; on the demand side, lower educational levels, lower production and 
discrimination against older workers shaped their employment.
it shows the importance of the supply side that older-worker activity rose 
after 1998, as the pension age gradually increased. For older workers it is 
more difficult to return to the labour market, and studies on unemployment 
benefits suggest that the chance of being employed decreases markedly with 
age (galasi and nagy, 2002).
in the years after the transition, the labour market prospects of older workers fell 
drastically. the rapid spread of modern technology and corporate governance 
methods devalued their knowledge, gained before the transition, compared 
to those workers whose knowledge was more appropriate to the new situ-
ation. but the impact of this sudden reduction in relative productivity faded 
within 10 years, according to estimates, as newer cohorts of older workers 
came through, with more appropriate education and work experience (lovász 
and Rigó, 2010).
the deterioration in the labour market situation of older people was also 
reflected in wages. kertesi and köllő (2002) estimated that, in terms of wages, 
20 years of labour market experience resulted in a reduction of 4 percentage 
points between 1989 and 1992, and 7 percentage points between 1989 and 
18 In Hungary, 0.1 per cent of work-
ing-age men, as against 10 per cent of 
women, claim insured maternity leave 
benefit (gyed) or flat rate parental 
leave benefits (gyes and gyet). Chap-
ter 6.3 deals in detail with the situa-
tion of women with small children and 
steps taken to improve their situation.
19 Lovász (2010) showed that, in 
Hungar y, growing compet it ion 
explains about 15 per cent of the 
reduction in the inexplicable male/
female wage gap, also implying indi-
rectly the presence of prejudice-
based discrimination. This is why 
a  competition-friendly economic 
policy is an important aid to policies 
aimed at reducing discrimination 
(OECD, 2008).
20 In the EU-MIDIS survey, accord-
ing to 29 per cent of the population, 
female jobseekers are disadvantaged; 
that is confirmed by the CSO and 
TÁRKI surveys (Simonovits and Koltai, 
2011a). According to the Equal Treat-
ment Authority survey, discrimination 
against women is the fourth most com-
mon form of discrimination, with 45 
per cent of respondents believing that 
discrimination against women is wide-
spread (Neményi et al., 2011). TÁRKI 
testing research in 2006 for women 
gave seemingly contradictory results: 
the lack of feedback – that is the most 
elementary form of rejection – was 
higher in the case of men, but this 
also suggests gender segregation of 
occupations (Simonovits, 2009).
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1999. the growing wage disadvantage of older workers was partly a result 
of the devaluation of knowledge gained before the transition: the relative 
productivity of skilled older workers declined significantly compared to that 
of younger workers, and by 1999 there was no significant difference between 
them and unskilled workers (kertesi and köllő, 2002; lovász and Rigó, 2010).21
Disadvantages in employment and wages cannot be regarded as a measure of 
discrimination in the case of the elderly, since productivity (experience, knowl-
edge, and physical performance) change with age. However, the shock of the 
transition in itself worsened the labour market chances of this worker cohort 
and may have led to further prejudice-based discrimination. this is indicatedby 
Daxkobler’s (2005) research, which examined stereotypical attitudes towards 
older workers by evaluating job applications and by interviewing Hungarian 
human resources managers and other senior personnel. the research indicates 
that the attitude to older workers is not necessarily negative, but those who 
are significantly younger than the older applicant tended to have more nega-
tive attitudes towards older workers.
according to public surveys, there is major labour market discrimination 
against the elderly. in the european union minority and Discrimination survey 
(eu-miDis), 67 per cent of people said that old age means disadvantage; and 
Hungarians equate age with disadvantage more strongly than the people of 
any other eu member state (sik and simonovits, 2008).
some 16 per cent of those who were asked during a supplementary study to 
the Central statistical office’s (Cso) annual labour Force survey of 2008 had 
experienced discrimination in job search and dismissal, mostly on account of 
age (sik and simonovits, 2009). according to a recent equal treatment authority 
survey, age is the second most common factor leading to discrimination: more 
than 10 per cent of the population had witnessed age-related discrimination. 
For more than half of the population, age-related discrimination is ‘very’ or 
‘fairly’ widespread (neményi et al., 2011).
4. people with disabilities. the change in discrimination against people with 
disabilities over time is even less well documented: there are also few compa-
rable data available on their labour market activity. Censuses have collected 
data on the activity of people with disabilities, and, within the framework of 
the annual Cso labour Force surveys of 2002, 2008 and 2011, supplemen-
tary surveys gathered data on the labour market situation of those who live 
with a permanent disability or illness. according to the latter group of surveys, 
the working-age population with disabilities has shown a growing tendency 
to employment; yet even in 2011, barely halfwas employed. the proportion of 
employees with disabilities is very low in all sectors, and in the civil and public 
sector it is even lower than the national average (about 1 per cent, while it is 
about 2 per cent in the private sector) (simonovits and koltai, 2011b). We have 
no information available on wage differentials of the disabled.
as with older workers, this low labour market participation is explained by 
reasons from the supply and demand. on the supply side, the relatively easy 
access to disability pensions is responsible; on the demand side, low levels of 
education22 and discrimination are the causes. 
according to the household surveys of the past few years, the extent of 
discrimination is considerable. in the equal treatment authority survey, after 
21 For the period 1992–99, using 
three distinct models (unskilled, 
young-skilled, old-skilled), Kertesi and 
Köllő (2002) carried out estimates of 
differences in wages and productivity. 
Lovász and Rigó (2010) estimated dif-
ferences in productivity using similar 
methods for the period 1986–2008, 
also dividing the unskilled group into 
two, by age. 
22 The low level of education itself 
may be a consequence of discrimi-
nation: in addition to the demoti-
vating impact of lower anticipated 
wages, discriminatory practices in 
public education can lead to discrimi-
nation. Children with special needs 
are taught in typically segregated, 
separated institutions; this often 
means lower-quality education. It is 
particularly common in the case of 
children of low-educated parents not 
to get access to proper development 
(Havas, 2009).
4. aCtivation anD Wage aDjustment 4.4 . labouR maRket DisCRimination
160
origin and age the most frequent perceived reason for discrimination is 
disability. almost 8 per cent of the total population perceived disability-related 
discrimination in the year prior to the survey. according to half of the popula-
tion, disability-related discrimination is frequent (neményi et al., 2011). in the 
eu-miDis survey, 50 per cent of the total population of the same skilled and 
experienced jobseekers believed that disability was a disadvantage, while the 
eu average was 41 per cent (sik and simonovits, 2009).
according to a study by the social research organization táRki, people with 
disabilities typically face some form of discrimination – most of them (20 
per cent) on the labour market (bernát and Hajdu, 2011). During Cv testing 
in hiring, there was less feedback given to people with disabilities. men with 
disabilities received feedback only 19 per cent of the time, while in other 
groups the feedback rate ranged from 20 per cent to 29 per cent (simono-
vits, 2009).
policy meAsures And their effects 
there are different reasons for the various manifestations of labour market 
discrimination among different groups. these all require specific policy actions. 
However many measures provide protection for all vulnerable groups and are 
of key importance in combating all types of discrimination. the most impor-
tant of these measures are laws that guarantee the right to equal treatment, 
and the most important organizations are those that monitor and encourage 
implementation of these laws. in Hungary, the basic legal framework was put 
in place early on; however, the institutions that can actively intervene to uphold 
the law have developed rather more slowly. a prohibition on discrimination 
is, above all, enshrined in the Constitution. the equal treatment act, which 
reflects eu recommendations and contains detailed rules on the outlawing of 
discrimination and on safeguarding equal rights, has been in place since 2004.23 
this legislation describes exactly what is meant by the concept of discrimina-
tion; who is covered by equal treatments; and, in the case of violation, what 
legal procedures are available. the act explicitly refers to employment, and 
also contains several more related rules.24 to monitor compliance, the equal 
treatment authority was established.25
since the enactment of the legislation, the practical enforcement of these 
legal tools has been limited, as the content of standards and the practice of 
law is characterized by over-cautiousness (lehoczky, 2010).
the limitations of enforcement and the low rate of success have not encour-
aged victims to take legal action in the face of discrimination and have not 
deterred offenders; thus enforcement of the anti-discrimination laws is still 
weak (majtényi, 2009; lehoczky, 2010). a comparative analysis by the euro-
pean Roma Research Council, however, suggests that the authorities in the 
countries of Central europe have inadequate resources to educate and inform 
employees and employers (eRRC, 2007). only 30 per cent of a representative 
sample of the Hungarian population were even aware of the equal treatment 
authority (neményi et al., 2011). according to experts, growing professional 
experience and changing social values can, in time, lead to the establishment 
of efficient legal frameworks and legal tools (lehoczky, 2010).
23 Act CXXV of 2003 on equal treat-
ment and the promotion of equal 
opportunities (Ebktv.).
24 The Equal Treatment Author-
ity, if discrimination is proved, may 
impose a fine ranging from HUF 50 
thousands to HUF 6 million. It may 
order the infringement to be rectified, 
may prohibit future illegal behaviour 
and may order the public announce-
ment of legally binding decisions on 
the violation. Since November 2009, 
a list of those employers who have 
been shown to have engaged in nega-
tive discrimination on at least two 
occasions within the past two years 
should be published; this would result 
in those firms’ exclusion from numer-
ous European Union tenders (Udvari, 
2009). It is important to emphasize 
that in legal proceedings initiated for 
violation of rules governing equal 
treatment, the burden of proof is dif-
ferent from the principles that apply in 
civil proceedings. The burden of proof 
is not only on the accuser, but shared 
between the parties involved (ibid).
25 The Hungarian Labour Inspector-
ate and its regional inspectorates also 
have supervisory powers related to 
equal treatment. In the field of edu-
cation and enforcement, non-profit 
organizations are also important 
players. 
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the employment policy tools that helped disadvantaged groups at the begin-
ning of the transition sought to combat unemployment, rather than to foster 
integration. only in the late 1990s, when employment began to grow, did policy 
turn towards the so-called ‘active tools’ to promote employment. a further 
motivation was the preparation for accession to the eu; also, in the past 
ten years, eu guidelines have meant that more emphasis has been placed 
on combating exclusion and encouraging the labour market integration of 
disadvantaged groups. 
one of the first steps, in 1998, was to raise the retirement age and introduce 
rehabilitation, encouraging employers – by the threat of financial penalties – to 
employ people with disabilities.26 other measures have included public educa-
tion reform, launched in 2003 with the aim of improving equal opportunities;27 
the extension of training and wage subsidies offered by local job centres to 
disadvantaged groups from 2005; and the ‘start’ programme, introduced in 
2007, which basically grants wage subsidies to mothers returning to work 
after having a baby28 and to unskilled or older long-term unemployed people.29
the last two years have seen significant progress in the development of 
complex rehabilitation services, with claimants of the new rehabilitation allow-
ance, launched in 2008, being helped by eu-financed mentors and services 
to return to the labour market (scharle, 2011). even back in the mid-1990s, 
programmes were launched to promote the integration of the Roma popula-
tion, though they were typically small-scale and did not bring significant results 
(Fleck and messing, 2010; simonovits and koltai, 2011b). there are no impact 
studies available to assess the effectiveness of programmes to promote equal 
opportunities – apart from integration in education. 
recommendAtions 
the Western european and american experience of reducing discrimination 
suggests that successful policies consist of diversified and coordinated steps: 
anti-discrimination laws and their vigorous enforcement; action aimed at creating 
equal opportunities; an avowed commitment and active participation on the part 
of the state; and strict supervisory authorities (eRRC, 2007; oeCD, 2008).
the primary condition for reducing discrimination and inequality is to balance 
opportunities for employment.30 in compensating for perceived or real disadvantage 
in production and services, the active tools of job centres can play an important 
role, by offering more personalized assistance for disadvantaged jobseekers.
employers can also be motivated by positive and negative incentives, and by 
education. an example of the latter is when the state, as an employer, sets 
a positive example in the field of equal opportunities and workplace integra-
tion. the oeCD (2008) recommendations say that the first step is to shape 
public opinion and disseminate information, to assist victims with legal cases, 
and to provide professional support for employers in drawing up appropriate 
internal rules. in the integration programmes, steps also need to be taken 
to form the attitudes of the majority, as well as to shape the identity of the 
Roma. the eRRC (2007) report emphasizes that, in the case of the Roma, it 
is particularly important for the government to declare that discrimination 
is unacceptable.
26 A  contribution has to be paid 
by enterprises with more than 20 
employees if the proportion of dis-
abled employees is less than 5 per 
cent of the labour force. This amount 
tripled in 2004 and had increased 
five-fold by 2010; it now stands at 
close to the annual minimum wage. 
27 By the end of 2009, EU-financed 
education development programmes 
reached into 1,600 schools, a quar-
ter of them practising integration 
(Reszkető et al., 2010). The Integra-
tion Pedagogic System aims to pro-
vide various opportunities for multiply 
disadvantaged children. According to 
a particularly thorough impact study, 
as a result of the methodology devel-
opment programmes, fewer disad-
vantaged children – including Roma 
pupils – were lagging behind; mean-
while non-Roma pupil results have 
not deteriorated (Kézdi and Surányi, 
2008).
28 For other tools supporting moth-
ers with small children returning to 
work, see Chapter 6. 3.
29 According to the study on the pro-
gramme’s effects, less than 5–8 per 
cent of the enterprises that partici-
pated in the ‘Start’ programme hired 
mothers with small children, while 
4–13 per cent of the institutions that 
participated in the ‘Start-plus’ pro-
grammes took on older or unskilled 
long-term unemployed people (Simo-
novits and Koltai 2011b).
30 For actions required in this field, 
see Havas (2008).
4. aCtivation anD Wage aDjustment 4.4 . labouR maRket DisCRimination
162
references
becker, g. s. (1971): the economics of discrimination. second ed., the univer-
sity of Chicago press, Chicago–london.
bernát, anikó–Hajdu, gábor (2011): az akadályozottsággal élők helyzete 
magyarországon. tárki research report, sRop project no. 5.4.1-08/1-2009-002.
Campos, n.–jolliffe, D. (2005): Does market liberalization reduce gender 
discrimination? econometric evidence from Hungary, 1986–1998. labour 
economics, vol. 12. no. 1. pp. 1–22.
Csepeli, györgy–Fábián, zoltán–sik, endre (1998): xenofóbia és a cigányságról 
alkotott vélemények. in: kolosi–tóth–vukovich (eds.): társadalmi riport 1998, 
budapest: tárki, pp. 458–489.
Daxkobler, márta (2005): az idősödő munkaerőről alkotott sztereotípiák, 
a magyar munkaerőpiacon. magyar pszichológiai szemle, vol. 60. no. 1–2. pp. 
91–109.
enyedi, zsolt–Fábián, zoltán–sik, endre (2004): nőttek-e az előítéletek 
magyarországon? in: kolosi–tóth–vukovich (eds.): társadalmi riport 2004. 
tárki, budapest, pp. 375–399.
erős, Ferenc–Fábián, zoltán (1999): az etnikai előítéletek kialakulásáról: 
tekintélyelvűség és szociális környezet. educatio, vol. 8. no. 2. pp. 233–247.
eRRC (2007): the glass box: exclusion of Roma from employment. european 
Roma Rights Centre
eu-miDis (2009a): eu-miDis at a glance introduction to the FRa’s eu-wide 
discrimination survey european union agency for Fundamental Rights, euro-
pean union minorities and Discrimination survey.
eu-miDis (2009b): Data in focus report 01 – the Roma. european union 
minorities and Discrimination survey.
Fazekas, károly–köllő, jános–varga, júlia (eds.) (2009): green book for the 
Renewal of public education in Hungary. ecostat, budapest.
Fleck, gábor-messing, vera (2010): transformations of Roma employment 
policies. in: Fazekas–lovász–telegdy (ed.): the Hungarian labour market. 
Review and analysis 2010, institute of economics, Has, national employment 
Foundation, budapest, pp. 83-98.
Frey, mária (1998): a nők munkaerő-piaci helyzetének változása a rendszerváltás 
óta neltelt időszakban. nők a munka világában. a nők munkavállalói jogai 
magyarországon. ilo, közép- és kelet-európai szakcsoport, pp. 9–24.
galasi, péter (2000): női–férfi kereseti különbségek magyarországon, 1986–
1996. országos munkaügyi kutató és módszertani központ, budapest.
galasi, péter–nagy, gyula (2002): a munkanélküli-ellátás változásainak hatása 
a munkanélküliek segélyezésére és elhelyezkedésére, közgazdasági szemle,vol. 
l. no. 7–8. pp. 608–634. 
Havas, gábor (2009): equality of opportunity, desegregation in: Fazekas–köllő–
varga (eds.): green book for the Renewal of public education in Hungary. 
ecostat, budapest, pp. 131-149.
Havas, gábor–zolnay, jános (2010): az integrációs oktatáspolitika hatásvizs-
gálata. kutatási beszámoló. európai Összehasonlító kisebbségkutatásokért 
közalapítvány.
4. aCtivation anD Wage aDjustment 4.4 . labouR maRket DisCRimination
163
kátay, gábor (ed.) (2009): az alacsony aktivitás és foglalkoztatottság okai és 
következményei magyarországon, mnb tanulmányok, no. 79.
kertesi, gábor (2005): a társadalom peremén. Romák a munkaerőpiacon és az 
iskolában. osiris kiadó, budapest.
kertesi, gábor–kézdi, gábor (2006): a hátrányos helyzetű és roma fiatalok 
eljuttatása az érettségihez. egy különösen nagy hosszú távú költségvetési 
nyereséget biztosító befektetés. budapesti munka-gazdaságtani Füzetek, 
2006/6.
kertesi, gábor–kézdi, gábor (2010a): segregation of primary schools in Hungary. 
a descriptive study using data from the national assessment of basic Compe-
tences of 2006, in: Fazekas–lovász–telegdy (eds.): the Hungarian labour 
market. Review and analysis 2010, institute of economics, Has, national 
employment Foundation, budapest, pp. 99-119.
kertesi, gábor – kézdi, gábor (2010b): iskolázatlan szülők gyermekei és roma 
fiatalok a középiskolában. beszámoló az educatio Életpálya-felvételének 2006 
és 2009 közötti hullámaiból. budapesti munka-gazdaságtani Füzetek, 2010/3. 
kertesi, gábor–kézdi, gábor (2011a): Roma employment in Hungary after the 
post-communist transition. economics of transition, vol. 19. no. 3. pp. 563–610.
kertesi, gábor–kézdi, gábor (2011b): the Roma/non-Roma test score gap in 
Hungary. american economic Review, vol. 101. no. 3. pp. 519–525.
kertesi, gábor–köllő, jános (2002): labour demand with heterogeneous 
labour inputs after the transition in Hungary, 1992–1999 – and the potential 
consequences of the increase of minimum wage in 2001 and 2002. budapest 
Working papers on the labour market. no. 2002/5.
kézdi, gábor–surányi, Éva (2008): egy sikeres iskolai integrációs program 
tapasztalatai. a hátrányos helyzetű tanulók oktatási integrációs programjának 
hatásvizsgálata. educatio közhasznú társaság, budapest.
koncz, katalin (2008): nemek szerinti bér- és keresetkülönbségek 
magyarországon és az európai unióban. munkaügyi szemle, vol. 52. no. 4. pp. 
61–75.
koncz, katalin (2011): a munkaerőpiac nemek szerinti szegregációjának jellemzői, 
mechanizmusa és következményei. közgazdasági szemle, vol. 58. no. 1. pp. 
74–94.
Cso (2008): társadalmi jellemzők és ellátórendszerek, 2007. Central statis-
tical office (ksH), budapest
lehoczky kollonay, Csilla (2010): legal instruments guaranteeing equal treat-
ment in the wake of accession to the european union. in: Fazekas–lovász–
telegdy (eds.): the Hungarian labour market. Review and analysis 2010, 
institute of economics, Has, national employment Foundation, budapest, 
pp. 68-82.
lovász, anna (2010): the effect of competition on the gender wage gap in 
Hungary 1986–2003. in: Fazekas–lovász–telegdy (eds.): the Hungarian labour 
market. Review and analysis 2010, institute of economics, Has, national 
employment Foundation, budapest, pp. 151-160.
lovász, anna–Rigó, mariann (2010): the evolution of productivity-wage gaps 
following the transition in Hungary – evidence from linked employer-employee 
data. Cerge-ei, prague.
4. aCtivation anD Wage aDjustment 4.4 . labouR maRket DisCRimination
164
lovász, anna–telegdy, álmos (2010): labour market discrimination – types, 
measurement issues, empirical solutions. in: Fazekas–lovász–telegdy (eds.): 
the Hungarian labour market. Review and analysis 2010, institute of economics, 
Has, national employment Foundation, budapest, pp. 151-160.
lundberg, s. j.–startz, R. (1983): private discrimination and social interven-
tion in competitive labor markets. the american economic Review, vol. 73. 
no. 3. pp. 340–347. 
majtényi, balázs (ed.) (2009): lejtős pálya. antidiszkrimináció és esélyegyenlőség. 
Föld-rész könyvek, l'Harmattan kiadó, budapest.
medián (2009): Fagypont körül. medián, February 26, 2009.
neményi, mária–laki, ildikó–ságvári, bence–takács, judit–tardos, katalin–
tibori, tímea (2011): az egyenlő bánásmóddal kapcsolatos jogtudatosság 
növekedésének mértéke – fókuszban a nők, a romák, a fogyatékos és az lmbt 
emberek. kutatási zárójelentés, egyenlő bánásmód Hatóság, budapest.
oeCD (2008): the price of prejudice: labour market discrimination on the 
grounds of gender and ethnicity. oeCD employment outlook 2008, annexes 
3.b to 3.C. 
okRi (2008): állásfoglalás a magyarországi bűnözési helyzetről, az elkövetők 
etnikai hovatartozásának nyilvántartásáról és a „cigánybűnözésről”, országos 
kriminológiai intézet.
otlakán, krisztián–sik, endre–simonovits, bori–szabó, endre (2006): munka-
helyi diszkrimináció a kis- és középvállalkozások körében. manuscript, tárki, 
budapest.
Reszkető, petra–scharle, ágota–váradi, balázs (2010): az esélyegyenlőségi 
és integrációs kiemelt projekt külső értékelése, budapest intézet.
scharle, ágota (2011): integrated employment and rehabilitation services: new 
evidence from Hungary, social Work Review, 2011(3), pp. 63-69.
sik, endre (2011): nem nőtt a nyílt, s tovább csökkent a  látens és a teljes 
idegenellenesség. tárki, budapest.
sik, endre–Csaba, Dániel–Hann, andrás (2011): a  férfiak és nők közötti 
jövedelemegyenlőtlenség és a nemi szegregáció a mai magyarországon. kuta-
tási jelentés. egyenlő bánásmód Hatóság.
sik, endre–simonovits, bori (2010): measuring discrimination: questionnaires 
and tests. in: Fazekas–lovász–telegdy (eds.): the Hungarian labour market. 
Review and analysis 2010, institute of economics, Has, national employment 
Foundation, budapest, pp. 120-134.
sik, endre–simonovits, bori (2011): koruk miatt érzik legtöbben diszkrimináltnak 
magukat a munkaerőpiacon. tárki, budapest.
sik, endre–simonovits, bori (eds.) (2012): abena, sára, Chen és ali esélyei 
magyarországon. tárki, budapest.
simonovits, bori (2009): a munkaerő-piaci diszkrimináció megjelenési formáinak 
feltárása álláshirdetések monitorozása, tesztelés és közérdekű igényérvénye-
sítés útján, a fair álláshirdetés és munkaerő-felvétel gyakorlatának kialakítása. 
in: középkorú férfiak esélytelenül? egy diszkriminációkutatás különös tapasz-
talatai. nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogvédő iroda és másság alapítvány, 
pp. 28–113.
4. aCtivation anD Wage aDjustment 4.4 . labouR maRket DisCRimination
165
simonovits, bori–koltai, júlia (2011a): a munkáltatók munkavállalói kiválasztási 
gyakorlata a diszkrimináció tükrében. kutatási jelentés, egyenlő bánásmód 
Hatóság.
simonovits, bori–koltai, júlia (2011b): a munkáltatók attitűdjeinek és a védett 
tulajdonságokkal rendelkező munkavállalók munkaerő-piaci foglalkoztatott-
ságának és a megfelelő munkafeltételek biztosításának összefüggései. kutatási 
jelentés, egyenlő bánásmód Hatóság.
szmm (2007): zöld könyv. a romák médiaábrázolása. szociális és munkaügyi 
minisztérium, budapest.
tárki (2006): a munkahelyi diszkrimináció mérése, módszertani pilot kutatás. 
kutatási jelentés. tárki, budapest.
udvari, márton (2009): Hazai antidiszkriminációs jogi környezet (foglalkoztatási 
diszkrimináció), in: középkorú férfiak esélytelenül? egy diszkriminációkutatás 
különös tapasztalatai. nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi jogvédő iroda és másság 
alapítvány, pp. 6–26. 
166
5. matCHing DemanD anD supply
5.1. geographical mobility 
ágnes HáRs
migration is a form of mobility that involves crossing the boundaries of a specific 
geographical unit (region or country) and a change of residence. moving between 
the regions of a country is usually termed internal migration or mobility, while 
cross-border mobility is called international migration. this chapter examines 
these two types of migration, and commuting is discussed in Chapter 6.4. 
there are crucial differences between interregional and international migra-
tion, primarily in the regulation of migration policy and the equalizing effects 
of migration. the direction of international migration, the fact and the impact 
of emigration and immigration have a diverse influence on the labour market of 
a country, and thus it is important to distinguish between them in our analysis. 
migration involves a longlasting change of residence, and this is the main 
difference from commuting – a temporary, short-term change of residence 
or longer-distance travel with no change of residence.
theoreticAl bAckground, working mechAnisms
in classical economic theory, the individual’s decision to migrate is determined 
primarily by the wage and employment prospects and whether or not they 
are better. if it is indicated at all, the loss of certain factors – such as the 
familiar surroundings of home – is included in the models only as a subjective 
cost, if at all, and is hard to quantify. according to the classic Harris–todaro 
model (1970), which examines urbanization resulting from industrialization, 
the expected differential between incomes in the city and in rural areas is the 
main factor in the decision to migrate. in this model involving unemployment, 
the migrant individual is able to make a rational decision about moving from 
a rural area to the city by considering both the potential for high wages in the 
city and the possible loss of income due to unemployment, and factoring in 
the unemployment rate. the conclusion the model reaches is that a number 
of inhabitants in less developed regions take a rational decision to move to 
more developed regions, which can reduce the gap between the development 
rates of regions within the country.
However not even in theory does migration remove all territorial differences. 
moving entails considerable cost: it means cash expenditure, the need to 
acquire information, a change of house and the removal of belongings, leaving 
one’s home, losing social contacts and security, a change of environment. the 
people who decide to migrate are those for whom the prevailing difference 
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in wages will make the move worthwhile, thus – according to human capital 
theory – it is the young and educated who are more likely to leave in order 
to settle somewhere else. However, those living in extreme poverty in poor 
regions do not participate in migration.
it takes time for migration to gain momentum and for the migration networks 
to be consolidated (boyd, 1989). Furthermore, family ties may lessen the will-
ingness to migrate (mincer, 1978). according to the recent economic theory 
of migration, the decision to migrate is made by the family rather than by 
the individual, which reduces the risk at the individual level. the family may 
choose to delegate a member for whom it was not optimal to migrate if he 
were to decide on his own (stark and bloom, 1985; massey et al., 1993). newer 
theories, supported by empirical data, state that the migration decision is 
determined not by the difference in wages alone, but also by the standard 
of living, or relative prosperity, and status compared to the reference group 
(stark, 1984; stark and taylor, 1989; Rappaport, 2005).
many of the factors that motivate international migration are similar to those 
that prompt internal migration. the most important difference is a function 
of the state control of borders (zolberg, 1989), which makes an econometric 
estimation of the migration decision practically impossible.
the effects of international migration on the labour market of the host country 
are described in well-researched studies, which provide important insights for 
migration policy. the labour market is influenced by the structure of migrant 
groups and native employees. Depending on this, either the migrants can take 
the place of native employees on the labour market of the host country, if the 
two groups are similarly structured, or – if their structure is different – then 
there is a complementary effect, with new jobs created and increased wages 
(borjas, 1995; altonji and Card, 1991; Chiswick, 1999). empirical studies show 
the effect of migration on unemployment and wages in the host country to 
be surprisingly low (borjas, 1994; Winter-ebmer and zweimüller, 1996; boeri 
and brücker, 2000). migrants usually pose a threat to the wage rates and 
jobs of earlier migrants, while on the labour market of the host country they 
play a complementary role. a study by baas et al. (2010) found this to be the 
strongest effect of migration on the labour market after the eu enlargement.
most studies concentrate on the host countries and only a few analyse the 
effect of migration on the labour market of the sending country. most of 
those that do examine the effect of the migration of highly qualified workers: 
in such cases there is no definite proof of any economic loss to the sending 
countries due to migration (Commander et al., 2004; stark, 2005). Rarely do 
these studies examine the connection between migration, unemployment 
and wage levels in the sending country. a study did examine the effect of 
increasing emigration in eight east european countries of the post-enlargement 
eu. it can be shown that, on the labour markets of the sending countries, the 
equalizing effect on employment and wage levels is equivocal, contradictory 
and difficult to distinguish from the effects of the business cycle (baas et al., 
2010; kazmarczyk, 2010).
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the effect of mobility on employment 
the potential of migration for regional equalization is limited: mobility does not 
significantly change the differences between regional labour markets. apart from 
the imperfection of mobility, the lack of equalization can also be explained by 
the fact that the workforce is not sensitive enough to the differences in wages. 
barro and sala-i-martin (1991; 1995) examined the differences in incomes in the 
states of the us, the regions of europe and the prefectures of japan (regard-
less of productivity), and found that workforce mobility had a minimal effect on 
the convergence of wages: a 25 per cent difference in wages led to a maximum 
1 per cent increase in net migration. other estimates showed an even smaller 
effect (Hatton and Williamson, 1998) or else no correlation at all between the 
level of wages and migration (blanchard and katz, 1992). using a long time 
series, Rappaport (2005) proves that the decisive factor in equalizing incomes 
is capital flow. in other words, it is unlikely that workforce migration causes 
wages to fall and it has no effect on the equalization of wages.
in line with the international experience, migration in Hungary has had a very 
limited effect on employment in the last twenty years. kertesi (1997) exam-
ined the factors that boosted territorial mobility and internal migration in the 
first half of the 1990s, and ábrahám and kertesi (1996) identified the factors 
that increased domestic mobility for periods during which the regional differ-
ences in unemployment were great and were becoming constant. based on 
settlement-level migration statistics kertesi (1997) showed that migrants 
are attracted neither by low unemployment, nor by better employment pros-
pects, but rather by flourishing economic regions. For a  later period (the 
whole of the 1990s) Cseres-gergely (2004; 2005) found the role of labour 
market factors – unemployment and wage differences – to be significant in 
inducing migration, but this observation explains a relatively small proportion 
of migrations. examining regional income and wage differences, köllő (2004) 
(for the turn of the millennium) and szabó (2007) (for the years after 2000) 
found moderate differences when they compared regions with the same level 
of productivity and unemployment, and somewhat greater differences when 
they took into consideration wage gain and labour cost reduction. in terms 
of territorial mobility, those factors – together with the transaction costs of 
migration – are insufficient to stimulate the decision to migrate.
Contrary to expectation, the low migration rate of the end of the 1980s 
decreased still further in the 1990s. between regions, the migration from 
east to west became dominant. if we look at the different counties, the capital 
budapest has suffered a significant migration loss to pest county. the char-
acteristics of internal migration can best be described at the level of small 
regions. in the small regions of the budapest agglomeration, the yearly migra-
tion gain was significant even back in the 1990s, while in the disadvantaged 
regions of the north-east there was a considerable loss through migration. 
by the beginning of the 1990s, the earlier trend of moving to the cities had 
changed direction: the migration balance of cities was negative from 1990, 
and the same was true of the capital from 1991 onwards, while in the villages 
after 1991 the balance was positive. in the 2000s the zone of migration into 
the agglomeration stretched steadily further from the capital.
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in recent years, the direction seems to have changed again, but the nature of 
the change is not yet clearly discernible (illés, 2000; Dövényi, 2007; 2009). the 
strong wave of suburbanization and de-urbanization of the 1990s was partly 
directed towards smaller and less well-appointed, cheaper villages, due to 
the lower cost of living. the labour market-related connection between such 
migration and commuting can be demonstrated, as the target settlements 
of migration lack local jobs but offer the possibility for people to commute. 
migration is also partly motivated by the wealthy escaping from the cities. 
a comparison of the economic and other reasons for migration based on the 
available statistics suggests that only a small proportion of migration was 
directed at tackling territorial differences (Cseres-gergely, 2004; 2005).
Different effects are to be expected in the case of cross-border migration.1 
the situation in Hungary has proved changeable: at the beginning of the 1990s, 
migrants and refugees arrived in the country in unprecedentedly large numbers 
(compared to previous periods), and it was expected that immigration would 
remain a permanent feature.2 no estimates were made in the early 1990s of 
the consequences of immigration for the labour market, but international 
studies have shown small effects even in the case of a large and sudden influx 
of migrants (Winter-ebmer and zweimüller, 1996). the relatively high wages of 
the 1990s (compared to other countries in the region) and the strengthening 
of the network connections of those living in neighbouring countries were 
enough to predict a permanent influx (gödri, 2010). analysing the structure of 
immigration, Hárs (1992) assumed that migrants would have an influence on 
wages in those labour market segments that cover the low-skilled domestic 
workforce and the illegal migrant workforce, but this assumption lacks empirical 
evidence. the enduring (and partly illegal) immigrant workforce serves to 
point up the complementary nature of migration, contributing as it does to 
domestic employment (Fox, 2007; pulay, 2005). the trend of the first years 
after the political regime change ran out of steam, and there has been no 
increase of a similar size since.
by the end of the 1990s there was a regional shortage of labour in the fast-
developing western region of the country that could not be met by domestic 
recruitment. (no studies were undertaken into the reasons for the lack of 
adjustment.) in the short term this labour shortage was met by the – partly 
organized – cross-border daily commuting of Hungarian-speaking slovak 
workers, in the context of a regional labour market characterised by major 
differences in terms of tightness and structure on the two sides of the border 
(Hardi and lamp, 2008). Regional cross-border commuting remains a perma-
nent feature, though it has fallen back during the current economic crisis. to 
the best of our knowledge, there have been no studies into the effects of 
cross-border (regional) commuting on the labour market.
the main targets for the Hungarian workforce that emigrated in the 1990s 
were germany and austria. migration with the aim of finding employment 
was partly in response to recruitment drives. in accord with the theoretical 
models, it was largely better-placed employees, generally with some qualifi-
cations, who participated in this (Hárs, 2003a; 2004). the scale of migration 
had no substantial effect on labour market indicators, and those returning 
home did not use their savings to start up businesses (Hárs, 1999; 2003a). 
1 As a rule, international migration 
studies classify migrants according 
to citizenship or place of birth, the 
latter being relevant in the case of 
successive generations of migrants. 
Hereafter, when examining interna-
tional migration, we use the classifi-
cation according to citizenship. Until 
recently, migration meant a stay of 
longer than a  year; now it means 
a stay of longer than three months. 
However, cross-border commuting – 
just as internal migration – is a differ-
ent type of equalization mechanism 
of mobility.
2 Even countries with different 
migration histories have in com-
mon the fact that the direction of 
economic migration shifts towards 
immigration. On the transitory posi-
tion of East European countries see 
Hárs (2010).
3 The trends of internal mobility can 
be determined based on administra-
tive data for migration. The Demo-
graphic Yearbook of the Central 
Statistical Office gives detailed infor-
mation on permanent and temporary 
migration; the TSTAR database offers 
similar assistance, supplying unified 
data on permanent and temporary 
migration, and on moves in and out 
of every municipality.
4 NUTS2 regions are the territorial 
planning units of the EU. Hungary 
was divided into seven regions, which 
were formed by uniting certain coun-
ties and the capital.
5 The low mobility in Eastern Europe 
is usually explained by theories that 
lack empirical evidence – by the 
legacy of the socialist past, by the 
secure workplaces and (partly) by 
family ties (see Feldmann, 2004; Paci 
et al., 2008). It is worth noting that, 
though such explanations refer to 
internal mobility, in countries with 
a low emigration rate (like the Czech 
Republic or Hungary), they are valid 
for international migration as well. 
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after accession to the eu, in contrast to some other member states, such as 
poland or the baltic states, emigration gained momentum only slowly (Hárs, 
2008; baas et al., 2010).
the process of migrAtion And the trends
the migration process of the early 1990s clearly shows some continuity from 
earlier periods; the trends were strengthened by rising unemployment and 
by the transformation of the economy.3 Cseres-gergely (2004) compared 
domestic statistics with those of foreign countries and found that mobility in 
Hungary was low, but his estimates for people moving between larger regions4 
suggest that migration does not lag behind other countries of europe. paci et 
al. (2008) examined internal migration and commuting in the 1990s and the 
2000s in the eight new, east european member states (eu-8). according to 
this study, mobility across regions of Hungary is low by comparison with the 
older eu-15 member states or other developed countries, but in some mediter-
ranean countries, such as greece or spain, mobility is even lower. Commuting 
between regions is also low compared to the eu-15 member states and some 
other developed countries; however, between 1999 and 2004, commuting 
increased in the new eu member states, whereas it declined in most of the 
eu-15 states. Hungarian figures are not below the eu-8 average, and low 
mobility is characteristic of all these countries.5
immigration into Hungary began rapidly after the transition and was more 
significant than in other east european countries. Refugees arrived in large 
numbers, and the primary source of migration was citizens from neighbouring 
countries who had Hungarian as their mother tongue.6 after the rapid initial 
influx, the level of legal immigration stabilized; so, too, did the composi-
tion, with most migrants arriving from neighbouring countries. the level of 
Hungarian immigration does not significantly differ from other east european 
countries, with migrants accounting for only a few per cent of native citizens 
(a substantially lower level than in most West or south european countries). 
among east european countries, only the Czech Republic after 2000 experi-
enced rapidly growing immigration that was comparable to West and south 
european migration (Hárs, 2010).
after the political transition, the rate of emigration was relatively low, and 
the main destination countries were germany and austria.7 the destination 
of migrant labour did not change significantly after Hungary’s accession to 
the eu: unlike in other east european countries, the fact that the free move-
ment of labour was restricted in those two countries until the end of the 
transitional period made little difference. on the other hand, the proportion of 
Hungarians in the fast-growing migration from eu-8 countries – particularly 
to the united kingdom and ireland –remained low and grew only slowly (Hárs, 
2008).8 migration figures indicate the forecasts,9 and the calculations based 
on the labour Force survey of the Central statistical office (Hárs, 2011) also 
show that the largely labour emigration from Hungary – unlike from other new 
east european member states – increased in the period beginning with the 
austerity measures of 2007 and the imminent economic crisis. the increase 
seems to be definite; however, its scale and structure are hard to predict. until 
6 Immigration f igures are regu-
larly published in the Demographic 
Yearbook of the Central Statistical 
Office. Based on information from 
the public administration bodies, we 
are able to trace the foreign nationals 
legally staying in Hungary. Only the 
stock data and the immigration data 
are adequate for a reliable analysis; 
net emigration, however, cannot be 
established from available data, due 
to the inaccuracy of data on out-
flow (see Table 4.4 of the Statisti-
cal Annex).
7 The statistical sources for quan-
tifying emigration are not reliable 
and only a  fraction of those living 
abroad are officially registered; thus 
the statistics of the host country (so-
called mirror statistics) must serve as 
the statistical source on Hungarian 
citizens living abroad. These show 
the data for legally and permanently 
settled people; the registers do not 
contain those who, for one reason 
or another, have not registered (see 
Table 4.5 of the Statistical Annex).
8 After EU enlargement on 1 May 
2004, the movement of labour 
became free. The United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Sweden were the first to 
open up their labour markets; how-
ever, some of the old EU Member 
States, concerned about perturba-
tions on the labour market, took the 
opportunity to only gradually open 
up their labour markets to the new 
members. They deferred the possi-
bility of the free movement of labour 
for a three-year period after enlarge-
ment, and then for an additional four 
years. But since May 2011, the labour 
markets of those countries that 
prevented free movement for lon-
gest, Germany and Austria, have also 
opened up to the new EU members. 
9 In the 1990s both short- and long-
term intentions of working abroad 
were low (3–4 per cent) in the rele-
vant age group (18–55). At the begin-
ning of the 2000s this figure rose (to 
8–9 per cent in the short term and 
to 6–7 per cent in the medium term). 
In 2005 the short-term intention of 
working abroad soared (to 15 per 
cent), and then fell back the next year. 
In 2008, both short- and long-term 
migration expectations rose again 
(to 11 per cent), then finally settled at 
a level that was 1–2 per cent higher 
than before (Monitor- and Omnibusz-
surveys of TÁRKI, 1993–2010).
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now, the Hungarian emigration rate has remained low by international stan-
dards: along with the Czech Republic, the proportion of nationals who live in 
the eu-15 countries is below 1 per cent, whereas the figure is 3.5–4 per cent 
in those new member states with the greatest number of migrants (bulgaria, 
lithuania, poland) and more than 7 per cent in Romania (kahanec et al., 2010).
exogenous effects on mobility
Why are Hungarians not mobile? What prevents the equalizing effect of mobility 
from acting on the labour market? the main question for Dövényi (2007), who 
examined domestic mobility after the transition, was: Why do people stay in 
the same place, rather than migrate? in the absence of statistical data, his 
hypothetical answer was that, on the one hand, the old workers’ hostels had 
closed down, and so workers who returned to their villages had no mobility 
assistance, while on the other hand, house and property prices had changed. 
Hegedüs (2004) examined the housing market of the 1990s and found that 
those factors that impeded mobility were the high cost of housing and of mort-
gages on privately owned flats, the institutional system for subsidizing housing 
mobility, the lack of private rental apartments and their inadequate regulation, 
the scarcity of information about the housing market, and the municipal social 
support system (which disadvantaged newly settled inhabitants). under such 
circumstances, the personal risk of mobility is disproportionately high for 
the individual, which impedes migration to regions with better employment 
prospects. this is the barrier to adaptation.10
internal migration can be thwarted by other factors as well: for example, in 
the job-hunting process, the scale and importance of informal channels of 
information is very high, which serves to accentuate the role of the local 
community. Data show that, from the beginning of the 2000s, the scale of 
informal job seeking was high in all eu-8 countries, compared to West euro-
pean countries and developed non-european countries. (only in spain was the 
level comparably high.) in Hungary, the role of informal information in finding 
a job was especially high – the highest in the region, which is quite remarkable. 
the mobility-hindering effect of this requires more thorough analysis (see the 
results of the international social survey programme (issp) 2001; the calcula-
tions of the World bank are quoted in paci et al., 2008: 48).
Hungarians have proved to be immobile in foreign job seeking as well. However, 
the causes of low intensity are – apart from the low propensity to migrate 
(which is hard to prove) and the lack of language skills (which is a common 
argument) – of economic and institutional nature. according to Hárs (2009), 
among the factors that hinder and constrain the decision to migrate are the 
(relative to the region) high welfare benefits in Hungary, the unemployment 
benefits and childcare system, plus the old age and disability pension systems. 
all these push the migrant reservation wage up and raise the alternative 
cost of migration, which lowers the propensity to migrate. kurekova (2010) 
came to a similar conclusion when (taking advantage of the rare opportunity 
presented by the natural experimental situation) she compared the low Czech 
and slovak migration rates. in these two countries which, until the very recent 
past, had a common history and customs, the pattern of emigration was very 
10 More recent results on the 
changes in the housing market and its 
effects are not available. The costs of 
adapting without changing residence 
and of commuting, and the restrictive 
factors are not discussed here; they 
are dealt with in Chapter 6.4. 
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different – something that casts doubt on the theory that low (or high) migra-
tion propensity has its origins in history. the two countries’ propensity can 
be explained much better by their different paths of development after the 
break-up – primarily the differences in the social benefit system, which was 
generous in the Czech Republic, but scanty and restricted in slovakia.
The inflow of foreign nationals to the Hungarian labour market – after an 
intensive start and expectations of a rapid increase – quickly ebbed (Hárs, 
1998). the attraction of foreign nationals was limited by economic growth 
with no increase in the number of jobs – indeed with redundancies – and by 
the different structure and the scarcity of new jobs (kertesi and köllő, 2001; 
kőrösi, 2005); there was also a lack of jobs in the kind of micro- and small 
enterprises that induced the south european migration (Reyneri, 2008; abreu 
and peixoto, 2008). in contrast to Hungary, there was a swift increase in the 
number of foreigners taking jobs in the Czech Republic, primarily to satisfy 
growing demand in the labour-intensive sectors (Drbohlav, 2011).
the role of stAte policy And its influence on migrAtion
though it was always a goal of state policy to encourage internal migration, 
with the aim of levelling out regional differences, the role of incentives to this 
end remained marginal, which is reflected in the size of the budget allocations 
and in the number of individuals concerned (Fazekas and németh, 2005). 
most of the direct support for mobility subsidized commuting in the form of 
individual and group travel subsidies, and the number of those who received 
a subsidy diminished steadily (around 1,000–3,000 beneficiaries), the option 
of housing support was removed, and neither the effectiveness of the subsidy 
nor its effect on the labour market was examined.11
other experimental programmes that subsidized mobility failed similarly. 
For example, the experimental programme launched by the national public 
employment Foundation (oFa) in 2008 to support the mobility of those living 
in disadvantaged areas (which aimed to encourage mobility by subsidizing 
the costs of migration) failed to generate any interest: there was not a single 
beneficiary of the programme (oFa, 2008). another experimental programme 
of oFa offered a subsidy to healthcare workers affected by sectoral reforms, 
but was implemented only partially after several amendments and delays. the 
failure of the programmes indicates the haphazard nature of the policies and 
the vagueness of the targeting. the effectiveness of the programmes was 
not examined (oFa, 2009).
apart from the failed targeting of direct subsidies, other serious drawbacks 
included the state of the housing market (which deterred migration) and the 
lack of rental apartments. around 2000, as part of the housing policy reform, 
there was an attempt to adjust housing subsidies, and in 2002–03 a rental 
apartment strategy was announced; but after six months these programmes 
were cancelled (Hegedüs, 2006).
though immigration was modest, Hungarian regulators tended to restrict 
even this, in preparation for perturbations on the labour market.12 labour 
legislation regulated the access to employment of foreign nationals, and at the 
end of the 1990s a ceiling was imposed to limit the number of work permits. 
11 Governmental decree 39/1998 
(III .4.) on subsidies for employee 
travel expenses and manpower 
recruitment. Subsidies could be 
granted for a) local travel; b) group 
transport ; c) housing subsidies 
refund; d) workforce recruitment. 
However the decree failed to regu-
late the last two, the text referring 
to these remained incomplete, and 
they were not indicated among the 
sources.
12 In 1993 Act LXXXVI of 1993 on the 
Entry, Stay in Hungary and Immigra-
tion of Foreigners was passed, and 
later a number of amendments and 
additions adjusted the regulation to 
the presumed dangers. The paradox 
described by Freeman (1993) pre-
vails in this case: the question is on 
what grounds economists accept free 
trade and on what grounds they sup-
port the restriction of migration. The 
preconceptions formed as a result 
of presumed dangers act, accord-
ing to Freeman (1993), as a barrier 
to the absorption of migrants, which 
sets a  limit on the influx of foreign-
ers, even if this is not justified by the 
labour market.
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However, the number of foreign nationals never even came close to the limit. 
immigration was not encouraged in any tangible manner. When bulgaria and 
Romania joined the eu, after much consideration the Hungarian labour market 
was opened up; but no impact assessments were carried out and restrictions 
were imposed: only specific jobs were open to the nationals of these two 
countries, in anticipation of a significant level of migration, which would have 
caused disturbances and had adverse effects on the labour market.13
before the 2004 enlargement (and in some cases in the transition period after 
enlargement), the older eu-15 member states had restricted access to their 
labour markets on similar grounds, and back then Hungary had disputed the 
need for excessively tight restrictions to counter presumed risks; through 
bilateral agreements, she had put in place a  legal framework that made it 
possible for people to work abroad, but further measures were not under-
taken on account of the relatively modest rate of emigration. if we examine 
Hungary’s position, it becomes clear that neither inbound nor outward migra-
tion was significant. the restrictions on immigration were substantial and 
little was done to encourage it. While the restrictions involved significant 
cost, their effect on the labour market, their advantages and disadvantages 
were barely examined.
the result of meAsures on mobility And their effect on 
employment
the possibilities of internal migration proved to be limited in smoothing terri-
torial differences. the regional differences in unemployment, as we have seen, 
are stable and persistent, and the variation in productivity of the regions is 
also permanent, which is a cause of the wage differentials.
the regional development policy, without well-targeted developments 
supported by case studies, can also impede territorial equalization. addressing 
the popular notions of aid programmes, Razin and sadka (1997) emphasized 
that in such cases trade can act as a mechanism to supplement workforce 
mobility. Wage differentials will not necessarily be eliminated as the result 
of such a programme; in fact, they may even increase, thus providing greater 
incentive for workforce migration, should the technical and economic advan-
tage of one region remain the same (or increase) compared to another region.
Hárs (2003b) examined the possible effect of the employment of foreign 
nationals in Hungary on the labour market, in light of the exaggerated fore-
casts of policy makers and the measures taken to protect the labour market. 
an ex ante approximation was made – at a time when conditions favoured 
inquiry, in the period before the status law was passed – of the connection 
between the wage expectations of the migrant workforce and the antici-
pated supply of labour. it found that the reservation wages of the migrant 
workforce far surpassed Hungarian wages (approximated by the minimum 
wage), which predicted a substantially smaller supply of migrant labour than 
the policy makers expected. given the professional and wage structures at 
the time, it was unlikely that the naïve assumptions for the supply of migrant 
labour would be realized. the often heated and partisan debate surrounding 
the status law and the resulting restrictions were pointless and unnecessary. 
13 According to an employee of 
the Ministry of Labour, Hungary ‘... 
accepted that old Member States 
also restricted their labour markets. 
Caution is legitimate if we consider 
the state of the labour market and 
the unemployment rate. In addition 
Bulgaria and Romania have a bigger 
potential of migrants than any of the 
countries that have recently joined’ 
(Index, 6 September 2006).
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another estimate for a later period was made by Hárs et al. (2006) to evaluate 
the restrictions on the labour market after Romanian and bulgarian accession. 
the results were similar.
conclusion And recommendAtions
the potential of domestic mobility to go some way towards levelling wages 
and unemployment is, as we have seen, limited. territorial differences can be 
mitigated by well-targeted, clearly defined development policy, and mobility 
could be encouraged, primarily by means of education and housing policy.
in the regulation of international migration, restriction has prevailed. the 
costs of this, as we have already pointed out, are significant, albeit difficult to 
quantify. the policy regulating migration could be a liberal and selective one, 
based on impact assessment; it would be especially important to examine the 
job-creation potential of migration.
policy has few means at its disposal to restrict or to enhance emigration. migra-
tion is regulated by the restrictions and opportunities of the host countries, 
and most Hungarian emigrants have been attracted by the labour markets of 
austria and germany, both of which restricted immigration. this shows the 
limited effect of such regulation. earlier programmes to channel migration and 
to recruit a migrant workforce were successful, but not in all cases. the labour 
market of the host country will decide the success of any decision to migrate.
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5.2. active labour market meaSureS 
galasi pÉteR anD nagy gyula
the definition of active labour market policies (retraining, labour market 
training) has evolved in parallel with the diminution of the role of financial 
assistance in coping with unemployment. the term covers any policy measure 
that serves to hasten the reintroduction of unemployed people to the labour 
market. the concept has seen significant changes since the 1980s. until the 
end of that decade, two types of active programme were in evidence: those 
that affected the supply side, and those that dealt with the demand side. on 
the supply side, the most important measures sought to prevent any decline 
in a person’s ability to work (public works), to boost their ability (education, 
training courses) and to cut the costs faced by an employee (transport contri-
butions). the various measures on the demand side aimed to cut the cost of 
employment. 
From the 1990s, the concept of active measures was broadened out to cover 
recruitment and related services, subsidy schemes that encouraged job search, 
as well as counselling and monitoring – and also sanctions. sociological litera-
ture describes these measures as counselling and monitoring (see Chapter 4.1). 
according to the grouping of kézdi (2011a), the main types of active labour 
market policies are as follows: counselling and the provision of information 
to assist in job hunting; public works; programmes to support employment 
(such as benefits for companies if they employ target-group individuals, or 
assistance in becoming self-employed); training programmes; and packages 
of (usually) small-scale initiatives that perhaps combine programme elements 
with other measures to offer services to a clearly defined target segment.
over the past twenty years there has been no unified framework to guide 
measures in Hungary: as well as the employment office and the ministry of 
labour, other government ministries and eu development agencies have 
launched employment support programmes, drawing on several streams of 
finance. partly for this reason, there is no long time series available of compa-
rable data on the implementation and effectiveness of the various measures. 
in this chapter we examine the best-documented measures: the programmes 
undertaken by the employment office, which fall within the framework of the 
employment act.1 1 Frey (2010) gives the most detailed 
and up-to-date overview of the set 
of measures and of the major pro-
grammes outside the framework of 
the Employment Act (TÁMOP pro-
grammes, Start-card, benefits for 
disabled workers, etc.).
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the mechAnism of Active meAsures
active measures can help speed up the process by which potential employees 
and employers ‘find’ each other and can sustain an individual’s ability to work – 
partly by reducing the work-related costs that face employers and employees, 
and partly through the direct creation of jobs. training courses can enhance the 
skills of individuals (increase their human capital), but equally they can adjust 
those skills to fit the requirements of the demand side – an employer’s needs.
the working mechanism for the measures can be described by several theoret-
ical models. in order to analyse the various measures, studies of unemployment 
use ‘search’ or ‘search-matching’ models (another name is ‘search-equilibrium 
models’) (Diamond, 1982; kiefer and neumann, 1989; mortensen, 1986; pissa-
rides, 1990). these models easily handle primarily passive measures (income 
supplement) and measures that increase the incentive to search for employment 
and the probability of finding a job (for example, help in contacting employers, 
monitoring and sanctions). However, direct job creation (i.e. public works 
under a variety of names) and wage subsidies, or the reduction in employer 
contributions do not fit well into this modelling framework.
in the first case (direct job creation) we do not really have a theoretical model, 
and the effectiveness of the programme is entirely an empirical question. 
in the latter cases, we can apply simple labour market demand models, in 
which the reduced cost of employment leads to an increase in the number of 
employees; thus the employer can hire more (previously unemployed) workers 
than he could if there were no benefits. the theoretical effect is ambiguous, 
because in such cases the counter-effects also need to be considered: the 
crowding-out effect (those supported by a policy can ‘crowd out’ other job 
seekers), the replacement effect (hiring a supported individual may involve 
firing another employee) and the dead-weight loss (the job might have been 
created even without the subsidy). if a specific measure reduces the cost of 
work for the employee (e.g. a previously unemployed person receives a travel 
benefit for a certain time), then we have a simple model of work supply, where 
reducing the working costs of the employee (with the wages remaining the 
same) unambiguously raises the individual supply of work.
the effects of training can be described by simple human capital models. the 
individual can add to his/her human capital (intellectual capital) by undertaking 
learning. this will have two consequences: on the one hand, it will raise the 
(expected) wages of the individual, and on the other hand, an intellectual 
capital that is better suited to demand will speed up his/her (re-)employment, 
so – ceteris paribus – the result is a shorter spell of unemployment. in prac-
tice, retraining can have significant adverse side-effects (dead-weight loss, 
a crowding-out effect and a replacement effect), but these can be mitigated 
by well-targeted programmes.
internAtionAl evidence
to what extent do the programmes aid a rapid accommodation to the labour 
market and thus an increased level of equilibrium employment to be reached? 
this is an empirical question, and we can attempt to measure the effects 
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using empirical estimation that identifies the causalities. today there are 
several international studies available on the subject.2 in some of these, the 
net programme impact or the average (median) effect are calculated as well, 
which allows the effectiveness of programmes to be clearly quantified and 
for them to be compared properly.3 at the same time, only partial and short-
term estimations have been made of the effect of active measures, and the 
assessments of the effects of the programmes are mixed.4
according to recent meta-analysis, the type of the programme determines its 
success (Card et al., 2010; kluve, 2006). aside from the type of programme, 
there are no other factors (e.g. the macroeconomic environment, the institu-
tional characteristics of the labour market or the timing of the programme) 
that would explain the effectiveness of the programmes. according to Card 
et al. (2010), counselling, monitoring and wage subsidy are effective measures, 
while the direct creation of jobs in the public sector (public works schemes) is 
clearly a failed programme type. training programmes usually have a negligible 
positive effect on employment and wages, and so their cost-effectiveness 
is inadequate. such programmes are more effective when general growth 
prospects in the economy are good, when they are small in scale and when 
they are well targeted. training programmes for the young and for those who 
have lost their jobs in mass redundancies produce especially weak results. 
but workplace training and training combined with services connected to 
employment are generally more effective than average training courses. in 
developed countries, the figures usually show small but positive effects on 
employment, and have a mixed effect on salaries; in transitional countries the 
effects are usually positive.
Card et al. (2010) point out that, when measuring the effectiveness of 
programmes, the timing of the survey plays a crucial role. in the case of 
training, they demonstrate that the short-term effects (measured one year 
after the programme) are often not significant or are negative, whereas 
the medium-term effects (measured two years after the programme) are 
significant and positive. the more time elapses between somebody finishing 
the programme and the assessment, the more successful is the programme; 
and so it is a good idea to measure the effects at least three years after the 
programme.
as betcherman et al. (2004) point out, for a programme to be deemed effective, 
it is not enough simply to have a greater probability of a person being hired. it 
is only effective if the programme costs no more than the yields from being 
employed (the taxes paid or the benefit spared), if without the programme 
the employee would not have found a job, and if there are no side effects 
(or they are negligible) – e.g. the crowding-out effect. in the case of wage 
subsidies and employment incentives, it is mostly dead-weight loss and the 
substitution-out effect that are the causes of low efficiency: it is difficult to 
ensure that those employers who are subsidized would not have recruited new 
workers anyway, regardless of the subsidy, and that the subsidized workforce 
does not replace other employers. these risks become even more acute in 
the case of programmes for the long-term unemployed: careful targeting can 
lessen (but not eliminate) these negative effects, and vigorous monitoring is 
needed to detect abuses.
2 In this chapter we mention only 
the studies with a microeconometric 
approach, and some empirical results 
collected in summarizing studies. 
3 See Card et al. (2010); Fretwell 
et al. (1999); O’Leary (1998; 2000); 
O’Leary et al. (1998; 2001). In the 
Hungarian language, Kézdi (2004; 
2011a) sums up the methodological 
problems of the impact studies of 
the programmes, while Hudomiet 
and Kézdi (2008) give an overview 
of experiences abroad. Kézdi (2011b) 
and Hudomiet and Kézdi (2011) give 
a  short summary of the problem 
areas, describing earlier results as 
well.
4 The first comprehensive study was 
made by Dar et al. (1999); later works, 
partly based on this, include Betcher-
man et al. (2004), Lehmann and Kluve 
(2008), Hudomiet and Kézdi (2008), 
Kluve (2006) and Card et al. (2010). 
The later studies, which also examined 
specific problems, produced contro-
versial results.
5. matCHing DemanD anD supply 5.2. aCtive labouR maRket measuRes
182
the evolution of expenditure on Active meAsures in hungAry
in the last two decades, several active labour market programmes have been 
launched in Hungary (see tables 6.1 and 7.1 of the statistical annex for an 
overview). most programmes are run by the employment offices; but the 
ministries of labour, the economy and finance, various institutions that fall 
within their remit and the development agencies of the eu have also launched 
programmes, in some cases very significant ones.5
apart from national schemes, several smaller, experimental programmes have 
started up in the past two decades. most of these have not come to form part 
of the conventional set of measures, but they have long been operating using 
grant money applied for and won.
at the beginning of this period, budgetary expenditure on active measures 
was around 0.6 per cent of gDp; later on it formed 0.4–0.5 per cent, which 
is very low in international terms.6 according to oeCD data, in the period 
2004–09 the average for oeCD countries ranged from 0.5 per cent to 0.6 
per cent, while in Denmark, the netherlands and sweden it topped 1 per cent.
at the beginning of the period, the passive subsidies outstripped the active 
ones. the resources for active measures began to rise from the middle of 
the 1990s, more or less in parallel with the economy taking off (Figure 1). in 
the second half of the period, the expenditure allocated to active measures 
remained at much the same level in terms of share of gDp and adjusted for 
the number of job seekers.7
5 About the organization of the insti-
tutional system of the training system 
see Pulay et al. (2009).
6 Hungarian data are shown in Table 
7.1 of the Statistical Annex. 
7 The sudden rise in 2002 was 
caused by a new form of compensa-
tion – wage compensation to raise the 
minimum wage (Frey, 2008).
Figure 1: Budgetary expenditure on active measures 1990–2010
Note: active = an active measure of the Labour Market Fund (MPA), training, 
vocational education, rehabilitation and TÁMOP (Social Renewal Operational Programme); 
passive = unemployment subsidies. All active expenditure /1,000 
unemployed (CSO MEF) as a per mille (‰) of GDP.
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the conventional elements of the measures were set out in the employ-
ment act of 1991, which entrusted the labour market Fund with distributing 
resources.8 in the first ten years, there was almost no change, except for some 
smaller steps that were taken at the end of the 1990s to encourage demand 
and bolster mobility. at the turn of the millennium, the allocation of resources 
was determined by an urge to centralize, and the proportion of resources 
spent was weighted towards enhancing the supply of labour. From accession 
to the eu in 2004 until the world economic crisis hit, the role of conventional 
elements seemed to lessen: a major part of the expanding resources was allo-
cated to allowances on tax and contributions (in order to raise demand), and 
to personalized services (in which the authorities try to involve the inactive 
population). now, at the end of this period, the factors that determine labour 
policy are how to handle the global crisis and long-term unemployment; as 
part of the drive to tackle the latter, there has been an unprecedented expan-
sion of public works.
in the last twenty years, the role of retraining has shown a tendency to decline 
(albeit with greater or smaller fluctuations), while the role of wage subsidies 
and other measures to raise demand for labour has become steadily larger.9 
until 2009, around 20 per cent of the resources were allocated to the public 
works scheme undertaken by the central labour organization, while since 2000 
a growing sum has been spent on public works organized by municipalities. 
as of 2010, the government was spending half of all domestic labour policy 
resources on this latter function.
the shift to active measures may have been partly brought about by the 
decline in unemployment (which was only halted by the recent crisis), partly 
through encouragement by the eu and partly by the efforts of experts who 
were familiar with the experiences of the european union or the oeCD coun-
tries in this field. experience (so far unsupported by statistical calculations) 
suggests that the allocation of resources between the different types of policy 
may have been influenced by political considerations10 and lobby interests, as 
well as by professional considerations. the professional aspect has failed to 
prevail – on the one hand, because there has been no consistent labour policy 
with political support, and on the other hand because – as we will show below 
– there have been no case studies to reliably measure the cost-effectiveness 
of specific measures, filtering out the diverse distorting effects.
the effectiveness of hungAriAn progrAmmes
For the period between 1996 and 2010, the raw placement rate for those who 
completed the main programmes is available. based on this, the most effective 
of the programmes was the small business start-up assistance: except for in 
the last few years, the rate of those starting a small business has been over 
90 per cent.11 after completion of the wage subsidy programme, the rate of 
those finding or staying on in work has been somewhat less than two-thirds, 
except for in the last two years, when the figure has surged to three-quarters 
and later to over 90 per cent. the programme to support school leavers in 
getting work experience – which was cancelled at the end of 2006 – was at 
least as successful as wage subsidies in raising participants’ chances of getting 
8 See Chapter 2.1 and the summary 
of Frey (2011).
9 Subsidies for small business start-
ups, for creating and keeping jobs, 
compensation for travelling costs and 
job- seeker clubs. Of these, the role 
of subsidies for job creation – which 
is the most debated internationally 
in terms of effectiveness – was never 
significant: it accounted for around 7 
per cent of the conventional active 
measures. 
10 For example, the county boards 
of labour could have an interest in 
raising resources, which they could 
divide among specific local employers, 
since these could be used for politi-
cal purposes. Lobby interests could 
have a special influence on training, 
since the market for these services 
was formed without a transparent 
quality-assurance system based on 
evaluation of results. The operators 
on the market were able to influence 
the conditions under which suppliers 
entered the market and also the con-
tent of the training (Halmos, 2005; 
Pulay et al., 2009).
11 The data for the last years cannot 
be fully compared, as between 1996 
and 2008 data collection was done in 
the third month after the end of the 
programme, whereas in 2009 and 
2010 it was conducted in the sixth 
month. The data are presented in 
Table 7.3 of the Statistical Annex.
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a job. Finally, the rate of those finding employment after training is around 
40–50 per cent, with a consistently lower rate in the case of group training 
organized by labour centres. the effectiveness of training, as measured by 
the probability of placement, has not advanced in this period, which raises 
questions about the targeting, validity and evaluation of such programmes.
However, the overall effects of the programmes are presumably smaller than 
the measured raw placement rates. in the case of subsidies for the employer 
(or the potential small entrepreneur) the crowding-out effect and the dead-
weight loss can distort the results; in the case of training, the issue lies espe-
cially with selection for the training.12
an impact analysis to filter out some of the distortions of selection was carried 
out for the first time between 1995 and 1997, as part of a project funded 
by the World bank to help in setting up the employment office’s system of 
monitoring and following up active measures. the results were published 
in several studies by the lead researcher on the programme; here we use 
o’leary’s (1998) results. in the last twenty years, other research projects have 
been undertaken, but these cannot be regarded as programme evaluations 
in the sense of the potential outcomes model, and so we shall refer only to 
their more important results.13
o’leary (1998) covers the main active measures, based on a representative 
sample of several thousand people taken from the pool of registered unem-
ployed. the first survey was in the second quarter of 1996, and the second in 
the first half of 1997; this made it possible to determine for at 6 months the 
labour-market status of each person in the two groups, and the most important 
events between the two dates. the effects of the programmes were measured 
by their influence on the chances of finding employment and on wages,14 and 
several measurement methods were applied.15 a relatively large range of an 
individual’s data was examined: education, previous career details, past and 
recent employment, the desired position, details of the household and type of 
habitation. the findings show unambiguously that public works do not boost 
the employment prospects of participants, and nor will those participants 
gain a wage advantage. For the poorly educated, the effect on employment 
prospects is significantly negative; in the case of the better educated, the 
effect is negligible.
based on similar data, the research of Csoba and nagy (2011), which exam-
ined individuals embarking on an active measure at the end of 2009 and the 
beginning of 2010, reached the same conclusion. nor did the only piece of 
research over a longer duration indicate positive effects: according to the 
assessment of köllő and scharle (2011), based on settlement-level data for 
the years 2003–08, the public works schemes organized by municipalities 
do not reduce the level of long-term unemployment.
o’leary’s (1998) results show that wage subsidies do not increase the pros-
pects of someone finding a job: the raw data on placement/retention are 
a result of the favourable composition of the participants and not the effect 
of the programme. However, in the case of the poorly educated, the effect of 
the programme is positive and significant.16 as for wages, even after filtering 
out the effects of the composition of the group, a positive effect could be 
discerned; thus the programme contributed to higher wages in the first job. 
12 Two kinds of selection effects 
can prevail: we might suppose that 
those who themselves initiate the 
training are more motivated and more 
informed about the requirements of 
employers, which also helps them to 
get a job. Moreover, the officials who 
decide which applicants to send on 
expensive training courses may aspire 
to send those with better prospects 
of success (see Chapter 6.2).
13 First, they did not use a control 
group that did not take part in the 
problem, and to which the results of 
the participants (treatment group) 
could be compared; secondly, the 
estimation methods (models with 
restricted dependent variables and 
duration models) are not capable 
of measuring the effects of the 
programmes. The most important 
characteristics and results of Hun-
garian research into wage subsidies 
are summarized by Cseres-Gergely 
and Scharle (2012). The methodologi-
cal limitations indicated by them are 
valid for several programmes, as most 
of the studies listed examined the 
aggregate of main active instruments.
14 Four outcome variables were used, 
according to the type of employment 
(subsidized or not; employed or self-
employed) and to the time of the 
survey (any time in the observation 
period or at the time of the second 
survey), and another two variables 
referred to the demand.
15 Estimations were made in a  lin-
ear probability model and also with 
a  matched-pairs method. These 
can filter out the distortion result-
ing from the different composition 
of the group of participants (treat-
ment group) and the control group 
(distortions due to education, age 
and other traits), but are not suitable 
for filtering out distortions due to the 
traits that were not observed (such 
as motivation).
16 According to Galasi et al. (2007), 
based on the monitoring database of 
the Employment Office, in the period 
between 2002 and 2005, the short-
term placement chances of women, 
older people and those with a voca-
tional high school education are 
higher, while the chances of those 
with general schooling are signifi-
cantly lower. However, the authors 
had no information on whether or not 
a former recipient of the subsidy was 
working at another employer.
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the estimation of Csoba and nagy (2011) for later periods shows a significant 
effect on the chances of getting a job, despite the fact that in the past decade 
the proportion of the uneducated unemployed among subsidy recipients 
has dropped.17 as none of the assessments filtered out either the (presum-
ably significant) crowding-out effect or the replacement effect, it is not clear 
whether there has been any improvement.18
the effect of wage subsidies can depend on the duration of the entitlement 
and the circumstances of the labour market. according to research by galasi et 
al. (2007), in the period 2002–05 wage subsidies for 180–270 days provided 
a better chance of an employee being retained by an employer in receipt of 
the subsidy than wage subsidies for less than 180 days (this is a lower esti-
mate for the probability of being employed examined in the above studies). 
otherwise the duration of wage subsidies does not influence the chances of 
retention. a worse labour market situation (a higher unemployment rate in 
the micro-region) reduced the chances of an individual being retained in the 
job, especially at the beginning of the period under examination.
in the case of individual training, the raw placement rates and those estima-
tions that take account of composition effects both indicate a significant and 
positive effect (o’leary, 1998). individual training thus raises the prospects for 
employment and wage expectations; the effect is relatively long term and is 
felt right up to the end of the period under examination.19 the raw indicators 
show a somewhat smaller effect for group training, but this is at least partly 
caused by the composition of the participants. an estimate of the effect of 
such programmes after this element has been filtered out shows no significant 
difference from individual training, either in terms of employment probability, 
or in terms of wages. Csoba and nagy (2011) calculated that the overall effect 
of the two types of training is positive and significant, albeit smaller than the 
effect of wage subsidies.
according to galasi et al . (2007), in the 2000s training programmes raised 
the chances of women and job seekers under 30 getting a job. the chances 
of employment for people over 30 are definitely lower. However, there is 
no clear relationship between the level of education and the chances of 
getting a  job: even those participants with less education than general 
schooling do not face significantly worse chances in every year. at a higher 
rate of unemployment, those leaving training may even have less chance 
of finding a job.
Regarding the different types of educational establishment, a  larger than 
average and unambiguously positive effect on the chances of employment 
can be observed in the case of lower secondary vocational schools (which 
usually do not offer an a-level certificate) and institutions of higher educa-
tion. the effects of training at training providers and specialized schools and 
of companies’ in-house training do not differ from the average; the results for 
higher secondary vocational schools are mixed.
the type of training also has an impact on the chances of school leavers getting 
a job. both vocational and practical training are more advantageous than 
language training. However, those who complete a practical training course 
have roughly double the chances of those completing vocational training. the 
training hours also have a positive impact on the chances of getting a job: the 
17 According to Frey (2011), the pro-
portion of poorly educated people in 
the programme in 2002 was nearly 23 
per cent, while in 2010 it was barely 
20 per cent.
18 A significant dead-weight loss is 
indicated by the fact that, accord-
ing to the Employment Office’s own 
monitoring questionnaire, around 
a quarter or a fifth of those employ-
ers surveyed said that they would 
have hired the employee even without 
the subsidy offered by the programme 
(data from 2001–07, see Frey, 2011). 
19 In those assessments that deal 
with the effect of simultaneous par-
ticipation in several programmes, the 
effect of individual training is not sig-
nificant (the effect of group train-
ing remains significant), which raises 
doubts about the results.
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more lessons one takes, the greater the probability of finding a job (though 
the effect is rather weak).
Finally, o’leary (1998) found a significant positive placement rate in the case 
of small business start-up assistance (even surpassing the various forms of 
training), while its effect on wages is negative. the programme raises the 
chances of employment among older people and women.
tArgeting of Active instruments
the targeting policy for the main instruments has been more or less the same 
for the past twenty years. in the 1990s, galasi et al. (1999) examined the 
composition of those participating in the programmes: in this period the small 
business start-up assistance had the most participants with a higher education, 
and the fewest participants with only general schooling. the opposite pole 
was public works, which had many participants with only basic schooling (or 
even less); the education level of those receiving wage subsidies was some-
where between the two other groups. on public works, the proportion of the 
over-50s and of men was relatively high.
For the years between 2001 and 2006, galasi and nagy (2008) found similar 
rates among those on social assistance and benefits.20 according to their results, 
among those registered as unemployed, women had a better chance than men 
of getting onto training programmes. the chances decline with age, but grow 
with level of education. When it comes to wage subsidies, those aged 25–39 
had the best chance of receiving one, and those under 20 the least chance. 
the results show that the chances of receiving a wage subsidy get better with 
higher education. the local unemployment rate also influences the chances of 
getting onto a wage subsidy scheme, since more wage subsidies are allocated 
to regions with a difficult labour market situation. Finally, men, older people 
and poorly educated job seekers are much more likely to participate in public 
works. if we examine the length of time that people have been registered 
as unemployed, the chances are that those on public works will have been 
registered as unemployed for 1–3 months; this shows that many register or 
re-register just for this reason. With a higher unemployment rate, the chances 
of getting into public works are also greater.
galasi and nagy (2008) also examined the chances of getting onto a programme 
according to the type of assistance received. people who receive social benefits 
have a better chance of getting onto a wage subsidy scheme than people who 
do not, while those receiving social assistance have less chance. in the case 
of public works, the situation is reversed: those on benefits have 30 per cent 
less chance, and those receiving social assistance have double the chance 
of being taken on. the results thus show that, compared to other groups of 
unemployed people, those on social assistance have less chance of getting 
into wage subsidy schemes, but more chance of getting onto public works 
schemes – after which very rarely can they return to the labour market.
köllő and scharle (2011) pointed out that the ‘Road to work’ programme (begun 
in 2009) did not substantially change the targeting of public works. those 
with a lower education were more likely to get into this programme, to which 
significantly more resources were allocated than preceding programmes. 
20 The data come from the com-
puter database of the Public Employ-
ment Service. Those registered in 
July 2005 are followed until Janu-
ary 2006 in the registers. The esti-
mates were made using discrete-time 
duration models for each programme 
independently.
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age had no significant effect – with one important exception: under-25s had 
a significantly greater chance of getting on; this is not necessarily a good thing, 
as public works participants do not get work experience that they can later use 
somewhere else, and they have less time and motivation to look for a job on 
the open labour market. in settlements far from the city and with a depressed 
labour market, the number of participants in public works has grown, but the 
inhabitants of the remotest, farthest-flung villages cannot make so much use 
of the opportunity. 
summAry And recommendAtions
to sum up, we may conclude that in the last twenty years Hungary has seen 
a relatively small (in european terms), albeit steadily increasing sum spent on 
the active measures that help the unemployed to find a job. several institutions 
share responsibility for the management of the set of measures, so it is hard 
to establish even the rate of expenditure. there are only a few appropriate 
research results available on the effectiveness of the utilization of resources, 
and thus the choices between the specific measures are random.
although most evaluations of the Hungarian programmes are not suited to 
measuring their effects, based on the only such attempt (and international 
experience) we can draw certain conclusions. most importantly we see that the 
various types of public works neither improve the chances of finding proper 
employment, nor lead to better wages. if the aim of the programmes is to lead 
the unemployed back to the labour market, this measure barely lives up to 
expectations at home or abroad. apart from the mixed programme results of 
the 1990s, the single Hungarian programme evaluation and the results of the 
most recent meta-analysis show that subsidized private sector employment 
(wage subsidies, small business start-up assistance) has a more beneficial 
effect on the probability of securing employment. the available data on training 
and retraining programmes show that their exit indicators – measured by the 
placement rates – show a declining rather than a rising trend.
the lack of impact assessments is presumably connected to the general 
difficulties of policy making discussed in detail in part 3 of this book. it is 
characteristic of the whole period that no comprehensive strategies were 
developed for economic policy, to which the strategy for employment could 
have been coupled. as a result, the goals of the labour ministry were hazy, 
or were changed rapidly according to short-term political aims, but were not 
accounted for later. it therefore comes as no surprise that the interest of policy 
makers in impact assessments could not be met by the available studies (see 
Chapter 2 of part 3).
based on sociological studies, it would seem that retraining programmes can 
be effective if they are supported by impact assessments, are well targeted, 
small scale, and often combined with other measures. to this end, it is primarily 
analysis using control groups that is needed; such analysis is feasible with the 
present it system of the national employment service – at minimal cost – if 
the data from the registers and the unified Hungarian employment Database 
(emma) are merged at the individual level. However given the present legal 
situation, it is not enough that academic research requires such scientifically 
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based evaluations: only politicians can initiate the process to anonymize the 
data needed. thus, in order to improve the context of political decision making, 
rights of access need to be broadened, or the interest of policy makers in this 
area raised.
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5.3. part-time jobS and other atypical formS of employment 
jános kÖllő
introduction
over the last thirty years the most developed economies have seen a relaxation 
of the old work routine: 8 hours a day, 5 days a week, the same place and the 
same time. other forms of paid employment have evolved; for want of a better 
term, these are called ‘atypical forms of employment’ (see a detailed descrip-
tion in kalleberg, 2000). the literature and language of sociology considers 
part-time jobs, flexitime work, jobs through ‘temp agencies’ or jobs with 
a fixed contract all to be ‘atypical jobs’ – and in some cases self-employment 
is added to this list.
the adjective atypical seems inaccurate – not only because it tries to meld too 
many concepts into one, but also because, throughout history, work undertaken 
without a contract, at home or at different locations, and with a variable time-
table has rather been the rule than the exception (e.g. for farmers, tradesmen, 
hauliers or merchants). in fact, the novelty has been that, after the 1980s, these 
types of work came to be more frequently carried out within the framework 
of regular employment; meanwhile their importance decreased in parallel 
with the reduction in the number of jobs in the agricultural and traditional 
small-trade sectors. the example of southern european countries illustrates 
these two parallel processes: in italy, portugal and spain, the proportion of 
part-time jobs stagnated or slightly decreased until 1991–92, and in greece it 
plummeted until 1992, and since then has not increased significantly.1
nor can we say that atypical work forms have been gaining huge ground in 
all developed economies. if we take just part-time jobs: in the united states 
their share decreased steadily between 1980 and 2000; and after a rise in 
Canada there came a drop in the 1990s (buddelmeyer et al., 2004). Finally in 
those Central east european countries that can be categorized as developed 
countries on the basis of their economic and welfare indicators, these types 
of employment were exceptional until very recent years.
in this chapter, we examine part-time employment in detail, and only touch 
on other atypical forms. one reason for this is that either the other types 
play a marginal role in Hungary (like remote working or flexitime), or there 
is insufficient data about them (temp agencies, concealed employment) – or, 
even if the data are available, conceptual obscurity makes their analysis diffi-
cult (working from home). another, more important reason is that part-time 
jobs have become widespread in europe (their proportion has also grown in 
1 Smith et al. (1998) and Buddelmeyer 
et al., for example, show and evaluate 
long time series.
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Hungary over the past ten years), and many analysts and politicians consider 
this to be one of the most important factors in raising aggregate employment 
and making the labour market more flexible.
in the case of Hungary, this assumption seems to be supported by the fact 
that today the working population is sharply divided into two groups: those 
who typically work 8 hours a day, five days a week, according to fixed working 
hours; and those who have no connection to the ‘world of labour’ at all. bajnai 
et al. (2008) analysed the micro-data of the labour Force survey for the year 
2005 and found that in Hungary the total working hours of the prime-age 
group of the active population diverge less from the optimum than is the case 
in, for example, sweden, Finland, norway, France, england, germany or the 
netherlands. at the same time, the relatively large workload is distributed 
among fewer people, and the intermittent zone between proper full time 
employment and unemployment is significantly narrower. the net average 
working hours of Hungarian males (41.6 hours a week) is 36 minutes longer 
than the eu-15 average, while working women put in more hours a week (39) 
than their Western european counterparts: they work 6.5 hours more every 
week – almost a whole working day.2 Hungarian employees are absent from work 
less; the pattern of working hours deviates less from the customary pattern 
(and if there is any deviation, it is seldom due to flexible working hours); and 
fewer Hungarians work part time. Compared to the most advanced countries, 
fewer people work from home (bajnai et al., 2008), those with remote working 
account for less than 2 per cent; and more than 90 per cent of all employees 
have a fixed daily ‘clock in’ and ‘clock out’ time – the highest proportion in 
the eu (eu, 2006, quoted in Frey, 2005). thus in Hungary the work is done 
by fewer people, and largely within the rigid employment framework of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. this situation may be altered by raising 
the number of part-time jobs. very few studies exist in Hungary that examine 
part-time employment based on ‘solid’ empirical data, so we have to make up 
for the lack of factual data by using ad hoc calculations; that said, we are fully 
aware that this method may not fit into the concept of this volume. the figures 
and estimates published here do not amount to systematic research, and we 
can only hope that they are adequate to demonstrate the most fundamental 
trends and correlations, and to help formulate suitable research hypotheses, 
evaluation criteria and starting points for policy making.
pArt-time work – incentives, gAins, costs
the number of part-time jobs has been boosted by factors on both the demand 
and the supply side of labour. part-time labour can cut costs for the employer 
by making it easier to adjust to the peaks and troughs of the workload; such 
considerable – yet calculable – fluctuations in the workload are very common 
in trade, in catering, in personal services, in healthcare, education and even 
in the civil service. another advantage of part-time jobs (though not every-
where) is that employee-protection regulations do not apply to part-time 
employees, who also enjoy less protection from the trade unions. a similarly 
important advantage (although again not universally the case) is that, in many 
countries, part-timers are paid lower wages than full-time employees, as we 
2 Average weekly working hours in 
the week of the survey. (Source: Euro-
stat: Labour Force Survey, 2005.)
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will discuss in detail later. last but not least, in most european countries the 
state subsidizes part-time employment through several types of allowance, 
hoping to create new jobs or to involve more employees in the same ‘volume’ 
of work (layard et al., 1991).
on the supply side, part-time jobs make it easier to divide the time between 
childcare or looking after relatives – work at home, in general – and taking 
a job on the labour market. mothers who are bringing up a child and who do 
not want to give up their career are not obliged to make a yes or no choice; 
nor are students who want to learn and at the same time to earn money; nor 
are newcomers to the labour market who are ‘shopping around’ for a job and 
do not yet want to commit themselves for a longer period of time. part-time 
jobs open the labour market up to those whose optimal working hours – taking 
account of the expected wage and their incomes from other sources – are 
more than 0 but less than 8 hours a day (or 40 hours a week).
alongside these advantages, there are considerable difficulties and disad-
vantages. the process of taking on a new worker and of getting employed 
in a new position has fixed costs (advertising, training, travelling, childcare), 
which render part-time employment less profitable for both the employer and 
the employee. the fixed costs can impel the employer to pass these on to the 
employee in the form of lower wages, exploiting the fact that many people 
choose this kind of employment not because they want to, but because they 
have no option (the proportion of such people in the eu is 10–40 per cent, 
according to labour force surveys). at the same time, again because of the 
fixed costs, it is often only worthwhile taking on a part-time job if the hourly 
rate is higher than for a full-time job, which makes part-time employment 
more expensive for employers. Certain longitudinal studies (o’Reilly and 
bothfeld, 2000) show that part-time employment is typically not a stepping 
stone towards full-time employment: most of those quitting part-time jobs 
do not move on to full-time employment, but instead leave the labour market.
the differences in advantages, expenses, incentives and barriers may be the 
reasons for the wide range in the proportions of part-time working across the 
eu. the netherlands – a country that is frequently cited in any discussion of 
part-time labour, since the proportion (for both sexes) of part-time workers 
is over 40 per cent – is an extreme even in Western europe: in other Western 
countries the proportion before the global crisis was between 5 per cent and 
25 per cent; in the old eu member states it was 21 per cent (eu, 2006: 40, 
table 23), and once the new member states are considered, the figure was 
somewhat below 20 per cent. the united kingdom and the northern countries 
head the list, while at the bottom come greece, spain, italy and portugal, plus 
the former socialist new member states.
the contribution part-time jobs made to raising aggregate employment was 
not significant until 2000: apart from in the netherlands, nowhere did it reach 
even 1 per cent. but in the last ten years it has become more significant: in 
2004–05 some 65 per cent of new jobs were part time, according to the eu 
(2006) report.
the author of this chapter has no information about any research that would 
reveal the effect of part-time jobs on net employment, or about differences 
between countries. buddelmeyer et al. (2004) analyse the ratio of part-time 
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employment within net employment; although this does not answer the ques-
tion that most interests economic policy makers (whether it is possible to raise 
the employment rate by encouraging part-time employment), the results are 
nevertheless remarkable.
the ratio of part-time employment was significantly influenced by changes in 
the emphasis of labour policy, which manifested themselves – at different times 
but in the majority of countries – in the wages for part-time jobs, the guaran-
teeing of equal rights for part-time workers and the abolition of discrimination. 
the proportion of part-time employment was indirectly raised by regulations 
protecting full-time employees with a fixed-term contract, since these made 
full-time employment more expensive (employment protection legislation, epl).
there is a strong correlation between the proportion of part-time employ-
ment and productivity and child allowances. on the basis of the trends (and 
ducking the issue of what is cause and what is effect), we can state that, on 
the one hand, we see high productivity, low childcare benefits and many part-
time jobs; on the other we have generous childcare benefits, few part-time 
jobs and low productivity.
the study by buddelmeyer et al. (2004) found no significant correlation between 
the proportion of part-time employment and taxes on labour, or between 
part-time employment and the sum (and duration) of unemployment benefits. 
part-time employment is negatively correlated to the business cycle: it is high 
in times of recession and low in times of growth.
on the basis of the study’s somewhat imprecise estimates (which are neverthe-
less revealing because they indicate the magnitude), we reckon that reforms 
such as those undertaken in europe in the period examined (1983–2002) could 
raise the proportion of part-time jobs in Hungary by 1.6–3.5 per cent over ten 
years, though naturally this would not lead to a similar (or any) increase in 
the level of net employment. even if we suppose that the new part-time jobs 
resulting from the reforms would simply add to the existing jobs (or would 
replace full-time jobs deemed to be lost anyway), the numbers warn us to be 
prudent on the subject of the job creation through direct labour policy measures.
pArt-time employment in hungAry
the exact number of part-time workers cannot be determined – or, to be 
more precise, we achieve different results by using different definitions, all of 
which are equally valid. before the crisis, at the beginning of 2008, according 
to the labour Force survey of the Central statistical office, 4.3 per cent of 
employees had a part-time contract; however 7 per cent stated that their 
weekly working hours were less than 40; most worked 30 hours, and only 1 
per cent worked less than 30 hours (table 1).
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Table 1: Part-time contract and average weekly working hours 
in January–March 2008 (per cent, all employees=100)
Men Women All
Part-time contract 3.1 5.9 4.3
Usual weekly working hours less than 40 5.4 8.9 7.0
1–19 hours 0.3 0.2 0.3
20–29 hours 0.9 1.0 0.9
30–35 hours 2.2 4.0 3.0
36–39 hours 2.0 3.7 2.8
40 or more hours 94.6 91.1 93.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0
N=25,554 employees
Note: For those who described their usual working hours as ‘very varied’ (mostly 
entrepreneurs), we used the hours worked in the week of the study.
Source: Labour Force Survey of the Central Statistical Office, 2008. 
January–March, author’s calculations.
the two groups overlap: 1.3 per cent of those who described themselves as 
part-time workers worked more than 40 hours a week, while 2.4 per cent of 
full-time workers worked less than 40 hours. similarly, the data of the Wage 
survey show divergent ratios, with some overlap. in companies with more than 
five employees and in public administration bodies, the proportion of part-time 
workers was 8.1 per cent (not counting those who carried on working in retire-
ment, the figure was 7.2 per cent). However the data show that 2.4 per cent of 
full-time employees worked less than 40 hours, and in the case of 10.5 per cent, 
the number of paid working hours in may did not reach 168, while this figure 
was exceeded by 1.1 per cent of those employed part time.
Whatever data and working-hour limits we work with,3 the proportion of 
part-time employment seems much lower than the european average; this is 
not specific to Hungary nor to eastern europe, but is also a characteristic of 
southern europe, as was shown by bajnai et al. (2008).
it is not just the level, but also the evolution of part-time employment that is 
hard to determine. as we can see from table 2, the data from the labour Force 
survey of the Central statistical office show a rise of just a few decimal points 
between 2003 and 2010, which (considering the c. 0.5 per cent margin of error 
in the case of employment) can be deemed insignificant. the data of the Wage 
surveys of the national employment office, drawn from company records, show 
a higher ratio and bigger increase in part-time jobs (table 2). the reason for this 
discrepancy is unclear; perhaps it might be attributed to the fact that companies 
can pay below the minimum wage by declaring their employees to be part time. 
in 2008, 22 per cent of part-time workers – roughly 2 per cent of all employees – 
were earning less than the relevant full-time minimum wage. even if the net rise 
shown in the proportion of part-time jobs between 2003 and 2010 is entirely 
due to this factor (which seems unlikely), we still get a higher rate than for the 
time series of the labour Force survey. However, even if we trust the data of the 
companies, the increase is very modest and does little to alter the perception 
that we are lagging behind Western countries.
3 In our calculations shown here, we 
draw the line at 40 working hours 
a week. If we applied 36 hours, for 
2008 we would get almost 3 per cent 
less part-time employment (as can be 
seen in the indicated data).
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Table 2: The ratio of part-time workers according to different surveys 
and criteria, 2003–10
Labour Force Survey
Labour Force Survey, the target 
universe of the Wage Surveya
Wage Survey
part-time
usual working 
time  
1–39 hoursb
part-time
usual working 
time  
1–39 hoursb
part-time
usual working 
time 1–39 
hoursc
2003 4.8 8.5 3.8 6.7 6.0 9.0
2004 4.4 8.5 3.5 6.7 6.5 9.7
2005 4.0 8.6 3.1 6.7 7.7 10.2
2006 3.9 7.9 3.2 6.1 8.9 11.7
2007 4.0 7.7 3.3 5.9 7.3 9.6
2008 4.3 7.6 3.5 5.8 8.1 10.6
2009 5.0 8.5 4.1 6.6 9.8 12.4
2010 5.6 9.2 4.1 6.9 .. ..
a An approximation: we listed here those who work for companies with at least five 
employees and the public sector (education, healthcare, public administration).
b For those who described their usual working hours as ‘very variable’ (mostly entrepreneurs) we 
used the number of hours worked in the week of the study (See Table 1.3 of the Statistical Annex).
c The working hours stipulated in the employment contract. At the time of 
writing the micro-data from the 2010 survey were not available.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Table 3: Ratio of part-time workers among new entrants 
and all employees, 2003–09
(Companies with five or more employees and the public sector, not counting pensioners)
Year
Proportion of part-time workers among
Proportion of employees normally working  
1–39 hours per week
All employees
Previous year’s  
entrants
All employees
Previous year’s  
entrants
2003 6.0 9.8 9.0 11.2
2004 6.5 10.5 9.7 12.2
2005 7.7 12.1 10.2 13.3
2006 8.9 13.8 11.7 15.1
2007 7.3 12.5 9.6 14.4
2008 8.1 13.3 10.6 14.3
2009 9.8 14.4 12.4 15.5
Part-time employee: based on the contract. 
New entrant: was hired in the year indicated and was still employed at the time 
of the next year’s Wage Survey in May at the company or public body. 
Note: The information on the nature of the contract is first indicated in the 2003 survey.
Source: Wage surveys.
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to gauge the future trends of part-time employment, it is useful to observe the 
ratio of part-time jobs in recent contracts. to determine this, the data from 
either the Wage survey of the national labour office or the labour Force 
survey are suitable; here we use the data from the former (comparison of old 
and new contracts yields a similar result in the case of the labour Force survey 
as well). as we can see from table 3, the proportion of part-time workers is 
significantly higher among new employees (in the previous year) than among 
all employees; it rose steadily and, by the end of the period, was not far behind 
the part-time ratio of Western european employees.
Whether we can expect a significant rise in part-time employment based on 
these data depends on the proportion of part-time workers among those who 
quit a job or are dismissed. it is possible that the data in table 3 merely serve 
to indicate the instability of part-time jobs and a higher-than-average turnover 
in the workforce. the labour Force surveys of the national statistical office 
contain all the data needed to examine this important question – however it 
takes a very long time: by tracing individuals, we can find those who changed 
jobs, or became unemployed or inactive, and we can determine whether those 
jobs that were left or lost were full or part time.
who works pArt time?
We try to answer this question briefly using three estimates, which are summa-
rized at the end of this chapter, in tables F1, F2 and F3 of the annex. in all 
three we examine, with probit functions, how certain individual, company 
and environmental factors influenced the fact that the person examined 
worked part time (according to the contract). the first estimate is based on 
the labour Force survey of the first quarter of 2008; the second is based on 
the employment office’s Wage survey of 2008, as is the third, though it only 
examines the private sector. the labour Force survey allows for the use of 
household variables, while the data of the Wage survey provide information 
on the effects of company characteristics.
according to table F1, the bulk of part-time employees are poorly educated, 
especially women with only basic schooling (though their share of employees 
is less than 0.5 per cent); women aged 15–29 are 2 per cent more likely to 
work part time; and women over 50 are 5 per cent more likely. the number 
of children does not influence at all the decision by men to work part time, 
but it does influence women to a small extent. the strongest factor affecting 
part-time work is receipt of a pension, childcare allowance (maternity leave, 
flat rate parental leave) or unemployment/social benefit: being a pensioner 
increases the probability of part-time work by 40 per cent, childcare allow-
ance by 32 per cent, and unemployment benefit by 8.5 per cent for men and 
24 per cent for women; this is more dominant than any other effect.
table F2 indicates that the rate of part-time work drops as the level of education 
increases. the age factor is insignificant here, though receipt of a pension has 
a strong influence. the difference between the private and the public sectors 
is only significant in the case of women; the difference between budapest 
and the rest of the country only in the case of men. the higher the rate of 
unemployment in the micro-region, the more probable it is that the individual 
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observed works part time. this effect, though significant, is not very strong (an 
unemployment rate one standard deviation above the mean indicates a rate 
of part-time working that is roughly 1 per cent higher). 
table F3, where we examine primarily the effects of company characteristics, 
combines both sexes. Here we have a chance to examine further dimensions, 
apart from the earlier divisions according to sex, age and education. part-time 
labour is 4.3 per cent higher among new entrants and 6.3 per cent higher among 
those with a fixed-term contract. those, who have a sector-level, company-
level or other kind of collective agreement, are (individually) 2–4 per cent less 
likely to work part time, while foreign ownership of the company has a similar 
effect. state ownership has no effect. the data show a higher part-time rate 
in the case of very small and medium-large enterprises. the sectors with the 
highest rate of part-time employment are catering, personal, business and 
financial services, (private) healthcare and (private) education.
the fact that the rate of part-time employment is relatively high among smaller 
enterprises and enterprises not covered by collective contracts, in areas of high 
unemployment, and among the least well educated indicates that part-time 
jobs are created more on the initiative of enterprises than on the demand of 
employees. at the same time, the fact that, among those on benefits, part-time 
employment is many times higher than average can be interpreted as a sign of 
less resistance to part-time jobs among such people; moreover it shows that 
a contract with more advantageous conditions can be agreed upon by both 
parties. Why is that so? the wages of part-time workers – and among them 
of those receiving and not receiving transfers – can provide vital information 
to answer this question.
wAges of pArt-time workers
the international literature of sociology discusses in detail the problem of 
part-time penalty. in the most developed economies, most studies observe 
a lower hourly rate among part-time workers (ermisch and Wright, 1993; Wolf, 
2002; kranz and Rodriguez-planas, 2009; manning and petrolongo, 2005; 
Rodgers, 2004), and this remains true even after controlling for the differences 
in structure and selection effects. However this result cannot be generalized: 
certain studies have, in contrast, detected a part-time premium – e.g. posel 
and muller (2007) for south africa; krillo and masso (2010) for estonian 
women; o’Dorchay et al. (2007) for Denmark; and in Hungary, too, the data on 
wages – raw data and data adjusted for observable characteristics – suggest 
something similar.
according to the Wage survey in 2008, part-time workers – both men and 
women – earned 15.5 per cent more an hour (pro rata) than full-time employees. 
on top of that, after controlling for sex, work experience, education, the sector, 
the region and company size, the wage premium rises to 29.6 per cent!
there may be a variety of reasons for this: part-time workers may be more 
productive; they may be better in non-observable traits; they may fill special 
positions. at the same time, they are scarce and therefore have a better 
bargaining position. the aim of this chapter is not to uncover the causes of the 
wage premium – to make up for research not yet done; but we would like to 
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share with the reader an observation – and, based on that, a hypothesis – that 
might be useful for subsequent research and discourse on employment policy.
hypothesis on the costs of pArt-time employment
broadly speaking, the hypothesis can be summarized thus: in Hungary a) 
it is primarily those receiving transfers (pension or flat rate parental leave 
benefits) who will seek part-time work; b) these people are willing to accept 
such a job for substantially lower wages than are those who do not receive any 
transfer, and who choose part-time work only if the wage is much higher than 
average; c) the consequences of this are 1) that part-time jobs are expensive 
for employers and (for this reason) are also scarce; 2) these jobs are filled 
primarily by pensioners and those receiving childcare allowance.
as for statement (a), table 4 shows that the proportion of the unemployed 
who are looking for (or are willing to accept) a part-time job is much higher 
among those receiving a transfer.
Table 4: The distribution of those looking for a job, according to the type 
of transfer received and the type of employment sought
What kind of employment is sought?
Pension, parental leave
All job seekers
Does not receive Receives
Full-time job 54.3 19.6 52.4
Primarily a full-time job 34.0 28.4 33.7
Part-time job 1.6 28.5 3.1
Primarily a part-time job 0.8 10.0 1.3
Any job 9.0 11.6 9.1
Wants to start a business 0.3 1.9 0.4
All 100.0 100.0 100.0
N = 2,826 persons
Source: Labour Force Surveys of the Central Statistical Office, April–June 2008; author’s calculations.
also the second (b) assumption is supported by the same data from the labour 
Force survey of the first quarter of 2008. only monthly wage data are available, 
so in table 5 there are no data about the hourly reservation wage; nevertheless, 
it underlines the thesis that those receiving transfers will accept a part-time 
job at much lower wages than an average unemployed person.
this observation is in line with the basic model of work supply. on the one hand, 
if the fixed costs of taking on a job are high, they may equal – or even exceed – 
the wage from short-term employment, which rules out part-time employment; 
this is not necessarily the case if the job seeker receives some kind of allow-
ance. on the other hand, if the job seeker has a significant non-employment 
income that he or she will not lose by taking on a job, then his/her choice will 
more likely be to take part-time employment; without such income, only a high 
hourly wage rate ensures that it is more profitable to work than to remain inac-
tive, since a relative low net income is commensurate with short hours of work.
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Table 5: The reservation wage according to the type of transfer and the type 
of employment sought, compared to unemployed people receiving no transfer 
who are willing to take only a full-time job (regression coefficients*)
How many logarithmic points lower is the monthly 
reservation wage if the job seeker is:
Pension or parental leave
Does not receive Receives
–0.1381
(4.32)
–0.2699
(8.13)
willing to accept a part-time job and ...
–0.0814
(8.33)
–0.1969
(8.52)
* The dependent variable of the regression equation is the logarithm of the monthly reservation 
wage of the job seeker. Independent variables: male, age, the square of the age, a binary variable 
for each of the six levels of education, a binary variable for Budapest, the logarithm of the local 
unemployment rate, the length of job-seeking in months, and the interactive variables shown in 
the table (looking for a part-time job, receives a benefit, etc.). The coefficients show the difference 
in the reservation wage counted in logarithmic points, compared to those who are not looking 
for a part-time job (first row), or would only accept full-time employment (second row).
Note: in the reference groups, the reservation wages of those receiving benefits do not differ 
significantly from those not receiving benefits. The values in brackets are t-quotients.
N = 2,452 persons 
Data source: Labour Force Survey of the National Statistical Office, January–March 2008.
Table 6: Working hours and income of part-time employees, April–June 2001
In receipt  
of a pension or 
parental leave?
Weekly working hours 
(hour)
Wages modified by regression (the wage of full-
time employees in a similar position = 100)
Working hours
Full-time employee  
= 100
Monthly income Hourly wage
Yes 19.1 48.7 52.7 110.1
No 20.9 51.1 68.3 134.9
Control variables: sex, age, local unemployment rate, and binary variables for ten business sectors, 
for ten kinds of profession, for five categories of companies according to size, and for Budapest.
Data source: Labour Force Survey of the National Statistical Office, second quarter of 2001.
Real wages show a similar difference to the reservation wage, as table 6 shows 
(already published in köllő and nacsa, 2004). unfortunately the data on wages 
of the labour Force survey are currently not accessible to scholars; however 
the data from 10 years ago are adequate to formulate a hypothesis.
it can be observed that the hourly wage of those receiving transfers is not 
much higher than that of full-time employees in a similar position: they work 
51.3 per cent less and earn 47.3 per cent less in a month. However those not 
receiving transfers only accept a part-time job for a much higher hourly wage: 
they work 48.9 per cent less, but their income is only 31.7 per cent less, and 
their hourly wage is 34.9 per cent higher than that of full-time employees in 
a similar position.
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Finally, concerning point (c), not only is it true (as we saw earlier in tables 
F1–F3) that part-time employment is much more frequent among those 
receiving benefits (42 per cent, compared to 3 per cent in the case of full-time 
employees), but what is more, those receiving benefits make up almost half 
of part-time employees – 47.4 per cent, as shown in the data of the labour 
Force survey for the first quarter of 2008 (table 7).
Table 7: The distribution of employees according to whether they receive 
benefits and the type of their position in the first quarter of 2008 (per cent)
Benefit status and type of position Per cent
1. The ratio of those receiving pension or parental leave
– among full-time employees 3.3
– among part-time employees 47.4
2. Among those who receive a pension or parental leave
– full-time employees 58.1
– part-time employees 41.9
– all 100.0
3. Among those who do not receive pension or parental leave
– full-time employees 96.7
– part-time employees 3.3
All 100.0
 
N = 25 554.
Data source: Labour Force Survey of the National Statistical 
Office, first quarter of 2001; author’s calculations.
conclusion And recommendAtions
in the last twenty years, Hungarian labour policy has consistently tried to tackle 
the question of part-time employment, and has sought to encourage it through 
pragmatic measures. people were allowed to undertake part-time work while 
claiming certain childcare allowances or drawing early retirement pension. 
young mothers returning to the labour market were supported by allowance 
benefits (the start programme); after some years the healthcare contribution 
(eho) was calculated as a proportion of the monthly working hours; a transport 
allowance was offered to new entrants, which reduced the fixed costs of taking 
on a job. in the years of the crisis, a temporary (or even permanent) reduction 
in working hours has been supported (assistance for keeping jobs in 2008–09). 
a programme has been introduced to support the wage costs of working mothers 
(in 2011), and the state itself has created plenty of new part-time jobs under 
public work programmes (from 2000 to the present).
based on the data at our disposal, these efforts have failed to bring significant 
gains. the proportion of part-time employment – even if some data sources do 
show a rise – is today not even a third or a half that in Western countries, and is 
significantly behind the figure for poland, which has risen steadily in recent years.
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if the hypothesis discussed under above is true, then it has important conse-
quences for the evaluation and planning of labour policy measures. First of 
all, we can state that successive governments have provided highly effective 
support for part-time working by offering monthly cash benefits to the inac-
tive working-age population. limiting these benefits (raising barriers to early 
pensions or cutting the generous childcare allowances, which is not currently 
being considered, but which is regularly mooted) would militate against part-
time employment and would raise its costs – though this would not necessarily 
be a negative consequence.
 secondly, if the observations described above are correct, then we can conclude 
that the high costs of part-time employment are not necessarily a consequence 
of the fixed costs faced by employers, and are certainly not a result of the 
high rates of employer contributions (which are calculated in a linear fashion, 
and therefore do not make part-time employment any more expensive), but 
are simply a consequence of high wages: in the Hungarian context, part-time 
jobs will be profitable for the average job seeker only if they bring with them 
high hourly rates. this situation may be helped by easing the fixed costs of 
employees, by better transport, more nurseries and kindergartens with a more 
flexible daily schedule.
the hypothesis briefly described here needs verification, but – until researchers 
gain access to the existing (but as yet inaccessible) data of the labour Force 
survey – insufficient data are available. apart from the labour Force survey 
(complemented with data on wages), other important sources include the 
company panels, based on the data of the Wage survey of the national employ-
ment office, and the institutional survey of the national statistical office. given 
that information on part-time and full-time jobs are available for the whole of 
a company, this survey would allow the creation and termination of part-time 
jobs to be examined, especially with regard to the question of whether the part-
time jobs are in addition to full-time jobs or are merely substitutes for them. 
Without such studies it would be irresponsible to evaluate the measures of 
labour market policy in this direction; nor is it possible to conceive of a rational 
and useful labour policy.
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Annex to chApter 5.3.
Table F1: Factors affecting the probability of working part time
(probit marginal effects for the sample mean)
Labour Force Survey, employees, January–March 2008
Dependent variable: works part time.
Male Female
0–7 classes 0.035* 0.266***
(1.76) (4.51)
8 classes 0.020*** 0.061***
(3.71) (7.14)
Vocational school 0.002 0.056***
(0.50) (7.46)
High school 0.008** 0.024***
(2.00) (4.08)
15–30 years old 0.006 0.020***
(1.59) (3.07)
41–50 years old 0.000 –0.008
(0.15) (1.59)
51–60 years old –0.001 0.002
(0.35) (0.32)
61–74 years old –0.005 0.049***
(1.07) (3.16)
Budapest 0.006 –0.002
(1.16) (0.20)
unemployed/local population (log) 0.002 0.007**
(0.77) (2.07)
0–6 years old children in the household –0.003 0.009*
(1.31) (1.83)
7–18 years old children in the household 0.001 0.011***
(0.54) (4.09)
Entrepreneur –0.005 0.001
(1.54) (0.22)
Works on a casual basis 0.192*** 0.193***
(10.67) (4.42)
Receives pension 0.419*** 0.386***
(24.62) (24.37)
Receives parental leave benefits 0.146** 0.320***
(1.99) (11.27)
Receives unemployment benefit 0.085*** 0.242**
(2.92) (2.34)
Number of observations 13 869 11 685
Note: Z values in parenthesis.
Significant for * 10 per cent; **5 per cent; *** 1 per cent.
Source: Central Statistical Office Labour Force Survey, January–March 2008.
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Table F2: Factors affecting the probability of working part time
(probit marginal effects for the sample mean)
Wage survey, employees, May 2008 
Dependent variable: works part time
Male Female
0–7 classes 0.147*** 0.171***
(10.97) (9.48)
8 classes 0.023*** 0.084***
(7.73) (23.52)
Vocational training 0.001 0.049***
(0.66) (14.47)
High school 0.009*** 0.008***
(3.78) (3.17)
15–30 years old 0.014*** –0.015***
(5.62) (5.22)
41–50 years old 0.002 –0.015***
(0.89) (5.71)
51–60 years old 0.016*** –0.010***
(6.66) (3.59)
61–74 years old –0.006 0.040***
(1.43) (6.27)
Pensioner 0.537*** 0.423***
(72.85) (63.64)
Company (0 = no; 1 = yes) –0.000 0.071***
(0.13) (33.81)
Budapest (0 = no; 1 = yes) 0.017*** 0.001
(6.58) (0.24)
Small-region unemployment rate (log) 0.011*** 0.008***
(6.51) (3.76)
Number of observations 105 426 110 007
Note: Z values in parenthesis.
Significant for * 10 per cent; **5 per cent; *** 1 per cent.
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Table F3: Factors affecting the probability of working part time 
(probit marginal effects for the sample mean)
Wage survey, private sector employees, May 2008 
Dependent variable: part-time employee
dy/dx Z values
Sex (0 = female; 1 = male) –0.061*** 37.44
0–7 class 0.183*** 13.82
8 classes 0.062*** 19.74
Vocational training 0.026*** 10.43
High school 0.017*** 7.34
15–30 years old –0.011*** 5.37
41–50 years old 0.001 0.72
51–60 years old 0.019*** 8.76
61–74 years old 0.038*** 7.87
Pensioner 0.529*** 86.48
Entered in the previous year (0 = no; 1 = yes) 0.043*** 21.14
Has a temporary contract 0.063*** 19.82
Does the company have a collective agreement? –0.032*** 16.84
Sectoral collective agreement encompassing several employers? –0.028*** 8.06
Non-sectoral collective agreement encompassing several employers? –0.024*** 6.50
100 per cent foreign owned –0.032*** 15.20
Majority is foreign owned –0.039*** 11.58
Minority is foreign owned –0.024*** 4.63
Budapest (0 = no; 1 = yes) 0.009*** 3.90
Local unemployment rate (log) 0.014*** 8.59
5–10 employees 0.066*** 18.21
11–20 employees 0.026*** 8.39
21–50 employees –0.004* 1.81
51–300 employees 0.061*** 23.64
Mining –0.010 0.92
Processing industry 0.011*** 2.86
Energy sector –0.017** 2.26
Sewage, waste treatment 0.012** 2.16
Building industry 0.008* 1.83
Trade 0.037*** 8.70
Transport 0.003 0.55
Catering 0.098*** 14.88
Telecommunications, IT 0.046*** 7.01
Banking, insurance 0.092*** 14.42
Real estate agency 0.015** 2.25
Science and technology 0.025*** 4.20
Renting and man power agencies 0.089*** 14.79
Education (private ) 0.099*** 13.70
Healthcare (private) 0.100*** 15.49
Culture (private) 0.022*** 2.97
Personal services 0.076*** 8.11
Number of observations 156 584
Note: Z values in parenthesis.
Significant for * 10 per cent; **5 per cent; *** 1 per cent.
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6. ReDuCing tRansaCtion Costs
6.1. informing jobSeekerS and employerS – toolkit 
lajos bóDis, zsomboR CseRes-geRgely* anD pÉteR galasi 
* I would like to thank Bálint Szőke 
for the excellent research assistance 
which helped in the empirical analysis.
this chapter addresses the provision of information to registered jobseekers 
and employers, as well as the information services toolkit. the organizational 
background to informing clients and the way it has changed over time are 
discussed in Chapter 6.2; information channels between the responsible ministry 
and the public employment service (pes) are discussed in Chapter 3.2. the 
available literature is limited to a few studies, and so, as well as research find-
ings, this chapter relies on interviews carried out with managers and officials 
from the employment service. 
the role informAtion plAys within the services provided  
to the unemployed
the issue of informing unemployed people can be discussed theoretically 
within the context of a job-search model that explicitly models both the dura-
tion of unemployment and the lifespan of unfilled vacancies: one example is 
the so-called search and matching model (Diamond, 1982; mortensen, 1986; 
pissarides, 1990). the situation is very simple in theory. We look at an imperfect 
labour market, where the speed with which demand and supply are matched 
up depends – among others - on the costs of obtaining information. the more 
complete and accurate the information about jobseekers and vacancies that 
is provided by the organization that deals with finding jobs and filling job 
vacancies, the sooner jobseekers and vacancies can be brought together: in 
other words, the length of time spent on job seeking (unemployment) and the 
length of time vacancies remain unfilled will both be shorter.
as they go about matching jobseekers and vacancies, and of developing 
jobseekers’ skills, employment services are simultaneously producers, proces-
sors and customers of labour market-related information (koning and graves-
teijn, 2012). their data on jobseekers and vacancies serve as a basis not only for 
labour statistics, but also for their daily operations. the employment services’ 
job placement activities are more efficient if they collect quality information 
and are able to pass it on effectively.1
in the process of informing people looking for work, the best international 
practice is characterized by the cautious application of self-service methods, 
alongside personalized case-management (pieterson, 2011). it is important 
that an overabundance of information should not deter users: information 
should be provided in a user-friendly structure and form. if successful, such 
1 Especially if the employment serv-
ice outsources part of its activity: if 
so, it has to give detailed information 
about the clients and receive informa-
tion on their operations (Finn, 2011).
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a development can provide a genuinely direct connection to job centre infor-
mation, which will also reduce the workload of officials who deal directly with 
clients. to efficiently combine personal case-management and multichannel 
systems, both personalized information and client access to their own personal 
data are necessary (pieterson and johnson, 2011).
However, while the employment service’s main task in its dealings with 
employers was, for a long time, to assist with recording vacancies, recently 
there has been a shift, and the service in many countries has gradually been 
moving from almost exclusively serving jobseekers to serving employers, 
too (koning and gravesteijn, 2012). as well as placing (without a fee) those 
jobseekers who are prepared to work, there is a move to provide informa-
tion services that are both more comprehensive than before and also more 
personalized. in many countries, the employment service coordinates and 
distributes forecasts on where labour-market bottlenecks might be expected, 
and on the basis of these they provide employers with information. Finally, 
there are more and more places where more personalized information is 
offered to enterprises, on top of more general information on hiring, training 
and dismissal; sometimes this is accompanied by a fee.
the main trends in the approach of job centres are shaped mainly by the 
everyday experiences of the officials involved and the new technological oppor-
tunities becoming available. empirical literature that deals with the efficiency 
of particular approaches is quite scant, but the literature based on the search 
and matching theory examines what influences the duration of unemployment. 
international experience shows that active programmes which include guidance 
and counselling (as well as provide information) generally increase people’s 
chances of finding employment and reduce the time spent unemployed (martin 
and grubb, 2001; kluve et al., 2006). guidance and counselling have a positive 
effect only if they are paired with monitoring and sanctions (cf. martin and 
grubb, 2001; Chapter 4.1).
informAtion Activities in the hungAriAn  
public employment service 
at the beginning of the 1990s, the employment service focused on monitoring 
eligibility for, and the disbursement of, unemployment benefits. in 1993, when 
unemployment reached a then unprecedented rate of 12 per cent, there was 
little or no talk of activation of the registered unemployed by means of tools 
such as those discussed in the literature – considered the most successful, 
combining as they do powerful monitoring and very varied support.2 by the 
end of the 1990s, the officials and managers of the pes had gained enough 
experience to know that, in addition to their supervisory tasks, service expan-
sion required the development both of local job centres and of the central 
office. this aim luckily met with a funding opportunity: from 2002 onwards, 
money was provided by the pHaRe programme, in preparation for eu acces-
sion, and this was followed by subsequent development projects (Human 
Resource Development operational programme or HRDop and social Renewal 
operational programme or sRop). the first project, aimed at modernizing the 
public employment service, consisted of several objectives that promoted 
2 This is supported by the interviews 
conducted with policy makers during 
the mini-research we did in relation 
to this volume (For more details see 
Appendix 8.2). For the political con-
siderations, see Chapters 2.1 and 3.1. 
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direct information for jobseekers. the most important of these followed the 
international trends and included the development of self-service systems and 
the introduction of new service models supporting personalized administra-
tion. the details of this development process are discussed in Chapter 6.2.
However, the Hungarian pes keeps in touch with a smaller proportion of those 
who are not in work than is generally the case abroad (bajnai, Hámori and 
köllő, 2008), although this proportion is relatively high among the registered 
unemployed, at around 60 per cent (see Chapter 4.1). one reason for this is 
that those concerned receive unemployment benefit through this channel; 
however, the pes’s information role should not be neglected. Figure 1, which 
is based on the labour Force survey (lFs) of the Central statistical office 
(Cso), shows the extent to which certain groups of the unemployed rely on 
the employment service during their job seeking. We deal separately with 
the unregistered unemployed; and among the registered unemployed we 
distinguish those actively seeking work. However, information gained from 
the lFs questionnaires did not make it possible to separate the pes’s service 
and information provider activities.3 it can easily be seen that this relationship 
is fairly close and stable over time – despite the significant methodological 
change that occurred at the end of 1998. only a small proportion of clients 
who are registered as jobseekers but not actively seeking a job use the employ-
ment service as a source of information on job opportunities. of those who 
are not registered, quite a lot use the employment service, and after the crisis 
that broke in 2008, the numbers increased by a fifth. nearly 90 per cent of 
those registered unemployed who are actively seeking a job used the service 
3 The analysis is based on the LFS 
question ‘How did you look for a job?’. 
Before 1998 it was not possible to 
choose search options separately, but 
only to rank the tools used as first, 
second and third (three in total): 
here PES users are those who at 
least in one case ticked ‘via the Public 
Employment Service’. After 1998 we 
deemed PES users to be those who 
inquired about vacancies at the job 
centre or gave ‘is waiting for notifi-
cation from the Public Employment 
Service’ as an answer. 
Figure 1: Proportion of those who used the services of the PES by particular 
groups of unemployed
 
Note: We have defined job search according to the ILO standard.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the CSO Labour Force Survey.
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throughout the period under examination (Figure 1). We do not analyse the 
period before 1998, and especially not the major drop in the number of those 
unregistered unemployed who used the pes after 1995, due to the method-
ological change in data collection.
informAtion bAse of the employment service
since the beginning, in the 1990s, the employment service has considered 
one of its primary tasks to be to pass on information about incoming vacan-
cies to its clients. For this, the primary information source was the database 
of available vacancies. this was based on registrations by employers and 
vacancies sought out by pes officials. information related to unfilled vacan-
cies was collected by the job centres even in the 1990s, but at most was 
shared between counties. it was one of the most important results of the 
2002 modernization programme that vacancy descriptions were standardized, 
and a countrywide database and platform were created (to which every job 
centre was given access). the quality of the information available, however, 
needs to be improved. 
one reason for this is that the regulations in Hungary – in contrast to the trends 
of the international labour organization (ilo) and the eu and the practice of 
two-thirds of oeCD countries – are confined to mandatory employer vacancy 
registration;4 they do not apply sanctions if registration is omitted (Frey, 1999; 
konle-seidl and Walwei, 2001).5 this practice may disadvantage those who 
obey the rules, since it increases the administrative costs of those who do 
not wish to recruit through job centres. it also undermines expectations of 
a rational procedure, since there may be no practical consequences flowing 
either from registration or from the lack of it. Finally, it could weaken the culture 
of cooperation and give rise to a wrong interpretation of the rule-makers’ 
intentions, since the increase of administrative costs contradicts the intention 
that services provided to employers need to be improved.6 enterprises are not 
allowed to upload their vacancies to the database independently; moreover, 
not even electronic notification is possible. the system only allows employers 
to have a say in the procedure to the extent that they may stipulate avoidance 
of placement or open announcement of the vacancy.7
Carrying out job placement activities effectively requires information about 
current labour demand that helps officials to orient the job searches and/or 
training of the unemployed. this sort of large-scale survey based on enter-
prise questionnaires was introduced in the mid-1990s and has been ongoing 
since then.8
these forecasts form the basis of the so-called ‘labour force barometer’ that 
shows, by county and by region, what size of workforce increase or decrease 
might be expected and in what occupations (trades). although, in principle, 
the barometer provides useful information for the short term, the results of 
our interviews indicate that the job centres do not consider it a tool that can 
help them with the timing of their tasks or the planning of training. Results 
of the barometer are available by region, in contrast to the local job centres, 
for which the most useful information refers to employers in the area and 
the county.
4 The official form used for the 
labour-market service and available 
benefits is the annex of 30/2000 
(IX.15) Ministry of Economy regula-
tion. According to the interviewees 
working at the Public Employment 
Service, the PES has made several 
attempts to make the form more flex-
ible and simple, so far in vain.
5 A few analyses have named Hun-
gary as lacking the relevant regu-
lations (Kuddo, 2009; Larsen and 
Vesan, 2011).
6 We will come back to the concep-
tual explanations of the contradiction 
in Chapter 6.2.
7 As a  prerequisite of some pro-
grammes, vacancies must also be 
advertised on the internet, but by 
withholding some important ele-
ments (e.g. contact details of the 
employer) the information will be 
useless without an official’s interven-
tion. In practice, the employees of the 
local job centre have the opportunity 
to recommend this course of action 
to the employers, too, if they think it 
proper with regard to the selection 
of applicants or for the evaluation of 
their own performance.
8 At present, forecasts are made 
yearly by the Institute for Economic 
and Enterprise Research (MKIK) and 
the Employment Office; those for 
2004–11 are available on the homep-
ages of the employment service.
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the quarterly manpower survey is similarly important. it was introduced within 
the framework of the pHaRe twinning programme (2004–05) and has been 
operating throughout the employment service since 2005. the job centres 
contact the employers in their area with a questionnaire every quarter – the 
survey may provide a sort of framework for keeping regular contact with 
employers, but it is not necessarily accompanied by a site visit. in the question-
naire, the job centres ask about expected changes in the labour force in the 
next quarter (three months) and the next year (twelve months). based on the 
information gleaned from the questionnaires, the local job centres – also at 
the level of individual employers – can picture what changes can be expected 
in the coming quarter and in the coming year in terms of size and direction of 
the number of employees. the results are published every quarter, and the 
reports on the individual quarterly survey are available on the homepage of 
the pes. 
it is not only the current results that are reported (from various aspects), 
but also the extent to which the currently available figures correspond to 
the expectations of the previous period. the survey concerns 8,000–10,000 
employers, employing some 500,000 or 600,000 employees; the response 
rate is good (76–80 per cent).
in theory, as with the barometer, this information is suitable for informing the 
unemployed, and the local job centres – according to our interviews – would 
use it to plan training. one of its limitations, however, is that users do not 
see the data reliable enough; the way in which the data are collected is partly 
responsible for this. the samples are not representative of the enterprises, 
at least in the light of any published statistical data characterising respon-
dents, and there is no sign that any kind of statistical methodology has been 
applied to establish representativeness. according to the experience of job 
centre staff, the plant units of larger enterprises often do not even have the 
necessary information, or else head office does not give its approval for such 
information to be shared. accordingly the job centres typically include those 
employers in the survey from whom data are relatively easy to obtain. 
informAtion services provided by officiAls
the Hungarian pes provides labour-market information within various activi-
ties. employers and jobseekers are provided with information in various forms, 
depending on the target group. the service is rich in content, but it seems 
that the integration of the traditional system (which requires the intervention 
of officials) and the self-service system – for example, by developing a single 
protocol that takes into account all channels – has not yet been successfully 
accomplished. this all suggests that efficiency lags behind potential, and it 
cannot be guaranteed that different organizational units and service staff 
provide a service that benefits both sides and that draws on professional 
know-how. this issue is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3.3 and Chapter 6.2.
the recently completed work on a national standard for job placement9 separates 
traditional and personalized job placement as well as self-service information 
gathering. it envisages a situation whereby jobseekers have a detailed first 
interview, during which information is recorded for administrative purposes; 
9 The elaboration of service stan-
dards was a  development within 
the SROP 2.6.1 project at the end 
of the 2000s; a  longer-term goal is 
to contribute to standardization of 
the quality of labour market services 
ordered by the state, irrespective of 
where the services are provided and 
by whom. This is dealt with in more 
detail in Chapter 6.2.
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an employer must be informed of a client’s existing competencies and special 
needs. the applicable rules of the standard are included in the employment 
esrvice protocol (employment office, 2011). the daily routine, however, is 
rather different from this ideal.
in traditional job placement, the interview involves only a few questions, 
and placement is restricted to offering a particular vacancy. by contrast, 
the personalized job placement interview covers standard work-impeding 
factors (for example, family circumstances) and competencies that may be 
lacking, and identifies any fears jobseekers may have about potential negative 
stereotypes on the part of employers. then the official helps the jobseeker 
find a job through personalized choice and recommendation. so that clients 
can find information for themselves, if necessary they are taught how to use 
the computers at the job centre.
Fulfilment of the employer’s needs may require not only a simple pre-screening, 
but also a more methodical and intensive involvement in selection. the starting 
point for the process, according to the standard, is a ‘job requirements profile’, 
although the method of constructing one is not specified (an example of 
Hungarian best practice is described in Chapter 6.2). the interview held 
during screening is part of this process. the standard does not refer to the 
types of interviews ,and the use of tests. However such tools are common 
in the selection process for routine jobs at enterprises, and such vacancies 
are frequent in the pes. nor does the professional standard cover the part 
that officials should play in selection or the aspects that should be attended 
to during screening together with the employers, although these might be 
critically important in selection. 
self-service systems
an important tool for disseminating information within the pes is the Hungarian 
institutional system of euRes (european employment services), which has 
been developed since eu accession (koncz, 2011). it consists of information 
collected by the member states, and its task is to provide information and 
guidance to employees who intend to get a job abroad, and to help employers 
hire foreign workers. the services of the Hungarian network are available at 
all job centres. the activities of local euRes assistants (170 people) are coor-
dinated by consultants (29 people) working in the chief county towns. both 
job activities involve direct client relationships; at the same time, however, 
the system is largely based on self-service, and the tool for that is the euRes 
portal, which consists of labour-market and other information provided by 
the member states. 
Within the euRes-t, a regional version of this service, is an area-specific and 
more intensive forms of providing information and job placement may be 
realized by cross-border partnerships that promote commuter traffic. the 
Hungarian pes is heavily involved in this initiative: of the 20 or so partnerships 
covering 13 countries, Hungary is involved in three. the joint partnership with 
the slovak border areas was the first of these, and apparently enjoys inten-
sive cooperation; it was followed by the organization of two-way information 
flow with austria and then with Romania. outside the euRes framework, an 
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austrian initiative has helped a few cross-border county job centres to maintain 
intensive work contacts with partner organizations since the 1990s.
in addition to the euRes, several self-service tools and internet portals help 
clients in their individual job search; however, these are sometimes not easy 
to use, are not integrated, and their content is sometimes incomplete or 
out of date. general information and available services are outlined on the 
main homepage of the employment service (www.afsz.hu, or more recently 
www.munka.hu) and the regional job centre homepages provide further 
details. unfortunately, these are all fairly difficult to use; however there are 
some promising signs of development. 
When it comes to self-service job hunting, the situation is just the opposite: 
individual job centre homepages direct people to the main homepage, where 
a fairly lean database search engine is available. the now defunct www.epalya.hu 
can be seen as a forerunner to the [ez itt link legyen: www.eletpalya.munka.
hu ], introduced in 2010, but the latter’s functionality is wider: it provides 
expected vacancy figures for a number of jobs (though it is already based on 
an outdated forecast) and information about expected salaries. the lifelong 
guidance portal created within the sRop 2.2.2 project was introduced at the 
end of the 2000s and offers adequate information on current professional 
standards and on career choices and changes. the existence of such websites 
indicates that the pes did, to a certain extent, realize the importance of self-
service systems, but it never devoted as many resources or paid as much atten-
tion to such services as to developing and maintaining the traditional services.
efficiency of information provision for jobseekers
the process of informing jobseekers has improved over the past 20 years, 
though not as much as was technically possible; client service has developed 
at the same time, too. However, in this period we have witnessed no substan-
tial growth, either in the chances of an unemployed person finding work or in 
the employment rate – not even if we disregard the unfavourable effects of 
the recent crisis. one reason could be that these changes have affected only 
one (less important) job search tool. nagy (1999) reports that formal tools 
are effective in large-scale or extensive job search, but are unable to provide 
details on certain features of the individual offers: the proportion of those 
who have been able to get work with the support of formal job placement is 
25 per cent – and in many cases is below 10 per cent. by contrast, through 
informal channels people can receive information on only a narrow segment 
of the labour market, but that information is detailed and reliable.
if we wish to ascertain the extent to which unemployed people acquire infor-
mation from the pes , we should evaluate it just like any other programme. 
to date there has been no analysis that has directly addressed this question. 
Cseres-gergely and scharle (2010) provide detailed results on the overall 
impact of the pes modernization programme on unemployed people’s chances 
of getting a job; they found it significantly positive, albeit small in scale. this, 
however, fails to answer our question satisfactorily in many respects – mainly 
because it is not able to separate the pes’s information role from its other 
roles, and because it covers only a few years.
We try to make up for the lack of comprehensive studies for a major part of 
the period with an assessment based on individual lFs data. We are trying 
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to find out whether the chances of getting a job have altered for unemployed 
people who rely on the pes in their search for a job, by comparison with those 
who do not rely on the pes; in all other respects the two groups have similar 
characteristics.10
as we saw from Figure 1, use of the pes is stable among active jobseekers. 
examining the same groups, we found that the proportion of those who got 
a job – among both the non registered unemployed and the registered unem-
ployed who are actively searching for a job – is generally not dependent on 
use of the pes as an information resource (10–13 per cent on average over 
10 years, either with or without use); at the same time, in the case of those 
who are only registered but are not actively seeking a job, returns to using 
this source of information are significant: 31 per cent of pes users found a job, 
but only 14 per cent of non-users did.11
the effects of pes use could be influenced by factors that determine what type 
of people have a better chance of finding a job, and these may be correlated 
with the probability of using the pes. to controll for these factors, we used 
multivariate analysis. Contrary to expectations, the regression results show 
no significant change from the raw data: use of the pes has a significant effect 
on the chances of finding a job only in the case of those unemployed who are 
not actively seeking a job. although job hunting through informal channels is 
of major importance (nagy, 1999), the results do not change even if we use 
the indicator of searching for a job with the help of relatives and friends in the 
estimation, as a proxy for social embeddedness. pending further examination, 
we can say in general that we could not prove the impact on successful job 
search of using the pes as an information resource. the significant observed 
proportion of those who found a job among the population of registered 
unemployed who were not actively searching for a job requires further exami-
nation and research.
tools for informing employers And their use 
in Hungary, the tools for informing employers typically do not feature as a sepa-
rate service, but are included in various services. some of the information 
services could be clearly connected to either the employer or the jobseeker, 
whereas in other services they are connected to both at the same time. tasks 
defined in the regulations that belong here include: provision of labour-market 
and employment information services, local (area) employment counselling 
(employment office, 2011), maintaining contact with employers in job place-
ment, service contract with employers (ibid.) and (rather as an idea for the 
future) providing labour-market information to employers.12
as part of the Hungarian professional standards – following the international 
trends mentioned above – more emphasis was given to serving employers; 
however, the provision of information is limited by certain general features 
and problems of the pes. in practice, supplying labour-market information 
has meant informing unemployed people rather than employers. the primary 
goal of maintaining contact with employers has been to explore vacancies 
and draw attention to allowances – and, to a lesser extent, to provide more 
general information by making them aware of trends.13
10 We measure the chances of find-
ing a job by observing how many peo-
ple got a job between two quarters of 
the LFS. We made a probit estimation 
for the years from 2000 to 2010 for 
the registered unemployed and the 
job-seeking unemployed. Among the 
explanatory variables were registered 
and jobseeker status, and interac-
tion of those with the indicator for 
PES usage. 
11 We give no details here on the 
estimation; it is available from the 
authors on request.
12 See the protocol mentioned in 
footnote 9 (Providing labour mar-
ket information to employers, SROP 
2.6.1.).
13 Only the comprehensive protocol 
on development plans treats provi-
sion of information to employers as 
a separate service.
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at the end of the 2000s, important measures were enshrined in eu programmes 
to strengthen relations with employers: a network of full-time agents was 
set up in the pes head office to liaise with large businesses, and a dedicated 
internet portal was created.14 the pes’s routine operations, however, still 
relied heavily on employers initiating contact. mirroring the situation with 
jobseekers, in practice there is little sign of any planning of staff capacity. 
Disproportionately great attention is paid to certain employers, for whom the 
service is free (as it is for all). the provision of information to clients can thus 
fall victim to a backlog of tasks – perhaps caused by growing unemployment 
or a change in the rules governing unemployment benefits. as soon as there 
is an expansion in the number of employers who maintain contact with local 
job centres – as has recently been the case – those offices immediately face 
serious capacity limits.
the essential elements of international best practice appear in the profes-
sional standards, and primarily in the service standards. these are, first, to 
emphasize the various flexible forms of employment and to inform smaller 
businesses about matters of which they may have little knowledge (efficient 
selection and orientation methods, the relationship between the internal 
and external labour market); second, to offer the quarterly manpower survey 
providing information on supply and demand by labour-market segments; 
third, to provide documentation and share experiences within the pes of 
maintaining contact. the local job centres also do this in practice; however, 
maintaining contact is still largely carried out in a traditional way (focusing 
on vacancies and benefits).
the element most lacking from local job centre practice (and from ideas for 
further development) is a guarantee of professionalism and fairness in providing 
personalized information to employers. one of the goals of maintaining contact 
is to get to know the main job requirements, but up until now the application 
of suitable methods and the adoption of tried and tested enterprise workforce 
management methods have been only sporadic and unsustainable. Chapter 6.2 
describes a few cases where international trends of intervention in hiring and 
workplace training are to be found even in Hungarian practice.
generally speaking, despite the range of available tools and services, both 
employers and unemployed are averse to using job placement services. there 
are other reasons for this, besides the relatively modest returns of the extensive 
job search. those who are searching for a job know that job placement is not 
the most popular way to fill a vacancy, and they suspect – not without reason 
– that employers opt for this route to fill low-quality, hard-to-fill vacancies. 
the least-attractive vacancies hang around and accumulate on the register. 
employers are also mistrustful of applicants from an employment service, 
because they know that those who can get a job more easily tend to avoid 
such services, and that clients of employment services are less productive 
than average. this applies especially to the public employment service, which 
has also to deal with those people for whom private employment services are 
unable to offer a job. moreover, all the unemployed who receive benefits are 
obliged to register with thepes. the combined effect of all this is that the most 
unsuccessful jobseekers and the long-term unemployed are concentrated in 
the public employment service (nagy, 1999).
14 The pilot period of the job agent 
system was carried out within the 
SROP 1.3.1 programme in 2009–10, 
when 14 agents explored vacancies in 
an unprecedented and concentrated 
way. Since 2011, the number of agents 
has been increased to 40. By main-
taining contact with large enterprises, 
the head office of the PES expects the 
system to harmonize the activities of 
those job centres involved through 
countrywide recruitment campaigns, 
and to make information dissemina-
tion more efficient and simpler for 
the employers. 
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there are only a few empirical results available from the 2000s on the use of 
job placement services and the success rate. the conclusion is that the client 
groups of the pes are heterogeneous, and that placement services – compared 
to other tools – are relatively important, but in many cases are not the most 
important tool. according to certain assessments (ipsos, 2011),15 pes services 
are the second most frequently used hiring mechanism (24 per cent), with 
only informal channels used more often (29 per cent). it seems that one of 
the important observable characteristics is the frequency of contact. møller 
(2003) analyses a business sample,16 from which it appears that those busi-
nesses that had maintained regular contact with the employment service over 
the previous two years hired nearly half (44 per cent) of their new employees 
through the employment service.
some unrepresentative information indicates that the client group also varies 
by sector: , certain industries in the private sector – e.g. transport, commerce, 
tourism and hospitality – are underrepresented among enterprises that main-
tain regular contact with the employment service (møller, 2003).
businesses that want to hire blue-collar workers use the pes more than 
businesses that are seeking white-collar workers (nagy and kopasz, 2010).17 
a third (34 per cent) of white-collar workers are hired through the employment 
service (while advertising is heavily used). the share claimed by the employ-
ment service is slightly bigger for blue-collar workers (40 per cent), and the 
proportion of advertising is the same as for white-collar recruitment; however 
the role of internet as a tool is smaller. moreover, private employment services 
are used relatively frequently to hire white-collar staff, and informal methods 
are commonly used in the case of blue-collar workers.
the use of the pes in hiring appears to depend to some extent on the size of 
the enterprise (ipsos, 2011): it is used less by enterprises with fewer than nine 
employees (14 per cent) and by enterprises with more than 1,000 employees 
(19 per cent). according to this study, the pes’s main client group is formed of 
enterprises with between 10 and 1,000 employees: for this group, job place-
ment through the pes is the most frequent way of hiring (around 30 per cent) 
and is even overtaking informal search.
unfortunately, it would seem that not only are job placement services used by 
only a subset of companies, but in general they are not especially successful, 
despite the efforts made. in this respect, important differences can be seen 
between subsidised and non-subsidised vacancies. the number of successful 
job placements into non-subsidised vacancies between 2004 and 2009 fell 
almost throughout the period. the number of successful job placements into 
assisted vacancies increased from year to year (except in 2007, the year of 
regional restructuring, when there was a dramatic, 30 per cent drop in this 
category over the previous year). Within all open vacancies, the proportion of 
subsidised vacancies was above 50 per cent in most of the counties and (not 
surprisingly) the figure is high in areas with the worst labour-market situation. 
During the period examined, as a whole the share of successful job placements 
for non-subsidised vacancies got smaller and smaller (berde, 2010).18
15 As part of their joint research 
(Labour market prognosis, 2009) 
Ipsos Zrt., the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Labour, the PES, regional 
chambers and the Institute for Eco-
nomic and Enterprise Research (MKIK 
GVI) examined inter alia the labour 
market  share of the PES on a rep-
resentative sample of 7,500 within 
the TÁMOP 1.3.1 project (Ipsos, 2011).
16 The size of the sample includes 
670 enterprises. The survey was car-
ried out in such a way that the 20 
local job centres who were involved 
in the pilot project recommended 60 
enterprises each for the sample; of 
those, 40 enterprises used the serv-
ices of the PES, and 20 did not use; 
the response rate was slightly more 
than 50 per cent. Due to the compo-
sition of the sample, the survey was 
most suited to indicating the most 
critical problems. 
17 Within the research carried out 
in the plant units using the so called 
‘linked survey method’, Nagy and 
Kopasz (2010) analyse those survey 
questions that were asked of manag-
ers about the information channels 
used to hire workers. The sample 
consisted of nearly 1,000 plant units 
in the private sector that had at least 
10 employees. Since firms with fewer 
than 10 employees were not included, 
and since the figures for companies 
with more than 250 employees are 
unreliable (due to the small number of 
items), the results cannot be regarded 
as valid for the Hungarian labour mar-
ket as a whole. 
18 In 2004 the referred rate was 41 
per cent, and it had dropped to 32 per 
cent by 2006; after a small drop in the 
next two years, by 2009 the propor-
tion of the non-assisted vacancies 
among the successful job placements 
stood at 23 per cent. 
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efficiency of the pes’s job plAcement service 
the pes’s success with job placements also depends on settlement type. the 
role of internet advertising and the significant differences in the intervention 
level of local job centres are features worthy of attention (nagy and kopasz, 
2010). local job centres in budapest are used less frequently than in the 
countryside and their success rates are lower: they have a 10 per cent rate 
for successful job placement of blue-collar workers and only 5 per cent for 
white-collar staff. meanwhile, the success rate for hiring blue-collar workers 
for businesses in villages is 43 per cent. Differences in the use of internet and 
newspaper advertisements are significant too; however, the use of informal 
recruitment methods varies only slightly by settlement type.
the already low success rate and the further decline in job placement success 
indicators may have been influenced by many factors. the increasing proportion 
of people who have found a job without assistance in recent years – despite 
the employment rate barely rising – may indicate that the pes has success-
fully concentrated on the provision of information. in that case, it is hardly 
a problem if the proportion of direct job placements has fallen within the 
pool of non-subsidised vacancies. the huge proportion of unfilled vacancies 
might be explained if these are lower in quality than the jobs whose informa-
tion is readily accessible through self-service. a qualitative examination of the 
service tools and organizational processes, however, does not indicate any 
such reshaping of activities. quite the opposite: it indicates a concentration 
on direct job placement and the underdevelopment of self-service information 
– a trend that is possibly a result of the introduction of performance evalua-
tion and the method used to calculate the indicators measuring the lifespan 
of vacancies19 (on this see Chapter 6.2).
according to previous empirical studies, for blue-collar workers it is still usual 
for most information that actually leads to employment to come through 
informal channels. it is a new development in the case of white-collar staff 
that formal channels have gained the upper hand: most likely white-collar 
applicants are using the internet differently. the development and spread of 
mobile communications and the internet may improve the quality and acces-
sibility of information put out through formal channels, while the opportunity 
to pick up information informally need not necessarily decrease. borbély-
pecze (2009) suggests that public and private service suppliers might ensure 
joint monitoring of the quality of labour-force information and it could be 
in their mutual interests to increase the use of formal channels. the author 
gives internet real estate as an example and makes recommendations on how 
to improve labour-market services; however, at present in Hungary these 
recommendations are more by way of potential aspirations. they all accord 
with the recommendations and trends presented in relation to the pHaRe 
project that preceded eu accession; a central element of that project is to 
have information provided without the local job centres playing a direct role, 
in such a way that unemployed people and unfilled vacancies can find each 
other (Hansen, 2003).
19 The lifespan of a vacancy is the 
elapsed time from registration until 
the vacancy is filled or ceases to exist.
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recommendAtions
the way in which the Hungarian public employment service provides labour-
market information differs significantly from the recommendations made 
at the time of preparation for eu accession. this would not necessarily be 
a problem if, during the ongoing development processes since 2002, there 
had been any analysis of the advantages, risks and system-level correlations, 
and if a different but consistent information model had been set up. However, 
no alternative has been worked out to the recommendation that would form 
the basis for modernization, which mainly concerns the categorization of 
clients and an increasing move towards a self-service system. if this indicates 
a change of goal, it should be explicitly recorded. Failing this, there is a risk 
that development will take place without the requisite frameworks and that 
clients will receive information only on haphazardly.
managing vacancies by undertaking proper, methodical support and monitoring 
in addition to (rather than instead of) activation and proper human resource 
services would also increase the effectiveness of activation. it would be a good 
idea to work out protocols for both, paying particular attention to the possible 
complementary nature of the two activities.
With regard to the efficiency of pes information activities, no empirical infor-
mation is available. it would be a good idea to initiate research, if possible, that 
differentiates between specific information tools and target groups. it needs 
to be investigated which tools make it possible to reach employers more 
effectively and in larger numbers than at present, and these should be applied 
in practice. the provision of information to employers – especially small and 
medium-sized enterprises – must be balanced.
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6. ReDuCing tRansaCtion Costs
6.2. informing jobSeekerS and employerS – intereStS  
lajos bóDis
of the tasks facing the Hungarian public employment service (pes), seeking 
out and publicizing vacancies are two that are of outstanding importance. the 
quantity, quality and availability of the vacancies offered are strongly influ-
enced by the internal operations of the local job centres. the present chapter 
investigates this in detail. there have only been a handful of studies on the 
topic in Hungary, and therefore we have supplemented our analysis of the 
results of the various research studies with document analysis and interviews. 
lacking reliable data from the past, our ability to reconstruct the changes in 
the practices of job centres has been rather limited.
interests And role conflicts of providing informAtion  
And plAcement services
the relationship of those involved with labour market information services 
can be appropriately modelled by the principal-agent theory (bódis, 2002). 
the theory concerns itself with situations where one party (the principal) 
commissions another party (agent) to perform a task because he is unable 
to do it himself or it is not worth his while doing it. the principal has to deal 
with an information gap and faces the risk that the agent may be incompetent 
or may fail to act to the principal’s advantage. However, by applying a variety 
of selection, motivation and monitoring practices, one can prevent the risks 
stemming from opportunistic behaviour (milgrom and Roberts, 2005).
the pes offers services to employers and unemployed people alike, at the same 
time acting as an authority over them. as a service provider it is their agent, 
but as an authority (in the role of the principal) it may monitor compliance 
with the law. at the same time the local job centre is an agent of the national 
employment office as well as of the ministry responsible for employment 
policy (addison et al., 2010).
the pes must represent the interests of both employers and jobseekers: only 
then can it be effective. but this also presents an inherent conflict of roles: 
both groups must be regarded as principals! since recruiting is costly for the 
employer, he expects the job centre to pre-screen applicants. if, however, 
companies perceive that the centre disregards their interests – in other words, 
if they are dissatisfied with the quality of jobseekers referred by the agency 
– in future they will not make use of its services. permanent cooperation also 
prompts the job centre to consider company interests. should the employment 
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agency convince the company to hire an unsuitable workforce, the firm is likely 
to dismiss him in the future and, due to the unpleasant experience, withdraw 
from dealing with agency altogether.
a company might strive to satisfy its urgent expansion needs by raising wages 
and spreading the word more widely. as a result, it may temporarily occupy 
a central position on the labour market, as if it was the sole employer. in other 
words (in accordance with the monopsony model) it can gain more manpower 
by raising wages (ehrenberg and smith, 2012). However, it is only worthwhile 
and possible to offer higher wages than the competitors if the less obvious 
skills and efforts of employees have a significant influence on the overall 
performance of the company. this is not characteristic of mass production 
(with the exception of automotive plants assembling products of a high unique 
value). another way of increasing applications is to boost the reputation of 
the company through a recruitment campaign. this may be combined with 
higher-than-average wage rates (except for public placement services, given 
that their jobseeker clientele is of a different composition).
instead of addressing rapid expansion needs, it is a more frequent concern 
to replace departing staff or, at most, to provide for gradual growth. in this 
case, it may be sufficient (especially for companies of great renown) to accept 
applications ‘on spec’ or applications from people recommended by employees, 
as well as to contact candidates on the company files. this route of attracting 
applicants is faster, and the composition of candidates more favourable than 
is often offered by state-run job centres. Hence even companies that require 
such services at production launch or when there is a need for rapid staff 
increase are likely to loosen the relationship with the job centre later on.
Figure 1: Roles performed by the public placement service 
as an authority and service provider
Note: The arrows point from the principal to the agent, the numbers denote the relation.
Role  
as a service provider
1.
3.
2.
4.
unemployed
Providing appropriate 
quantity and quality  
of jobs
Providing appropriate 
quantity and quality 
of candidates
Mandatory job reg-
istration, employing 
foreigners, prohibiting 
discrimination
Monitoring the eligi-
bility criteria of the 
unemployment benefits, 
enforcing cooperation 
requirements
Company
Role as an authority
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if we focus solely on job placement as a service, it is reasonable to suppose that 
the goal of jobseekers is to find employment, that of companies is to employ 
productive staff; and as an agent for both, the job centre aims to match them 
appropriately. in addition to this, however, state-run job centres also monitor 
adherence to various laws and regulations, in which role they act as a principal 
of unemployed people and employers alike. the simultaneous roles as service 
provider and authority fulfilled by the job centre are a source of further role 
conflicts, summed up by Figure 1.
it is an official task of the pes to decide if the unemployed are eligible for 
unemployment benefit: whether they take the steps prescribed in order to find 
employment and whether they accept job offers that suit their level of qualifi-
cation (role no. 3). in this relation, the unemployed person is an agent of the 
job centre and can avoid keeping his end of the agreement if his cooperation 
is purely nominal. this question is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 4.1; 
in the present chapter we concern ourselves with its direct implications for 
job placement.
the job centre may only chart the features of jobseekers and employers partially, 
and it can rarely provide unambiguous justification for a failed partnership 
attempt. it would be unacceptable to employers if the job centre assessed 
the entitlement of all unemployed people at their expense, citing powers 
vested by law (see the conflict between principal-agent relation no. 2 and 3). 
this would rather prompt them to circumvent the pes , in the same way as 
failure to pre-screen applicants would. the optimal degree of pre-screening 
as performed by the job centre also depends on assessing the contradictory 
consequences of a strict application of authority.
What happens if the unemployed person identified by the job centre does 
not want to enter employment? Deliberately poor performance on the entry 
test will probably remain hidden, as the actual result will render the applicant 
unsuitable. if the company accepts all applicants, the reluctant candidate 
may reveal his unwillingness openly. in this case jobseeker and employer may 
agree to cite inadequacy as the reason for the unsuccessful placement, thus 
avoiding disqualification from unemployment benefit. if, however, the company 
is unwilling to follow this course of action and it forces the unemployed person 
to accept the position, and if that person then leaves the company soon after 
or else acts in a disruptive fashion, that can prove rather costly. since dealing 
with people referred by the job centre also incurs certain costs, mass place-
ment of those unwilling to work may drive the company to avoid the pes in 
the long run.
in spite of the costs associated with the workforce fluctuation and undisciplined 
behaviour, some companies that offer unattractive wages and/or working 
conditions may decide to use the threat of disqualification from unemployment 
benefit to fill their vacancies. employment service officials are reluctant to send 
unemployed people to these plants, citing reasons of fairness. additionally, 
they may not be disposed to shoulder the psychological burden of disqualifi-
cation, even if that is part of their job. in other words, if they cannot decide 
whether the blame lies with the employer or with the disruptive behaviour 
of the employee (conflict between principal-agent relationships no. 1 and 3), 
they are likely to suppose the former.
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in Hungary, the pes is licensed to take action regarding the mandatory reporting 
of vacancies and the authorization of foreigners work permits. it is likewise 
responsible for ensuring that there is no discrimination in the hiring process: 
the pesenforces compliance with the rule that says that any decision to hire 
is legally based on considerations of personal ability.
monitoring the eligibility criteria of the unemployment benefit and acting 
against discrimination in hiring (principal-agent relation no. 3 and 4) are 
compatible with each other. if the job centre refers a member of a group that 
is discriminated against, deeming them suitable for the position based on 
their personal merits, this causes a conflict between the authority and the 
employer (principal-agent relation no. 2 and 4) as well as between the authority 
and the unemployed person unwilling to work (principal-agent relation no. 1 
and 3). there is no such conflict if the authority adjusts to discrimination and 
ensures that the company’s criteria are entirely met during the pre-screening 
process. Discrimination in hiring is advantageous to those unemployed people 
who violate the criteria for receiving unemployment benefit: since they are 
offered fewer vacancies, they are more likely to stay as unemployment benefit 
recipients. this kind of behaviour, whether exhibited by the employer or the 
jobseeker, has a negative impact on the common good. at the same time, moti-
vation is difficult to achieve, as the parties involved are mutually uninterested 
in a successful placement.
goAls And developments defining the functioning of the pes 
the goals of the pes concerning information on jobs and jobseekers have 
barely changed in the past 20 years. in the early 1990s, providing information 
to employers and jobseekers was not considered an important task (as with 
other services). in the second half of the decade, however, with economic 
growth, the role of the employer regained its value and the focus shifted 
primarily to start-ups. the eu projects launched after the millennium further 
strengthened employer orientation, at least in the declared strategy of the 
pes network.
in the 1990s there was no single, government-supported and consistently used 
concept to improve the efficiency of the employment service. in the middle of 
the decade, the discourse shifted from motivating and monitoring methods 
meant to improve efficiency toward the dilemma of combining or separating 
the tasks of authority and service functions, even though international prac-
tice1 and theoretical considerations likewise suggest that efficiency depends 
on other factors, such as less obvious organizational features. as observed by 
larsen and vesan (2011), in order to achieve efficiency, the management should 
not only be able to define what effective motivation and the right strategic 
choices are for the organization as a whole, but should also specify exactly 
what these mean for the individual professional procedures. in the view of 
milgrom and Roberts (2005), in turn, the key is planning and reinterpreting 
the explicit and implicit agreements that link the employment service officials 
with each other and their clients on a daily basis. that way cooperation pays 
off better than gaining advantage at each other’s expense. lastly, Williamson 
(1991) asserts that even if the functions of authority and service provider 
1 In international practice, both mod-
els are widespread and the direction of 
transformations is also not clear-cut.
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are separated, they have to be harmonized. if they are integrated, differing 
responsibilities have to be delineated. in sum, the institution is a hybrid either 
way, and the solution lies in the exact efficiency criteria.
there has been no clear-cut professional standpoint on the conceptual contra-
dictions that emerged in the second half of the 1990s, when a mass need for 
corporate manpower became apparent. in all likelihood, this provided ample 
leeway to the local directors of the employment service to adjust to the situ-
ation at any given time. the efficiency of placement and providing information 
may have been damaged by local practices carried out without due reflection.
at the turn of the twenty-first century, as a basis for the modernization 
programme already alluded to in Chapter 6.1, a comprehensive development 
strategy was produced regarding the information-providing tasks of the 
employment service. However, the administration never followed up its actual 
implementation. the core idea of the ‘new service model’ that the strategy 
proposed was that, in order to provide valuable information services, precise 
targeting was necessary (Hansen, 2003). in the first place, it is indispensable 
that all jobseekers should be able to access information pertaining to vacancies, 
including through the internet.2 on the other hand, they had to ensure that 
only those who were confused by the system and were unable to find a job 
would be given counselling and individual case management. We will see that 
the daily routine of job centres differs significantly from this on more than 
one point – or at least the transformation is slow.
the recommendations set out by Hansen (2003) have only been further 
expounded in a limited number of analyses known to a small audience (for 
instance borbély-pecze, 2009; ergoFit, 2008; németh et al., 2011). the devel-
opment of an employment code system necessary for competence-based 
recruitment was indeed launched within the framework of a central platform 
(borbély et al., 2008), but the programme was halted because (to the best 
of our knowledge) decision-makers deemed its application too complicated, 
the prerequisites surpassing the capacity of the service. the use of a simpler 
version of competence-based recruitment that can be developed locally (kun 
et al., 2008) remains sporadic; widespread evaluation or dissemination never 
came to pass.
the eu-funded development project brought with it the centralization of 
development initiatives: the position of the national pes headquarters strength-
ened considerably, while the importance of local (county-level) job centres 
declined. the job information system was unified as part of the programme, 
and a management evaluation system (mbo) based on performance indica-
tors was developed.3 in order to achieve uniform quality, best-practice labour 
market services were enshrined as standards at the end of the 2000s.4
the centralization, however, had little effect on the daily routine of individual 
job centres. a high sense of methodological independence has been a feature 
of job centre staff since the foundation of the employment service. While the 
legal background is regulated down to the smallest detail and the internal 
standard operating procedures (sops) also provide a  legal-it framework 
(for instance FszH 2007), the specification of methodological guidelines has 
been seen neither as indispensable nor as a management task (bajka, 2001). 
job centres tend to rely on individual practices, and it is uncommon for the 
2 In accordance with the employment 
strategy of the EU, Member States 
had to provide that by 2005 the latest.
3 The Management by Objectives 
(MBO) system, based on performance 
indicators and widely used in other 
EU Member States, has been in use 
in the Hungarian PES since 2005. For 
further information see Chapter 3.3.
4 The specif ication of the stan-
dards was carried out by boards 
of experts within the TÁMOP 2.6.1 
project (Social Renewal Operational 
Programme). The standards comprise 
about 40 kinds of services. For further 
information consult Chapter 6.1 or 
visit http://www.tamop261.hu.
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management to invest time and attention in organized comparisons or joint 
discussion of methodological findings; a tendency that has not changed since 
the 1990s.
contrAdictory locAl development efforts
the local and central developments aimed at providing information and recruit-
ment services have rather tended to run their separate courses, instead of 
being a joint effort. there are no comprehensive data available about the 
procedures as they are actually implemented at the job centres. However, even 
a few documented cases suffice to point out the vast differences between 
local strategies.
the goal of a typical development effort that emerged in the 1990s was to 
enhance the intensity of participation in the employer’s admission procedures 
, as well as to improve its quality. the employment service strove to screen 
applicants using extensive mechanisms. Furthermore, participation in selec-
tion was not limited to the neediest of clients, and the job centre did its best 
to ensure that jobseekers were able to access the list of vacancies (janovics, 
1998, 1999a,b; adorján, 2000). the basic principle of the method was the joint 
analysis of vacancies on offer, the identification of skills and competences 
necessary for the successful applicant, the selection of appropriate admis-
sion tests and a degree of involvement in the screening process. Financial 
support for the admissions testing, combined with joint supervision, may 
prompt an employer to abandon group-based discrimination of jobseekers. 
this may prove to be a ‘carrot and stick’ kind of recommendation to improve 
the targeting of services, especially considering that large mass producers in 
a state of rapid expansion cannot really avoid the involvement of the state-run 
placement service. From a professional point of view, this is a more meaningful 
practice than unsystematic arbitrary selection by the job centre, based on 
vague instructions from the company. the procedure (rooted in the second 
half of the 1990s) has recently been developed further as the so-called equal 
programme (kun et al., 2008). 
another branch of local developments aimed at providing information to small 
and medium-sized enterprises. personal participation at discussion events 
was the main focus of the effort, apart from a self-service job information 
portal developed by county experts well ahead of Hungary’s eu membership 
and the joint pHaRe programme. this spread through the western counties 
primarily: the austrian public employment service and ministry (with the 
special involvement of a few leading officials) showed great interest in the 
partner organizations across the border well before Hungary joined the eu, 
and a dialogue was initiated back in the 1990s. the fact that there were no 
dominant corporations in the area facilitated the development efforts. the 
small and medium-sized enterprises naturally presented themselves as the 
ideal target group for the service. Furthermore, in recent years, the Hungarian 
pes recommended on a regional level the acquisition of opten llc.’s company 
information database. an algorithm was developed to identify start-ups, and 
job centres were offered to them through a combination of letters, emails 
and phone calls. 
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the diversification of local developments might have been prompted by the 
competition existing between counties and experts. lamentably, the same 
rivalry blocked the exchange of experience, the spread of good practice and the 
correction of conceptual and methodological mistakes. the ongoing ‘demar-
cation disputes’ between higher levels of administration and the lack of any 
tradition of cross-county cooperation also contributed to the phenomenon.
stAndArd operAting procedures And ActuAl routine
the practical procedures show a significantly greater stability than the changes 
on the labour market or in the service concepts.5 organizational attributes 
unaffected by the launch of the Hungarian pes may be a possible explanation 
for this. the potential mistakes anticipated by Hansen (2003) among others 
did indeed happen in the active practice of the employment service. to the 
best of our knowledge, no systematic assessment of effects measured the 
fulfilment of the recommendations set out in the developmental concept that 
served as the basis of the modernization effort. We can draw some conclu-
sions on the service methods and related organizational procedures, based 
on a few qualitative studies and some data system analysis. these were veri-
fied and amended using data from the interview-based research conducted 
for the current volume.
the introduction of the management evaluation system based on perfor-
mance indicators opened the door to evaluation and management feedback of 
varying intensities. this had a motivating effect on local job centres to achieve 
the performance indicators. the consequences of underperformance may 
have been different in the individual counties and regions, but according to 
the testimony of the interviewees they were never more severe than listing 
the job centres in question, obliging them to justify their failure to comply 
with the indicators, and the occasional verbal reprimand. statistical record 
keeping in itself is not a sufficient leadership tool to supervise the provision 
of information: the regulation and qualitative monitoring of work processes 
is also necessary.6
there are several circumstances showing that the introduction of the mbo was 
at least partly a nominal act, in accordance with the predictions of contract 
theory (milgrom and Roberts, 2005). in the view of berde (2010), an increasing 
intensity of performance is reported by services that are included in the evalu-
ation (while the results indicator steadily declines), whereas the services not 
included in the evaluation gradually fade from the records (but probably not 
from practice, though that is difficult to monitor, and can only be done with 
qualitative tools).7
tArgeting, quAlity And Accessibility of job informAtion
there are few signs indicating that the pes would have considered the strict 
conceptual logic needed to distribute clients and the capacity of the staff. effi-
ciency is likely to suffer badly if either is mishandled. the ‘new service model’ 
placed great emphasis on refining targeting; another of its indispensable 
elements would be the profiling of clients in order to assist in assigning them 
5 By way of example, prior to the 
ministerial decree on providing 
labour market services, on the official 
vacancy registration formula in use 
until the autumn of 2000 there were 
two openly discriminatory questions: 
the age and gender of the desired 
applicants. In an interview-based sur-
vey conducted shortly afterwards, job 
centre staff asserted that employers 
continued to verbally specify these 
wishes, a practice with which job cen-
tre staff could find no fault (Bódis, 
2002).
6 The ‘disappearance’ of one of the 
services (providing labour market and 
employment-related information) 
from among the activities registered 
with the MBO also seems to point 
to that. This is the service with the 
most flexible boundaries; its recom-
mended duration was not even speci-
fied. It may take place over the span 
of a short conversation or within the 
framework of a job fair. The exclusion 
of the service from the list of indica-
tors may be explained by a reluctance 
to include as a motivational indicator 
an activity that is so hard to measure. 
The local job centres subsequently 
lost interest in updating their records, 
though it is reasonable to suppose 
that they continued to share infor-
mation regarding the labour market 
conditions and chances of employ-
ment in the region. The demonstrated 
intensity of information provision on 
the labour market declined in 2007, 
as did all other services. In 2008 it 
saw the smallest growth rate of all 
the services – a phenomenon that 
Berde (2010) attributes to a lack of 
motivation.
7 Cf. pre-MBO results indicators, 
which varied by county (Kaucsek et 
al., 2006), may have contributed to 
the variety of tools used for sending 
notifications.
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to the right kind of service. nevertheless, this element slowly died away with 
the implementation of the programme. in the daily routine, they rarely use 
even its simple form incorporated into the new information system (Cseres-
gergely and scharle, 2010).
the reliability of information regarding vacancies would be of primary impor-
tance, too, its main assurance being that the employers and jobseekers take 
responsibility for it themselves by uploading and (if necessary) modifying 
their data. major errors can be screened out if the pes renounces its right to 
directly supervise the input of information and allows participants to do that 
(as they have an interest in having accurate data). What is needed for that is 
the deliberate development of a nationally unified system and the intervention 
(as needed) of a few resident specialists in the pes headquarters.
the modernization programme, however, introduced a results indicator that 
rewards the rapid placement of jobseekers and fast response times to manpower 
needs. this motivates the job centre staff to refrain from entering the vacancy 
into the system until they have some assurance that the jobseeker they have 
identified as suitable for the position really is going to be employed by the 
company. in the meantime, those jobseekers who would be identified (possibly 
earlier) as suitable by a competence test are not informed about the existence 
of this position (Hasen, 2003). Research data demonstrate that the average 
lifespan of vacancies decreased in supported and unsupported workplaces alike 
throughout almost the entire period (berde, 2010),8 which suggests that the 
indicator is indeed prompting job centre staff to withhold information.
Finally, several job centres reported that the self-service computer kiosks are 
rarely used, which is obviously at odds with the recommendation of the pHaRe 
project (Hansen 2003). the fact that the typical clientele of the employment 
service (people with elementary schooling or vocational training) usually 
perform worse at reading and writing tasks than their western counterparts 
of the same age may play a part in this (köllő, 2008). this is why they may 
have an increased need for a user friendly interface (cf. Chapter 6.1) and to be 
provided with assistance in using the terminal to find information for them-
selves; however, the conditions necessary for that are not present. another 
potential explanation may be that uploaded information relating to vacancies 
is incomplete (we will return to the reasons for this later), which casts doubt 
on the point of using public access internet databases. 
the locAl employment centre As A plAcement Agency
Hansen (2003) emphasizes that the ill-considered organizational solutions 
may damage the efficiency of the service provider model. only a  limited 
number of jobseekers should be involved in the cases that merit individual 
treatment, since these are time consuming and staff capacity is finite. Hansen 
provides the example of pre-screening for the employer as a critical activity, 
where professional treatment is as important as thorough knowledge of the 
job description and the skills of the applicants. these significant staff needs 
constitute a reason for targeted use, in only a few important cases.
the efficiency of placement service is damaged not only by lenient pre-screening 
practices (and consequently low willingness to cooperate on the part of the 
8 The exception is the 2009 launch 
of the so-called Way to Work pro-
gramme, when the changes in cri-
teria posed greater organizational 
difficulties to the local job centres 
than before. Admittedly, they tried 
to locate suitable applicants for all 
vacancies on offer in a  little over 
a month, or vacancies ceased to exist 
within that time frame (Berde, 2010).
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employer) but also by overly strict practices (and consequently, a low number 
of vacancies). From the employer’s point of view, the pes may be an attractive 
choice for those who can only afford less (or who are only willing to pay less) 
for admissions testing. the prevalence of pre-screening using inadequate 
individual methods and the insistence on the direct influence of job centre 
staff may result in a low level of information distribution regarding the services 
and clientele of the pes. 
However, job centres traditionally ascribe great importance to pre-screening, 
viewing it as the ultimate assurance that an employer’s needs will be met (bódis, 
2002; 2008). apart from a general strategy of favouring employers’ needs, 
one explanation could be that pre-screening has always been a fundamental 
part of pes employees’ skill set and job perception. this mindset can only 
be changed by persistent efforts on the part of the management, and with 
considerable spending on training, monitoring, etc.
During the economic boom in the second half of the 1990s, ambitious managers 
and experts in the county employment centres were the engines for the provi-
sion of information services aimed at companies.9 this was especially true of 
the western counties, where the first multinational companies appeared and 
where the job centre’s ability to respond to increasing manpower demand 
had a direct impact on the social appreciation of the services. they failed 
to realize that this degree of involvement in the recruitment campaigns of 
multinationals could not be sustained, and in later years they had no faith that 
another service model could bring them similar appreciation.
pre-screening is an important element of the strategy favouring employer 
needs. the two characteristic types of clients are mass producers either 
just starting up or in a state of rapid expansion, and small and medium-sized 
enterprises that need financial assistance beyond recruitment services. they 
often require the job centre to pre-screen applicants. the exact job descrip-
tion is often composed with the involvement of a job centre administrator, 
thus presenting an opportunity for screening. the cases we looked at seem 
to suggest that some companies applying similar technologies are not willing 
to spend a large amount on admissions screening and prefer to rely on the 
experience of job centre staff instead. Whether a job offer is made is often 
down to simple methods based on the administrator’s own experience. 
according to accounts shared in the interviews, employers with wage-subsidized 
vacancies are even more likely to require pre-screening by employment offi-
cers. typically, these are small companies with modest recruitment resources 
at their disposal, often comprising informal methods. public works organized 
by the local authority is a special case where self-servicing and self-selection 
are not really an option. prior to the 2009 introduction of the Way to Work 
programme, it was not uncommon for employers to have personalized require-
ments, whether the public works scheme was organized by the local govern-
ment or by the local job centre (bódis and nagy, 2008).
between the partly conflicting goals and the clashing principal-agent relations, 
jobseekers’ access to relevant information suffered damage. in the middle of 
the 1990s, for instance, individual mentoring to aid the employment of perma-
nently unemployed people was first administered in the region where the first 
multinational companies took root (berzsenyi, 2000; bódis, 2002; Rimányiné, 
9 Chapter 3.3 delves deeper into 
the capacities of county employment 
centres and local job centres, while 
the leeway for local policymaking is 
addressed in Chapter 2.4.
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2005). in order to satisfy labour needs, the local employment centre performed 
gender-based pre-screening as well, unreasonably narrowing down the scope 
of vacancies for jobseekers, including permanently unemployed people (bódis, 
2002). instead of reforming the procedure in use with disadvantaged applicants, 
it tried to aid their placement through additional expenditure. a type of bargain 
seemed to drive the practice of mentoring: in exchange for favours done in 
the past or promises for the future, the employer let the job centre convince 
it to accept a number of jobseekers that belonged to disadvantaged groups. it 
is easily imaginable that, with selection based on group traits, the duration of 
employment is shorter and public expenditure is higher than if the job centre 
had prompted the employer to screen applicants individually. 
Finally, extensive pre-screening places high demands on administrators working 
at understaffed job centres. at the same time, they themselves contribute to 
the perception that they are indispensable, making it doubtful that they are 
in favour of, or would actively support, the spread of self-service information 
kiosks.
self-selection And pre-screening
the importance attached to pre-screening also has an impact on further means 
of providing information, such as the method of registering jobs or informing 
jobseekers about job vacancies.10 job centres are aware that pre-screening 
performed without tests and other methodical procedures leaves much to be 
desired, which is why they are keen to rely on the self-selection of jobseekers. 
the official operating procedures11 allow for this by using non-obligatory notifica-
tion forms (ie. where refusal of the job offer is not sanctioned). the continuing 
increase in these channels and the differences between the practices of job 
centres also indicate that the mechanism is an important one.
the jobseeker typically receives a placement form (which it is compulsory to 
return) only if recruitment is assured. that has two advantages: first, jobseekers 
who are unsuitable or unwilling to work do not damage relations with the 
companies in question, and, second, job offers are rejected less frequently (for 
which jobseekers would otherwise be penalized). the methods of informing 
jobseekers, which have been used for some time, are as follows in the order 
of increasing self-selection:
 – A recruitment form is posted to the address of the client. pre-screening is 
only possible based on the database, and both non-appearance and rejec-
tion of the job offer (if no adequate reason is given) are usually penalized. 
this method is used in the case of urgent need for manpower and clear 
expectations as to the competencies required. it occurs if there is pressure 
from above or if the job centre wishes to penalize the jobseeker for another 
failing that is difficult to prove. 
 – A recruitment form is given to the jobseeker at the job centre. pre-screening 
is also possible during the personal meeting. it stands to reason that this 
is only used in the case of those who have already fulfilled the requirement 
of appearing in person at the job centre.
 – Letter informing the jobseeker of an offer. the jobseeker is called into the 
job centre to clarify mutual expectations and to decide whether or not 
10 On international trends and the 
conceptual and practical problems 
associated with mandatory job reg-
istration, see Chapter 6.1. The forms 
of notification used are discussed in 
this chapter because of the links to 
organizational structure. 
11 Currently: Standard Operating 
Procedures on Placement Service 
(FH 2011).
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a recruitment form should be issued. non-appearance is frequently not 
penalized, although in some cases it may be. this method is used when 
there is an urgent need for manpower. it qualifies as a special case if the job 
centre is not convinced that the employer will deliver on his promises with 
regard to working conditions, and if the job centre is therefore reluctant 
to apply penalties if the jobseeker rejects the offer.12
 – Letter informing the jobseeker about a group information session. the 
information session is held by the employer (which can also be a temporary 
work agency) with the cooperation, to a greater or lesser extent, of the job 
centre; the venue tends to be the job centre, a hired room or the site of the 
employer. non-appearance or rejection of the offer is rarely sanctioned, but 
it is not out of the question for the job centre to use more coercive means 
later.13 
self-selection plays a key role in the concept of Hansen (2003), discussed 
earlier in this chapter. this involves self-service that requires no administra-
tive input (rather than placement performed by the job centre staff). the 
division of capacities proposed by Hansen is in line with the comprehensive 
modernization ofplacement, such as activating jobseekers and combining the 
monitoring of independent job-seeking with support services (larsen and 
vesan, 2011). by contrast, the practices of job centres described above tend 
to impede the activation of jobseekers, since it is not clear when acceptance 
of the job offered is mandatory for the unemployed person, and when it is left 
to their own discretion.14
recommendAtions
international best practice does not provide clear guidance with regard to the 
dilemma of combining or separating the tasks of an authority and those of 
a service provider on an organizational level. both solutions are used in many 
countries, and both can be regarded as hybrid institutions, because the two 
roles need to be harmonized. in reality, the main point is that of encouraging 
cooperation. there are numerous specific institutional forms in which that 
can be carried out, but the choice of a single structure does not guarantee 
cooperation.
a clear development concept supported and supervised by the government is 
needed in order to promote information services more efficiently. When moni-
toring implementation, it is worth supplementing quantitative measurements 
and the management evaluation with qualitative observations and feedback 
from experts and peers. if assessments are performed only on the basis of 
numerical data collection and management evaluations, then there may be 
a strong incentive to manipulate the procedure, administrators may not receive 
professional assistance, and there may be a lack of collective selection and 
dissemination of good practice.
in the strategy for information services, it would be worth clarifying what 
role pre-screening, which has thus far been quite important, should play in 
placement. based on Hansen (2003), a significant reduction in interventions 
by administrators would be justified, even if that entails a change in some of 
12 Some companies competing to 
cut costs (such as the garment shops 
that performed contract work, which 
played a significant role in women’s 
employment in the countryside in the 
1990s) for the purpose of filling jobs 
requested that unemployed people 
refusing jobs be excluded from unem-
ployment benefit on the grounds that 
they had not satisfied the requirement 
of accepting a suitable job. 
13 Self-selection of jobseekers – by 
definition, allowing them total free-
dom – would mean their being able 
to upload their CVs to the database 
of the PES. However, despite plans 
to that effect, there is no such func-
tion on the www.munka.hu website.
14 Chapter 4.1 addresses the prob-
lems of activating jobseekers.
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the company clients. if we do not regard the widespread application of pre-
screening as problematic, then it should be performed more methodically, 
based on central and local developments to date.
if it is indeed true that the company clients of the pes apply poorer screening 
procedures than their competitors, it would be advisable to focus on perfecting 
them in order to improve matching and increase competitiveness. similarly, if 
the company clients rely more heavily on pes screening than their competitors, 
then group-based discrimination may be attributable to the job centres. it is 
worth analysing the placement process from this angle, since certain excessively 
subjective and unprofessional practices may endanger fairness and efficiency.
the more general dilemma underlying the issue of pre-screening is the role of 
self-service, a practice that is currently barely accessible to the clients of the 
pes (especially employers). that employment policy ascribes great importance 
to company relations is in stark contrast to the cumbersome procedure of job 
registration from a legal (upholding mandatory registration, legal guidelines) 
as well as a technical point of view (no self-service or electronic administra-
tion). several components of the procedure could, in all likelihood, be improved 
independently from addressing the more complex conceptual issues.
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6. ReDuCing tRansaCtion Costs
6.3. reconciliation of work and family life   
 – the impact of child allowanceS 
jános kÖllő
introduction
Hungary is one of those countries where, after giving birth, only a small 
proportion of women permanently leave the labour market (or do not even 
enter it), instead devoting their whole lives to their children and housekeeping. 
according to the labour Force survey of the Central statistical office, in the 
first quarter of 2008 overall only 14.5 per cent of mothers with (last-born) 
children aged 0–2 years stated that they had never worked. However, the rate 
is only significant for women with just primary (or lower) schooling (39 per 
cent); for better-qualified women the figure is only 3.6 per cent. later on, the 
majority of these mothers also start working: this is demonstrated by the fact 
that, of those women over the age of 35 and with dependent children, only 
15.3 per cent (of unqualified women) and 1.6 per cent (of qualified women) said 
they had never had a job. in Hungary, the prevalent strategy – indeed virtu-
ally the only strategy among better educated groups – is to have a shorter or 
a longer break after giving birth.
the optimal period for staying out of work is determined by the relative values 
of work and of staying at home. the first depends on the salary, the cost of 
childcare and whether parents believe a kindergarten will have a positive impact 
on the child’s cognitive and emotional development. the option of staying at 
home depends on the amount of child benefit, the value of the household 
production, the benefit gained from the increased amount of spare time, and 
the utility associated with home childcare.
the costs of childcare decrease significantly as the child gets older (e.g. because 
the network of kindergartens is denser than the network of day nurseries or 
because it is cheaper to organize the supervision of older children privately), 
and the relative benefits of formal versus home care for the development of 
the child also tend to increase significantly with age. in most cases, the point 
is reached when the net gain derived from a parent getting a job is higher than 
from staying at home. However, if the child cash benefit is generous; if the 
costs of getting to work and of child day-care facilities are high (or the quality 
of the childcare institutions is poor); if the return on household production 
is considerable; or if the expected salary level has decreased because of the 
time spent out of work, then this point may be reached quite late on. 
the factors influencing the duration of the stay at home also have an impact on 
fertility – and through this also increase or reduce the supply of labour in the 
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long term. if the system does not favour employment alongside child-rearing, 
then those women who appreciate professional success, who enjoy working, 
who derive self-esteem and a sense of purpose from work, who value the 
independence offered by having an income of their own and who relish the 
social relationships at work may decide to forgo motherhood.
as is widely known – and later on we will deal with this question in more detail 
– in Hungary the time a woman can spend at home and claim cash benefits 
after giving birth is extremely long by international standards. according to 
bálint and köllő (2008), mothers spend an average of 4.7 years at home before 
leaving the child support system (insured maternity leave called tgyás and 
gyed, and flat rate parental leave benefit gyes and gyet), which amounts to 
approximately 12 per cent of their active careers. in a back-of-the-envelope 
estimate, if this period were only half as long, it might increase aggregate 
employment by approximately 2.5–3 per cent. or, consider that the employment 
rate of mothers with children aged 0–6 is 35 percentage points less than the 
rate of women without children (for women aged 20–49, nagy, 2009: 87). in 
the eu-27, the gap is only 12.6 per cent, that is, roughly 25 percentage points 
smaller. the number of women aged 20–49 who have children aged 0–6 (i.e. 
wives, unmarried partners, single parents) is around half a million in Hungary. 
taking 25 per cent of this number yields 125 000, which would correspond to 
a 3.3 per cent increase in aggregate employment. since all efforts to increase 
the employment rate of those below retirement age have failed for a decade 
and a half – the rate remains at the 1998 level – we must regard as significant 
the aggregated employment loss due to the long stay at home.
shorter maternity leave could also stimulate a salary increase, as the earn-
ings of mothers returning to work (controlling for other factors) are lower 
(proportionate to the length of stay at home). later on we give more details 
on this. in the long run, a further loss in terms of employment occurs if the 
conflict between employment and maternity results in lower fertility rates – 
this question is still open, and we will return to this topic, too.
cAsh support for home childcAre in hungAry
the flat rate parental leave benefit (gyes), which is the basis of the system 
supporting the paid stay at home, was introduced in 1967, partly for population-
policy reasons and partly with the aim of siphoning off some of the unem-
ployment expected to be generated by the elimination of central economic 
planning. the insured parental leave (gyed) was introduced in 1985 (and in 
1986–87 was extended to two years) and the flat rate parental leave benefit 
for large families (gyet) came into being in 1993 – we assume that both the 
labour market and population policy aspects were taken into consideration. 
the first phase of the insured parental leave (tgyás), which covers a period of 
six months after (or around) giving birth, was established in its current form 
in the early 1990s (though it has a long history). see the comprehensive over-
view by tárkányi (2001/02) of the establishment of these systems and the 
study by blaskó (2010) of recent regulations. in the past 20 years there have 
been at least seven benefit regimes, which have differed from one another 
in important aspects – as table 1 shows. the following events marked the 
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turning points: the introduction of gyet (1993); the elimination of gyed, the 
introduction of means-testing for gyes and the loss of its insurance aspect 
(1995); the universal entitlement to gyes and gyet (1999); the reintroduction 
of gyed (2000); full-time employment permitted while claiming gyes (2006); 
a reduction in the duration of gyes to two years (2009); followed by its prolon-
gation to three years (2010). 
Table 1: The conditions of entitlement to parental leave benefits 
(gyed, gyes, gyet)*
Year Insured maternity leave (gyed)
Flat rate parental 
leave – gyes
Flat rate parental 
leave – gyet**
Regime 
type
1992 I, 2 years*** I, PT, 3 years – 1
1993 I, 2 years I, PT, 3 years I, M, PT, 8 years 1
1994 I, 2 years I, PT, 3 years I, M, PT, 8 years 1
1995 I, 2 years I, PT, 3 years I, M, PT, 8 years 1
1996 – M, PT, 3 years I, M, PT, 8 years 2
1997 – M, PT, 3 years I, M, PT, 8 years 2
1998 – M, PT, 3 years I, M, PT, 8 years 2
1999 – U, FTH, 3 years U, PT, 8 years 3
2000 I, 2 years U, FTH, 3 years U, PT, 8 years 4
2001 I, 2 years U, FTH, 3 years U, PT, 8 years 4
2002 I, 2 years U, FTH, 3 years U, PT, 8 years 4
2003 I, 2 years U, FTH, 3 years U, PT, 8 years 4
2004 I, 2 years U, FTH, 3 years U, PT, 8 years 4
2005 I, 2 years U, FTH, 3 years U, PT, 8 years 4
2006 I, 2 years U, FT, 3 years U, FTH, 8 years 5
2007 I, 2 years U, FT, 3 years U, FTH, 8 years 5
2008 I, 2 years U, FT, 3 years U, FTH, 8 years 5
2009 I, 2 years U, FT, 2 years**** U, FTH, 8 years 6
2010 I, 2 years U, FT, 3 years U, FTH, 8 years 7
Notes: We can distinguish seven periods with significantly different regimes; the last column 
shows their sequence (For data on take-up, see Table 6.2 of the Statistical Annex).
U: universal (non means tested), flat rate; I: insurance based (conditional on employment 
before childbirth) and proportional to prior income; M: means tested (although with a very 
high income threshold), flat rate; PT: allows part-time employment; FTH: allows full-time 
employment at home, after 1.5 years; T: allows full-time employment after 1 year. 
* Beside the above-mentioned benefits, there is an insurance-based maternity leave of 168 days (tgyás), 
proportional to prior income (until 1996 a maximum of 100 per cent, from then on max. 70 per cent).
** gyet is a benefit after three or more children.
*** The periods of entitlement shown (2 years, 3 years, etc.) are valid until the child reaches 2, 3, etc. 
years of age. When someone receives Tgyás, other benefits can be received only after its termination. 
**** The changes announced by the Bajnai government would have become effective only from 2012.
Sources: Tárkányi (2001/02); Ignits and Kapitány (2006); Blaskó (2010) and internet sources.
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even during the period of budgetary cuts known as the ‘bokros package’ this 
seemingly ever-changing system remained essentially the same generous 
system as at the beginning of the 1990s, and after the turn of the century 
it definitely again became one of the most generous systems. according to 
a study by the oeCD (2007), when the calculations are made for a single child 
and the expenditure is measured in percentage of GDP per capita, then, of all 
its member states, Hungary spends the most on cash benefits for parents 
staying at home with a small child. the Hungarian expenditure level was three 
times more than the oeCD average, double that of austria and one and a half 
times the swedish level in 2006. Hungary had the highest full-time equivalent 
parental leave – i.e. the number of weeks multiplied by the proportion of the 
monthly benefit and the average wage.
However, the Hungarian system is unbalanced: it gives benefits usually in cash 
and rarely in kind. an extremely small number of children under 3 years of age 
go to crèche (as with eastern and southern european, turkish and mexican 
children): 7.5 per cent of under-2s went to crèche in 2005 and 2006, while 
the eu-27 average is 25 per cent – and in barcelona the target was set at 33 
per cent (Fazekas, 2008). as for children aged 3–6, Hungary is not that far 
behind the others: a quarter of such children go to kindergarten (just a few 
per cent less than the eu-27 average and 15 percentage points less than the 
target value set in barcelona) (Fazekas, 2008).
the majority of eligible parents (with few exceptions, usually the mother) claim 
for child benefits, and the employment figures accord with these data. While 
female employment levels are not far behind the oeCD average, the employment 
rate for mothers in Hungary is the lowest of all member states. the Hungarian 
employment rate for mothers who have children aged below 2 is the worst of 
all developed countries; the employment rate for mothers who have children 
aged 3–6 years is the second lowest, after slovakia.1 apart from that, Hungary 
has the widest gap between the employment rate of mothers who have a small 
child (under 2) and that of mothers who have an older child (6–16).2
several measures have been introduced in the last 20 years to ease the ‘child 
or career’ conflict: these included the right to work from home during flat-rate 
parental leave (gyes and gyet) – at first part time and later full time; the right 
to work full time and to receive parental leave benefits (gyes); child benefits 
for grandparents; the right to work when a child is 12 months old (instead of 
the former 18 month threshold); and the introduction of the ‘start-plusz’ card 
to help reintegration. at the same time, women are still not allowed to work 
while on insured maternity leave (gyed) and – what is more important – at 
the time of the ‘bokros package’ and later, as a result of measures taken by 
the first orbán administration, the insurance aspect of the flat-rate parental 
leave (gyes and gyet) have disappeared: no former employee status is needed 
for entitlement to child benefits. Dissolving the link between employment and 
child benefits produced a tangible transformation: the proportion of those 
who finished their primary schooling, had no previous work experience but 
claimed flat-rate parental leave increased in a single decade from 10 per cent 
(mid-1990s) to 40 per cent, and the figure for those who were without even 
primary schooling rocketed to over 70 per cent (bálint and köllő, 2008; labour 
Force survey of the Central statistical office, 2008, first quarter).
1 In the former Czechoslovakia 
– partly following the Hungarian 
example – a benefit system was cre-
ated that favoured support in cash 
(Haskova 2010). In terms of the child 
benefit, family allowance and employ-
ment statistics cited above, the Czech 
and Slovak figures are similar to those 
for Hungary.
2 OECD data: OECD (2007) Charts: 
PF 7.2, PF11.1, LMF 2.1 and LMF 2.2.
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under the second gyurcsány administration and the bajnai administration, the 
regulations changed and tended to support and encourage work and child-
rearing: it became possible to hold a full-time job while being on flat-rate 
parental leave; the duration of flat-rate parental leave was reduced to two 
years; and a plan was drawn up to expand the crèche system (partly in the 
form of family day nurseries and by reducing the age limit for kindergarten) 
(see Reszkető et al., 2011).
the second orbán administration implemented (or, as this book is in prepara-
tion, is planning to implement) measures that again are designed to promote 
long, supported parental leave and childcare that remains within the family, in 
a way that shifts the burden onto female family members. Flat-rate parental 
leave can again be claimed for three years; women can retire after 40 years 
of work without any age limit in order to help out as grandparents; and the 
government is planning to give priority support to the part-time employment of 
women. the five-day paid ‘paternity’ leave is to become unpaid leave – though 
a symbolic move, it says a lot about the preferred family model.
in this chapter we deal only with the benefits that can be claimed for the 
period when employment is interrupted because of pregnancy; we do not 
discuss other types of benefit that are independent of labour-market status 
and that can be claimed for every child (e.g. universal, flat-rate child benefit, 
educational benefits, benefits to support kindergarten and school attendance) 
nor child tax credits. the reason for this is practical, rather than theoretical. 
benefits that are independent of employment status depress female employ-
ment in the same way as benefits that are only available to people with inactive 
employment status; child tax credits can have either a positive or a negative 
influence – but in Hungary there are no empirical data on the labour-market 
effect of these measures. the only exception to this is a comparative study 
written by scharle (2007), which examined the influence of child benefits in 
cash and in kind on female employment; the results confirm that the former 
reduce female employment, while the latter increase it.
the effect of pArentAl leAve benefits on employment
First of all, there is not much information available on the effect of parental 
leave benefits on employment – only a small number of studies have been 
conducted on this topic; moreover, no comprehensive, targeted data collec-
tion (which could help in analysis of the ‘child or career’ dilemma) has taken 
place since 1972. the only exceptions in this respect are the additional data 
collections of the labour Force surveys conducted by the Central statistical 
office (lakatos, 1996; Frey, 2002), in which mothers on paid maternity leave 
were asked about their career plans and the obstacles to returning to work. 
these are extremely important pieces of information; however, they are not 
suitable for a proper analysis of the decision to have a child or to return to 
work. studies like bálint and köllő (2008), Chapter 8 of köllő (2009b) and 
szathmáry (2007) are based on data from the labour Force surveys of the 
Central statistical office, while szabó-morvai (2011) used data collected by 
the ‘milestones of our life’ research, whose database is more suited to these 
purposes.
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the study by bálint and köllő (2008) examined those factors that influenced 
the duration of parental leave benefit claims between 1993 and 2005 and the 
salaries of those who returned to the labour market. the result most relevant 
for employment policy-making was that regulation changes reduced employ-
ment rates. mothers who went on paid maternity leave during the ‘bokros 
package’ period were 25 per cent less likely to return to work than previous 
benefit recipients, and the situation deteriorated during and after the first orbán 
administration. this ‘deterioration’ might be partly specious: the root cause is 
not simply that the system encouraged the same people to take longer paid 
parental leave in 2005 than in 1993, but that the groups entitled to parental 
leave benefits became loosely connected to the labour market.
estimates show that the length of time spent at home is shorter if there is 
more than one family living in the same flat; if the town or village has a low 
unemployment rate and good transport; and if there is at least one functioning 
crèche in the settlement. in the case of a non-working adult who does not live 
alone, the likelihood of claiming parental leave benefits in the child’s first year 
is 16 per cent less – controlling for all other factors – and this remains at 11–12 
per cent in the child’s second and third years as well. a local crèche does not 
significantly influence the take-up of benefits in the child’s first year, and in the 
second year the estimated effect depends on the specification of the regression 
model; however, in the child’s third year the coefficients of the crèche availability 
indices used by bálint and köllő (2008) show a significant negative effect. While 
it is hard to say much about the real extent of these effects (because they are 
based on ‘noisy’ data), what can be said is that the lack of childcare institutions 
has a negative effect – more and more pronounced as the child becomes older 
– on the employment of mothers with small children.
lastly, the study found that those who return to work from parental leave (on 
average after 3.7 years of staying at home) face an 8–10 per cent income loss, 
which is almost equal to the earnings gain of 3.7 years of work experience esti-
mated in empirical earnings models. the loss is the equivalent of an extra hour 
of work per day, and therefore counts as significant income loss.
köllő (2009b) and szabó-morvai (2011) analysed the consequences of abolishing 
and reintroducing parental leave benefits. Data from the Cso labour Force 
surveys for the period of the bokros package show an accelerating tendency 
to return to work among mothers with high qualifications (who might have 
been entitled to parental leave benefits according to the previous regulations); 
however, these results are not statistically significant, so it can be said only 
for 1997 that the abolition of parental leave benefits encouraged employment. 
Women with high qualification levels chose paid maternity leave – at the 
same rate as in previous periods – despite the substantially lower amount of 
parental leave benefits; or else they postponed or gave up the idea of having 
a child. (among these women the number of children dropped considerably 
and returned to previous levels only once the parental leave benefits were rein-
troduced.) the reintroduction of parental leave benefits did not influence the 
probability of employment during the child’s first two years, but it did reduce 
the probability in the third and fourth year. szabó-morvai (2011) interpreted 
this as an income effect (meaning that high levels of parental leave benefits 
served as savings for the later years, when no benefits were received), but 
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it is also possible that it is their plans to have another child – which was not 
asked in the survey – that reduces the likelihood of returning to work among 
gyed recipients in the third and fourth year after child birth. 
köllő (2009b) used administrative data to examine how allowing women to 
take full-time employment while claiming parental leave benefits influenced the 
duration of the claim, and arrived at the result that a large number of already 
working mothers applied for benefits and that the tendency to combine work 
with benefits also increased, but that employment after the end of benefit 
receipt dropped significantly; consequently the pace of return to work did 
not accelerate.
in the case of minor alterations to the regulations governing benefit systems 
(for instance unemployment benefit systems), the weak income effect might 
explain why no significant acceleration is observed in the pace of return to 
work; however, in the case of large-scale upheavals – like the abolition and 
reintroduction of parental leave benefits, or the doubling of the amount that 
could be earned while claiming benefits – it cannot serve as an explanation.
the absence of an effect on employment suggests that there are costs and 
obstacles that make returning to work impossible or that considerably decrease 
the net gain from having a job, even though the people involved receive a small 
amount or no benefits.
another question is how the childcare benefit system can influence employ-
ment in the long run by encouraging women to have a child. estimates by 
gábos (2003) and gábor et al. (2008) show that benefits in cash significantly 
increase fertility in Hungary, and this is supported further by the above-
mentioned consequences of abolishing parental leave benefits in 1995 (köllő, 
2009b). However, this means neither that Hungary has a pronatalist policy, 
nor that an increase in benefits would lead to a replacement-level birth rate. 
on the one hand, while Hungary has spent more money on cash child benefits 
than any other developed country, its fertility rates – in terms of level and 
dynamics – are poor: fertility rates dipped below the replacement level as 
early as 1980, and after the transition they continued to drop; since 1997 the 
rate has remained at between 1.25 and 1.35. on the other hand, according to 
estimates by gábor et al. (2008), the following is clear: if the aim is to increase 
the rate to 1.6 (which is still a long way from the ‘2 plus’ range that would be 
the replacement level) only by means of cash incentives, then the amount 
should be doubled, and that would cost six times more than the oeCD average.
policy dilemmAs
Hungarian social policy is apparently still based on the belief that there is an 
unavoidable negative link between fertility and female employment. this was 
true 30 years ago, when the birth rate was high in those countries where female 
employment was low; however, this negative correlation first disappeared and 
then turned positive: nowadays high female employment goes hand in hand 
with high fertility rates and vice versa (see the Hungarian charts, for instance, 
in the study by nagy, 2009). obviously, there has been no change in the rela-
tions of cause and effect – it is still hard to return to work when one has a small 
child, and it cannot be said that encouraging female employment automatically 
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leads to a rise in the average number of children; but it is certainly true that 
deteriorating population trends have been reversed (or at least arrested) in 
places where it is easier for women to reconcile work and professional life. 
these countries did not have to trade lower female employment for higher 
fertility rates.
there is a degree of narrow-mindedness in public opinion, too, and this could 
be an obstacle to policy changes, even if the politicians themselves were 
ready to change. However, research conducted by blaskó (2011) has revealed 
that public backing for long-term stay-at-home motherhood is not as solid 
as might be suggested by the results of surveys over the past two decades. 
if the question is asked not in general, but by referring to specific conditions 
(like accessibility to a crèche, financial aid for commuting, or a more flexible 
work schedule) 36–73 per cent of those who previously insisted on a three-
year period at home after birth are willing to change their minds and accept 
a shorter stay at home.
in order to improve accessibility to childcare, it would be sensible to make 
the opening hours of childcare facilities more flexible (see also Chapter 2.4) 
and to expand their capacity. the cost of this latter move would probably be 
covered by the tax revenues earned from the salaries of mothers who return 
to work (köllő, 2009a: 274–75); meanwhile, thanks to the improved education 
and health of disadvantaged children, social and healthcare expenditure would 
decrease, which would help balance the budget in the long run. implementation 
is thwarted not so much by budgetary constraints as by the decision-making 
mechanisms of government: the cost of such an expansion places a burden 
on one ministry (or one level of government), while the benefit is reaped by 
another. this – in the absence of smooth conciliation procedures – can stop 
any move to expand capacity in its tracks.
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6. ReDuCing tRansaCtion Costs  
6.4. commuting and Spatial variation in employment 
tamás baRtus
the spatial differences in terms of economic and social development are well 
known: in southern transdanubia, northern Hungary, and in the sub-regions 
of the northern plain close to the border, unemployment is significantly 
higher than, for example, in the vicinity of budapest (ábrahám and kertesi, 
1998; kertesi and köllő, 1998; Faluvégi et al., 2005; lőcsei, 2010). there is 
no obvious explanation for these spatial differences: the inhabitants of sub-
regions and villages could easily commute or move to more advanced regions 
or cities; it is even possible, at least theoretically, that crisis-stricken regions 
could attract new jobs. thus commuting is one of the mechanisms – besides 
migration and the relocation of jobs – for smoothing out regional differences. 
since in Hungary most housing is owner occupied, and since buying a house 
or a flat involves serious costs and risks (Hegedüs, 2003), commuting (rather 
than moving) is the means that will more probably even out spatial differences 
in employment.
How has the number of commuters changed in the past twenty years? What 
policy measures might explain this change? is there a connection between the 
change in the number of commuters and the change in spatial inequalities? in 
this chapter we try to answer these questions.1
encourAging commuting – in theory
the state can encourage commuting in order to smooth out regional differ-
ences and to cut the welfare costs of structural unemployment. the measures 
might include administrative orders and regulations, transport compensation 
for employees, employers or transport companies, or a combination of these. 
generally, a subsidy is appropriate if, without it, fewer people commute or 
commute over a shorter distance than is optimal for the public good. are 
employers interested in contributing to the commuting costs? it is clear that 
the real wage is the sum of the nominal wage and the compensation, and thus 
any regulations may compel an employer to pay a higher wage. Without state 
regulation, the contracting parties could negotiate the compensation of travel 
expenses the same way as they do wages. theoretically, state regulation of 
compensation for travelling expenses gets in the way of the free bargaining 
process. it is surprising that the effectiveness and consequences of this have 
not yet been examined, given that state intervention in the field of wages – for 
example the regulation of the minimum wage – has been thoroughly studied. 1 See also Chapter 5.1 on migration.
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international literature on commuting indicates that state intervention in 
compensation for travel expenses probably does have unintended consequences. 
in international – primarily american – literature, research into the economic 
consequences of commuting was motivated by the ‘spatial mismatch hypoth-
esis’ (kain, 1992; ihlanfeldt and sjoquist, 1998). according to this, in downtown 
ghettos unemployment is high partly because vacancies are far from the 
city centre, it is too expensive for people to move to the distant workplaces, 
and migrating from the ghetto is difficult because of discrimination on the 
housing market. the issue of commuting is originally linked to the problem 
of job seeking and discrimination: for those who live far from the available 
workplaces, getting a job is complicated not just by the cost of travelling to 
work, but also by the difficulty of finding far-away vacancies – partly because 
of the travelling costs – and by the fact that employers consider commuters 
to be worse employees (gobillon et al., 2007). 
the hungAriAn toolkit – subsidized public trAnsport And 
compensAtion for trAvel expenses
in Hungary, the measures to encourage commuting over the past two decades 
have been few and far between. We might mention the partial exemption of 
employer tax and social insurance contributions on the compensation in kind 
of employee travel expenses (for example, season tickets for public transport); 
the temporary reimbursement of travel expenses for someone registered 
unemployed who starts a job; or the harmonization of local transport schedules.
many employers utilize the tax exemption on transport subsidies – depending 
on the fluctuating scale of the exemption and the amount of red tape involved. 
according to Horváth et al. (2006), in 2003 around 17 per cent of employees 
received such benefits in kind, and (in contrast to other forms of compensa-
tion) the figures for the proportion of skilled workers (17 per cent) and trained 
workers (14 per cent) who received it were close to the average. However, 
there is no information about how many of these are commuters and how 
many just travel within the boundaries of a settlement. there are also no data 
on what percentage of commuters receives travel compensation. a survey 
conducted in spring 2001 of those coming off the unemployment assistance 
register (köllő, 2002) tried to determine the costs of commuting; however, 
the amount of compensation remains unknown. the data suggest that, even 
if most commuters do receive some kind of compensation, the probability is 
positively correlated to the distance of the travel involved (bartus, 2011).
the unemployed have been able to apply for travel compensation since 1994, 
but in the last two decades or so only a few thousand job seekers have taken 
the opportunity. Compensation can be claimed either individually or for a group. 
in the last ten years both types of claim have dropped. one plausible reason 
for this is the long-winded application procedure, and the relatively small gain, 
since only registered unemployed (new entrants) can receive it – and then for 
a year at most.
the length of time involved in travelling (counted as a cost) can be shortened 
by harmonizing the transport schedules. We have only scant information 
about government efforts in this direction (based on interviews with experts), 
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according to which the earlier informal and haphazard negotiation procedure 
was replaced in 2007 by the use of regional transport organizing offices, whose 
duty it is to draw up proposals for schedules, to cut out parallel (duplicate) 
routes, and to harmonize local and intercity transport. the way in which these 
offices function varies from region to region, and there has been no study of 
their effectiveness.
evolution of commuting in hungAry
Data on commuting are available from the censuses of 1990 and 2000, and 
from the micro-censuses of 1996 and 2005. these data are shown in Figure 
1. the number of commuters in the year of the political transition was 1.114 
million. by 1996 it had dropped to 886,000. after this low point, the number 
began to climb again: in 2001, it was close to the figure for 1990, and by 2005 
it was higher. (the number of commuters in 2001 was 1.102 million; in 2005 
it was 1.221 million.) among those with a job, the proportion of commuters 
has never declined: the stagnation between 1990 and 1996 was followed by 
a surge of 5 per cent after the turn of the millennium.
a possible explanation for the growth in the commuting population is that 
many people working in budapest have moved to outlying settlements, but 
have continued to work in budapest. between 2001 and 2005, the population 
of budapest dropped by some 60,000; however, the number of commuters 
grew by double that – 120,000. thus suburbanization around budapest in itself 
provides no explanation for the growth in commuter numbers.
Figure 1: The number of locally based workers and commuters, 1990–2005 
(thousand people)
Source: CSO censuses of 1990 and 2001, micro-censuses of 1996 and 2005.
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the issue of commuting is closely connected to long-term rural unemploy-
ment, and so we now deal with the possibility of commuting from a village to 
a town. it is a well-known fact that the highest unemployment rates are in the 
villages of the northern plain, northern Hungary and southern transdanubia. 
according to our calculations, in the villages of these regions in 2005 some 
55–62 employees out of every 100 commuted, while the rest worked locally. 
this commuting rate is behind the 66–69 per cent in the more developed 
regions. yet we must add that the inhabitants of the villages in middle Hungary 
mainly commute to budapest, and the high rate for Western Hungarian villages 
should probably be attributed to the proximity of the austrian labour market.
the lAbour mArket incentives for dAily commuting
How can we explain the increasing number of commuters in a period when the 
number of those working locally has stagnated or even decreased? to answer 
this question, we might start with the financial motives. let us look at the 
situation facing an unemployed man who cannot find work in his local village. 
if he remains unemployed, his legal form of income is unemployment benefit; 
once that ceases, he will receive regular social assistance. if he gets a job in 
another village, he will receive a wage, but commuting is expensive. the overall 
costs include not only the direct cost of transport (a season ticket for the bus 
or train, fuel costs), but also the income losses due to time spent travelling to 
and from work (the commuter has less time for household work and casual 
labour). thus commuting will be profitable only if the wage received minus 
the costs of commuting comes to more than the amount of social assistance.
as far as we know, there is no database that includes data on all of the following: 
the wages offered for non-local work, the costs of commuting to that work, the 
income received as an unemployed person, and the actual rates of employment 
and commuting. therefore, in order to assess the circumstances surrounding 
a daily commute, we can only work with estimated figures. We will seek to 
locate those villages where daily commuting is profitable.
given the lack of individual-level data, we rely on three assumptions about the 
factors that influence the decision to commute. our first assumption is that 
the wage on offer for non-local work equals the minimum wage. this claim 
is supported by the fact that the working population of a village is largely 
uneducated and unskilled. our second assumption is that the income of the 
unemployed individual equals the average amount of social assistance (jöve-
delempótló támogatás). Finally, we assume that commuters use long-distance 
bus routes, and that the cost of the monthly bus pass is paid in full by the 
employer. the last two assumptions are clearly unrealistic: some unemployed 
people do occasional work, and compensation for travel expenses is governed 
by regulations. yet these assumptions are suitable for our purposes: since it 
is a precondition for commuting that the wages received should exceed the 
sum of the commuting expenses plus benefits, we need a reliable estimate of 
this sum if we are to identify the most disadvantaged villages. this estimate 
remains valid even if we underestimate one component and overestimate 
another. and this is what we are doing: we overestimate the cost of travelling, 
at the same time as we underestimate the value of benefits.
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based on our assumptions, we can calculate the threshold value that indicates 
the greatest distance at which commuting is still profitable. We calculate 
the values for 1994 and 2006, because for these years we have available 
settlement-level data on accessibility. the results are shown in Figure 1. the 
difference between the net minimum monthly wage and the average amount 
of social assistance was HuF 4,482 in 1994 and HuF 28,104 in 2006. in 1994, 
HuF 4,482 was enough to buy a monthly pass for the volán bus and coach 
company for up to 30 kilometres; in 2006, HuF 28,104 would buy a pass valid 
for up to 45 kilometres. if we suppose that vacancies are to be found only 
in towns and cities, then the most disadvantaged villages are those that are 
more than 30 or 45 kilometres by road from a town.
Table 1: The threshold value of profitable daily commuting 
1994 2006
Net minimum wage (HUF) 10 375 51 875
Social assistance (HUF) 5 893 23 771
Difference between minimum wage and assistance (HUF) 4 482 28 104
Threshold value of daily commute (km) 30 45 
Source: Munkaerőpiaci tükör 2009. Statistical data, Tables 9.8 and 10.3. The source for season 
ticket prices: 48/2007 (IV.26) GKM order, and the accessibility dataset of János Köllő.
thus, from 1994 to 2006, the boundaries of the labour markets of towns have 
expanded significantly. the most reasonable explanation for this is that in this 
period the minimum wage rose more than social benefits: the net minimum 
wage (at current prices) increased five-fold, while social assistance increased 
only four-fold. (the rise in the minimum wage is largely attributable to a one-off 
dramatic jump in january 2001.) another reason is that the costs of commuting 
rose more slowly than the net minimum wage: in 2006, volán season tickets 
for 30 and 45 kilometres cost approximately 4.6 times more than they did in 
1994. We may conclude that the real value of social assistance did not change, 
while both the cost of season tickets and the minimum wage rose, but the 
surge in the real value of the minimum wage outstripped the increase in the 
real cost of season tickets. so it is possible that the daily distance for profit-
able commuting rose in the period under examination. as far as we know, the 
aspect of commuting played no part in the decision to raise the minimum wage 
or to set the fares on volán. thus, the improved conditions for commuting 
can be regarded as an unintented consequence of the minimum wage policies.
How did the accessibility of villages change between 1994 and 2006? For 
these calculations we use, on the one hand, the transport database of 1994 
compiled by jános köllő, and, on the other hand, the transport database of the 
Hungarian academy of sciences (mta) for 2006. both databases examine the 
transport available from villages to nearby larger settlements (called ‘centres’). 
the definition of a centre has changed over time: in 1994, any settlement with 
an employment office was considered a centre; in 2006 centres were regarded 
as towns and cities.
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as a first step, we classified settlements into three groups, according to acces-
sibility: we deemed a village to be accessible if the village was at most 30/45 
kilometres by public road from a centre, and if it was possible to get from the 
village by volán bus to the centre by the start of the morning shift, i.e. between 
6.00 and 7.30 (köllő, 1994). Non-accessible villages are those that, although 
30/45 kilometres from a centre, did not offer the possibility of getting in for 
a morning shift by volán. Finally, isolated villages are those that are more than 
30/45 kilometres by public road from a centre. When interpreting the results, 
the reader should keep in mind that accessibility is a relational characteristic, 
meaning the accessibility of a village to a given centre. note that we do not 
examine the same village–centre relationship. this is partly because in 1994 
data collection did not include relations where the village is more than 40 
kilometres from the centre. since, in 2006, only villages more than 45 kilo-
metres from a centre were considered isolated, none of the relations in our 
1994 database can be termed ‘isolated’ in 2006.
since the threshold for being regarded as isolated grew by 15 kilometres 
between 1994 and 2006, it is not surprising that in this period the number of 
isolated village–centre relations dropped significantly – though in the more 
disadvantaged regions there were still some isolated villages even in 2006. 
Depending on the region, between 1994 and 2006, the number of accessible 
village–centre relations grew from 34–42 per cent to 72–87 per cent. in spite 
of these favourable trends, the proportion of isolated village–town relations 
was still 12 per cent in northern Hungary and 3 per cent in the northern plain. 
in southern transdanubia it was under 1 per cent. it is worth noting that the 
figure was less than 1 per cent in Central Hungary and Western transdanubia 
as well, while the regions of Central transdanubia and the southern plain had 
no isolated villages at all.
in parallel with the decreasing isolation, the accessibility of towns advanced 
significantly. the likely explanation is that, in the period examined, there was 
a silent revolution in the organization of transport: the timetables of the bus 
lines became better aligned to the start of the morning shift. nevertheless, 
before we reach this conclusion, we must consider the fact that the acces-
sibility data for 1994 may not be reliable: 2006 data were collected via the 
internet, but for 1994 printed timetables were used to decide whether it was 
possible to get in for a morning shift by bus. in the data collection of 1994, it 
was thus considerably more difficult to determine all the routes that involved 
a change of bus, and so there was a relatively high chance that a village–city 
relation would be classified as non-accessible. because changes of bus are 
more important for villages that are further from a centre, it is possible that 
a relation was classified as non-accessible solely because a town could be 
reached from a given village only with a change of bus, and this route has not 
been identified.
there are two arguments in favour of assuming that accessibility did indeed 
improve in this period, and that the trends indicated above should not be 
explained by problems with the 1994 data collection. on the one hand, volán 
timetables were continually adapted to the start of the morning shifts – 
because this was in the basic economic interests of the companies concerned. 
on the other hand, most public transport from the villages to the towns was 
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in the form of a bus route, and the vast majority of routes reached the towns 
with no need of a change of bus. thus the incompleteness of the bus routes 
identified for 1994 cannot wholly explain the improved accessibility between 
1994 and 2006.
We examined changes in accessibility at sub-regional level, too. the Central 
statistical office has created the concept of the ‘most backward and disad-
vantaged’ (lHH) regions. of the 35 lHH sub-regions, 8 are to be found in 
southern transdanubia, 12 in northern transdanubia, 9 on the northern plain 
and 6 on the southern plain. it is worth noting that 17 lHH sub-regions are 
in borsod and szabolcs counties – they make up most of the sub-regions in 
these two counties. Figure 2 shows the change in accessibility according to 
the sub-regional classification.
between 1994 and 2006, the number of available transport relations enabling 
daily commuting grew from 34 per cent to 68 per cent in lHH sub-regions, 
and from 40 per cent to 83 per cent in non-lHH sub-regions. at the same 
time, the proportion of isolated village–town relations dropped in the lHH 
sub-regions from 36 per cent to 9 per cent, and in other sub-regions from 31 
per cent to 1 per cent. thus, in lHH sub-regions the proportion of isolated 
relations was 5 per cent and 8 per cent higher.
dAily commuting And spAtiAl differences
Research examining the potential of daily commuting aims to answer the 
question of whether commuting is able to alleviate the spatial differences in 
unemployment. if commuting really has such an equalizing effect, and if the 
Figure 2: The distribution of accessible, non-accessible and isolated villages 
(per cent) according to the type of sub-region, 1994 and 2006
Source: Own calculations based on the accessibility dataset 
compiled by János Köllő and the MTA KTI Volán database.
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number of commuters is higher in villages that are accessible and closer to 
towns, then unemployment should be higher in villages that are further from 
a centre or are not accessible. 
We examine the supposed equalizing effect of commuting through the relative 
unemployment in villages. the indicator is thus the quotient of the unemploy-
ment rates in a village and in a centre: it shows how much higher the unem-
ployment rate is in the village than in the centre. We use the relative rural 
unemployment rate instead of the absolute rate, in order to render compa-
rable villages that are in areas with different levels of economic development. 
We do not calculate the unemployment rate according to the international 
labour organization (ilo) standard, but by dividing the number of registered 
unemployed by the size of the population aged 15–64.
Figure 3 shows the relative unemployment in villages categorized by distance 
from a centre, in 1996 and 2006. since any improvement in the relative rural 
unemployment figures can be explained by a drift of town employees into 
villages, we excluded from the analysis the Central Hungarian region, where 
suburbanization is highest. according to this figure, relative rural unemploy-
ment was higher in 2006 than in 1996 in all distance categories, irrespective 
of accessibility. Despite the generally better accessibility, far from decreasing, 
unemployment in villages rose compared to towns. another important fact 
is that relative rural unemployment in 1996 was lower in the non-accessible 
Figure 3: The average of relative rural unemployment according to 
distance and accessibility, 1996–2006
Source: Own calculations using the accessibility dataset of János Köllő 
and the regional databases of MTA KTI Volán.
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villages, while in 2006 this was true of the accessible ones – when we compare 
villages the same distance from centres. another clear trend is that, in acces-
sible villages, the unemployment rate is positively correlated to the distance 
from a centre, while in non-accessible villages relative unemployment shows 
no (or negligible) correlation with the distance. the data for 2006 clearly 
show that the difference between the unemployment rates in accessible and 
non-accessible villages narrows with increasing distance, and in the 26–45 
kilometre zone it disappears altogether. it is especially this last point that 
supports our initial hypothesis: the costs of commuting reduce the chances of 
employment, and without public transport connections the costs of commuting 
are especially high.
if inactivity or failure to register as unemployed is partly due to the inaccessi-
bility of the town’s labour market, then the number of registered unemployed 
underestimates the number of unemployed and the previous results are due to 
the presence of measurement error. We therefore repeated the analysis, this 
time replacing the ratio of registered unemployed in the working-age popula-
tion with the ratio of taxpayers in the working-age population. the results are 
in line with the results of our previous analysis: in 1996, the relative rate of 
taxpayers was higher in the non-accessible villages, while in 2006 it was higher 
in the accessible villages. but the differences are negligible: in those villages 
that are 11–45 kilometres from a centre, the relative rate of taxpayers is around 
86–91 per cent, while in the accessible villages the taxpaying rate compared 
to the centre is only 2–3 per cent higher than in non-accessible villages. thus 
the distance from a centre and accessibility have only a weak correlation with 
the rate of legal employment. based on this, it would seem that the differences 
in the relative unemployment rates can partly be explained by the fact that 
the unemployed in non-accessible villages are less willing to register with the 
employment offices – because of the high anticipated costs of travel.
if commuting does indeed equalize spatial differences, and the number of 
commuters is higher in villages that are accessible and close to the towns, the 
transport infrastructure should smooth out spatial differences in unemployment, 
thus the spatial dispersion of rural unemployment rates should be relatively 
low in accessible villages. thus we also examined how relative unemployment 
is dispersed in relation to distance and accessibility. We found that, in 2006, in 
non-accessible villages, the relative unemployment rate was more dispersed 
than in accessible villages; however, the difference decreased with distance, 
and indeed at a distance of 35–45 kilometres the dispersion was higher in 
accessible villages. the data for 1996 show a similar pattern: the dispersion of 
relative rural unemployment was greater in non-accessible villages between 
0 and 15 kilometres from a centre, whereas between 21 and 30 kilometres 
this was the case in accessible villages. However, the relative taxpayer rate 
showed no great diffusion. thus, if the probability of a person registering at 
an employment office is reduced by the distance from the centre and the lack 
of public transport, then our conclusion is that poor accessibility is a barrier 
not only to economic activity, but also to the detection of unemployment – in 
terms of someone being registered as unemployed.
We also examined the change in relative rural unemployment in those village–
town relations that were isolated in 1994 but were accessible by 2006. 
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surprisingly we found that relative unemployment was higher in 2006 than 
it was in 1996. However the relative taxpayer rate had not changed; better 
accessibility is not associated with better employment prospects. 
our analysis thus suggests that despite better accessibility, the employment 
prospects of unemployed people in villages did not improve substantially. to 
explain this fact (which contradicts our expectation), let us reiterate that the 
conditions for daily commuting improved between 1994 and 2006 because 
the minimum wage had increased by more than social benefits and the cost 
of a season ticket. the enduring spatial differences can be attributed to the 
fact that, with the rise in the minimum wage, the demand for work dropped 
off (kertesi and köllő, 2004). this explains the negative results: the lower 
demand for labour had a greater impact on potential employees who lived 
(relatively) far from the jobs, while those employees who lived nearer were 
less affected. in short, though the rise in the minimum wage expanded the 
geographical boundaries of labour markets, it also have reinforced ‘spatial 
discrimination’, and thereby spatial inequalities..
summAry And recommendAtions
after the political transition, the number of commuters first declined, but 
then from 1996 onwards it began to rise again. in 2005, it exceeded the 
number in 1989. the rise in the number of commuters coincided with better 
accessibility of the towns and cities. this was partly caused by the significant 
jump in the minimum wage and the ensuing expansion of the boundary of the 
labour market of the towns from 30 kilometres to 45 kilometres. on the other 
hand, it seems that there was a silent revolution in the organization of public 
transport: there was a significant rise in the number of villages from where 
public transport allowed workers to get into the centre in time for a morning 
shift. However, the employment rate in villages did not rise significantly with 
these positive changes. better accessibility did not reduce spatial differences.
the explanation for this contradiction is that accessibility and a more advanced 
transport infrastructure are a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
mobility of labour. the first and most important explanation is that the number 
of vacancies did not increase with the improved accessibility. Commuting can 
smooth out regional differences if, in the vicinity of villages, there are nearby 
towns that are suffering from a labour shortage. However, if the labour markets 
of the towns are also beset by unemployment, then better accessibility merely 
means that more job seekers have to compete for the scarce vacancies on 
the urban labour market. Daily commuting will reduce regional differences 
significantly only if urban unemployment drops. it is worth noting that in the 
centres of developed regions, not only is the unemployment rate smaller, but 
also average wages are higher; thus, paradoxically, it is the centres of more 
developed regions – not the nearest centres – that will prompt the unemployed 
of surrounding villages to commute (bartus, 2010).
a second explanation for the situation is that better accessibility does not 
mean that the costs of commuting become negligible. the overall cost of 
commuting includes not only direct financial cost of transport, but also the 
time cost: commuters have less time available for ‘informal’ work around the 
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house, and as a result less income from such activities. Due to a lack of data, 
we cannot determine the relative proportions of these two kinds of cost.
to better understand the circumstances of villages that are far from towns, 
we might refer to the studies of the downtown ghettos of american cities: 
commuters tend to be those who were long-term unemployed before. better 
accessibility in itself will not mitigate village unemployment, since employers 
in the city will not employ someone from the country, who needs to be paid 
a higher wage to cover their travelling expenses. better accessibility in itself 
will reduce unemployment in the villages only if rural job seekers, on average, 
are far better trained and more productive than their urban counterparts.
references
ábrahám, árpád–kertesi, gábor (1998): Regional unemployment rate differ-
entials in Hungary 1990–1995, the changing role of human capital. in: Halpern, 
lászló, Ch. Wyplosz (eds.): Hungary – towards a market economy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge university press.
bartus, tamás (2010): travel time and the urban-rural wage differential. in: 
Fazekas–molnár (eds.): the Hungarian labour market. Review and analysis 
2011, institute of economics, Has, national employment Foundation, buda-
pest, 136–139. o.
bartus, tamás (2011): Commuting time, wages and reimbursement of travel 
costs. evidence from Hungary. Review of sociology, vol. 21. no. 4. 72–94. o.
Faluvégi, albert–Fazekas, károly–nemes-nagy, józsef–németh, nándor (eds.) 
(2005): a hely és a fej. munkapiac és regionalitás magyarországon. kti könyvek, 
6. sz. mta közgazdaságtudományi intézet, budapest. 
gobillon, l.–selod, H.–zenou, y. (2007): the mechanisms of spatial mismatch. 
urban studies, urban studies, vol. 44. no. 12. pp. 2401–2427.
Hegedüs, józsef (2003): the housing market and residential regional mobility 
in the 1990s – the case of Hungary. in: Fazekas–koltay (eds.): the Hungarian 
labour market. Review and analysis 2011, institute of economics, Has, national 
employment Foundation, budapest, pp. 73–80.
Horváth, Hedvig–Hudomiet, péter–kézdi, gábor (2006): in kind benefits in 
Hungary. in: Fazekas–kézdi (eds.): the Hungarian labour market. Review and 
analysis 2011, institute of economics, Has, national employment Foundation, 
budapest, 36–46. o.
ihlanfeldt, k. R.–sjoquist, D. l. (1998): the spatial mismatch hypothesis: a review 
of recent studies and their implications for welfare reform. Housing policy 
Debate, vol. 9. no. 4. pp. 849–892.
kain, j. (1992): the spatial mismatch hypothesis: three decades later. Housing 
policy Debate, vol. 3. no. 2. pp. 371–392.
kertesi, gábor–köllő, jános (1998): Regionális munkanélküliség és bérek az 
átmenet éveiben: a bérszerkezet átalakulása magyarországon, ii. rész. közgaz-
dasági szemle, vol. 45. no. 7–8. pp. 621–652. 
kertesi, gábor–köllő, jános (2003): Fighting „low equilibria” by doubling the 
minimum wage? Hungary’s experiment. bonn: institute for the study of labor, 
2003. iza Discussion paper no. 970
6. ReDuCing tRansaCtion Costs 6.4 . Commuting anD spatial vaRiation in employment
254
köllő, jános (1997): a napi ingázás feltételei és a helyi munkanélküliség 
magyarországon. számítások és számpéldák. esély, no. 2.
köllő, jános (2002): az ingázási költségek szerepe a regionális munkanélküliségi 
különbség fenntartásában. becslési kísérlet. budapesti munkagazdaságtani 
Füzetek, no. 2. mta közgazdaságtudományi kutatóközpont, budapest.
lőcsei, Hajnalka (2010): the influence of the economic crisis on spatial 
inequalities of unemployment. in: Fazekas–molnár (eds.): the Hungarian 
labour market. Review and analysis 2011, institute of economics, Has, national 
employment Foundation, budapest, pp. 117-132.
255
 
7. statistiCal annex
1. employment
1.1. employment rate by age group
1.2. employment rate of the population aged 20-64 by education
1.3. share of part-time employment by gender and pension receipt
1.4. employment rate of the population aged 15-64 by county
1.5. employment by sector
2. unemployment
2.1. unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64
2.2. Registered unemployment in the population aged 15-64
2.3. unemployment rate of the population aged 15-24 
2.4. job search activity of the non-working population aged 20-64
2.5. Registered unemployed visiting the job centre in the previous month
2.6. Registered unemployed or out of work in the population aged 15-64
2.7. long-term unemployment (ilo)
2.8. long-term unemployment (registered) by small region
2.9. Composition of the unemployed (ilo) by gender and education
2.10. unemployment rate (ilo) by gender and education
3. Wages
3.1. monthly wage of the average production worker
3.2. estimated wage advantages for gender, level of education and age 
group
4. population
4.1. population aged 15-64
4.2. population aged 20-64 by education
4.3. life expectancy at age 60 by gender
4.4. immigrants in Hungary by sender country
4.5. emigrants from Hungary by destination country
4.6. Demographic and economic dependency ratio
5. eConomy
5.1. gDp and consumer price index
5.2. self-employment
5.3. business environment
256
7. statistiCal annex 
5.4. subsidies for regional development projects
5.5. spatial development target appropriation
5.6. minimum wage and guaranteed minimum pension
5.7. taxes on labour
6. WelFaRe
6.1. unemployment benefit, social assistance and participation in active 
labour market programmes
6.2. parental leave benefits and daycare for children
6.3. pensioners and the average age at retirement
7. employment poliCy
7.1. expenditure on main employment policy measures
7.2. staff and caseload in the public employment service
7.3. Reemployment rates of active labour market programmes
7.4. political leaders in ministries responsible for labour and related affairs
The Statistical Annex was edited by Ágota Scharle. The data for all the tables were calculated by Mónika 
Bálint, Zsuzsanna Sinka-Grósz and Zsuzsanna Szabó (Databank, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy 
of Science), except for Tables 4.4 (Ágnes Hárs), 5.3. (Attila Bartha and Gábor Kocsis), 5.4-6, 6.1-2 and 7.1 
(Ágota Scharle), 7.2 (Lajos Bódis) and 7.4 (Vera Balogh).
7. statistiCal annex 7.1. employment
257
1.1. Employment rate by age group
Aged 15-64 Aged 20-64 Aged 15-24 Aged 55-64
men women together men women together men women together men women together
1990 78.5 63.5 71.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1991 72.2 59.1 65.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1992 64.0 52.3 58.0 70.7 56.9 63.6 37.1 33.7 35.4 33.3 14.3 22.9
1993 60.3 49.4 54.7 66.8 53.6 60.0 36.2 32.7 34.4 26.5 9.5 17.1
1994 59.8 48.0 53.7 66.5 52.2 59.1 35.5 31.9 33.7 24.1 8.0 15.2
1995 59.8 46.0 52.7 66.8 50.3 58.3 34.4 29.0 31.7 24.4 7.5 15.0
1996 59.8 45.5 52.4 66.6 49.9 58.0 35.5 27.1 31.3 23.6 8.4 15.1
1997 60.0 45.2 52.4 66.3 49.4 57.6 37.1 28.2 32.7 23.5 8.4 15.1
1998 60.3 47.3 53.6 66.3 51.3 58.6 37.5 30.6 34.1 25.9 9.6 16.7
1999 62.2 48.9 55.4 68.2 53.1 60.4 37.8 30.4 34.1 29.6 11.3 19.3
2000 62.7 49.6 56.0 68.8 53.9 61.1 36.0 28.8 32.5 32.8 13.1 21.9
2001 63.0 49.8 56.2 68.9 54.1 61.3 34.4 26.9 30.7 34.1 14.9 23.5
2002 62.9 49.8 56.2 69.0 54.3 61.4 31.2 25.8 28.5 35.4 17.6 25.6
2003 63.4 50.9 57.0 69.6 55.5 62.4 29.7 23.7 26.7 37.9 21.8 29.0
2004 63.1 50.7 56.8 69.2 55.3 62.1 26.3 20.8 23.6 38.4 25.0 31.1
2005 63.1 51.0 56.9 69.2 55.6 62.2 24.4 19.2 21.8 40.5 26.8 33.0
2006 63.8 51.1 57.3 69.9 55.7 62.6 24.5 18.8 21.7 41.4 27.1 33.6
2007 64.0 50.9 57.3 70.2 55.5 62.6 24.2 17.8 21.0 41.7 26.2 33.1
2008 63.0 50.6 56.7 69.0 55.1 61.9 23.2 16.8 20.0 38.5 25.7 31.4
2009 61.1 49.9 55.4 67.0 54.4 60.5 19.9 16.3 18.1 39.9 27.0 32.8
2010 60.4 50.6 55.4 66.0 55.0 60.4 20.0 16.6 18.3 39.6 30.1 34.4
 
Source: 1990-1991: The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and 
Analysis 2002. IE-HAS, 2002, Budapest pp. 277-278.
1992-2010: CSO LFS
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut01_01
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1.2. Employment rate of the population aged 20-64 by education, %
Lower secondary or below Upper secondary or above
men women together men women together
1990 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1991 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1992 65.7 46.7 56.3 80.1 71.5 75.3
1993 60.7 42.7 51.8 78.2 69.5 73.4
1994 61.1 41.1 51.2 76.6 68.1 71.9
1995 61.1 39.4 50.4 77.3 65.5 70.7
1996 61.0 38.9 50.3 76.7 64.4 69.8
1997 60.6 38.9 50.0 77.1 63.9 69.7
1998 61.3 40.2 51.2 75.0 64.9 69.3
1999 63.4 41.5 53.1 76.1 65.8 70.2
2000 64.3 42.1 53.9 75.8 66.1 70.3
2001 64.9 42.8 54.6 75.4 65.7 69.8
2002 65.3 43.2 55.0 74.9 65.4 69.4
2003 65.3 43.8 55.3 75.7 66.4 70.4
2004 64.5 43.4 54.8 75.6 65.6 69.9
2005 64.9 43.3 55.1 75.1 65.9 69.8
2006 65.8 44.1 55.9 75.2 65.0 69.3
2007 66.2 44.1 56.2 75.3 64.3 69.0
2008 64.6 43.1 54.9 74.4 64.1 68.5
2009 62.0 42.2 53.1 72.6 63.0 67.2
2010 60.8 43.9 53.3 72.0 62.6 66.6
 
Source: 1992-2010: CSO LFS 
 
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut01_02
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1.3. Share of part-time employment by gender and pension receipt, 
% of total employment
Men Women Pensioner Not pensioner Total
1990 n.a.
1991 n.a.
1992 6.7 11.6 49.6 6.6 8.9
1993 5.7 10.0 52.0 5.8 7.7
1994 5.6 9.8 51.7 5.8 7.6
1995 5.4 10.4 53.3 6.1 7.6
1996 5.6 10.7 53.1 6.4 7.9
1997 5.8 11.4 57.4 6.7 8.3
1998 5.8 11.0 53.8 6.6 8.2
1999 5.6 11.1 45.8 6.5 8.1
2000 5.1 10.5 47.0 6.1 7.6
2001 5.2 9.8 50.8 5.9 7.3
2002 5.0 9.7 53.9 5.6 7.1
2003 6.0 10.9 55.2 6.4 8.2
2004 5.9 11.0 55.4 6.2 8.3
2005 5.8 11.0 54.1 6.2 8.2
2006 5.6 9.9 52.4 5.6 7.5
2007 5.4 9.9 52.5 5.5 7.5
2008 5.9 9.9 53.7 5.6 7.7
2009 7.0 11.4 58.2 6.9 9.0
2010 6.7 11.9 61.6 7.1 9.1
 
Source: 1992-2010: CSO LFS
Note: Part-time was defined as regular weekly working hours below 40, or for those 
reporting variable hours, actual working hours during the reference week.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut01_03
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1.4. Employment rate of the population aged 15-64 by county, %
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1990 n.a.
1991 n.a.
1992 50.1 51.4 52.4 52.6 52.9 55.1 55.2 55.4 56.4 56.5 57.4 57.5 58.5 58.6 59.4 60.4 62.2 62.2 63.5 63.7
1993 45.0 49.4 49.1 51.0 49.6 51.9 51.6 53.9 52.3 54.5 52.3 53.2 57.9 54.5 56.3 59.8 57.4 59.7 63.0 59.7
1994 43.7 49.1 47.3 48.0 48.6 52.1 51.1 53.9 53.1 52.5 52.5 52.3 56.8 53.8 55.6 57.8 55.0 59.5 63.6 58.3
1995 43.8 49.1 45.4 45.4 48.5 47.9 51.0 50.4 52.7 51.7 48.5 47.5 55.9 53.2 54.0 57.6 55.3 58.3 61.4 58.8
1996 42.7 46.3 45.9 45.0 47.4 47.5 49.5 50.1 53.2 51.4 50.7 49.7 54.0 54.2 54.7 57.7 55.8 58.6 63.5 58.1
1997 41.5 47.5 44.6 46.1 46.7 48.9 49.6 51.0 54.8 51.1 50.9 48.6 54.6 55.0 55.0 57.6 56.6 58.7 64.1 57.5
1998 43.6 49.3 44.3 49.9 48.4 48.6 48.8 53.7 55.5 53.4 50.6 51.3 56.8 56.3 55.4 60.0 57.8 61.0 64.1 58.5
1999 44.0 51.5 46.1 50.9 52.0 51.2 50.8 56.1 56.2 55.0 51.4 52.4 59.6 58.5 57.7 62.7 58.1 63.0 63.8 60.2
2000 44.1 54.2 46.7 52.6 51.2 52.7 51.1 58.1 56.6 54.8 53.1 52.6 60.2 58.3 58.8 63.0 58.5 62.3 65.2 60.9
2001 45.4 53.9 47.2 52.1 52.1 51.9 51.3 57.6 56.3 53.8 51.3 52.3 60.3 59.5 59.4 64.1 59.3 61.8 63.9 61.3
2002 45.4 53.5 48.0 53.2 51.6 51.6 50.5 59.7 56.0 52.5 51.1 51.5 60.2 60.0 59.6 63.3 55.5 63.3 64.8 61.8
2003 47.9 54.2 48.6 55.2 53.0 54.9 50.1 62.4 55.7 55.1 55.6 50.7 61.7 62.7 59.3 60.3 53.0 61.2 64.7 63.3
2004 46.6 53.6 49.1 50.8 52.9 52.4 49.9 61.6 56.0 57.4 52.8 48.8 60.1 59.5 59.5 63.0 53.9 59.2 63.3 65.1
2005 47.2 52.7 47.8 50.6 51.7 52.3 50.1 60.8 55.1 55.5 51.7 53.4 60.6 59.4 60.2 63.7 55.5 61.0 62.0 65.3
2006 47.6 52.1 49.0 52.4 52.9 53.8 50.7 61.4 54.2 55.4 51.0 54.6 60.9 61.9 60.7 64.4 57.6 61.9 62.4 64.1
2007 46.8 53.2 49.1 53.2 51.3 55.0 53.1 62.5 54.6 53.2 49.8 51.2 62.1 61.2 61.3 64.0 57.8 63.7 62.4 63.7
2008 45.2 53.3 47.6 50.3 50.8 55.5 51.2 62.7 55.2 53.1 50.8 49.9 58.9 59.7 60.3 61.9 56.4 63.0 61.0 64.5
2009 44.8 51.6 47.3 48.6 48.4 52.5 49.9 59.2 53.2 53.1 50.4 53.0 56.7 57.6 59.1 59.0 56.0 61.4 57.4 63.3
2010 46.4 51.8 47.4 48.4 49.7 53.1 52.1 59.9 54.2 53.9 51.5 54.0 56.1 56.4 58.7 56.0 56.6 61.4 58.1 61.5
 
Source: 1992-2010: CSO LFS
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut01_04
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1.5. Employment by sector, %
Agriculture Industry Services
Public 
Administra-
tion
Total
1990 17.6 38.4 25.7 18.2 100.0
1991 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1992 11.5 35.7 33.3 19.6 100.0
1993 9.3 34.4 34.3 22.0 100.0
1994 8.9 33.6 34.7 22.8 100.0
1995 8.2 33.1 35.8 22.9 100.0
1996 8.4 33.1 36.1 22.5 100.0
1997 8.0 33.5 36.7 21.8 100.0
1998 7.4 34.3 35.8 22.4 100.0
1999 7.2 34.2 36.6 22.0 100.0
2000 6.6 33.8 37.5 22.1 100.0
2001 6.3 34.3 37.9 21.5 100.0
2002 6.2 34.1 37.9 21.7 100.0
2003 5.5 33.3 38.4 22.7 100.0
2004 5.3 32.9 38.8 23.1 100.0
2005 5.0 32.4 39.9 22.7 100.0
2006 4.9 32.3 40.1 22.7 100.0
2007 4.7 32.7 40.7 22.0 100.0
2008 4.4 32.4 41.4 21.8 100.0
2009 4.7 31.2 41.3 22.8 100.0
2010 4.6 30.7 41.1 23.6 100.0
 
Source: 1990: The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis 2002. 
IE-HAS, 2002, Budapest p. 292.; 1992-2010: CSO LFS
 
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut01_05
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2.1. Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-64
In proportion to the econmically 
active population
In proportion to the population 
aged 15-64
men women together men women together
1990 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.1 0.7 0.9
1991 6.0 5.1 5.6 4.4 2.9 3.7
1992 11.1 8.8 10.0 8.0 5.0 6.5
1993 13.6 10.3 12.1 9.5 5.6 7.5
1994 12.1 9.3 10.8 8.2 4.9 6.5
1995 11.7 8.7 10.3 7.9 4.4 6.1
1996 10.9 8.8 10.0 7.3 4.4 5.8
1997 9.7 7.7 8.8 6.4 3.8 5.1
1998 8.5 6.9 7.8 5.6 3.5 4.5
1999 7.6 6.3 7.0 5.1 3.3 4.2
2000 7.0 5.7 6.4 4.7 3.0 3.8
2001 6.3 5.0 5.7 4.3 2.6 3.4
2002 6.2 5.4 5.8 4.1 2.9 3.5
2003 6.1 5.6 5.9 4.2 3.0 3.6
2004 6.1 6.1 6.1 4.1 3.3 3.7
2005 7.0 7.5 7.2 4.8 4.1 4.4
2006 7.2 7.9 7.5 4.9 4.4 4.6
2007 7.2 7.7 7.4 4.9 4.2 4.6
2008 7.7 8.1 7.9 5.2 4.5 4.8
2009 10.3 9.8 10.1 7.0 5.4 6.2
2010 11.6 10.8 11.2 8.0 6.1 7.0
Source: 1990-1991: The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis 2002. 
IE-HAS, 2002, Budapest pp 277-278. (data for the registered unemployed)
1992-2010: CSO LFS
Note: economically active population = employed or looking for work. The unemployed are defined 
by the ILO/OECD standard (those looking for work and available to take up employment).
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut02_01
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2.2. Registered unemployment in the population aged 15-64
Year
Registered unemployed, 
thousands
In proportion to the population 
aged 15-64, %
men women together men women together
1990 na. na. 47.7 na. na. 0.7
1991 135.2 92.1 227.3 4.0 2.6 3.3
1992 328.0 228.9 556.9 9.9 6.5 8.1
1993 395.3 276.4 671.7 11.9 7.9 9.8
1994 333.0 235.3 568.3 10.1 6.7 8.4
1995 293.8 213.8 507.6 8.9 6.1 7.5
1996 284.1 216.5 500.6 8.7 6.3 7.5
1997 267.1 203.0 470.1 8.3 5.9 7.1
1998 233.4 189.7 423.1 7.0 5.4 6.2
1999 221.4 188.1 409.5 6.7 5.4 6.0
2000 209.7 180.8 390.5 6.3 5.2 5.7
2001 196.4 167.7 364.1 5.9 4.8 5.3
2002 184.6 160.1 344.7 5.5 4.6 5.0
2003 188.0 169.2 357.2 5.7 4.8 5.2
2004 193.3 182.6 375.9 5.8 5.2 5.5
2005 210.4 199.5 409.9 6.3 5.7 6.0
2006 200.9 192.5 393.4 6.1 5.5 5.8
2007 219.9 207.0 426.9 6.6 6.0 6.3
2008 228.3 214.0 442.3 6.9 6.2 6.5
2009 297.9 263.9 561.8 9.0 7.7 8.3
2010 305.0 277.7 582.7 9.2 8.1 8.6
Source: registered unemployed: Employment Office, The Hungarian Labour 
Market – Review and Analysis 2012. IE-HAS, 2012, Budapest, Table 5.11
1990-1991: population aged 15-64: CSO on-line database
1992-2010: population aged 15-64: CSO LFS
Note: annual average; the registered unemployed may in theory include some 
people aged over 64 but their actual number is zero or negligible.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut02_02
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2.3. Unemployment rate of the population aged 15-24, %
Men Women Together
1990 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1991 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1992 21.98 15.02 18.79
1993 25.94 17.85 22.30
1994 23.78 16.04 20.29
1995 23.28 15.04 19.69
1996 20.38 15.93 18.50
1997 18.23 13.58 16.30
1998 15.80 11.66 14.01
1999 13.95 11.48 12.88
2000 13.74 11.30 12.68
2001 12.16 10.02 11.25
2002 13.26 11.79 12.61
2003 13.72 12.88 13.35
2004 16.19 14.52 15.47
2005 19.64 19.13 19.42
2006 18.54 19.75 19.06
2007 17.64 18.54 18.03
2008 19.12 20.88 19.85
2009 28.14 24.20 26.44
2010 27.93 24.84 26.58
Source: 1992-2010: CSO LFS
Note: unemployment defined by the ILO/OECD standard.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut02_03
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2.4. Job search activity of the non-working population aged 20-64
Looking for work, % Wants a job  but not looking for work, %
men women together men women together
1990 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1991 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1992 27.9 11.7 18.0 14.3 14.6 14.5
1993 28.5 11.8 18.5 13.5 12.7 13.0
1994 24.8 10.0 15.9 13.6 12.4 12.9
1995 24.0 9.1 14.8 14.2 12.9 13.4
1996 22.8 9.0 14.3 14.2 12.5 13.2
1997 20.9 8.3 13.1 13.4 10.0 11.3
1998 18.9 8.4 12.5 13.9 10.8 12.0
1999 17.0 7.6 11.2 17.4 13.7 15.1
2000 16.1 7.0 10.5 17.5 14.3 15.6
2001 14.8 6.1 9.5 17.5 13.1 14.8
2002 14.3 6.8 9.7 17.7 13.8 15.3
2003 14.7 7.5 10.3 17.2 12.5 14.4
2004 14.0 8.3 10.5 17.0 13.1 14.6
2005 16.4 10.2 12.6 16.2 12.6 14.0
2006 17.0 10.7 13.2 14.7 12.1 13.1
2007 17.5 10.5 13.2 14.2 11.3 12.4
2008 17.8 10.8 13.5 14.0 11.5 12.5
2009 22.7 12.8 16.9 13.8 11.7 12.6
2010 25.1 14.7 19.0 13.5 12.4 12.9
Source: 1992-2010: CSO LFS
Note: Those looking for work include the unemployed as well as those who are 
actively looking for work but are not available to take up employment. Those 
wanting a job but not actively looking are also called discouraged workers.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut02_04
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2.5. Registered unemployed visiting the job centre in the previous month
Men Women
visited 
the job 
centre
registered 
unem-
ployed
ratio
visited 
the job 
centre
registered 
unem-
ployed
ratio
thousands % thousands %
1999 106.1 195.6 54.3 83.2 157.2 53.0
2000 69.1 170.1 40.6 53.8 129.4 41.5
2001 62.0 173.4 35.7 46.8 139.3 33.6
2002 59.6 161.2 37.0 52.7 142.0 37.1
2003 61.7 173.6 35.6 55.2 164.4 33.6
2004 57.6 142.8 40.3 55.1 133.1 41.3
2005 63.1 159.9 39.5 62.7 153.8 40.8
Source: CSO LFS
Note: Those giving a positive answer to the question “Have you visited the local job centre during the 
past month?” The CSO Labour Force Survey (LFS) included this question only between 1999 and 2005.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut02_05
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2.6. Registered unemployed or out of work in the population aged 15-64
Men Women
registered 
unem-
ployed
out of 
work ratio
registered 
unem-
ployed
out of 
work ratio
thousands % thousands %
1992 328.0 1199.5 27.3 228.9 1677.0 13.6
1993 395.3 1316.2 30.0 276.4 1775.4 15.6
1994 333.0 1324.8 25.1 235.3 1821.0 12.9
1995 293.8 1319.6 22.3 213.8 1887.9 11.3
1996 284.1 1307.9 21.7 216.5 1882.1 11.5
1997 267.1 1294.6 20.6 203.0 1869.4 10.9
1998 233.4 1317.7 17.7 189.7 1849.5 10.3
1999 221.4 1252.6 17.7 188.1 1788.4 10.5
2000 209.7 1239.1 16.9 180.8 1761.3 10.3
2001 196.4 1233.8 15.9 167.7 1759.4 9.5
2002 184.6 1234.0 15.0 160.1 1757.2 9.1
2003 188.0 1213.7 15.5 169.2 1716.7 9.9
2004 193.3 1223.6 15.8 182.6 1719.8 10.6
2005 210.4 1223.8 17.2 199.5 1704.5 11.7
2006 200.9 1202.7 16.7 192.5 1699.4 11.3
2007 219.9 1190.4 18.5 207.0 1705.0 12.1
2008 228.3 1225.4 18.6 214.0 1712.5 12.5
2009 297.9 1286.0 23.2 263.9 1726.3 15.3
2010 305.0 1312.7 23.2 277.7 1699.1 16.3
Source: registered unemployed: Employment Office, out of work: CSO LFS
Note: out of work = unemployed or economically inactive
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut02_06
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2.7. Long-term unemployment (ILO)
Thousands %
men women together men women together
1990 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1991 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1992 48.9 31.4 80.2 18.2 17.5 17.9
1993 94.8 64.2 159.0 30.2 31.8 30.8
1994 114.1 63.0 177.1 41.9 36.0 39.6
1995 120.5 63.7 184.3 46.5 41.4 44.6
1996 125.4 65.4 190.8 52.3 42.9 48.6
1997 96.4 53.8 150.1 46.1 41.3 44.3
1998 97.7 65.8 163.5 52.0 52.7 52.3
1999 86.8 55.9 142.6 51.2 48.6 50.1
2000 82.3 50.4 132.7 52.1 48.1 50.5
2001 70.8 41.7 112.5 49.8 45.6 48.2
2002 67.2 43.7 110.9 48.8 43.6 46.6
2003 59.2 45.5 104.7 43.2 43.1 43.2
2004 64.1 49.4 113.5 47.1 42.7 45.1
2005 77.4 66.5 143.9 48.7 46.1 47.5
2006 76.3 66.6 142.8 46.5 43.9 45.2
2007 78.3 71.3 149.7 47.9 48.5 48.2
2008 85.4 72.7 158.1 49.2 47.1 48.2
2009 100.9 79.4 180.3 43.3 42.6 43.0
2010 129.9 103.3 233.3 49.4 49.3 49.4
Source: 1992-2010: CSO LFS
Note: those looking for work for over a year, the unemployed 
are defined by the ILO standard..
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut02_07
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2.8. Long-term unemployment (registered) by small region
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2000 9.4 14.0 12.1 9.5 16 19 25 31 35 42.4 43.8 41.5 38.8
2001 10.3 13.4 9.7 9.3 14 16 23 30 34 41.6 37.1 44.3 40.0
2002 6.9 8.6 5.8 5.4 9 12 19 27 30 38.6 36.8 44.2 36.5
2003 8.2 8.9 5.7 5.5 10 12 19 28 33 40.0 42.8 47.5 43.8
2004 11.8 9.3 8.0 7.1 11 13 21 28 33 38.7 42.1 48.7 43.1
2005 10.4 11.7 8.1 8.2 11 14 22 30 34 39.0 42.3 44.2 38.5
2006 9.0 11.9 10.8 10.7 13 15 24 31 35 36.5 36.7 48.3 40.4
2007 11.1 9.1 9.3 10.9 12 16 27 34 39 42.5 38.5 45.9 44.8
2008 13.1 7.3 6.8 12.4 13 18 30 40 44 48.6 43.7 54.5 49.5
2009 10.1 4.9 6.1 10.3 10 14 25 34 38 47.2 31.7 46.3 48.9
2010 12.2 12.3 11.9 15.9 17 20 28 34 38 35.1 32.2 38.7 45.9
2011 13.5 13.9 14.8 19.4 19 22 25 29 31 24.9 27.7 35.1 42.5
Source: IE HAS Databank calculation based on Employment Office data.
Note: proportion of those in the register for over 12 months, 
based on the annual average of monthly stocks.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut02_08
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2.9. Composition of the unemployed (ILO) by gender and education, %
Year
Men Women
primary 
or less
lower 
sec ond ary 
vocation*
upper 
secondary tertiary together
primary 
or less
lower 
sec ond ary 
vocation*
upper 
secondary tertiary together
1992 41.1 38.9 16.1 3.9 100.0 49.1 21.1 26.7 3.1 100.0
1993 39.0 40.8 17.3 2.8 100.0 45.8 22.6 27.4 4.2 100.0
1994 37.3 42.7 15.8 4.3 100.0 44.4 23.1 29.4 3.1 100.0
1995 37.7 44.0 14.7 3.6 100.0 41.0 24.3 29.7 5.0 100.0
1996 37.6 44.0 15.1 3.3 100.0 38.2 24.9 31.6 5.4 100.0
1997 38.9 43.7 15.4 2.0 100.0 44.2 23.2 28.4 4.2 100.0
1998 37.4 42.0 17.2 3.4 100.0 41.6 22.7 31.4 4.3 100.0
1999 34.5 45.3 17.4 2.8 100.0 36.2 26.2 33.8 3.8 100.0
2000 32.9 45.8 17.9 3.4 100.0 31.8 28.2 35.0 5.0 100.0
2001 36.5 43.2 17.5 2.8 100.0 33.7 28.0 32.2 6.1 100.0
2002 36.7 43.3 16.7 3.3 100.0 33.2 26.0 32.2 8.5 100.0
2003 34.0 44.7 17.2 4.1 100.0 32.7 28.3 32.0 7.0 100.0
2004 33.9 42.6 18.6 4.9 100.0 27.8 27.4 34.2 10.6 100.0
2005 32.1 43.1 19.0 5.8 100.0 28.2 27.1 35.2 9.5 100.0
2006 33.4 40.0 20.0 6.6 100.0 31.5 27.5 32.5 8.5 100.0
2007 34.9 38.8 20.3 6.0 100.0 31.2 26.6 31.7 10.5 100.0
2008 35.2 39.4 19.8 5.6 100.0 32.2 24.3 33.3 10.2 100.0
2009 31.0 40.1 21.9 7.0 100.0 32.1 26.1 30.3 11.4 100.0
2010 30.1 40.2 21.5 8.2 100.0 30.5 24.3 34.0 11.2 100.0
Source: CSO LFS. The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis 
2012. IE-HAS, 2012, Budapest Tables  5.3. and 5.5.
* Completed a vocational secondary school that does not offer a school leaving (A level) certificate.
Note: using weights based on the 1990 census until 2000. The classification 
of levels of education was slightly modified in 1999.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut02_09
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2.10. Unemployment rate (ILO) by gender and education, %
Év
Men Women
primary 
or less
lower 
secondary 
vocation*
upper 
secondary tertiary together
primary 
or less
lower 
secondary 
vocation*
upper 
secondary tertiary together
1992 16.4 12.0 7.6 3.2 11.1 12.5 10.6 6.6 2.0 8.9
1993 20.3 15.0 9.7 2.9 13.5 14.6 12.8 8.1 3.2 10.4
1994 18.4 13.3 7.9 4.0 12.1 13.9 11.0 7.6 2.0 9.4
1995 18.8 13.1 7.0 3.1 11.6 12.7 10.4 7.1 2.8 8.7
1996 18.3 12.1 6.8 2.8 10.9 12.6 10.9 7.5 2.9 8.8
1997 16.9 10.6 5.9 1.6 9.6 12.6 8.7 6.0 2.2 7.8
1998 14.6 9.1 5.9 2.2 8.5 11.6 7.8 5.8 1.8 7.0
1999 14.3 8.2 5.0 1.5 7.5 10.5 8.0 5.2 1.3 6.3
2000 13.4 7.7 4.8 1.6 7.0 9.1 7.4 4.9 1.5 5.6
2001 13.6 6.4 4.3 1.2 6.3 8.4 6.4 4.0 1.6 5.0
2002 14.1 6.2 4.0 1.4 6.1 9.3 6.5 4.4 2.4 5.4
2003 13.6 6.6 3.9 1.6 6.1 10.5 7.2 4.4 1.9 5.6
2004 14.3 6.4 4.1 1.7 6.1 10.3 8.0 5.3 2.9 6.1
2005 15.6 7.4 4.9 2.3 7.0 13.0 9.8 6.7 3.1 7.5
2006 17.3 7.0 5.2 2.7 7.2 15.8 10.1 6.4 2.8 7.8
2007 18.4 6.8 5.1 2.4 7.1 16.0 9.4 6.2 3.3 7.6
2008 19.8 7.6 5.3 2.3 7.6 17.5 9.5 6.9 3.2 8.1
2009 24.4 10.6 7.7 3.8 10.3 21.6 12.4 7.7 4.1 9.7
2010 26.9 12.1 8.4 4.9 11.6 22.8 12.6 9.5 4.5 10.7
Source: CSO LFS. The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis 
2012. IE-HAS, 2012, Budapest Tables  5.2. and 5.4.
* Completed a vocational secondary school that does not offer a school leaving (A level) certificate.
Note: using weights based on the 1990 census until 2000. The classification 
of levels of education was slightly modified in 1999.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut02_10
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3.1. Monthly wage of the average production worker, thousand HUF*
Men Women Together
1986 7.2 5.3 6.3
1989 11.4 8.2 10.0
1992 21.6 15.5 19.3
1993 22.6 22.7 22.7
1994 31.3 22.2 27.8
1995 37.0 26.5 32.9
1996 45.9 32.3 40.5
1997 55.3 37.9 48.4
1998 64.1 45.0 56.6
1999 73.8 51.6 65.1
2000 81.3 59.5 72.8
2001 92.6 67.6 82.8
2002 101.6 75.5 91.7
2003 107.9 80.2 97.1
2004 117.1 84.8 104.5
2005 130.3 93.0 115.9
2006 133.1 97.1 119.5
2007 148.5 107.0 133.0
2008 155.4 112.9 139.4
2009 158.8 115.3 143.1
2010 165.1 120.5 148.5
Source: Calculation of the IE HAS Databank based on data from the Wage Survey of the Employment Office.
* Manual worker in Manufacturing, similar to the OECD average production worker (APW). 
Note: average gross monthly earnings. The data refer to May in each year.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut03_01
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3.2. Estimated wage advantages for gender, level of education and age group
Men Incomplete primary Primary
Lower 
secondary 
vocational
Tertiary Aged 15-24
Aged 
55-64
Public 
sector
1986 0.2920 -0.2840 -0.2090 -0.0893 0.3180 0.0182 0.0414 -0.0473
1989 0.2900 -0.3000 -0.2940 -0.1600 0.4170 0.0702 0.0878 -0.0436
1992 0.1990 -0.5240 -0.4080 -0.2550 0.3990 0.0615 0.0889 -0.1130
1993 n.a.
1994 0.1840 -0.4830 -0.4300 -0.2660 0.5080 0.0269 0.0966 -0.0722
1995 0.1730 -0.4640 -0.4370 -0.3010 0.4120 0.0103 0.1250 -0.1380
1996 0.1760 -0.5550 -0.4480 -0.3000 0.4660 0.0197 0.0948 -0.2510
1997 0.1750 -0.6300 -0.4580 -0.3170 0.4890 -0.0012 0.0852 -0.2040
1998 0.1720 -0.5970 -0.4640 -0.3120 0.4830 -0.0144 0.0668 -0.1780
1999 0.1780 -0.6020 -0.4630 -0.3210 0.5250 -0.0153 0.0378 -0.2010
2000 0.1570 -0.5740 -0.4080 -0.2780 0.5490 -0.0377 0.0430 -0.1250
2001 0.1580 -0.4870 -0.3590 -0.2530 0.5220 -0.0472 0.0636 -0.1160
2002 0.1380 -0.4610 -0.3590 -0.2730 0.5360 -0.0233 0.0607 -0.0605
2003 0.1460 -0.4100 -0.3520 -0.2550 0.6120 -0.0430 0.0482 0.1090
2004 0.1470 -0.3890 -0.3630 -0.2650 0.5810 -0.0274 0.0550 0.1560
2005 0.1480 -0.4780 -0.3670 -0.2750 0.5860 -0.0167 0.0699 0.1080
2006 0.1500 -0.3970 -0.3740 -0.2830 0.5730 -0.0112 0.0866 0.0870
2007 0.1790 -0.4260 -0.4090 -0.2920 0.5580 -0.0057 0.0783 -0.0009
2008 0.1700 -0.3940 -0.3980 -0.2780 0.5540 0.0039 0.0760 0.0178
2009 0.1430 -0.5460 -0.4400 -0.2990 0.6170 -0.0169 0.0897 -0.1360
2010 0.1460 -0.3590 -0.3660 -0.2420 0.5720 -0.0218 0.0708 -0.0646
Source: Calculated by Zsuzsanna Sinka-Grósz (IE HAS) based on the Wage Survey of the Employment Office.
Note: Coefficients of a regression on log earnings, which show the earnings advantage of each 
group on a logarithmic scale (roughly equal to percentages) compared to the reference group.
The estimates also included six region dummies and imputed years of 
tenure, which were omitted from the table for lack of space.
Reference categories: women, upper secondary education, Central 
Trans-Danubia, Private sector employee, aged 25-54.
The estimates could not be computed for 1993 as in the 1993 Wage Survey there 
is no information on the education level of public sector employees.
.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut03_02
7. statistiCal annex 7.4 . population
274
4.1. Population aged 15-64, thousands
Year Men Women Together
1990 3367.0 3503.3 6870.4
1991 3383.1 3515.4 6898.5
1992 3328.1 3515.3 6843.5
1993 3312.4 3509.5 6821.9
1994 3299.0 3500.5 6799.5
1995 3283.6 3493.5 6777.1
1996 3253.2 3454.6 6707.8
1997 3235.9 3413.2 6649.1
1998 3321.7 3511.0 6832.7
1999 3316.0 3501.3 6817.3
2000 3325.1 3497.4 6822.5
2001 3330.6 3502.5 6833.2
2002 3329.3 3502.9 6832.1
2003 3320.8 3496.6 6817.4
2004 3320.4 3488.2 6808.6
2005 3319.7 3478.1 6797.8
2006 3319.8 3479.3 6799.1
2007 3311.0 3472.6 6783.6
2008 3314.0 3465.0 6779.0
2009 3307.9 3447.7 6755.7
2010 3314.0 3440.3 6754.2
Source: 1990-1991: population aged 15-64: CSO on-line data. 
1992-2010: population 15-64: CSO LFS
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut04_01
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4.2. Population aged 20-64 by education, thousands
Men Women
lower 
secon-
dary or 
below
upper 
secon-
dary
tertiary together
lower 
secon-
dary or 
below, %
lower 
secon-
dary or 
below
upper 
secon-
dary
tertiary together
lower 
secon-
dary or 
below, %
1992 1898.8 666.2 360.2 2925.2 64.9 1834.4 952.5 332.9 3119.7 58.8
1993 1893.5 670.0 336.3 2899.8 65.3 1846.2 922.3 332.6 3101.1 59.5
1994 1874.6 678.9 327.1 2880.6 65.1 1809.8 941.8 323.4 3075.0 58.9
1995 1850.0 671.6 338.4 2860.1 64.7 1786.8 945.0 341.2 3073.0 58.1
1996 1837.3 668.7 336.8 2842.8 64.6 1736.5 957.3 358.8 3052.6 56.9
1997 1854.3 692.9 301.3 2848.6 65.1 1752.7 960.2 323.8 3036.6 57.7
1998 1884.0 729.3 348.9 2962.3 63.6 1737.8 1036.4 390.2 3164.3 54.9
1999 1852.2 769.7 350.5 2972.3 62.3 1645.7 1116.2 406.1 3168.0 51.9
2000 1837.2 784.2 371.0 2992.4 61.4 1614.4 1134.0 425.1 3173.4 50.9
2001 1855.0 780.9 369.4 3005.2 61.7 1610.9 1143.2 430.4 3184.4 50.6
2002 1835.7 792.5 382.0 3010.2 61.0 1593.5 1154.2 441.9 3189.6 50.0
2003 1769.1 826.4 410.6 3006.2 58.8 1527.3 1179.2 480.5 3187.1 47.9
2004 1724.0 843.5 440.2 3007.7 57.3 1473.4 1179.7 529.0 3182.1 46.3
2005 1728.1 841.1 440.1 3009.3 57.4 1444.9 1182.3 548.2 3175.5 45.5
2006 1699.4 860.2 452.2 3011.9 56.4 1403.3 1206.0 570.3 3179.6 44.1
2007 1674.5 873.4 456.6 3004.5 55.7 1384.5 1202.9 586.9 3174.3 43.6
2008 1646.8 881.2 482.3 3010.3 54.7 1358.5 1183.4 627.8 3169.7 42.9
2009 1611.5 910.6 486.1 3008.2 53.6 1313.8 1187.7 656.9 3158.4 41.6
2010 1606.4 920.7 493.8 3020.8 53.2 1278.7 1207.7 670.0 3156.3 40.5
Source: CSO LFS
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut04_02
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4.3. Life expectancy at age 60 by gender, years
Men Women Together
1990 14.7 19.0 17.0
1991 14.7 19.2 17.1
1992 14.5 19.1 17.0
1993 14.5 19.2 17.0
1994 14.7 19.3 17.2
1995 14.8 19.5 17.3
1996 14.9 19.4 17.4
1997 15.0 19.7 17.6
1998 15.0 19.8 17.6
1999 14.9 19.6 17.5
2000 15.3 20.0 17.9
2001 16.0 20.7 18.6
2002 16.0 20.7 18.6
2003 15.8 20.6 18.5
2004 16.1 20.9 18.7
2005 16.0 20.9 18.7
2006 16.3 21.1 19.0
2007 16.3 21.2 19.0
2008 16.6 21.4 19.3
2009 16.6 21.5 19.3
2010 16.8 21.6 19.4
Source: 1990-1999: Demographic Yearbook 2000, CSO and 2000-2010: Demographic Yearbook 2010, CSO
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut04_03
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4.4. Immigrants in Hungary by sender country, thousands
EU15 Romania Ukraine Serbia Slovakia Other European China Other Together
1990-1994 n.a.
1995 11,8 68,4 3,5 15,3 0,2 23,7 3,5 11,7 138,1
1996 13,0 65,7 4,4 16,2 0,5 22,6 4,3 13,3 140,0
1997 14,7 61,6 5,6 15,4 0,6 22,6 6,6 15,3 142,5
1998 16,4 62,1 7,2 14,3 1,0 23,0 7,8 16,5 148,3
1999 17,3 57,4 9,9 15,2 1,6 22,7 8,3 17,9 150,2
2000 17,9 57,3 11,0 15,6 1,7 22,2 8,9 18,5 153,1
2001 11,7 41,6 8,9 12,7 1,6 16,7 5,8 11,0 110,0
2002 12,2 45,0 9,8 12,0 2,2 16,5 6,8 11,9 116,4
2003 11,6 47,3 9,9 11,7 1,5 16,2 6,4 11,2 115,9
2004 12,1 55,7 13,1 12,4 2,5 15,2 6,8 12,4 130,1
2005 9,7 67,5 13,9 13,6 1,2 16,2 6,9 13,0 142,2
2006 18,4 66,2 15,3 12,1 3,6 15,0 8,6 15,3 154,4
2007 25,4 67,0 15,9 12,6 4,3 15,7 9,0 16,2 166,0
2008 25,5 65,8 17,3 17,2 4,9 15,4 10,2 18,3 174,7
2009 30,7 66,4 17,6 17,0 6,1 16,6 10,7 19,3 184,4
2010 33,6 72,7 17,2 17,2 6,4 17,5 11,2 21,9 197,8
2011 36,5 76,9 16,5 16,3 7,3 18,4 11,8 23,2 206,9
Source: CSO Demographic Yearbooks based on Home Office data.
Note: Data for January. Figures were revised between 2000 and 2001 and 
invalid residence permits were deleted from the database.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut04_04
7. statistiCal annex 7.4 . population
278
4.5. Emigrants from Hungary by destination country, thousands
Germany Austria UK Italy Ireland Sweden and Denmark Other EU
1990-1997 n.a.
1998 52.0 6.6 3.3 3.8
1999 51.9 5.9 3.3 6.8
2000 53.2 7.1 2.8 3.4 4.1
2001 54.4 12.7 4.3 3.1 3.4 5.7
2002 56.0 13.1 3.2 3.2 6.3
2003 56.0 13.7 6.6 2.9 9.1
2004 54.7 14.2 6.0 2.8 4.8
2005 47.8 15.1 5.2 3.7 2.8 8.4
2006 49.5 16.3 4.1 3.0 6.6
2007 56.1 17.4 4.4 3.3 9.4
2008 60.2 19.3 5.5 4.1 15.5
2009 63.8 21.5 6.2 5.9 5.2 14.6
2010 65.4 6.9 5.5 6.1 16.8
Source: Compiled by Ágnes Hárs based on Eurostat’s ’population by citizenship’ 
on-line database (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/)
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut04_05
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4.6. Demographic and economic dependency ratio
Demographic Economic
1980 0.54 0.96
1990 0.51 1.13
1991 0.50 1.29
1992 0.49 1.54
1993 0.49 1.71
1994 0.48 1.76
1995 0.48 1.81
1996 0.48 1.83
1997 0.47 1.82
1998 0.47 1.78
1999 0.47 1.69
2000 0.47 1.66
2001 0.46 1.63
2002 0.46 1.62
2003 0.46 1.59
2004 0.46 1.59
2005 0.45 1.59
2006 0.45 1.56
2007 0.45 1.56
2008 0.45 1.59
2009 0.45 1.65
2010 0.46 1.65
2011 0.46 1.62
Source: Demographic: The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis 2012. IE-HAS, 2012, Table 2.1.; 
Economic: employment: ibid. Table 4.1., population: ibid. Table 2.1.
Note: Demographic dependency ratio = (population aged 0–14 + 
population aged over 64) / (population aged 15–64)
Economic dependency ratio = (non working population) / (employed population)
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut04_06
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5.1. GDP and consumer price index
GDP (1960=100) CPI (previous year=100)
1989 317 117.0
1990 306 128.9
1991 269 135.0
1992 261 123.0
1993 259 122.5
1994 267 118.8
1995 271 128.2
1996 271 123.6
1997 280 118.3
1998 291 114.3
1999 301 110.0
2000 313 109.8
2001 325 109.2
2002 340 105.3
2003 353 104.7
2004 370 106.8
2005 384 103.6
2006 399 103.9
2007 400 108.0
2008 403 106.1
2009 376 104.2
2010 381 104.9
Source: CSO Stadat
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut05_01
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5.2. Self-employment
Thousands %
1992 597.3 14.8
1993 548.6 14.6
1994 544.0 14.7
1995 559.7 15.4
1996 564.9 15.7
1997 551.7 15.3
1998 530.4 14.4
1999 547.7 14.4
2000 536.5 13.9
2001 523.3 13.5
2002 510.9 13.2
2003 514.1 13.1
2004 544.4 14.0
2005 528.4 13.5
2006 493.9 12.6
2007 482.1 12.3
2008 472.0 12.2
2009 470.0 12.4
2010 460.7 12.2
Source: CSO LFS
Note: sole proprietors, family help, and owners of unincorporated 
businesses. In percentage of the employed population.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut05_02
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5.3. Business environment
Hu Cz Pl Sk Hu Cz Pl Sk Hu Cz Pl Sk
Global Competitiveness Report ranking
1990 59
1991 59
1992 55
1993
1994 56 52 59
1995
Doing Business ranking, World Bank Overall Competitiveness ranking (IMD) Government Efficiency ranking (IMD)
1997 42 47 55 46 45 58
1998 47 36 56 31 41 55
1999 46 33 50 29 43 53
2000 46 34 50 35 49 53
2001 42 36 57 49 36 45 58 46
2002 39 36 54 46 33 36 54 45
2003 36 35 54 44 37 36 54 45
2004 42 40 56 38 43 47 57 28
2005 35 36 56 39 36 43 54 20
2006 61 48 64 44 31 39 56 37 39 32 56 24
2007 69 54 78 38 34 38 56 36 43 44 56 40
2008 46 58 76 33 30 41 47 32 50 35 53 33
2009 41 76 77 36 30 47 46 34 52 32 46 35
2010 52 82 73 40 30 43 33 50 52 34 37 42
2011 46 63 70 41 30 47 34 48 52 28 35 42
Source: World Bank, GCI and IMD.
Note: Cz= Czech Republic, Hu= Hungary, Pl= Poland, SK= Slovak Republic
Each index shows the rank of the particular country among all countries surveyed in the given year, 
rescaled to the number of countries in the last year surveyed (so that ranks are comparable across 
years).GCI 1994 and IMD 2011 both covered 59 countries, DB 2011 covered 183. Rescaling distorts ranks 
(adds a downward bias) especially in the GCI ranking which covered only 23 countries in 1990. IMD 1997 
covered 46 countries, while the World Bank Doing Business survey covered 155 countries in 2006.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut05_03
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5.4. Subsidies for regional development projects, at current prices, 
million HUF
Ear-marked 
funds 
(címzett)
Targeted 
funds (cél)
Themed target appropriations (célelőirányzat)
Agri culture 
(agr)
Regional 
compen-
sation fund 
(teki)
spatial 
deve lop-
ment (tfc)
economy 
(gfc) water tourism
1990 n.a.
1991 38 335 11 757
1992 6 354 24 358 4208
1993 6 171 47 403 4859
1994 15 056 3 672 6856 69 779
1995 7 524 8 606 4863 1829 71 892
1996 18 129 27 124 5790 3078 2 1137 94 236 6545
1997 18 982 30 830 8578 5075 3 1163 100 667 8862
1998 35 321 41 021 7121 3327 4 1392 119 064 840
1999 9065
2000-2010 n.a.
Source: VÁTI OTO: Területfejlesztési országgyűlési jelentés 2. Pénzügyi eszközök. 
Háttéranyag, Magyar Regionális Fejlesztési és Urbanisztikai Kht, 2000 
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut05_04
5.5. Spatial development target appropriation (tfc), at 1999 prices, 
million HUF
Year Employment Infrastructure Other Total
1991 3503 1 269 388 5 160
1992 3868 7 004 1162 12 035
1993 1515 10 337 539 12 390
1994 1450 12 626 803 14 879
1995 2138 6 161 113 8 413
1996 3503 1 965 2697 8 164
1997 5391 1 517 3385 10 293
1998 4491 810 2390 7 691
1999 5145 2 039 1881 9 065
2000 2082 668 1059 3 824
1996-2008, 
annual
9 066
2000-2010 n.a.
Source: NFGM: A hazai területfejlesztési támogatási rendszer átfogó értékelése 1996–2008. 
Nemzeti Fejlesztési és Gazdasági Minisztérium, 2009
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut05_05
7. statistiCal annex 7.5. eConomy
284
5.6. Minimum wage and guaranteed minimum pension, at current prices, 
thousand HUF
Minimum wage Minimum wage, % of APW
Minimum wage 
for skilled 
workers
Minimum 
pension
1990 4.8 40.9 4.30
1991 7.0 n.a. 5.20
1992 8.0 41.4 5.80
1993 9.0 39.7 6.40
1994 10.5 37.8 7.37
1995 12.2 37.0 8.40
1996 12.2 30.1 9.60
1997 17.0 35.1 11.50
1998 19.5 34.4 13.70
1999 22.5 34.6 15.35
2000 25.5 35.0 16.60
2001 40.0 48.3 18.31
2002 50.0 54.5 20.10
2003 50.0 51.5 21.80
2004 53.0 50.7 23.20
2005 57.0 49.2 24.70
2006 62.5 52.3 68.8 25.80
2007 65.5 49.2 75.4 27.13
2008 69.0 49.5 86.3 28.50
2009 71.5 50.0 87.0 28.50
2010 73.5 49.5 89.5 28.50
2011 78.0 n.a. 94.0 28.50
Source: 1990: http://www.mszosz.hu/files/1/64/345.pdf 
1991-2011: The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis 2012. IE-HAS, 2012, Budapest table 10.3
APW: average wage of manual workers in Manufacturing, Wage Survey of the Employment Office. 
In 1990, we used data for 1989 adjusted for inflation, as there was no Wage Survey in 1990.
Note: Until 1999, the new minimum wage took effect a few months later 
in industries employing mostly unskilled workers.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut05_06
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5.7. Taxes on labour
Taxes on 
labour, % 
of total tax 
revenues
Implicit  
tax rate
Tax wedge  
at 67% of the 
APW
Tax wedge at 
the minimum 
wage
1990 43.4
1991 52.4 46.5
1992 54.8 48.4
1993 54.4 49.0
1994 53.7 48.8
1995 52.1 42.3 52.1
1996 52.5 42.1 48.8
1997 54.2 42.5 51.9
1998 53.1 41.8 51.4
1999 51.5 41.9 57.2
2000 51.8 41.4 51.4 57.9
2001 53.1 40.9 50.9 55.9
2002 53.7 41.2 48.2 54.3
2003 51.8 39.3 44.5 43.2
2004 50.1 38.3 44.8 42.1
2005 51.1 38.4 43.1 41.4
2006 51.7 38.8 43.3 39.4
2007 52.0 41.0 46.0 42.6
2008 53.0 42.1 46.7 43.2
2009 51.4 41.0 46.3 42.0
2010 49.7 43.6 37.4
Source: 1991-1995: own calculation based on Finance Ministry data.
1996-2009: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/gen_info/
economic_analysis/tax_structures/index_en.htm
2010: Eurostat online database
Implicit tax rate: Eurostat online database (gov_a_tax_itr)
Tax wedge at 67% of the APW (average production worker): OECD: Taxing wages 2010, Paris
2011, tax wedge at the minimum wage: own calculation. In 2009, the tax wedge at the minimum 
wage is the simple average of two levels (there was a cut in contributions in June 2009.)
Note: Taxes on labour are given in proportion to all tax and excise revenues. 
The implicit tax rate is calculated as a ratio of all revenues from taxes and 
social security contributions to total wage income (tax base).
Tax wedge = all taxes and contributions as a percentage of the total wage cost.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut05_07
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6.1. Unemployment benefit, social assistance and participation 
in active labour market programmes, thousands
Insured 
unemp-
loyment 
benefit
Social 
Assistance
School 
leavers
Registered 
unemp-
loyed 
receiving 
no benefit
Training
Wage 
subsidy
Other 
programm
PES Public 
works
Municipal 
Public 
works
Total
1990 43 - - 19 .. .. .. .. - 61.0
1991 236 - 9 73 .. .. .. .. - 317.7
1992 431 27 18 150 27 8 21 18 - 701.0
1993 312 123 24 196 30 15 45 26 - 771.1
1994 160 202 25 142 31 24 62 29 - 675.1
1995 151 193 26 109 20 11 65 22 - 596.8
1996 145 219 3 128 21 16 75 39 - 644.3
1997 134 194 0 122 25 30 96 39 - 638.9
1998 124 159 0 109 25 31 87 37 - 571.5
1999 136 147 0 107 28 31 61 36 - 544.7
2000 117 140 0 107 25 28 74 27 4 516.2
2001 112 113 0 105 30 26 37 29 7 452.2
2002 105 108 - 115 24 21 33 22 12 426.8
2003 105 110 - 125 23 20 37 21 15 440.0
2004 117 118 - 132 13 17 29 17 17 442.8
2005 126 128 - 140 15 21 31 22 17 481.6
2006 118 113 - 146 12 15 14 17 14 434.3
2007 128 133 - 152 15 23 7 19 15 477.0
2008 121 146 - 158 21 25 14 21 14 506.1
2009 203 152 - 215 14 18 54 7 60 790.5
2010 160 164 - 222 18 27 40 4 92 794.8
1991-2011: The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis 2012. IE-HAS, 2012, Budapest table 10.3
Source: 1990-1995: The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis 2002. IE-
HAS, 2002, 1996-2010: The Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis 2012. 
IE-HAS, 2012, Table 5.13, municipal public works: Hungarian Treasury.
Note: Data for October (stock), except for municipal public works figures which 
are annual averages (stock); the figure for October 2010 is 112 000.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut06_01
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6.2. Parental leave benefits and daycare for children
Year
Insured maternity leave benefit 
(gyed)
Flat rate parental leave benefit 
(gyes/gyet) Children admitted to crèche
average 
monthly 
amount, 
thousand HUF
number of 
recipients, 
thousands
average 
monthly 
amount, 
thousand HUF
number of 
recipients, 
thousands
number  
of recipients, 
thousands
in proportion 
to children 
aged 0-2
1990 5.2 155 3.3 95 41 11.1
1991 6.6 151 4.5 0 36 9.7
1992 8.3 148 5.2 0 34 9.1
1993 10.0 143 6.0 0 41 11.0
1994 11.5 136 7.1 0 40 11.0
1995 13.2 129 7.9 176 38 10.8
1996 15.7 118 9.2 186 32 9.3
1997 18.7 57 11.8 250 31 9.3
1998 28.0 10 13.5 307 33 10.6
1999 – – 14.9 314 32 10.7
2000 31.4 54 16.7 245 30 10.2
2001 39.3 63 17.8 234 29 10.2
2002 44.9 70 19.8 222 29 10.1
2003 48.7 78 22.1 215 29 10.2
2004 54.3 84 24.2 211 30 10.6
2005 58.5 87 25.7 209 30 10.7
2006 62.7 92 27.1 213 31 10.9
2007 68.4 94 28.5 208 32 11.0
2008 73.9 95 30.9 209 35 11.5
2009 78.7 95 30.3 214 37 12.4
2010 81.4 95 30.0 218 39 13.3
Source: CSO Welfare Statistics Yearbooks.
Note: annual averages, except for the number of gyes recipients in 1991-1994, which are for December.
For children in crèche: end of year until 1993, end of May (stock) after that. After 2008, includes 
children admitted to family daycare centres. Number of children aged 0-2 is data for 1st January.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut06_02
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6.3. Pensioners and the average age at retirement
Pensioners aged below the statutory 
retirement age, thousands
Average age at retirement, 
years
old-age and similar disability women men together
1990 232 617 n.a.
1991 252 103 n.a.
1992 288 966 n.a.
1993 294 812 n.a.
1994 99 235 313 049 n.a.
1995 64 207 332 332 n.a.
1996 66 889 352 032 52.4 54.1 53.1
1997 75 505 364 946 52.7 54.9 54.0
1998 69 723 380 148 52.1 53.1 52.6
1999 173 897 424 459 51.9 52.7 52.2
2000 148 381 418 746 52.1 53.2 52.6
2001 172 525 447 001 51.4 54.7 53.4
2002 169 633 453 203 52.6 55.0 53.9
2003 196 753 467 289 52.5 55.3 54.3
2004 181 485 462 228 54.5 56.0 55.3
2005 213 416 465 797 55.1 55.7 55.4
2006 222 916 454 348 55.2 56.1 55.6
2007 265 392 451 953 56.2 57.4 56.8
2008 297 861 432 840 56.1 57.4 56.7
2009 343 515 424 770 56.6 57.9 57.5
2010 312 465 393 184 56.4 58.1 57.5
2011 275 151 362 124 57.8 58.8 58.1
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of the National Pension Fund and The 
Hungarian Labour Market – Review and Analysis 2008 and 2012
Note: Data for 2011 are preliminary. The number of pensioners is for January each year, old 
age pensions include old age, widows, and miners pensions (öregségi, főellátásként folyósított 
özvegyi nyugdíj,elő-, bányász-, és korengedményes nyugdíj). Disability pensions include 
the rehabilitation benefit introduced in 2008. The average age of retirement applies to 
all types of old age and disability pensions, but excludes the rehabilitation benefit.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut06_03
7. statistiCal annex 7.7. employment poliCy
289
7.1. Expenditure on main employment policy measures
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
Labour Market Fund and main EU funds, at current prices, billion HUF
Active measures 7.3 12.2 15.3 17.0 13.6 16.1 26.6 28.9 31.5 33.2 45.3 57.7 53.5 52.6 57.6 64.9 68.5 88.9 75.2 83.7
Vocational training 0.0 0.1 2.6 2.6 3.0 3.9 6.4 7.2 9.8 12.2 16.0 18.6 15.3 15.9 14.7 31.7 33.0 38.4 19.5 27.3
Insured 
unemployment 
benefit
20.4 66.3 78.4 56.5 53.3 54.1 56.5 64.1 64.4 61.7 56.6 63.2 68.4 78.2 86.8 85.9 91.5 98.9 145.5 138.3
Social assistance 0.0 0.0 5.4 13.3 16.9 19.2 24.8 21.1 22.4 18.9 8.5 1.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wage Guarantee 
Fund
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 5.6 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.9 1.3 3.4 3.7 4.7 5.6 4.2 4.5 9.2 8.0
Rehabilitation 0.1 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.8 2.6 3.0 3.3 4.8 5.3 0.6 0.8
Payment into the 
national budget
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 10.0 19.0 48.2 57.1 48.9 67.7 82.1 83.1 114.3 120.8 146.1 8.0
PES services and 
management
2.3 4.3 5.3 6.4 7.1 7.1 11.0 11.6 12.7 12.8 15.5 18.3 22.5 22.6 21.5 23.8 23.7 26.1 26.8 30.5
PES development 2.3 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.5
SROP 
programmes*
0.0 4.6 5.9 9.7 12.8 26.1 32.9
Total 30.3 82.8 104.4 93.2 90.9 96.5 118.9 141.9 152.6 161.1 194.4 221.2 216.8 244.6 271.6 289.5 341.4 384.4 427.2 297.8
Ratios
active measures + 
training, ‰of GDP
2.9 4.2 5.1 4.6 3.0 3.0 3.9 3.7 3.8 3.6 4.2 4.6 3.8 3.4 3.6 4.5 4.6 5.5 4.7 5.4
LMF expenditures, 
% of GDP
1.2 2.8 2.9 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.8 1.2
payment into 
the national 
budget, % of LMF 
expenditures
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 6.6 11.8 24.8 25.8 22.6 27.7 31.9 30.7 36.3 34.8 40.3 13.7
active measures 
in proportion 
to the GDP and 
unemployment 
(ILO)
1.3 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.3
active measures 
/ unemployment 
benefits and 
assistance
0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.0 1.3
Sources: 1998-2010 communication by the Ministry for Labour / Ministry for the Economy and 
LMF budgets, 1991-2001: Data by Frey (2002) based on final accounts of the national budget, adding 
the expenditure on vocational training, WGF, rehabilitation and payment into the national budget.
Note: The Labour Market Fund (LMF) was established in 1995 by merging the Solidarity Fund, 
the Employment Fund, the Vocational Education and Training Fund, 
the Rehabilitation Fund and the Wage Guarantee Fund (WGF) (Frey 2002).
The WGF provides advance payments to workers of firms that 
went bankrupt and have no cash to pay wages.
* Based on the calculations of the National Audit Office (Source: A hazai és uniós forrásból finanszírozott 
munkahelyteremtést és -megőrzést elősegítő támogatások rendszerének értékelése, Annex)
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut07_01
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7.2. Staff and caseload in the public employment service
Registered 
unemployed PES staff
Of that: PES 
headquarters Caseload
1991 227 141 1728 123 131
1992 556 965 3384 163 165
1993 671 745 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1994 568 366 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1995 507 862 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1996 500 622 n.a. n.a. n.a.
1997 470 112 4285 97 110
1998 423 121 4416 102 96
1999 409 519 4300 97 95
2000 390 492 4165 119 94
2001 364 140 4125 122 88
2002 344 715 4107 140 84
2003 357 212 4131 150 86
2004 375 950 4250 241 88
2005 409 929 4367 345 94
2006 393 465 4309 360 91
2007 426 915 3931 307 109
2008 442 333 4017 329 110
2009 561 768 4348 435 129
2010 582 664 4558 494 128
Source: Annexes to the Annual Final Accounts (relevant chapters of the Hungarian 
budget as implemented, which is presented according to ministries).
Note: Annual averages. No data available for 1993–1996. Data for 1997–1999 exclude the 
staff of the Labour Inspectorate, which we estimated to be around 500), who worked under 
the supervision of the county job centres, but were not involved in delivering services to the 
unemployed. The number of labour inspectors was estimated by Lajos Bódis based on the final 
accounts for 2003 and expert interviews. Registered unemployed: Employment Office data.
We thank Judit Fejes, László Kajdi and Barbara Sziráki for their help in collecting the data..
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut07_02
7. statistiCal annex 7.7. employment poliCy
291
7.3. Reemployment rates of active labour market programmes, %
Training 
offered 
by the job 
centrec
Training 
chosen by 
the clientd
In work 
traininge
Subsidy 
for self-
employmentf
Wage 
subsidyg Work trial
h Internshipi
1996a 44.5 50.2 92.8 90.2 70.1 - -
1997a 46.3 51.1 90.4 88.1 66.3 65.7 72.1
1998a 46.8 51.5 94.7 91.7 59.1 59.1 75.1
1999a 46.8 50.0 94.8 90.5 59.7 55.8 68.5
2000a 48.4 52.0 94.9 89.4 62.3 57.9 73.8
2001a 45.4 49.3 94.2 89.2 59.7 64.5 71.6
2002a 43.3 45.8 92.7 90.7 62.9 66.9 78.4
2003a 43.0 46.0 93.3 89.6 62.0 66.1 78.2
2004a 45.5 45.6 92.1 90.7 64.6 66.5 71.5
2005a 43.8 51.4 90.4 89.6 62.6 66.8 70.9
2006a 41.1 50.9 .. 86.4 62.3 66.6 65.0
2007a 37.5 47.6 92.4 87.6 63.4 66.3 77.5
2008a 42.2 48.0 93.9 83.6 65.0 74.6 -
2009b 40.4 41.9 .. 73.1 72.4 .. ..
2010b 49.4 48.8 59.9 76.4 90.9 .. ..
Source: Employment Office.
a 3 months after completing the programme.
b 6 months after completing the programme.
c Training offered by the job centre: group training for jobseekers 
organised by the job centre (at small region or county level).
d Training chosen by the client: at the request of the jobseeker the 
job centre reimbursed all or part of the training costs.
e In work training: a subsidy to prevent dismissals, in cases where the training 
contributes to adapting to the new needs of the employer.
f Subsidy for self-employment: an allowance for jobseekers wanting to be self-
employed, equivalent to the minimum wage, and a loan or grant of 3 million HUF.
g Wage subsidy: available to disadvantaged jobseekers who would otherwise have a difficulty finding a job.
h Work trials: for job seekers with no work experience, a subsidy for 6-9 months 
of 50-80% of the total wage costs. Phased out by 31 December 2006.
i Internship: available to jobseekers with no work experience aged 
below 25, for 9 month. Phased out by 31 December 2006.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut07_03
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Source: Kormánytörténet http://kormanytortenet.zskf.hu
Note: dss = deputy state secretary (c: executive of the civil service, p: political delegate), css = administrative secretary 
of state (head of the civil service), pss = political secretary of state (party delegated), M = ministry, m=minister.
BPDATA  http://www.bpdata.eu/foglpol20/2012hut07_04
7.4. Political leaders in ministries responsible for labour and related affairs
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8.1. methodology of the media analySiS 
8. appenDix
Due to resource constraints, the media analysis for parts 2 and 3 was limited 
to selected issues of two daily newspapers and one weekly news magazine. 
the sample was designed to be politically balance and to include the main 
messages of political campaigns between 1990 and 2010. Népszabadság was 
chosen to represent socialists and Magyar Nemzet to represent Conserva-
tive views.1 lastly, Hvg was chosen as the organ of independent economic 
commentators. in each case, we considered printed issues only.
the sampling procedure was designed by ágota scharle and balázs váradi, 
sampling and coding was done by andrás g. szabó, and the analysis was done 
by balázs váradi.
the core sample was taken in the month preceding elections as follows.
parliamentary elections:
january 1, 1990 – march 25, 1990
january 8, 1994 – may 8, 1994
january 10, 1998 – may 10, 1998
january 1, 2002 – april 7, 2002
january 1, 2006 – april 9, 2006
january 1, 2010 – april 11, 2010.
local elections:
in 1990, 1998, 2002, 2006, and 2010: september 1 – December 31.
in 1994: november 1 – December 31.
Within the issues in the core sample, all articles were processed. views 
concerning employment were encoded for all relevant articles using Code 
sheet 1. When the core sample contained no relevant article, we gradually 
extended the time frame (by two months preceding and following the core 
period) until we found at least one and coded views on employment using Code 
sheet 1. Where the sample included an interview with a politician representing 
the ministry for employment, we also examined expectations towards the 
ministry using Code sheet 2.
1  Admittedly, this is a very crude 
approach. Népszabadság has been 
regarded a central left organ in the 
past 15 years or so, but not in the 
early 1990s, while Magyar Nemzet has 
gradually departed from its original 
central-right position, but no other 
paper took over its role.
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Number of issues and articles in the core sample
 issue article
Hvg  183 31
magyar nemzet 517 43
népszabadság 517 40
the core sample was supplemented by two additional samples. For the first one, 
we looked for interviews with  high ranking politicians or civil servants involved 
in employment policy, focusing on detailed interviews outside campaign periods. 
this sample was taken from the first few month of non-election years (1992, 
1995, 1999, 2003, 2005 and 2007) and we found two such interviews. For 
the second sample we looked for expert opinions and advice on employment 
policy in issues of Hvg at the end of the decade (between april 15, 2006 and 
February 28, 2009) and found 15 such articles. thus, altogether we examined 
131 articles in 2135 issues.
Code sheet 1. Opinions on employment
Name, date and issue of the newspaper, page, length, author of the article
Views to be identified Number of  
paragraphs 
where it is 
mentioned
Weight of 
all mentions 
in article 
(tenths)
Place of first 
mention: (1) 
first quarter 
(2) middle  
(3) last 
quarter
Whose 
opinion is it?
> see OP 
codes
Employment is a function of economic growth, 
thus it can only increase when the economy is 
growing.
Employment policy (e.g. flexicurity, activation, 
targeted wage subsidies) may increase employ-
ment even when economic growth is slow.
The main goal is to prevent the rise of unemploy-
ment so that social tensions do not lead to unrest.
The decline of labour force participation and the 
rise in early pensions cost a lot, especially in the 
long run.
Active measures (training, counselling, wage 
subsidies etc) are more efficient tools for reducing 
unemployment than unemployment benefits. We 
should spend more on active measures.
Welfare to work type reforms (in 1998/9 or in 
2008/9) help reduce social tensions at the local 
level.
Employment is low OR unemployment is high 
mainly among the low educated.
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Views to be identified Number of  
paragraphs 
where it is 
mentioned
Weight of 
all mentions 
in article 
(tenths)
Place of first 
mention: (1) 
first quarter 
(2) middle  
(3) last 
quarter
Whose 
opinion is it?
> see OP 
codes
 … the Roma minority.
 … older workers.
Employment is also low among youth.
 … mothers with small children.
An important cause of OR barrier to employment
is slow growth or no growth in labour intensive 
activities.
 … is the unpredictable business environment.
 … are high taxes on labour / high minimum wages.
 … is that those receiving social assistance do not 
want to work.
 … is that welfare recipients (parental leave, 
disability pension etc) are not looking for work.
 … the small business sector, who could higher low 
skilled workers, is underdeveloped.
 … the services of job centres are too few / to low 
quality.
Measures to promote employment growth (reduc-
tion of unemployment) should not distort the 
market 
Mentions other factors as a main cause of low 
employment, e.g.: …….
OP codes: 
1- reporter/journalist 2 – representative of the line ministry, as interviewee 3 – (representative of the) line 
ministry, quoted  by the author or the interviewee (watch out for shifts in which ministry was responsible 
for employment policy)  4 - representative of another ministry, as interviewee 5 – representative of another 
ministry, quoted   6 – external labour market expert as interviewee 7 – external labour market expert, 
quoted  8 – representative of a local government or a mayor as interviewee  9 – representative of a local 
government, quoted  10 – representative of a union as interviewee 11 – union, quoted  12 – employer as 
interviewee   13  – employer, quoted 14 – representative of an international organisation as interviewee 15  – 
representative of an international organisation, quoted  16 – other, namely: ………….
.
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Code sheet 2. Expectations of the ministry responsible for employment policy
This sheet must be completed for all articles in which 
(a representative of) the ministry is mentioned or interviewed.
Name, date and issue of the newspaper, page, length, author of the article,  
name and position of interviewee
Views to be identified Number of  
paragraphs 
where it is 
mentioned
Weight of 
all mentions 
in article 
(tenths)
Place of first 
mention: (1) 
first quarter 
(2) middle  
(3) last 
quarter
Whose 
opinion is it?
> see OP 
codes
High unemployment is a grave problem.
Unemployment is a natural phenomenon in 
a market economy.
Low employment / high rate of inactivity is 
a grave problem.
The main goal is to prevent the rise of 
unemployment so that social tensions do not lead 
to unrest.
The decline of labour force participation and the 
rise in early pensions cost a lot, especially in the 
long run.
The main task of the ministry responsible for 
employment policy is to reduce unemployment  
or prevent its further rise (e.g. by protecting 
existing jobs.)
The main task of the ministry responsible for 
employment policy is to ease social tensions, 
provide unemployment benefit, reduce or prevent 
poverty.
Employment growth depends on economic policy 
/ external demand for exports / etc.
Employment subsidies should be spent efficiently.
The ministry responsible for employment policy 
should calculate the expected costs and benefits 
of employment measures.
 … evaluate the impact and the efficiency of policy 
measures.
Mentions other tasks / expectations of the 
ministry, namely:  ……..
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8.2. methodology of the interviewS 
the interviews made for this volume were intended to gain some information 
on issues relevant to the past two decades of employment policy that are not 
available in existing sources. the supplementary material from the interviews 
was used especially in the following chapters:
2.1. the role and significance of labour affairs in the system of government 
institutions
2.2. Wage and taxation policies
2.4. local government
3.1. Decision making at the national level
3.2. the information base of policy making, impact assessment 
3.3. organizational capacity, organizational learning
6.1. informing jobseekers and employers – toolkit
6.2. informing jobseekers and employers – interests
the interviews were made by lajos bódis, zsombor Cseres-gergely, lászló 
neumann, ágota scharle and balázs váradi between june 2011 and February 
2012.
as a basis for selecting the persons to be interviewed, we considered their 
past experience of the formulation of employment policies and the following 
criteria: 
 – their experience in the formulation of policies and decision making should 
cover all or most of the past twenty years, and especially the years not 
documented by other sources;
 – they should include public servants, politicians and experts representing 
unions and employers in the tripartite negotiations;
 – the public servants should have experience in various positions including 
positions in related ministries (finance, welfare, economy) that are involved 
in formulating decisions of employment policy;
 – the politicians should include representatives of various parties;
 – they should not be in a position at the time of the interview that would limit 
their ability to give sincere answers;
 – for those interviewed about local level practices: they should have in depth 
experience of several relevant areas and of several years.
the interviews typically lasted 60 to 90 minutes (in two cases, we had two 
such sessions) and took the form of structured or semi-structured interviews 
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depending on the position of the interviewee and the nature of the issues we 
sought to explore. With a few exceptions, the interviews were recorded and 
we took written notes as well. We promised interviewees to keep all docu-
mentation confidential.
interviewees
Name Position(s) relevant to employment policy*
1. Busch, Irén public servant in the public employment service, 1990–2010
2. Csizmár, Gábor secretary of state, 2002–2004 and 2006–2010, minister, 2004–2006
3. Dávid, Ferenc expert and executive of employers’ chamber, 1990–2010
4. Garzó, Lilla secretary of the employees’ side of NCRI, 1991–1994, vice secretary of state, senior 
public servant, 1995–1998 és 2003–2010, expert to the parliamentary fraction, 
2001–2002, MSZP
5. Gyurcsány, Ferenc prime minister, 2004–2009, MSZP
6. Hanti, Erzsébet expert of employees’ union 1991–2010
7. Herczog, László public servant, senior public servant 1990–2009, minister, 2009–2010
8. Kajdi, László public servant, 1990–2010
9. Nagy, Judit public servant, 1990–2010
10. Őri, János public servant, 1990–2010
11. Őry, Csaba executive of employees’ union, 1990–1994, expert of parliamentary fraction, 1994–
1998, secretary of state, 1998–2002, member of parliament, vice president of the 
parliamentary committee for employment policy, 2002–2006, Fidesz 
12. Pataki, Péter expert of employees’ union, 1990–2004, executive of employees’ union 2004–2010
13. Pirisi, Károly public servant, senior public servant, 1990–2010
14. Pulay, Gyula senior public servant, (vice) secretary of state, 1990–2006
15. Szarvas, Sándor senior consultant, project manager, 1990–2010
16. Szalay-Berzeviczy, 
Gábor
member of parliament, 1990–2006, secretary of state of the ministry for the 
economy, 2002–2003, SZDSZ
17. Zalai, Mária expert of employees’ union, 1990–1995, public servant, head of minister’s cabinet, 
senior consultant, 2002–2010, MSZP
 
*Dates refer to the periods spent in the given position, party affiliation is given only in the case of politicians.
Note: NCRI = National Council for the Reconciliation of Interests (OÉT).
Concerning local level practices (chapters 2.4., 3.3., 6.1., 6.2.) we interviewed 
16 persons. interviewees were granted anonimity, thus we only disclose their 
positions: five of them are heads of a local job centre, six of them have been 
senior executives of the public employment service at county or region level 
(three of them had been directors of a regional centre and two of them have 
retired); two of them have held senior positions in human resource manage-
ment at the county level (one of them has retired since), three of them have 
held executive positions at the national headquarters of the employment 
service. the interviews typically covered several issues and on average lasted 
around 2-3 hours.
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issues covered in interviews with employees  
of the locAl public employment service
these interviews focused on cooperation with local municipalities and services 
operated by them, especially concerning policies to increase employment, 
reducing the cost of commuting to the workplace, the interests of local agents, 
the role of local job centres (e.g. in collecting information to revise the time 
table of local public transport, determining the opening hours of the nursery 
or kindergarten, organising public works, establishing and managing local 
employment partnerships). 
Concerning organisational capacity and learning, we focused on factors influ-
encing staff numbers in the past twenty years, forms of contracting local staff, 
local conditions determining the allocation of tasks and caseload, recruit-
ment, selection, training and re-training of staff, human resource conditions 
of methodological development, career development, the use of the internal 
quality assurance system, and the measurement of local performance indica-
tors for the management by objectives system. For all these issues, we sought 
to explore local experiences, interests and interpretations. 
as regards informing job seekers and employers, the interviews forcused on 
the use of available information on demand for occupations, the practice of 
registering vacancies and placing job seekers and the related interests of the 
local job centre, the use of formal and informal procedures, and the priorities 
in the provision of information services.
the structure of interviews with Actors At the nAtionAl 
level – Adjusted to the position of the interviewee  
And to time constrAints
0. introduction: aim of the interview, introductions, explaining our invitation 
to the interview
 0.1 brief review of their career: positions held, time periods
[the following questions were repeated for each governmental cycle.]
1. Relations between the government and the line ministry
 1.1. in your opinion, what was/were the main goal(s) of the government 
regarding employment, if any? 
 1.2. according the government’s programme, their main goal was <this 
and that >. Was this maintained during the cycle, and if not, how did it 
change? 
 1.3. What did the government expect of the line minstry and secretaries 
of state? Was there any change in this during the cycle?
 1.4. What was the political ambition of the minister(s)? What priority did 
(s)he give to reaching the policy goals of the ministry (cf the above 
mentioned goals of the government)?
 1.5. Which ministry / state secretariat did your views/interests conflict 
with? Who lost in these conflicts? Why?
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 1.6. Where were these conflicts fought: at the meeting of state secretaries, 
the government, party leadership, party fraction, other?
 1.7. What sources and types of information did you use at each phase of the 
policy cycle (agenda setting, preparation, implementation, evaluation)
 1.8. the following questions were asked in relation to a concrete policy 
decision that was important during the given policy cycle.
– What was the aim of the measure?
– Who initiated it?
– Who supported/opposed it and why?
– How much did it cost? How was it financed?
– How was it prepared (negotiations, ex ante impact analyses, previous
  or international experiences)?
– How was the implementation planned? 
– Was it considered a sucess at the end of the cycle? if so, how was this
  success measured?
– Retrospectively, to what extent do you consider it a success?
2. Relations between the minister and their staff 
 2.1. Who was well informed of all details, who was politically a „strong man” 
at the ministry? 
 2.2. How much did the minister and the vice-secretaries understood policy 
issues?
 2.3. How adequately were they briefed?
 2.4. How competent was their staff at the ministry (public servants)? please 
compare that to other ministries (if you have adequate experience)! 
Were there any attempts to increase the level of staff competence (e.g. 
by training or recruitment)?
 2.5. Did the ministry rely on external experts in decision making? Who, 
when, in what role? 
 2.6. Did independent research by labour economists had any influence 
on the decisions of the ministry? if so, please mention some authors, 
papers, examples.
3. implementation
   please describe changes in the relations between the headquarters of 
the public emloyment service and the local offices.
4. Wage bargaining and consulting social partners
 4.1. please describe the wage policies and priorities of the unions since 
1994. What were the main changes during this period?
 4.2. For each political cylcle, for one particular measure: Who initiated it, 
what was the aim? Was it supported by the unions and the employers? 
Why? Why not?
 4.3. in your view, how did this measure affect employment? 
 4.4. What was the role and content of nCRi wage negotiations in this cycle? 
 4.5. What did you, and the parties you represented think of the following 
plans and measures?
– Reducing the number of income tax brackets, valorisation 
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   (repeatedly since 1990)
– Reducing the top rate of the personal income tax 
   (repeatedly since 1999)
– introducing a flat income tax regime (2011)
– Reducing the personal income tax (pit) for the average wage (2010)
– Reducing or abolishing the low wage tax credit
– Cutting social security contributions (repeatedly since 2000)
– introducing/increasing/abolishing the flat rate health contribution 
   (various measures and recommendations since 1997)
– taxing perks (since 2009)
– Reducing tax credits and exemptions in the tax system
– Changes in the value added tax (2006–2008)
– introducing the regional differentiation of the minimum wage (oeCD)
– introducing family taxation
– abolishing taxes that generate a negligible revenue
– simplifying the tax system, cutting red tape
– introducing a notional tax base so that pit is levied on the total 
   wage cost, rather than the gross wage
5. Hipotheses in a closed form
   please fill in the questionnaire below. line ministry refers to the ministry 
responsible for employment policy.
Not true 
at all
To some 
extent 
- yes
Fully agree
Nea Don’t 
kanow m 
tudom
Notes
The line ministry held some training course in statis-
tics, econometrics, or economics during the past 
twenty years.
The employment service held some training course 
in statistics, econometrics, or economics during the 
past twenty years.
The level of competence of the ministerial staff was 
above average (compared to other ministries).
The line ministry had difficulties in acomplishing 
complicated tasks, partly due to lack of expertise, 
partly due to weak coordination between ministries.
In 1990–1994, the main goal was to curb the growth 
of unemployment and prevent social unrest, no 
matter what it cost.
In 1990, almost nobody understood that the decline 
of labour market participation and early pensions 
would cost so much
The benefits of employment policy are understood only 
by the experts – politicians do not really believe in it.
The main concern of the line ministry was to reduce 
unemployment and they waited for economic policy 
to increase employment.
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Not true 
at all
To some 
extent 
- yes
Fully agree
Nea Don’t 
kanow m 
tudom
Notes
In the media, the performance of the line ministry was 
meaured mostly in terms of the unemployment rate.
The welfare to work reforms of 1998/1999 and 
2008/2009 were urged/supported by local govern-
ments, so that they would have a tool for reducing 
social tensions at the local level.
The line ministry tended to have a weak position in 
negotiations within the government.
Most politicians did not trust civil servants: they 
regarded experts to be a barrier to implementing 
political decisions.
In 1998–2002, the conservative goverment purposely 
aimed to restrict the role of public administration to 
designing implementation.
In 2006, the abolition of the position of deputy 
state secretary was intended mainly to suppress 
the opposition of civil servants to unprofessional 
instructions of politicians.
Employment is a function of economic development 
– it will only increase when the economy is growing.
Flexicurity, activating the unemployed, targeted 
wage subsidies and other measures may increase 
employment even when economic growth is slow.
edited by károly Fazekas and ágota scharle
authors:
bartha, attila mta tk institute of political science
bartus, tamás Corvinus university
bódis, lajos Corvinus university
Cseres-gergely, zsombor institute of economics, RCeRs–Has and budapest institute
Fazekas, károly institute of economics, RCeRs–Has
galasi, péter Corvinus university and institute of economics, RCeRs–Has
Hárs, ágnes kopint–tárki
kabai, gergely pannon office for analysis
keller, judit tomori pál Főiskola
köllő, jános institute of economics, RCeRs–Has
lovász, anna institute of economics, RCeRs–Has
nagy, gyula Corvinus university and institute of economics, RCeRs–Has
németh, nándor pannon office for analysis
neumann, lászló mta tk institute of political science
scharle, ágota budapest institute
váradi, balázs budapest institute and eötvös loránd science university
translators:
barta, tamás part 5, Chapters 4.3., 6.3. and 6.4
bartha, attila Chapter 1.2
kelemen, melinda Chapter 4.4, 6.1 and 6.2
keller, judit   Chapters 2.3. and 2.4.
olasz, krisztina Chapters 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2. and part 3
scharle, ágota   7. statistical annex and 8. appendix 
turnpenny-kozma, ágnes  Chapter 4.2
unger, imola  Chapters 4.1 and 6.2
isbn 978-615-5243-16-5
publisher © budapest institute for policy analysis and institute of economics, Hungarian academy of sciences
graphic design: anagraphic
language editor: Clive liddard
photo credit: attila R. kovács (colour photo) and ágota scharle (black and white photo)
